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Karl Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 3
On 30 October 2016, EU and Canadian leaders officially signed a bilateral free 
trade agreement between the two regions, also known as the Comprehensive	Economic	
and	Trade	Agreement (CETA). The landmark agreement, which had been seven years 
in the making, nearly stumbled at the finish line. It had been in limbo for almost 
two weeks due to the refusal of the Belgian region of Wallonia to give its consent 
to the federal Belgian government to sign the deal. The Walloon government 
maintained major concerns among other things on the incorporation of provisions 
on investment protection and their enforcement through the proposed Investment	
Court	 System (ICS), which would empower foreign investors to bypass national 
courts and seek monetary compensation before an international tribunal for 
regulatory measures that may, directly or indirectly, negatively affect their business 
activities. Despite repeated threats and ultimatums from the protagonists of different 
European institutions, and the public vilification of Wallonia’s Prime Minister 
Paul Magnette by the mainstream media, the Walloon government maintained 
its firm stance against CETA so that the EU-Canada summit originally planned to 
celebrate its signing had to be postponed. Only after a week of fierce negotiations at 
the intra-Belgium level, with diplomatic pressure from EU institutions, an agreement 
was reached with the Walloon government, enabling the Belgian federal government 
to sign the trade deal. Although the intra-Belgium agreement quickly set in motion 
the official signing of CETA, the Walloon government insisted to ask the European 
Court of Justice to rule on the compatibility of ICS with the EU treaties, and warned 
not to ratify CETA with ICS in its present form, thereby placing a ticking time-bomb 
under the agreement. 
 Ever since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, ironically 
designed to enhance the EU’s negotiation powers while simultaneously increasing 
its democratic legitimacy, EU trade policy has suffered from a lack of political and 
popular support. After German and French leaders had already unofficially pulled 
the plug on another massive EU trade deal, the Transatlantic	 Trade	and	 Investment	
Partnership (TTIP) with the United States (EurActiv, 2016a), the erratic decision- 
making process over the CETA agreement was yet another major blow to the 
European Commission, pointing towards the further eroding democratic legitimacy 
of EU trade policy, and European governance more generally. The Canadian Minister 
of Trade, Chrystia Freeland, warned that “the EU is now not capable of having an 
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CHAPTER 1
international agreement, even with a country that shares European values such as 
Canada” (The	Guardian, 2016a). The growing doubts about the expected economic 
benefits, which tended to be negligible and unevenly distributed, the potential 
socio-economic and ecological costs, the ramifications for democratic policy-making as 
well as the secrecy surrounding the negotiations fuelled widespread social and 
political opposition against the neoliberal trade agenda across Europe. Both at EU 
and national level, various trade unions, consumer and public health organisations, 
environmental groups and entrepreneurs massively rejected TTIP and CETA. More 
than 3.3 million citizens from 23 different European countries signed a petition 
against the trade deals, more than 2,000 local and regional authorities spoke out 
against TTIP and hundreds of thousands of citizens entered the streets to express 
their deep concerns. During the hot summer of 2016, a majority of EU member 
state governments clashed with the European Commission about the legal status 
of the CETA deal and demanded it to be a ‘mixed agreement’, meaning that 
national and some sub-national parliaments would also have to ratify the deal 
before entering into force. Such trade negotiations became so controversial that 
they ultimately led – in the case of CETA – to the (partial) renationalisation of EU 
trade competences and the re-establishment of a right to national or in this case 
regional veto.
 The reason for such controversy relates to a great extent to the fact that both 
CETA and TTIP were among the first of a new generation of EU free trade agreements 
to incorporate provisions on foreign investment protection and investor-to-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS). The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 
2009 formed hereby a key transformative moment as the EU acquired exclusive 
legal powers over foreign direct investment (FDI) from the EU member states. Such 
supranationalisation of legal and regulatory competences constituted the hallmark of 
decades of European attempts to merge trade and investment policies into the EU’s 
common commercial policy with the aim to strengthen the global position of the 
EU as an economic powerhouse. Foreign investment protection became thereby 
part and parcel of a broader neoliberal project following the EU’s Global	 Europe 
strategy of 2006, which aimed at opening up new markets for European corporations 
through bilateral and regional agreements containing binding commitments on 
the liberalisation of trade in goods and services, the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers and other forms of regulatory alignment, and strong rules on intellectual 
property rights among other things. Building on the more than 1,200 bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) that EU member state governments had since the late 
1950s, the European Commission became the main driving force behind the 
formulation and implementation of what will be referred here as the post-Lisbon	EU	
investment	policy, comprising a set of legal rules, guiding principles and regulatory 
practices on how to protect and promote foreign investment. 
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 The supranationalisation of foreign investment protection formed an important 
catalyst for the further consolidation of neoliberalism as the hegemonic discourse 
underpinning European foreign investment regulation. EU investment policy only 
gained heightened prominence with the relaunch of the Single Market Programme 
in the 1980s, with the European Commission emerging thereafter as a global 
vanguard of neoliberal investment rules. Following the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the EU investment policy particularly crystallised in the context 
of a new generation of negotiated and signed EU free trade agreements that now 
contained provisions on foreign investment protection and investor-to-state 
dispute settlement. The negotiations with Canada and the US formed thereby key 
moments and crucially informed the EU approach taken in subsequent 
negotiations. At the time of writing, the EU successfully concluded and ratified 
agreements with provisions on foreign investment protection with Canada, 
Vietnam and Singapore with ratifications on member state level still awaiting. 
Other ongoing and nearly concluded investment negotiations are with Mexico, 
Chile, Indonesia, Tunisia, and China, while investment negotiations with the US, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, India, and Morocco have been 
(temporarily) stalled. Meanwhile, the European Commission and EU member state 
governments are actively pursuing the establishment of a multilateral investment 
court under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL). 
 This PhD research seeks to explain the politics that have informed and shaped 
the post-Lisbon EU investment policy through the following central research 
question: What	explains	the	content,	form	and	scope	of	the	post-Lisbon	EU	investment	policy? 
The subsequent analysis and structure of the arguments are broken down into its 
constituent parts, following a set of subordinate questions that guide the main 
research question:
• How can we understand the neoliberalisation and supranationalisation of 
foreign investment regulation at EU level against the backdrop of global and 
European capitalist restructuring processes?
• What (groups of) agents and what contending regulatory discourses can be 
identified, and how did they shape the course of events in the making of the 
EU investment policy after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon?
• What explains the political contestation to the post-Lisbon EU investment 
policy, particularly in the context of the CETA and TTIP negotiations, and why 
did this not translate into a fundamental break away from the neoliberal 
discourse?
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CHAPTER 1
These questions are relevant as the substantive content, institutional form and 
jurisdictional scope of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy are neither fixed nor 
pre-given, but instead the outcome of political struggles between different social 
forces and state institutions at a particular historical juncture. These struggles are 
historically contingent and need therefore to be understood within the wider 
social relations of capitalist production and concomitant structural inequalities 
in material, ideological and institutional power. As will be outlined below, such an 
understanding is rooted in a critical political economy perspective that perceives 
the EU state apparatus alongside EU member states as capitalist; however, without 
perceiving state agency as a mere transmission belt of the interests of capital, 
or alternatively as autonomous of the prevailing accumulation structures and the 
social forces with their specific set of ideas emanating from it. The Treaty of Lisbon 
might have been seen by many as a momentum to roll-back or reshape prevailing 
modes of European foreign investment regulation, away from neoliberal doctrines 
that have informed the creation of the single market and the EU foreign economic 
policies from the 1980s onwards. Likewise, the concessions made with regard to 
the investment rules and dispute resolution in CETA and subsequent FTAs might 
have been celebrated by certain oppositional forces. However, as this research will 
demonstrate, the ensemble of the EU state institutions, notably the European 
Commission as the principal negotiator of trade and investment agreements in 
the post-Lisbon era, did not start with a ‘clean sheet’, nor did the European Commission 
act as a neutral arbiter. The European Commission’s agency rather reflected the 
structurally inscribed selectivity in favour of neoliberal types of regulation, 
which enjoy the support of various fractions of organised transnational capital. 
Unravelling the concrete power configurations shows that the concessions in the 
content, form and scope of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy are indeed the 
outcome of the growing contestation and mass mobilisation in the wake of the 
CETA and TTIP negotiations; however, these concessions are still at the expense of 
organised labour and other civil society groups, as well as domestic, often smaller 
fractions of capital. As will be argued, the inability of EU institutions like the 
European Commission to accommodate the vast societal opposition to the further 
constitutionalisation of neoliberal solutions not only undermines temporarily the 
EU’s legitimacy in a given policy area, but it corrodes the very project of European 
integration. 
1.1 Defining European foreign investment regulation
Before reviewing the existing literature and outlining the research approach and 
methods in the next sections, a few key concepts need to be further clarified. 
European foreign investment regulation constitutes the explanandum of the present 
study and ought to be understood as deeply embedded within wider transnational 
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modes of foreign investment regulation. The concept of regulation is loosely derived 
from regulation theory and refers generally to different types of interventions in 
the economic sphere by political and legal-regulatory institutions to stabilise and 
sustain particular economic growth models. A mode of regulation is understood 
here as an “emergent ensemble of norms, institutions, organisational forms, social 
networks and patterns of conduct that can temporarily stabilise an accumulation 
regime” (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 42). Foreign	investment	regulation consists of a myriad 
of overlapping regulatory practices and legal frameworks that directly or indirectly 
affect the conduct of foreign investment. Within the national context, specific 
law applicable to foreign investment and domestic regulatory frameworks deal 
with the entry, establishment and operations of foreign capital, the treatment and 
protection of investors and the promotion and facilitation of investment. Moreover, 
regulatory practices in investment-related policy areas such as trade policy, 
tax policy, intellectual property regulation, competition policy, labour market 
regulation, access to land, corporate social responsibility, environmental policy, 
infrastructure, concession rules and public-private-partnership policies also 
importantly shape the overall regulatory architecture for private foreign investment 
(see for example UNCTAD, 2015a). Against this backdrop, the study primarily 
focuses on the promotion and protection of foreign investment through BITs, FTAs 
and other economic partnership agreements that contain provisions on investment 
as well as applicable rules and institutions at multilateral level as the main research 
objects. 
 These so-called International Investment Agreements (IIAs) are very similar in 
terms of content, form and scope and are primarily designed to protect foreign 
investment against uncompensated expropriation, discrimination and unfair and 
inequitable treatment, although in recent years more IIAs include also binding 
provisions on investment liberalisation and market access. Moreover, foreign 
investment protection is increasingly incorporated into broader bilateral and 
regional FTAs that establish cross-linkages between issues such as trade, services, 
investment and other horizontal regulatory areas such as sustainable development. 
The vast majority of IIAs contain provisions on dispute resolution with practically 
all of them including a broad and binding consent to investor-to-state arbitration. 
Next to the IIAs themselves, also complementary sets of treaties, rules and institutions 
regulating investment arbitration, such as the World Bank’s International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Court of Arbitration of 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), as well as the hundreds of decisions 
of the arbitral tribunals resulting in an informal body of case law are important 
components of the transnational regulatory framework on foreign investment (see 
also Bonnitcha et al., 2017: 2-8).
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The concept foreign	investment is understood here in the broadest sense in terms of 
any kind of cross-border and profit-seeking economic activity. Traditionally, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to physical and tangible assets of foreign 
investors, such as equipment, plantations, manufacturing plants, machinery and 
other assets related to the sphere of productive accumulation (UNCTAD, 2011a; 
Sornarajah, 2010; Lipson, 1985). FDI consists of a “package of assets that includes 
long-term capital, technology, market access, skills and know-how” (UNCTAD, 
2015a: 46). Both the IMF and the OECD have characterised FDI as a ‘lasting interest 
with a long-term relationship and influence’ (IMF, 1993; OECD, 2008).1 However, 
such a narrow definition is problematic in the wake of transnationalising 
production and finance, whereby the distinction between foreign direct investment 
and foreign indirect or portfolio investment has become increasingly blurred. For 
example, a substantial and growing part of global FDI has been structured through 
tax havens and jurisdictions offering special purpose entities before reaching 
their destination as productive assets and are for a great part motivated by tax 
avoidance practices, most notably by transfer price manipulation on intangible 
assets such as intellectual property rights, brands, royalties and licensing fees 
(UNCTAD, 2015b: 193-5; IMF, 2019). The round-tripping of FDI flows to offshore 
investment hubs is understood here in terms of what the IMF refers to as the 
“channelling by direct investors of local funds to [special purpose entities] abroad 
and the subsequent return of the funds to the local economy in the form of direct 
investment” (IMF, 2004a: 70; see also Chapter Four). In a context of growing finan-
cialisation, also new financial institutions such as money market funds, private 
equity funds, hedge funds, and other short-term oriented institutions have been 
increasingly involved in FDI for example through the financing of corporate 
takeovers and merger activities (Wigger, 2012; Stockhammer, 2012; Harvey, 2011). 
Also in legal terms, a rigid distinction between FDI and portfolio investment tends 
to be superfluous and obsolete. Contemporary IIAs use a broad definition of what 
constitutes an investment, which covers ‘every kind of asset’ owned or controlled 
by a foreign investor. Typically, these include tangible and intangible property; 
shares, bonds, and other interests in companies; claims to money or any performance 
having economic value; intellectual property rights, goodwill and know-how; and 
rights granted in law or contract, including concessionary rights (UNCTAD, 2011b). 
1 Two elements are usually emphasised in the definition of FDI and distinguishing it from foreign	
portfolio	 investment. FDI can be defined as international investment that reflects the objective of a 
resident entity in one economy to obtain a ‘lasting interest’ in an enterprise in another country. In 
contrast, portfolio investment is considered as the category of international investment that covers 
investment in equity and debt securities, excluding any such instruments that are classified as direct 
investment or reserve assets. The second element is that the investor has a ‘significant degree of 
influence’ on the management of the enterprise, referring to 10 per cent or more of the voting shares 
or voting power. The dominant literature on investment distinguishes between these two ideal-type 
forms of transnational capital flows and the vast majority of analytical accounts tend to limit their 
focus to FDI.
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The expansion of investment protection into the financial realm has been reflected 
by a growing number of investment arbitration cases involving banking, insurance 
and Ponzi schemes, the monetary system including bank bailouts, capital controls, 
currency reforms and financial crisis, sovereign borrowing in the form of debt 
restructuring and promissory notes, and taxes such as corporate income taxes, 
duty-free regimes, tax evasion investigations, taxation of income trusts and 
windfall profits taxes (Van Harten, 2013; UNCTAD, 2021). Moreover, such broad 
definitions on what constitutes as an investment has allowed also shareholders, 
even minority and passive shareholders, to file ISDS claims in relation to their 
shares in a company affected by governmental measures. This stands in stark 
contrast with the vast majority of advanced domestic legal systems where such 
shareholder claims for reflective losses are generally strictly limited or prohibited 
(Gaukrodger, 2014).
 Finally, the research focuses primarily on the transnational dimension of 
foreign investment regulation. While the empirical focus of the study is on the 
making of the EU investment policy at	 EU	 level, it is argued that the political 
processes and actors shaping European foreign investment regulation can only be 
understood against the backdrop of the broader structural developments in the 
global political economy. The transnational focus is predicated upon a historical 
materialist understanding of the notion of ‘transnationalism’ whereby political 
processes and structures constitute a social space that transcends the territorially 
demarcated national borders (Van Apeldoorn, 2004; Overbeek 2000). Transnational 
does not necessarily mean de-territorial, nor does it intend to downplay the crucial 
role that national states have played in transnationalisation processes. International 
and geopolitical relations are rather conceived of as inextricably bound up with 
the transnationalisation of global capitalism, and thus “embedded within and 
shaped by transnational social relations” (Van Apeldoorn, 2004: 143; Robinson, 
2004: 9-16). 
1.2  Putting foreign investment regulation in its place
The past four decades have witnessed a profound transformation of global 
capitalism. Emanating from the structural crisis conditions in the 1970s, this 
transformation has involved a fundamental restructuring of social power 
relations, and with that, the rise of transnational capital as the dominant force in 
shaping the course of neoliberal globalisation. The ensuing transnationalisation 
of production and finance has become manifest by the drastic increase in the 
volumes of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2018, the global stock of outward 
FDI amounted to a staggering US$30,975 billion, whereby foreign affiliates of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) owned more than US$110 trillion in corporate 
assets and employed around 76 million workers worldwide (UNCTAD, 2019: 18). 
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The increased prominence of TNCs and the cross-border mobility of goods, services 
and investments through geographically dispersed value chains that span the 
entire globe have attracted much scholarly debates on the structural power of 
transnational capital vis-à-vis states and the repercussions for the democratic 
governance of global capitalism (Gill and Law, 1989; Ohmae, 1995; Strange, 1996; 
Weiss, 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Schwartz, 2000; Robinson, 2004; Rodrik, 
2011). This study firmly rejects claims about the withering away of the state in the 
era of neoliberal globalisation and instead seeks to highlight how states and 
state-like institutions remain crucial nodes in driving and sustaining the 
progressive liberalisation of the world market and continue to proactively craft 
and reshape the contours of what has been referred to as ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, 
understood as the intensification and deepening of “the scope of market disciplines 
associated with the increasing power of capital in organising social and world 
orders, and in so doing shaping the limits of the possible in people’s everyday lives” 
(Gill and Cutler, 2014: 6). 
 The adoption of new transnational legal rules and institutions that seek to 
promote global economic integration are key components of disciplinary neo-
liberalism. In recent years, IIAs have become the most powerful legal instruments 
to protect foreign investment and further enhance the mobility of transnational 
capital. At the time of writing, there is a total number of 2,896 concluded BITs of 
which 2,336 are in force. In addition, a total number of 416 other international 
agreements with investment provisions have been concluded, with 323 of them 
currently in operation (UNCTAD, 2021a). These IIAs offer a broad set of legally 
binding and enforceable property rights to foreign investors that seek to shield 
them from certain types of adverse action by the government of the host states in 
which they invest. This set of rights has the objective of the “placing of legal limits 
on the authority of government, isolating economic from political power, and 
assigning to investment interests the highest possible protection” (Schneiderman, 
2008: 4). Through broadly and vaguely worded standards and concepts such as 
non-discrimination, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, 
legitimate expectations, and protection against indirect expropriation, investment 
rules seek to discipline states to create and enhance a stable and predictable 
business environment and to provide the necessary legal conditions for uninhibited 
corporate profit-making. Thereby, IIAs contribute to the further lock-in of 
disciplinary neoliberalism by establishing a “worldwide institutional grid that 
offers transnational capital multiple exit options within putatively suboptimal 
regulatory environments” (Brenner et al., 2014: 129). IIAs entail a ‘precommitment 
strategy’ (Schneiderman, 2008: 4) that binds future generations to market disciplines 
and that establishes certain thresholds beyond which states are expected never to 
step beyond. 
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IIAs remove disputes between states and investors from national contexts and 
elevates them in a transnational legal arena of ISDS, where ad	hoc, party-appointed 
and party-paid arbitral tribunals, typically consisting of three private lawyers 
with expertise in commercial and investment arbitration, are ascribed with wide 
discretionary powers to determine the scope of their jurisdiction and to set the 
boundaries for what they interpret as legitimate exercises of public authority and 
state interventions in the market. Final awards are binding and enforceable 
worldwide, thereby allowing foreign investors to seize commercial state assets in 
case of non-compliance, with only limited opportunities for appeal, review or 
annulment. Placing disputes in such transnational legal arenas creates also new 
spaces for ongoing struggles over the precise application and interpretation of 
those boundaries of state authority, leaving the door open for those seeking to 
advance the broadest and most expansive interpretation possible (Nichols, 2018: 
249; see also May, 2013; Dezelay and Garth, 1996). Although investment rules are 
drawn from the legal conceptions of property rights originating from the judicial 
traditions of the core capitalist states, in the context of ISDS they have come to 
constitute a greater and expanded set of substantive rights that go well beyond 
many domestic legal systems (Nichols, 2018; Poulsen, 2015; Kleinheisterkamp, 
2014; Johnson and Volkov, 2013). 
 The extraordinary character of IIAs has in recent years led to an emerging 
discussion both within academia and policy-making circles about their purported 
benefits and costs and the underlying normative objectives in terms of what they 
aim to achieve (Johnson	et al., 2018a; Pohl, 2018; Bonnitcha et al., 2017; Poulsen et 
al., 2015). Proponents commonly assert that IIAs are set to encourage global 
investment flows. However, empirical evidence that IIAs can increase FDI flows 
remains inconclusive. Numerous econometric studies have sought to explain the 
proliferation on IIAs by looking at their (statistical) effects on the attraction of 
additional volumes of FDI (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 
2004; Neymeyer and Spess, 2005; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Gallagher and 
Birch, 2006; Berger et al., 2010; for an overview, see for example UNCTAD, 2014). 
A recent OECD study comprehensively reviews the existing empirical evidence 
and concludes: “[s]ome studies found positive correlation, at least in certain 
configurations, some found a very weak, no, or even negative correlation with 
[IIAs] and some studies found correlation between [IIAs] and greater inflows, but 
not necessarily from the States with which a treaty has been concluded” (Pohl, 
2018: 28-9). Various other studies have assessed the potential determinants for FDI 
and indicate that other factors – such as market size, economic growth prospects, 
institutional environment and judicial systems, infrastructure, taxation, levels of 
corruption, trade openness, access to international capital markets, and the 
presence of skilled labour force – are more important for investment decisions 
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than IIAs (for an overview, see Colen et al., 2013a; Bloningen, 2005; Nunnenkamp, 
2004). 
 Moreover, many studies are premised on the neoclassical assumption that FDI 
will foster a wide range of benefits for host state economies through positive 
‘spill-over effects’ in the form of employment, transferring skills and disseminating 
technology, generating fiscal revenues, supporting industrial diversification and 
productive capacities as well as contributing to local enterprise development 
through linkages with suppliers and improved access to export markets 
(Borenszstein et al., 1998; Bloström and Kokko, 1998; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Te 
Velde, 2002; Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2009; Alfaro et 
al., 2010; for a literature overview, see also Gallagher et al., 2011; De Schutter et al., 
2013). At the same time, there is an abundant literature indicating that FDI can 
also have negative spill-over effects and, for example, crowd out domestic 
companies, create precarious jobs or reduce employment, increase income 
inequality, facilitate tax evasion and avoidance, and contribute to environmental 
degradation and pollution (Driffield and Hughes, 2003; Jaumotte et al., 2008; Park 
et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017; for an overview, see Johnson et al., 2018a: 8-9; Colen 
et al., 2013b; UNCTAD, 2015b). IIAs tend to protect all kinds of FDI irrespective of 
the nature of the investment, the behaviour of the investor or the social, economic 
or environmental impact of the investment. Moreover, IIAs generally go beyond 
the traditional notion of FDI and typically include also portfolio investment and 
other types of capital flows that are less likely to produce tangible benefits for the 
host economy.
 Another common rationale for IIAs and ISDS is that by enabling foreign 
investors to bring claims directly against host states before international arbitration, 
investment disputes are ‘de-politicised’. The purported benefit is that the investor 
no longer needs to rely on its home state in investment-related disputes, either 
through so-called ‘gunboat diplomacy’, diplomatic protection, espousal or the 
imposition of political or economic sanctions that may harm diplomatic relations 
(Vandevelde, 2005: 157). Investment disputes are often presented in merely economic 
terms that ought to be resolved without political interferences. Such conceptions 
of separating the economic from the political shows congruence with the notion 
of ‘depoliticisation’, referring to the “process of placing at one remove the political 
character of decision-making” (Burnham, 2001: 128), while obfuscating the 
distributional effects of transnational investment regulation and the “distributing 
power and resources as between citizens, states and investors [and] the suppression 
of politics under rule by lawyers” (Schneiderman, 2013: 2). Recent research shows 
however that investors still frequently seek assistance from their home governments 
in informally resolving incipient investment disputes. One particular study 
concludes: “[d]espite the rise of investment treaties and investor-state arbitration, 
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access to commercial diplomacy remains a valuable asset for firms seeking to 
manage political risks abroad” (Gertz, 2018: 107; see also Gertz et al., 2018). This 
suggests that commercial diplomacy has been complemented rather than replaced 
by IIAs and ISDS as mechanisms for protecting foreign investment.
 A third main argument often used to justify IIAs is that they promote the rule 
of law in the host states. However, there is also research that suggests that IIAs may 
even undermine the rule of law. For example, the availability of ISDS only for 
foreign investors, which are often already relatively better treated by host states 
than their domestic counterparts (Aisbett and Poulsen, 2016), potentially takes 
away the incentives for host state governments to improve domestic legal systems 
(Ginsburg, 2005; Guthrie, 2013). Moreover, IIAs do not require investors to exhaust 
domestic remedies before initiating ISDS proceedings and leave domestic courts 
and government agencies without the possibilities to address the substantive 
problems faced by foreign investors (CCSI, 2019). ISDS may also interfere with host 
states’ obligations under other fields of domestic and international law, for example 
combating corruption and tax evasion, promoting human rights, environmental 
protection and climate policy. The prospects of significant monetary damages may 
result in governments favouring the interests of foreign investors over other societal 
interests (Sachs and Johnson, 2017). Lastly, ISDS itself is an opaque and secretive 
system of arbitration that lacks proper checks and balances and institutional 
safeguards in terms of independence, fairness and balance as compared to 
domestic legal systems and other international courts (Van Harten, 2007). 
 While the purported benefits of IIAs and ISDS remain largely unclear, their 
adverse impacts have become increasingly apparent and widely recognised. Since 
the early 2000s, the number of investment treaty claims under the ISDS mechanism 
has exploded, with 57 publicly known ISDS cases in 2000 to 1,023 as of 1 January 
2020 lodged against as much as 120 respondent states, mostly from low and 
middle-income countries (UNCTAD, 2021b). TNCs and their shareholders have 
filed claims against a wide range of government measures that have little to do 
with blatant expropriation, including issues related to transparency, stability, 
predictability and consistency in regulatory frameworks. ISDS claims have 
targeted measures at all levels of government, including executive, legislative and 
judicial acts, and sometimes involving sensitive areas of public regulation, such as 
environmental protection, climate action, human rights, land reforms, public 
services and utilities, taxation, financial regulation, and developmental policies. 
Not all claims have been successful though. Almost two out of five concluded cases 
are successfully defended by the respondent states, but half of the concluded cases 
have been decided in favour of the investor or settled on often unknown terms, 
with probably many more being settled outside ISDS. Moreover, the majority 
(61 percent) of cases decided on the merits, that is, where the tribunal determined 
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whether a challenged measure breaches the IIA’s substantive obligations, was 
decided in favour of the investor (UNCTAD, 2020a). 
 Claims and compensation awards can add up to billions of dollars and can 
weigh heavily on government budgets, particularly in developing countries. The 
average amount claimed by investors was US$1.4 billion with an average award of 
US$545 million at the end of 2016 (UNCTAD, 2017: 118). In 2019, for example, a 
tribunal delivered a US$5.9 billion award against Pakistan in favour of two mining 
companies for a project that was never approved and never carried out, which 
equalled roughly 2 percent of Pakistan’s GDP or twice its entire public health care 
budget (Sachs, 2019). In the same year, Venezuela was ordered to pay US$8.4 billion 
plus interest to a Dutch subsidiary of US oil company ConocoPhillips for 
expropriating its assets in 2007, amounting to approximately 13 percent of its GDP 
(IMF, 2020). And in 2014, another tribunal rendered a mega-award of US$50 billion 
against Russia in favour of the shareholders of the defunct oil company Yukos, or 
12 percent of the government’s total revenue (Poulsen, 2015: 3). Even if a 
government successfully defends a case, it may still have to cover the legal fees and 
costs of the arbitral tribunal, which on average mounts up to US$5 million per 
case (Hodgson and Campbell, 2017). For example, Australia had to pay around 
US$17 million in legal fees and arbitration costs for successfully defending its 
tobacco plain packaging regulation in a case filed by Philip Morris (Ranald, 2019), 
while Germany already spent almost €20 million for defending a still pending 
claim from Swedish energy company Vattenfall for phasing out nuclear energy 
(Wettach, 2020).
 These are staggering amounts that put a significant financial burden on 
governments and risk undermining states’ capacities to provide crucial public 
services to their citizens, such as education, health care, basic infrastructure and 
housing. The exorbitant costs of ISDS could potentially result in a ‘chilling effect’ 
on governments to bring in new legislative proposals in order to avoid claims. 
Foreign investors can use the threat of ISDS claims to make governments watering 
down or even drop the contested measures. There are growing indications that 
governments are indeed susceptible to the threat of ISDS (Sattorova, 2018; 
Tienhaara, 2018; Van Harten and Scott, 2016). Foreign investors no longer 
exclusively use the ISDS mechanism as a ‘last resort’ when all other options to 
assert their rights are exhausted, but instead increasingly use ISDS to challenge 
government measures adopted in good faith to address issues of public concern 
and view it as a ‘deterrent’ to stop unfavourable policies in their tracks (Sachs et 
al., 2020; The	Guardian, 2016b). In the event of a dispute, filing an ISDS claim can 
also increase the pressure to reach a settlement with the government concerned 
(Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Hoffman, 2012; see also Johnson and Güven, 2017; 
Hafner-Burton et al., 2016), or act as a trump card that companies can use to obtain 
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more favourable conditions or exemptions for their investments (Hamby, 2016; 
Verbeek and Bakker, 2019). 
 Whereas ISDS, through the threat of debilitating investment claims, provides 
foreign investors with a tool to bend policy-making to suit their interests, victims 
of human rights violations, environmental degradation and other types of 
corporate misconduct do not have recourse to similar strong mechanisms to hold 
those same foreign investors to account. Contemporary IIAs are marked by an 
inherent asymmetry in the allocation of substantive rights and obligations and 
generally fail to include investor responsibilities without proper avenues for 
affected third parties – whose rights and interests can be at stake in investment 
disputes – to effectively intervene in ISDS proceedings (Arcuri, 2019; Cotula and 
Schröder, 2017; Perrone, 2016; Garcia et al., 2015). A prime example is the Chevron	
v	Ecuador case in which the arbitral tribunal ordered the Ecuadorian government 
to block a domestic court ruling foreseeing monetary compensation to the victims 
of oil pollution.2 Arbitral tribunals are not bound by domestic rules and procedures 
and give priority to the relevant IIA provisions when deciding cases, whereby other 
relevant areas of domestic or international law and policy, such as the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change or human rights frameworks, are 
generally not considered (CCSI, 2019). As IIAs generally place enforceable 
obligations only on states, rendering them without the possibility to initiate 
claims or to bring counterclaims, investors could win cases even if they have 
violated domestic or international law obligations. Hence, such asymmetry further 
widens the global governance gap in the regulation of transnational corporations 
and strengthens their legal and thus political position vis-à-vis governments and 
societies at large. 
1.3  Theoretical explanations for the rise of IIAs
Following the remarkable increase in the number of concluded IIAs worldwide 
and the concomitant explosion of investor-to-state arbitrations, the scholarship on 
the protection of foreign investment has been proliferating over the past two 
decades. The vast majority of the contributions is dominated by legal scholars who 
generally adopt what Robert Cox (1981: 128-9) has referred to as a ‘problem-solving 
attitude’, serving the purpose of finding solutions to problems that stem from the 
interpretation and application of current investment rules without further 
questioning the underpinning social and power relationships and the institutional 
configurations into which these are organised. A vast range of legal studies, largely 
confined to specialised arbitration and investment law journals, tends to be 
preoccupied with the complex and detailed technicalities arising out of the 
2 Chevron	v	Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Second Partial Award on Track II, 30 August 2018.
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evolving nature of the investment regime and the growing body of case law (see 
also Schill, 2011).3 More recently, there has been a significant increase in 
voluminous monographs, handbooks and commentaries that have become standard 
reference points for academics and practitioners alike (Dolzer and Stevens, 1995; 
Schreuer and Dolzer, 2008; Newcombe and Paradell, 2009; Salacuse, 2010a; 
Vandevelde, 2010; Brown, 2013; Douglas et al., 2014). Since 2009, a specialised 
Yearbook	 of	 International	 Investment	 Law	 and	 Policy brings together current 
developments and debates in the field (Sauvant 2009, and further volumes). In 
addition, the supranationalisation of the exclusive competence on foreign 
investment from the EU member states to the EU level with the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 has started to attract many legal scholars from the 
confines of EU law. This has led to numerous journal articles (Shan and Zhang, 
2010; Dimopoulos, 2010a; Chaisse, 2012; Kleinheisterkamp, 2012a; Reinisch, 2014), 
special issues and symposia (Dimopoulos and Sattorova, 2012; Sauvant, 2012; Happ 
and Tietje, 2013, Bungenberg and Reinisch, 2014) and edited volumes (Bungenberg 
et al., 2011; Bungenberg and Hermann, 2013; Bungenberg et al., 2013), dedicated 
to issues related to the emerging contours of what has been identified as the ‘EU 
foreign investment law’ (Dimopoulos, 2011) or the ‘EU investment policy’ (Calamita 
Jansen, 2012; Reinisch, 2014). 
 The growing body of legal literature not only reflects a vast interest in what 
Schill (2011: 875) refers to as “the most dynamic area of international law” and the 
professional and academic opportunities related to it, but it also demarcates what 
has to be understood as the emergence of a new specialised field of academic 
inquiry. In 2006, the United Nations International Law Commission described 
international investment law as a field of “exotic and highly specialised knowledges”, 
in contrast to other specialist areas of international law such as trade law, human 
rights law or environmental law (ILC, 2006: 11). The widespread rise of IIAs 
worldwide and the concomitant breadth of their effects stems from the fact that 
while each IIA is negotiated separately, their respective outcomes are largely 
consistent with each other. As observed by Salacuse and Sullivan (2005: 89), “it is 
these commonalities that are contributing to the creation of an international 
framework for investment”. The similarity in nature of their provisions has given 
rise to the claim that their terms reflect a ‘genuine constitutional jurisprudence’ 
in which the process of judicial norm-creation has given specific content and 
meaning to the overly general and broad provisions (Montt, 2007: 3). Some have 
come to argue that the similar IIA terms have moved beyond lex	 specialis and 
start to reflect customary international law “effective even for non-signatories” 
3 Most prominently, these include the Journal	of	Arbitration (since 1984), the Arbitration	International	(since 
1985), the ICSID	Review	–	Foreign	Investment	Law	Journal (since 1986), the Journal	of	World	Investment	and	
Trade (since 2000), the Transnational	Dispute	Management (since 2004), and the Journal	 of	 International	
Dispute	Settlement.
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(Lowenfeld, 2003: 129). Others have come to conclude that the plethora of IIAs 
forms a de	facto ‘standardisation’ (Montt, 2007) or even ‘multilateralisation’ (Schill, 
2009) of investment rules. 
 The maturing and institutionalisation of international investment law as a 
newly emerged and stand-alone field contributes to the further ‘fragmentation’ of 
international law, in which discrete specialised regimes each give expression to 
their own embedded preferences (Schneiderman, 2013: 53; Koskenniemi and 
Leino, 2002). Taking international investment law as a narrow and self-contained 
body of international law in which investment treaties are conceived of as lex	
specialis has severe repercussions for the interpretation and application of the 
investment provisions. Scholars and arbitrators alike are simply giving effect to 
the objective and purpose of investment treaties that are centred on the one- 
dimensional premise of the promotion and protection of foreign investment to 
the detriment of other sources of law, including those dealing with human rights, 
environmental law and other norms not directly related to property rights 
(Schneiderman, 2011). According to one prominent investment arbitrator, the 
desire is thereby that international investment law will, with the “fullness of time 
[…] have less recourse to other, external sources of law” (Wälde, 2007: 118). Such an 
understanding reflects the field’s historical emergence from international 
(commercial) arbitration and is typically emphasised by mainstream international 
investment law scholars and the most vigorous supporters of current IIAs. In fact, 
the majority of the mainstream legal accounts share a common normative stance 
in favour of strong transnational legal rules and institutions to protect and 
enhance the mobility of transnational capital and to further curb state authority. 
The merits of the current investment protection rules and their enforcement 
through investor-to-state arbitration are deemed self-evident in the sense that IIAs 
are considered as normatively desirable “instruments of global governance and 
expansion of the rule of law” (Montt, 2009: 75; Paulsson, 2005) as they ‘de-politicise’ 
investment disputes (Shihata, 1986; Vandevelde, 2005) and ‘stabilise’ investor 
expectations (Brower and Schill, 2009). The institution of ISDS has often been 
heralded as “one of the central achievements of international investment treaties” 
(Schill, 2010: 30), as a “change in paradigm in international investment law” 
(Schreuer, 2002: 237) or as a “revolutionary innovation [whose] […] uniqueness and 
power should not be overlooked” (Salacuse and Sullivan, 2005: 88). Accordingly, 
the common understanding of the undisputed virtues of ISDS stem from the 
widespread assumption that investment disputes are resolved without any reference 
to power and politics, but only to the rule of law as applied by an ‘impartial’ and 
‘independent’ group of lawyers, thereby obfuscating the fundamental political 
nature of international investment law. 
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 It is therefore quite remarkable that political scientists have not broadly 
covered the issue of IIAs, because the seemingly detailed judicial and technical 
matters lurk important political questions regarding state sovereignty, democratic 
choice, private authority and the distributional effects of economic power and 
wealth. In recent years, however, emerging research from different strands of 
political science, international relations, international political economy and 
business administration has sought to explain the broader political motives 
behind IIAs. The following sections identify and critically examine the most 
prominent approaches, including rational choice approaches, regime theory, insti-
tutionalist approaches, and constructivist approaches. Despite their many merits, 
it is argued here that these strands of literatures are ill-equipped to explain the 
deep political processes that have given shape to the content, form and scope of 
the post-Lisbon EU investment policy. They fundamentally fail to problematise the 
actual content and social purpose of the transnational legal rules to enhance and 
protect transnational capital, thereby overlooking the underlying social order 
underpinning current investment policy initiatives and outcomes. Crucially, most 
of these approaches have in common that they tend to neglect the critical role of 
social forces that drive, sustain and challenge the prevailing modes of transnational 
investment regulation. 
Rational choice accounts
The most dominant and frequently cited explanation for IIA proliferation in IR/IPE 
literature is the so-called ‘competing-for-capital’ thesis that primarily emerged 
from rational choice theories (Guzman, 1998; Elkins et al., 2006; see also Oman, 
2000; Haftel, 2010; Barthel and Neumeyer, 2012; Büthe and Milner, 2014). 
Adherents to this thesis argue that rational states seek to promote economic 
development by attracting FDI, and, therefore, attempt to divert foreign capital 
from their economic competitors by concluding IIAs. In a seminal article, Guzman 
(1998: 658, 676-7) argues that BITs constitute a ‘credible commitment’ that help to 
overcome the ‘dynamic inconsistency problem’ faced by foreign investors when 
entering a new market, that is, “a situation when a preferred course of action, once 
undertaken, cannot be adhered to without the establishment of some commitment 
mechanism”. For Guzman, individual governments conclude IIAs out of economic 
self-interest, effectively generating a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ whereby particularly 
developing states are ultimately worse off than if they had stuck together as a 
coalition (ibid.: 682). He draws on the prisoner’s dilemma to argue that it is optimal 
for developing states to reject multilateral attempts but that signing IIAs actually 
provides an advantage over other states in the competition to attract foreign 
investors (ibid.: 666-7). Thus, the reason for the proliferation of IIAs and with it, 
capital-friendly policies, is explained on the basis of global competitive pressures 
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for investment. This has been backed up by statistical evidence that states conclude 
IIAs primarily in response to other states concluding them, and particularly those 
with which they tend to compete for foreign capital (Elkins et al., 2006; Tobin and 
Busch, 2010).
 Such uni-directional explanations are problematic as they are based on 
ahistoric reifications of states as rational and utility-maximising agents, thereby 
implying an inevitable, teleological process of sacrificing state sovereignty along 
an ‘objective’ economic rationality. Rational choice approaches take states as the 
principal actors and by doing so they tend to neglect the crucial role of political 
struggles among different social forces that drive, sustain and challenge 
investment rules, as well as the material structures from which they emanate. 
Such a static understanding of the global order as a natural and self-perpetuating 
international state of affairs remains unable to account for historical and 
structural changes in global capitalism as agents are reduced to mere supporters 
of existing social realities rather than taking these realities as the result of 
open-ended struggles. Instead, such approaches say little about internal and 
domestic political dynamics that shape the content, form and scope of IIAs as well 
as particular state projects and reconfigurations of state-society relations against 
the backdrop of global capitalist restructuring.
 One important refinement of rational choice theory has come in the form of 
bounded rationality building on insights from behavioural psychology and 
economics (Poulsen, 2014, 2015). The bounded rationality approach accepts the 
main assumptions of the competing-for-capital thesis as a basis but makes two 
important interventions. First, state officials are subject to cognitive constraints and 
make decisions on the basis of imperfect knowledge and incomplete information. 
As a result, policy-makers did not – or could not – appreciate well the potential 
costs and benefits of IIAs and their expectations were often merely based on 
wishful thinking (Poulsen, 2015: 17). Second, governments can learn about the 
risks of IIAs over time with some modifying or even denouncing their treaties 
after being hit by ISDS claims (Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013; see also Haftel and 
Thompson, 2018; Manger and Peinhardt, 2017; Peinhardt and Wellhausen, 2016). 
These interventions are supported by rich empirical analysis that highlights the 
potential for a less static understanding of IIAs. Nevertheless, bounded rationality 
remains primarily focused on the behaviour of states and state officials without 
generally taking into account the critical role of other non-state agents involved in 
investment treaty-making processes and the role of ideas and discourses that 
crucially shape their strategic and political decisions.
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Several scholars conceive of the system of IIAs as an international regime and a 
mode of governance in order to grasp the dynamics of the relationships established 
by IIAs among states and between states and foreign investors. Following Krasner 
(1983: 2), an international regime is considered as “principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations”. The interlocking network of IIAs constitutes 
a convergence of expectations by states in the attitude of host state governments 
towards investments from other regime members (Schneiderman, 2008: 26). In 
that sense, the norms and rules enshrined in investment treaties are intended to 
constrain and standardise such attitudes in order to fulfil those expectations 
(Salacuse, 2010b: 431; Montt, 2009: 103). The explanation for the creation of an 
investment rule regime is based on the premise that states design regimes out of a 
shared belief that such a cooperative mechanism will be in their own individual 
interests. In line with (neo-) realist assumptions, regimes are taken as instances of 
international cooperation in an otherwise anarchic world of independent 
sovereign states (Keohane, 1989). The principal purpose of building a global 
investment regime is, then, to “facilitate the flow of capital and related technology 
among states so as to promote economic development and prosperity” by reducing 
foreign investment uncertainty resulting from the risk of adverse actions by host 
state governments (Salacuse, 2010b: 434-5). Although accounting for the role of 
international regimes, such perspectives do not escape from the same fallacy of 
the rational choice approaches discussed above. Regime theory still considers 
rational and unitary states as the principal actors that construct international 
regimes with the sole purpose of serving their own self-interest, thereby 
maximising the expected utility. By taking international regimes as the objective 
structures that constrain and influence individual state action, regime theory 
neglects the inherent political nature of such regimes and downplays the 
particular role of social groups in driving and contesting the norms and values 
that embody these regimes.
Liberal and historical institutionalist accounts
Drawing on the ‘legalisation’ literature in IR (Goldstein et al., 2000; Abbott et al., 
2000), liberal institutionalist approaches focus on the impact that international 
legal rules have on future state behaviour (Allee and Peinhardt, 2011; Simmons, 
2000; see also Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Keohane, 1984). Liberal institutionalists 
take IIAs as important signals of governmental commitment to liberal economic 
policies (Simmons, 2014; Allee and Peinhardt, 2010; Büthe and Milner, 2009; 
Ginsburg, 2005). From this perspective, IIAs are understood as “attempts to reduce 
the likelihood of a much broader range of intervention by committing the FDI 
562932-L-bw-Verbeek




host country to economically liberal policies and by increasing the speed and 
costliness of punishments for breaking such commitments” (Büthe and Milner, 
2009: 172; see also Allee and Peinhardt, 2011; Simmons, 2000). As IIAs constitute 
credible commitments to liberal economic policies by serving ‘hands-tying’ 
functions (Elkins et al., 2006; Kerner, 2009), the political constraints inherent to 
IIAs are then not seen as a mere ‘by-product’, but as deliberately designed features 
accepted by the participating states, thereby leading to the provocative conclusion 
that “BITs work […] precisely because they bite” (Büthe and Milner, 2009: 214). A 
particular role is ascribed to ‘norm entrepreneurs’ such as ICSID, UNCTAD and the 
ICC that have promulgated codes and model rules that have articulated 
liberalisation and strong protection standards, and contributed to the global 
spread of IIAs (Ginsburg, 2005: 117). Although liberal institutionalism takes into 
account international structures, these are still conceived of as part of an anarchic 
system in which states as the only relevant actors pursue rational policies of power 
maximisation and security enhancement to ensure their survival along (neo-) 
realist lines. Liberal institutionalism takes international institutions as 
independent actors, norms or established practices that shape the global political 
economy rather than understanding them as embedded in, and constituted by, 
transnational structures (see also Van Apeldoorn, 2002). By focusing on the central 
role of IIAs as institutions in the workings of the liberal economic order, liberal 
institutionalism, in turn, tends to neglect the power asymmetries between states 
and the apparent geopolitical dimensions underpinning the transnational 
regulation of foreign investment.
 Finally, an emerging strand of historical institutionalist approaches makes an 
important contribution by taking into account historical contexts and structural 
conditions in which IIAs and ISDS emerged and gradually developed over time, 
and the ways institutions shape and mediate these outcomes (St. John, 2018; 
Tucker, 2018). Historical institutionalism is centred on the premise that 
institutional development follows a path-dependent and self-reinforcing trajectory 
that constrains the possibilities for reversal or amendment (Rixen et al., 2016; 
Mahoney, 2000; Steinmo et al., 1992). For historical institutionalists, agents 
develop or adjust their preferences not in a political vacuum as often suggested by 
rational choice theories but rather in response to pre-existing institutional 
frameworks and often with unintended consequences (Fioretos, 2011). Gradual 
institutional developments are ascribed to specific trigger points, such as feedback 
effects, layering and conversion that together allow for incremental change to 
take place (St. John, 2018; Tucker, 2018; see also Pierson, 2004; Schickler, 2001; 
Hacker et al., 2015). Institutional stability is only disrupted during what historical 
institutionalists refer to as critical junctures as brief moments in time whereby 
social or institutional breakdown temporarily opens up spaces for new possibilities 
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and pathways (Capoccia, 2016). Both Tucker (2018) and St. John (2018) reconstruct 
the rise of international investment law and investor-state arbitration around 
such critical junctures in history and their gradual development for example 
through treaty practices and judicial review. 
 Although historical institutionalist accounts offer an insightful theoretical 
perspective that acknowledges the role of crisis moments in spurring institutional 
changes, while at the same time recognising the obstacles that governments face 
when dealing with such crisis moments, they generally fail to consider the social 
foundations of IIAs and ISDS as deeply embedded in capitalist societies and lack a 
theorisation of the circumstances under which critical junctures can occur. 
As Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 343) write, “[c]ritical junctures and their synonyms 
are too often treated as bookends, or a deus ex machina, on otherwise carefully 
constructed stories of institutional development”. Moreover, the unfolding legitimacy 
crisis of the ISDS system, and the wider network of IIAs more generally, and the 
concomitant political developments that follow from it, with several states now 
moving away from the system, have come to challenge some of the literature’s 
foundational assumptions. The inscribed path dependency of historical institu-
tionalism effectively limits the epistemological possibilities to account for 
structural or radical change beyond mere incremental reforms of various IIAs and 
other IIA-related institutions, norms and practices, thereby neglecting the uneven 
and variegated processes of capitalist development and restructuring (see also 
Bruff and Horn, 2012).
Constructivist accounts
A small body of literature associated with social constructivism has sought to 
tackle these rational choice and institutionalist approaches by exploring the 
deeper social processes as the precondition for action that made global competition 
for capital possible in the first place. The key argument is that the past decades 
have witnessed a profound shift in the predominant ideas with regard to FDI 
inflows and their meaning for economic development (Calvert, 2018; Yackee, 2005; 
Jandhyala et al., 2011; see also Linsi, 2016). From this perspective, IIAs ought to be 
understood by taking into account their ideational basis and the ways in which 
perceptions on IIAs and FDI form part of broader ideas on economic development. 
Subsequently, the proliferation of IIAs is to a great extent ascribed to the inter-
subjective belief in the developmental value of IIAs and of the FDI they are expected 
to attract (Yackee, 2005: 197). Yackee makes an important argument by saying that 
“we should not take for granted that the liberalising trends of the past twenty 
years will continue, nor that the pro-investment status quo will necessarily persist” 
(ibid.: 197). This is, so he argues, because such intersubjective meanings are 
imminently susceptible to changes that are expected to influence policy changes 
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as well. Hence, it is argued that the wave of IIAs since the 1980s, often involving 
pairs of developing states without significant capital flows between them, was 
driven primarily by pressures of emulation in a form of a ‘norm cascade’ (Jandhyala 
et al., 2011: 1049; see also Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), social learning (Yackee, 
2005: 216; Morin and Gagne, 2007: 64-5; see also Hall, 1993) or policy diffusion 
(Poulsen, 2015; Simmons et al., 2006). Importantly, as argued by Calvert (2018), 
normative beliefs also play a crucial role in how governments perceive the risks 
and costs associated with IIAs and the variegated responses undertaken by 
governments worldwide. 
 Such constructivist approaches ascribe importance to the role of ideational 
factors, albeit in a highly instrumental manner, but their specific content is never 
questioned and therefore naturalised despite its contentious and agent-specific 
nature (Van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 14). The assumed separation of inter-
subjective ideas from the underlying material social relations neglects the 
dialectical interrelatedness between the ideational and the material dimensions 
of social reality. Hence, constructivist approaches are able to explain how specific 
ideas become part of a structure, but fail to explain why a specific set of ideas 
becomes part of a wider social structure and not another (Bieler and Morton, 2008: 
107-9). Importantly, constructivism does not account for the circumstances under 
which regulatory and discursive shifts may materialise (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 
2014: 116). Moreover, these constructivist accounts still suffer from state-centricity 
and fail to explore systematically the explanatory role of agency and how ideas 
and norms are connected with social forces. Constructivism, therefore, treats the 
social purpose of IIAs as a black box as it fails to embed them into the broader 
structures of the global political economy.
1.4  Towards a Critical Political Economy perspective
This study is situated at the intersection of International Political Economy and EU 
Studies and advances a theoretical perspective drawing on historical materialist 
accounts within the field of Critical Political Economy (Cox, 1981; Shields et al., 
2011a; Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011; Jäger and Springler, 2015). CPE perspectives 
in the field of IPE emerged in the 1970s when the field tended to diverge into two 
different strands of scholarship with on the one hand approaches that focus above 
all upon “empirical questions in order to grasp the dynamics of agents within the 
international system”, and on the other hand approaches that “prefer to focus 
upon an ontological enquiry into its historical evolution” (Shields et al., 2011b: 1). 
Such divergence has led to claims about a division into the ‘American’ and ‘British’ 
schools, or alternatively into the ‘orthodox/heterodox’ or ‘positivist’ and the 
‘critical’ (Cohen, 2007; Murphy and Nelson, 2001). Such thrifty categorisation of 
the broad field of IPE as consisting of solely two flavours however tends to overlook 
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its rich variety and many ontological and epistemological differences. CPE 
perspectives are by no means limited to a single theoretical approach typically 
associated with Marxism and Marxist-inspired approaches, but are to be found 
among a wider range of social science approaches, including feminist, postcolonial, 
poststructuralist and other post-positivist studies. Nevertheless, critical approaches 
to IPE tend to share certain fundamental tenets that set them apart from the 
mainstream approaches within social science.
 Critical scholarship goes beyond the mere criticising and challenging of 
existing academic approaches and their underlying normative beliefs about social 
realities. As criticising typically involves passing a negative judgment, the prefix 
‘critical’ should be more than a mere “posh synonym for criticising” (Sayer, 2009: 
768; Wigger, 2016). The term ‘critique’ seems more apt to describe the academic 
practice of examining and unravelling “how truth claims are reached and 
legitimised as a naturalised state of affairs, as well as how such truth claims 
 authoritatively inform social practices” (Wigger and Horn, 2016: 40). Critical 
perspectives entail a profound critique of the existing world order by identifying 
and questioning the ways in which existing patterns and mechanisms produce 
and reproduce material and social domination and inequalities (Olin Wright, 
2010: 11; Worth, 2011: 358-9). Critical theory thus does “not take institutions and 
social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning 
itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of 
changing” (Cox, 1981: 129). As such, CPE has as its principal aim to take a holistic 
view and look at how social orders have formed historically. Rather than perceiving 
social orders as naturally given, they need to be understood as constructed 
through the social practice of human agents, making them necessarily historical 
products that are “transient and changeable, rather than transhistorical 
phenomena that would be amenable to the formulation of social scientific laws” 
(Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 16; on historicising IPE, see also Amoore et al., 2000). CPE 
perspectives cross disciplinary boundaries that have come to characterise many 
mainstream social sciences (Jäger and Springler, 2015; Van der Pijl, 2009; Jessop 
and Sum, 2001). Such disciplinary splits result in an obstinately conventional 
division of labour between the ‘economics’, ‘law’ and ‘politics’ of socio-economic 
phenomena, in which middle-ground theories within the confines of disciplinary 
boundaries create certain ‘blind-spots’ (Ryner, 2015: 277). In contrast, CPE 
perspectives seek the ‘co-constitution’ of economic, political and cultural forms in 
the context of the stratified, complex, contradictory and historically contingent 
capitalist mode of production (Drahokoupil et al., 2009: 5; Ryner, 2015: 277). 
 At the same time, critical scholarship goes further than scientific critique and 
implies a critical perspective on social reality and a normative commitment to 
human emancipation and exploring alternative avenues for a more just and 
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egalitarian social world order. This does not mean that critical perspectives are 
more normative than their seemingly value-neutral and problem-solving 
mainstream counterparts. Critical scholars reject the epistemological axiom of 
‘value neutrality’ and are more open and explicit about the values and norms 
underpinning their research (Keucheyan, 2013: 2; Wigger, 2016: 4). As social 
theories are deeply embedded within the ‘apparatus of society’ (Horkheimer, 1972: 
196), critical social theories should therefore be “reflexive and self-critical, and 
sensitive to difference” (Sayer, 2009: 767). Such a reflexive understanding of theory 
is also expressed by Cox’ famous aphorism that “theory is always for someone and 
for some purpose” (Cox, 1981: 128). In that sense, critical perspectives recognise 
that all theory is necessarily value-laden and that knowledge is thus both 
historically situated and constitutive of social practice (Rupert, 2003: 186). By 
unveiling the underlying mechanisms that generate inequalities in the 
distribution of material and ideational resources and power, critical social science 
also serves an inherent emancipatory purpose by seeking to transform or 
undermine those mechanisms. As critical theories are dominated at every turn by 
a “concern for reasonable conditions of life” (Horkheimer, 1972: 199), they do not 
only involve scientific explanations for oppression and exploitation but also engage 
with possible alternative visions on how to improve those conditions of social life 
and to enhance human flourishing (Olin Wright, 2010: 10). Such unification of 
theory and praxis then resembles much of what Marx wrote in his Thesis	 on	
Feuerbach: “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point is to change it” (Marx, [1845] 1969).
 Over the past two decades, a growing body of critical scholarship has emerged 
in the field of EU Studies (cf. Bieler and Morton, 2001; Van Apeldoorn, 2002; 
Cafruny and Ryner, 2003; Van Apeldoorn et al., 2009; Nousios et al., 2012; Jäger and 
Springler, 2015; Ryner and Cafruny, 2017). Despite their many differences, critical 
EU studies have in common that they refuse to assume – as most European 
integration theories do – that market forces are “expressions of an inner rationality 
of universal human nature that is held to be the essence of the realm of freedom 
in political affairs” (Van Apeldoorn et al., 2003: 18). In contrast, critical EU 
scholarship seeks to unravel and explain the fundamentally asymmetrical power 
structures in the EU and relate these to the inherent contradictions of capitalist 
restructuring in the European political economy (Drahokoupil et al., 2009: 5). 
Many of these contributions centre on the analysis of the social power relations 
and political struggles that shape the particular trajectory of European integration 
in order to fully grasp the nature and political limitations of the European project. 
In particular, neo-Gramscian approaches have contributed to redefining the 
problématique of European integration by highlighting the social purpose or 
socio-economic content underlying the European project as well as the institutional 
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form through which this is taking place (Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 11-2). These analyses 
have taken the current neoliberal form of European governance as the concrete 
manifestation of a broader hegemonic project related to the transnational process 
of neoliberal restructuring that has taken place since the 1980s (Gill, 1998; Bieler, 
2000; Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Bieling, 2012). They share the notion that the 
‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ enacted through the construction of the EU Single 
Market and the European Monetary Union (Gill, 1998) has contributed to the 
increased supranationalisation of neoliberal governance at the European level. 
At the same time, European integration is hereby considered as a “relatively 
autonomous regional expression of an emerging capitalist global political 
economy” (Van Apeldoorn et al., 2003: 34), in which processes of European state 
formation interact dialectically both with national and variegated trajectories of 
capitalist restructuring as well as the broader transformations of global capitalism 
(Jessop, 2006: 143). 
 While neo-Gramscian analyses have focused primarily on the European 
integration process against the background of the transnationalisation of production 
and finance and the concomitant neoliberal discourse, thereby constituting the 
“transnational transformation of European capitalism” (Van Apeldoorn and Horn, 
2007: 212), other critical approaches have focused more on the uneven and 
variegated trajectories of European (varieties of) capitalism (Macartney, 2009; 
Bruff, 2010; Jessop, 2012; Bruff and Ebenau, 2014). In the context of the Eurozone 
crisis (Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Macartney, 2013), critical scholars have highlighted 
that the institutional design of the EU did far from overcome the fundamental 
asymmetries between the core and the periphery but rather exacerbated the 
competitive pressures between the variegated configurations of European 
capitalism (Becker and Jäger, 2012; Rodrigues and Reis, 2012; Jessop, 2012; 
Drahokoupil and Myant, 2015; Jäger and Springler, 2015). In particular, these 
developments have been bound up with the rise of European financial capital 
against the backdrop of wider processes of global financial integration and 
finance-led restructuring, or the financialisation of European capitalism (Bieling, 
2006; Wigger, 2012; Nölke et al., 2013; Bieling, 2013), which forms a recurring 
theme in various critical contributions on, for example, EU competition regulation 
(Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011), European corporate governance regimes (Horn, 
2011) and  EU crisis management (Heinrich, 2015; Radice, 2014). These critical EU 
perspectives have contributed to the understanding of the fundamental social 
struggles that drive and sustain the current neoliberal crisis management and 
austerity politics across Europe, with several contributions highlighting the 
increased authoritarian character of the neoliberal crisis responses (Bruff, 2014; 
Sandbeck and Schneider, 2014; Oberndorfer, 2015).
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 The CPE approach taken in the present study is firmly rooted within this 
tradition of critical EU Studies and aims to make several (modest) contributions to 
the existing academic literature. Next to the different IPE approaches that have 
been extensively discussed in Section 1.3, the study also seeks to contribute to the 
existing body of scholarship on EU trade policy. Much of the dominant literature 
on EU trade policy is oriented towards explaining the institutional outcomes and 
reconfigurations of the integration process that all too often adopt a sui	 generis 
approach that tends to isolate them from broader political science and IPE 
approaches (Poletti and De Bièvre, 2014: 102; see also Kerremans and Orbie, 2013; 
Dür and Zimmerman, 2007). This is the case for accounts building on rational in-
stitutionalism (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 1999; Meunier, 2005; Woolcock, 2005), 
principal-agent approaches (Van den Hoven, 2002; Kerremans, 2004; Meunier, 
2007; Elsig, 2010) and neofunctionalism (Niemann, 2013) that focus primarily on 
the different institutional forms and interests underpinning EU trade 
policy-making without further specifying how and why such particular forms and 
interests are generated. Approaches that build on the liberal intergovernmentalist 
framework (Van der Hoven, 2007; Frennhoff Larsen, 2007; Young, 2002; Hanson, 
1998; see also Moravcsik, 1993, 1998), assuming that EU trade policy is simply the 
sum of different bargaining positions produced at domestic level, often take 
national preferences as pre-given and perceive EU member state governments to 
embody homogeneous societal interests, while failing to embed those in wider 
structures at supranational and transnational levels. Other actor-based approaches 
have taken into account the critical role of different interest groups in influencing 
trade policy-making processes (Dür, 2010; Young and Peterson, 2006; Woll, 2009) 
without considering the underlying imbalances in terms of social power and 
institutional access. In addition, constructivist approaches have taken the EU as a 
new kind of global power that is, above all, primarily ‘normative’ (Manners, 2002) 
or ‘civil’ (Orbie, 2006). Whereas such conceptualisations interpret EU trade policy 
as an attempt to gain legitimacy in social dimensions by promoting human and/or 
labour rights (Manners, 2009; Kerremans and Orbie, 2009; Kerremans and Martins 
Gystelinck, 2009), others have focused on the important role of ideas and discourses 
in explaining the rise and resilience of neoliberalism in EU trade policy 
(Siles-Brügge, 2013, 2014; De Ville and Orbie, 2014) without taking into account the 
underlying social power balances. 
 This study seeks to complement these types of literatures by providing a 
theoretically informed analysis that considers European foreign investment 
regulation as socially and historically contingent in the context of the dynamic 
nature of global capitalism. At the same time, it does not take the content, form 
and scope of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy as a mere functional outcome of 
particular capitalist developments but rather as reflecting particular political 
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struggles between different social forces at different junctures, thereby taking 
seriously the role of agents and their different ideas and discourses about how to 
regulate foreign investment. Moreover, the study also seeks to move beyond what 
has been called the ‘incestuous’ circles of critical IPE (Belfrage and Worth, 2012: 
132; see also Bruff and Tepe, 2011: 335; Shields et al., 2011b: 1-3), which often tends 
to refrain from venturing into new areas of enquiry, by incorporating other 
literatures from for example critical legal studies and critical geography in order 
to create new insights into the societal and variegated implications of the legal 
transformation of global capitalism. Finally, the study aims to move beyond the 
exclusive focus on elites as the primary drivers of political and economic change 
commonly found in much of the critical IPE literature and neo-Gramscian analyses 
in particular (Huke	 et al., 2015: 727-29) by taking various forms of political 
contestation and the agency of resistance seriously. 
1.5  Research approach: ontology, epistemology and methodology
The CPE approach adopted in this study differs from mainstream and positivist 
approaches by rejecting that the aim of social science is to identify causal 
relationships in an objective world. It neither accepts that it is possible to separate 
the subject from object, nor to distinguish between normative enquiries on the 
one hand and empirical scientific research on the other (Jäger et al., 2016; Wigger 
and Horn, 2016). Critical scholarship builds on particular assumptions about what 
the world consists of (ontology) and how humans can understand this reality 
(epistemology). This study takes critical realism as the meta-theoretical point of 
departure (Bhaskar, 1975, 1979). Critical realism is based on the ontological 
assumption that there is a social reality ‘out there’, but it is complex, stratified, 
contingent and therefore open-ended. Critical realism thus rejects the search for 
law-like regularities common to positivist approaches as the underlying social 
mechanisms and their generative powers do not always materialise in a directly 
observable fashion and only under particular circumstances (Bhaskar, 1975: 56; 
Sayer, 1992). Bhaskar distinguishes thereby between the intransitive	 dimension, 
which refers to the real structure or mechanism that exists and acts independently 
of our knowledge about it, and the transitive	dimension referring to the reality that 
exists to our knowledge (Bhaskar, 1975: 6; 1979: 9-14). Critical realists further 
distinguish between the ‘real’, the ‘actual’ and the ‘empirical’. The ‘real’ involves 
all structures and mechanisms that have causal powers, regardless of whether 
they are observable for us and whether we have an adequate understanding of 
their nature. The ‘actual’ refers to the events that follow when these structures 
and powers are activated, whereas the ‘empirical’ refers to the observations and 
experiences of these actual events (Sayer, 2000: 11-12; Jessop, 2005: 41). By 
distinguishing between these different strata, critical realism proposes that social 
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reality consists of different levels of structures and mechanisms that sustain and 
generate social phenomena independently from our capacities to observe them.
 The ontological core of critical realism lies in the dialectical relationship 
between the notions of structure and agency and the material and ideational 
dimensions of social reality. From a critical realist perspective, social realities are 
perceived of as “the open-ended and contingent outcomes of a dynamic interplay 
between material structures, discourses and agents” (Wigger and Horn, 2016: 44). 
This means that all these interrelated and interdependent dimensions need to be 
considered in order to explain specific social and political phenomena and 
outcomes. In particular, social structures do not exist independently of human 
agency that shapes and governs them, but instead they are the result of intentional 
human action undertaken in the past, which makes them also dependent upon 
their reproduction through such activity (Bhaskar, 1979: 48-9; see also Joseph, 
2006: 136; Dean et al., 2006: 12). Critical realism ascribes a causal primacy to 
structures over agents as the latter always operate within pre-existing structures 
that both enable and constrain their activities. This does not mean that critical 
realism purports an economic determinist understanding of agents as being 
reduced to mere ‘passive bearers’ of social structures. Instead, critical realists 
highlight the emancipatory potential of agents to engage in transformative 
practice, albeit within the confines of their structural and historically contingent 
contexts. Human agents can therefore reproduce or transform social structures 
rather than create them (Bhaskar, 1979: 42). Such an understanding of the 
structure- agency relationship reflects Marx’ famous aphorism that “men [sic] make 
their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it 
under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1851-2 [1995]: 5).
 Critical realism also emphasises on the ideational dimension and the role of 
ideas in how agents understand social reality and thus in the way they act within 
and reshape those social structures. Agents only have partial knowledge of the 
complex and stratified structures in which they find themselves, meaning that 
their intentional activities might lead also to unacknowledged structural 
consequences (Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 11). For example, few workers 
intentionally set out to reproduce the capital-wage labour relation yet this is the 
consequence of acting upon their intention to find employment in order to make 
a living (Joseph, 2006: 137). As Jessop (2010: 338) writes, human agents “do not 
encounter the world as pre-interpreted once-and-for-all but must engage with and 
reflect on it in order to make some sense of it”. Critical realism takes these inter-
pretations as intersubjective meanings of social reality and relates them to agency 
as it is only in human activity that ideas are generated, and thus linked to the 
structures in which agents are located and that shape their agency. Ideas are not 
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freely floating in a social world existing of a web of intersubjective meanings 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), but are produced by human agency in specific social 
structures at a particular juncture in time (Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 19; Bieler and 
Morton, 2008). Although ideas cannot be simply reduced to material processes, 
agents always interpret social reality as viewed from their structural location, 
which tends to influence their ideational inclinations (Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 
2011: 11). Critical realism thus recognises the material effects of the ideational 
through the practice of human agency, while at the same time accounting for the 
material structures shaping the kind of ideas and discourses human agents hold 
on to (Joseph, 2006: 155; see also Hay, 2002: 201).
 Adopting a critical realist ontology has important epistemological implications 
as only parts of the social world can be understood. The complexity of social reality 
requires therefore conceptual reflection in order to conduct scientific research. All 
research is necessarily underpinned by a conceptual asymmetry as social scientists 
privilege certain ways of viewing the world over others. This means that in effect 
all social scientists make a wager about the world and what the most important 
aspects of this world might be (Bruff and Tepe, 2011: 354-5; Dunn, 2009: 81-6). 
Science is therefore considered as a social practice and thus deeply embedded 
within a broader historical and societal context. Scientific practices, theories and 
methodologies are always a product of the society in which they originate (Van der 
Pijl, 2009: 221). This implies that direct observation is not possible, and that social 
phenomena can only be grasped via theoretical concepts, abstraction or 
perspectives that function as ‘theoretical glasses’. Hence, observation is “neither 
theory-neutral nor theory-determined, but theory-laden” (Sayer, 1992: 83; see also 
Jäger et al., 2016: 108). 
 From a critical realist perspective, it is crucial to be aware of this, and to take 
into account the different underlying assumptions, abstractions and concepts to 
be used for scientific inquiry. The method of abstraction, as presented by Marx in 
the Grundrisse (1993 [1857-8]), offers thereby a useful instrument to translate the 
various theoretical concepts and analytical abstractions into empirical analysis. 
Abstraction is a dialectical process of moving from the concrete to the abstract and 
returning to the concrete understood in a new way (Joseph, 2006: 29-30). It takes 
the concrete historical phenomenon or process under investigation as a point of 
departure while at the same time reflecting on the underlying complex social 
relations and power structures in which those phenomena and processes unfold. 
Abstract notions, or more precisely the process from abstract concepts to concrete 
events, are therefore crucial to fill concepts with understanding in order to gain a 
complete view of the social events that have occurred. Abstraction neither involves 
a deductive process that attempts to seek out constant event conjunctions, nor 
does it envisage any general or universally valid laws that can be explained by the 
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development of appropriate general applicable theories (Patomäki and Wight, 
2000: 223; Cox, 1986: 243-4). By posing the question of “what the real world must 
be like for a specific explanandum to be actualised” (Jessop, 2005: 43), the thorough 
and iterative process of abstraction seeks to identify and unravel the underlying 
structures and power relations that shape the course of concrete events. 
1.6  Research methods and data collection
The study rests upon an empirical analysis that seeks to reconstruct the coming 
about and the subsequent developments of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy 
against the backdrop of broader processes of capitalist restructuring. It builds on 
the triangulation of different qualitative research methods of empirical data 
gathering. This implies that different techniques, using both primary and 
secondary sources, were applied to cross-verify the collected information and to 
enhance the validity of the results (Denzin, 2006; Tarrow, 2010). Most importantly, 
the study draws on insights from the method of process tracing as an analytical 
tool for explaining the unfolding of political events or situations over time 
(Trampusch and Palier, 2016; Waldner, 2012; Collier, 2011; Bennett, 2010). Although 
process tracing has often been defined in positivist terms, for example as a tool to 
identify the intervening causal mechanisms between an independent variable and 
the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005: 206), it offers 
valuable starting points for the CPE approach taken in this study. Most notably, it 
enables the researcher to empirically chart and trace the complex interaction of 
political and social processes that produce structural and behavioural change 
(Hay, 2002: 149). Process tracing entails the systemic examination of diagnostic 
pieces of evidence understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or 
phenomena (Collier, 2011: 823-4; Gerring, 2007), which allows for an explanatory 
narrative that considers particular political decision-making processes, such as 
the making of the EU investment policy, and the underpinning social power 
relations as historically and socially contingent. Moreover, as diachronic analysis, 
process tracing allows for extracting a periodisation of the different time phases 
as contextual backgrounds against which different social forces articulate and 
formulate their preferences and strategies and interact with each other over time. 
 Qualitative data was collected from official and publicly accessible documents 
issued by DG Trade and other EU institutions. These include communications, 
(proposals for) regulations, conclusions, resolutions, negotiating directives, treaty 
texts, position papers, fact sheets, reports, official speeches and press releases. It is 
through these documents that the EU investment policy crystallises, thereby 
reflecting the dominant views and practices of the EU institutions with regard to 
foreign investment regulation. However, these documents constitute the end 
result of a political trajectory whereby certain types of policy proposals and 
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solutions are being preferred over others. Hence, the study also relies on a wide 
range of unofficial documents to examine internal EU decision-making processes. 
Most notably, a substantial number of internal discussion papers and non-papers, 
state-of-plays, reports, presentations as well as sensitive treaty proposals and 
consolidated texts of ongoing investment negotiations were obtained through 
various leaks, mostly through key contacts established during the research period. 
These documents provided critical and unique inside-information on the 
competing discourses and power struggles within the EU institutions – or rather 
the social forces located within them. Moreover, crucial information from a large 
number of internal reports and communication from within DG Trade, acquired 
under the right of access to EU documents (Regulation 1049/2001), revealed an 
organic link between DG Trade officials and representatives from organised 
business and the investment arbitration industry, as concretely manifested 
through personal e-mail contact, participation in conferences and numerous 
private meetings behind closed doors. The requests for access to documents have 
been filed by a civil society organisation and the obtained documents have been 
shared with author. Some of the requests and obtained documents are also publicly 
available on the website AsktheEU.org. 
 Lastly, the study also rests on various position papers, reports and pamphlets 
from different interest groups both at EU and national level, including organised 
business associations, law firms specialised in investment arbitration, trade 
unions, NGOs, political parties and governments, in order to identify and examine 
the particular positions and worldviews of relevant agents with particular 
perceived interests.
 Another type of primary data for the empirical analysis was gathered through 
the conduct of semi-structured expert and elite interviews. Like any other research 
strategy, expert and elite interviews have their particular strengths and limitations 
(Kvale, 1996; Madill et	al, 2000; Odendahl and Shaw, 2002; Mason, 2002; Bogner et 
al., 2009). Crucially, interviews help to gain “privileged access to the common 
understanding of subjects, the understanding that provides their worldview” 
(Kvale, 1996: 291). In the context of the present study, they provided a critical and 
unique source of important information about the main interests, ideas and 
positions among the key agents involved in driving, sustaining and contesting the 
making of the EU investment policy. Moreover, they were crucial for gaining 
insights into the initiation and early stages of relevant policy processes within a 
relatively new EU regulatory field with almost no pre-existing documentation to 
build on (see Seldon, 1996). Also in the light of the restrictive and secretive nature 
of (ongoing) EU trade negotiations (Dür and Zimmerman, 2007), the interviews 
provided, albeit to a certain extent, essential information on internal deci-
sion-making processes and dynamics, in order to examine the articulation and 
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formation of particular policy initiatives with regard to foreign investment 
regulation. The interviews were thus instrumental for the examination of how 
political and social developments were experienced, interpreted and ultimately shaped 
by the strategic action of key social agents (Gerson and Horowitz, 2002: 201). 
 Between January 2013 and September 2014, a number of 23 expert and elite 
interviews were conducted with a wide range of key agents involved in driving, 
sustaining and contesting the making of the EU investment policy. The notion of 
elites often implies “a group of individuals, who hold, or have held, a privileged 
position in society and, as such […] are likely to have had more influence on political 
outcomes than general members of the public” (Richards, 1996: 199; Lilleker, 2003: 
207). However, the present study also includes interviews with lower ranking 
officials and representatives, as they often have a more detailed knowledge than 
the leading representatives about the different positions and processes within 
their respective institutions and organisations. Among the interviewees were 
relevant officials of the European Commission (primarily, but not exclusively in 
DG Trade), Members of the European Parliament and their trade advisors, member 
state officials, representatives from national and European business associations, 
trade unions and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Access to the 
interviewees was obtained through existing relationships with key gatekeepers 
established during the period of research, and through ‘snowball sampling’ 
whereby the initial contacts led to recommendations to other contacts (Burnham 
et al., 2008). Among the key gatekeepers were leading civil society voices who had 
a clear overview of the most influential individuals and organisations in the 
‘Brussels bubble’ and provided useful entry points in the European institutions, 
such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and, through 
snowballing, contacts at EU member state level. Other interviewees were contacted 
directly, with most of them responding in a positive manner. The interviews were 
conducted in a semi-structured fashion, most of them face-to-face with a small 
number by telephone due to geographical or time constraints. All the interviews 
but one were recorded and transcribed and are all on file with the author. 
Interviewees are identified in the text by function and date only upon request by 
the majority of the respondents (see the Annex for an overview of the interviewees). 
 Other important information was gathered from a wide range of increasingly 
rich and reliable sources. Macroeconomic statistics on FDI were mainly retrieved 
from the publicly available databases at UNCTAD, Eurostat and Statistics Canada. 
Likewise, facts and figures on international investment agreements as well as case 
statistics and materials came from UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub, Italaw and 
ICSID. Relevant analyses and opinions on recent developments in the field of 
investment treaties and arbitration were collected from Investment	 Arbitration	
Reporter, Global	Arbitration	Review, Kluwer	Arbitration	Blog, Investment	Treaty	News	of the 
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International Institute for Sustainable Development, and the Columbia	 FDI	
Perspectives from the Columbia Centre on Sustainable Development. These sources 
were supplemented by a wide range of newspaper articles and reports from general 
media outlets, such as the Financial	Times, The	Economist, EurActiv, and the European 
edition of Politico, providing valuable insights and background information on 
political developments around ongoing trade and investment negotiations.
 Conducting research on European foreign investment regulation entails a 
range of challenges and limitations. Most notably, as the title of the dissertation 
already hints, the EU investment policy is very much a policy in the making. The 
title of the dissertation refers to E.P. Thompson’s classic work, who considered his 
study of the English working class as “a study in an active process, which owes as 
much to agency as to conditioning. The working class did not rise like the sun at 
an appointed time. It was present at its own making” (Thompson, 1966: 9; see also 
Van der Pijl, 2012: xvi). The making of the EU investment policy suggests a process 
leading to an increasingly but by no means fully materialised and institutionalised 
EU regulatory field. Thus, it refers to a process rather than an end-state. Policy 
initiatives and negotiating proposals often developed behind closed doors and 
were subject to constant change. This highlights the selective and contentious 
nature of foreign investment regulation and its constant mediation through 
political struggles that increasingly challenged dominant policy discourses. 
Internal EU decision-making processes are notoriously secretive and lack 
transparency and accessibility, particularly within the Commission and the 
Council (Arregui, 2008; Veen, 2011; Kleimann, 2011; Cross, 2012). In the case of the 
latter, official minutes of the intergovernmental negotiations in the Trade Policy 
Committee are basically non-existent; instead, member state representatives tend 
to make minutes of their own, often even in secret code language to avoid any 
public disclosure.
 The increased politicisation of the EU investment policy also meant that many 
EU officials were not willing to discuss in detail the particular developments and 
dynamics of ongoing investment negotiations. Officials became increasingly 
anxious to share any sensitive information, particularly after certain leaks of the 
CETA and TTIP proposals had sparked a widespread societal backlash against 
investment protection and ISDS. This relates to a common difficulty of ‘studying 
up’ through elite interviewing (Nader, 1972), whereby the interviewees may 
perceive that there is little to gain from the interaction. Elites tend to be better 
equipped to protect themselves and are better positioned to manipulate the 
direction of the interview (Smith, 2006: 644). Occasionally, interviews were 
prematurely aborted and some interviewees requested not to explicitly disclose 
the shared information. Interviews with other agents not directly involved but 
closely related to the negotiations were therefore highly important.
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1.7  Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter Two outlines the critical political 
economy perspective that informs the empirical analyses on the politics of the EU 
investment policy in the subsequent chapters. By drawing on insights from 
historical materialism, the chapter offers a theorisation of foreign investment 
regulation against the backdrop of ever-expanding capitalism and the concomitant 
juridification of social relations of production politically expressed through the 
notion of property rights. It argues that foreign investment regulation is inextricably 
linked to the role of the state as facilitator and developer of laws and regulations 
enhancing and sustaining the expansion of capital. The particular content, form 
and scope of the EU investment policy should moreover be understood as following 
from an open-ended and ongoing struggle between different social classes and 
class fractions, and as a condensation of prevailing ideas and ideologies expressed 
through norms and values associated with particular dominant social class 
fractions that tend to evolve into particular political projects.
 Chapter Three and Four take a longitudinal perspective by analysing and 
explaining the historical transformation of European modes of foreign investment 
regulation against the background of the broader structural changes that have 
taken place within the global political economy since the end of the Second World 
War. Chapter Three traces the historical origins of foreign investment protection 
and the rise of European bilateral investment treaties that emerged in the post-war 
era of embedded liberalism roughly stretching from the 1950s to the 1970s. 
Further, the chapter explains why such efforts did not result in a common 
European approach to foreign investment regulation by highlighting how national 
mercantilist and eventually Euro-mercantilist responses to the ‘American challenge’ 
inhibited the further supranationalisation of European foreign investment 
regulation. 
 Chapter Four critically examines the neoliberal transformation of European 
foreign investment regulation since the 1980s and places this in the context of 
broader processes of capitalist restructuring and the transnationalisation of 
production and finance. It explains how and why IIAs became the preferred legal 
instruments to promote and protect European foreign investments. Moreover, the 
chapter reconstructs the gradual supranationalisation and neoliberalisation of 
foreign investment regulation at EU level, with the European Commission playing 
a vanguard role in rolling out neoliberal rules on the liberalisation and protection 
of foreign investment through various bilateral and multilateral agreements with 
support from the emergent transnational capitalist class. The neoliberal turn 
came also with the gradual strengthening of the EU’s regulatory powers that 
would eventually culminate in the full transfer of FDI competencies to EU level 
with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Importantly, the chapter identifies 
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the rise of a centre-leftist discourse manifested by societal and political opposition 
to neoliberal investment rules, particularly in the wake of the MAI and WTO talks.
 Chapter Five explains the politics that came to inform the developments of 
European FDI regulation during the first years after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. It reveals foremost the resilience and further consolidation 
of the neoliberal discourse underpinning European foreign investment regulation 
in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis of 2008-9. The chapter 
argues that the political struggle over the post-EU investment policy expressed 
itself in the form of contending regulatory discourses in which different social 
forces mobilise into broader coalitions that evolve around two specific political 
projects. On the one hand, a neoliberal project has been propagated by those social 
forces bound up with transnational capital and the state-capital nexuses deeply 
rooted in the outward-oriented and capital-exporting states in Western Europe, 
while on the other hand, a centre-leftist project emerged out of a growing European 
alliance of subordinate social forces, most notably non-governmental organisations 
associated with environmental, public health, human rights and sustainable 
economic development concerns. These concerns have become manifest in the 
left-leaning fractions within the ranks of the European Parliament, which formed 
an increasingly important platform for the articulation of the centre-leftist 
discourse and the overall politicisation of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy. 
The chapter concludes that the content, form and scope of the emerging EU 
investment policy became crystallised along the lines of ‘embedded neoliberalism’ 
with on the one hand a persistent neoliberalisation aimed at the liberalisation and 
protection of EU investment abroad at the highest level and on the other hand a 
pronunciation of social protection principles related to safeguarding regulatory 
policy space to advance human rights, labour standards and environmental 
protection.
 Chapter Six examines and unravels the politics underpinning the CETA 
negotiations on investment protection and takes the resulting compromise as a 
key moment in the construction and consolidation of embedded neoliberalism as 
the potentially hegemonic orientation of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy. 
It places the CETA project against the backdrop of transnationalisation processes 
and asymmetric accumulation structures between the EU and Canada and traces 
the specific political struggles that crucially informed the specific content, form 
and scope of the CETA investment rules. Particularly, it reveals the key role of 
organised transnational capital in driving and supporting the neoliberal part of 
the CETA investment rules, while at the same time taking into account the 
increased political contestation by subordinate social forces bound up with the 
centre-leftist discourse to explain the social embeddedness of those neoliberal 
investment rules. 
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 In a similar vein, Chapter Seven explains the political nature and limits of the 
TTIP negotiations in the context of broader transatlantic market integration 
processes along neoliberal lines. Particular attention is given to how the European 
Commission fiercely promoted the TTIP project both in economic terms of 
restoring economic growth and enhancing EU competitiveness as well as in 
geopolitical terms of reasserting global leadership in an emerging multipolar 
world order. The chapter crucially reveals that the neoliberal discourse came 
increasingly under pressure by vehement opposition to ISDS and TTIP from a 
plethora of social forces pertaining to the centre-leftist discourse that managed to 
establish the necessary linkages with political leaders in key EU member states 
and members of the European Parliament. Against the backdrop of waning 
political support and legitimacy of the neoliberal discourse, the chapter critically 
assesses the responses by the European Commission and the wider EU power bloc 
to neutralise and co-opt certain elements within the centre-leftist project. The 
chapter explains why the resulting proposal for an Investment Court System did 
not constitute a fundamental break away from neoliberalism but rather emerged 
as an incremental step towards further market expansion and investment 
protection along embedded neoliberal lines, albeit in a continued state of fragility 
and contestation. 
 The concluding chapter, Chapter Eight, recapitulates the main findings of 
the study and discusses the empirical and theoretical implications of the research. 
It will also critically assess some recent EU level policy responses to looming crisis 
conditions and speculates on the endurability and resilience of the embedded 
neoliberal compromise underpinning the post-Lisbon EU investment policy and 
whether we are witnessing the first steps towards a more fundamental 
transformation of European foreign investment regulation. Finally, the chapter 
closes with exploring several avenues for alternatives to neoliberal modes of foreign 
investment protection.
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Marx and Engels, 1848
“Capital	is	a	coward.	It	does	not	go	where	it	does	not	feel	safe.”
Robert Zoellick, 2002
This chapter lays the theoretical groundwork for the empirical analysis of the 
coming about and the transformation of the EU investment policy that follows in 
the next four chapters. The critical political economy perspective advanced in 
this chapter is rooted in a historical materialist framework and serves the purpose 
to grasp in abstract terms the inherent political nature of transnational legal 
rules aimed at the promotion and protection of foreign investment. In addition to 
understanding capitalism and the state, a focal point will be the theoretical 
exercise of unravelling social struggles between different groups of agents 
proclaiming concrete political projects. In line with the critical realist perspective, 
the chapter provides a starting point for the theorisation of foreign investment 
regulation in terms of a dynamic interplay between material structures, agency 
and discourses. The chapter is structured as follows. The first part explores the 
structural dynamics of global capitalism and the tendency towards expansion 
resulting from the crisis-ridden and competitive nature of capital accumulation. 
Moreover, it examines the dialectical and contradictory relationship between the 
dynamic logic of capitalist expansion and the fixed logic of territorial power, and 
the need for extra-economic mechanisms to ensure the expansion and reproduction 
of capitalism. It furthermore discusses the legal form of such extra-economic 
mechanisms, and in particular the institution of private property rights as the 
legal expression of capitalist social relations. The second part theorises the role of 
agency, or more specifically, the role of social forces and class fractions that drive, 
sustain or contest particular state policies. The third part conceptualises the role 
of the state from a strategic-relational perspective and takes the EU and EU 
institutions as a form of ‘multi-scalar governance’ to account for the strategic 
action of the EU against the backdrop of global capitalist restructuring. The final 
part looks at the critical role of regulatory discourses, ideas and practices that 
serve as rallying points around which different social forces coalesce and construct 
particular hegemonic projects. 
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2.1 The structural tendencies of capitalist outward expansion
The critical political economy perspective deployed here locates EU investment 
policy in the context of the dynamic and expansionary nature of capitalism and 
the ways and modes in which capitalism is regulated. While capitalism cannot be 
reduced to one single and universal logic as it consists of “multivalent connections 
in society that facilitate, structure and ultimately limits its reproduction” (Anievas 
and Nisancioglu, 2015: 8), capitalism can nonetheless be defined on the basis of a 
number of abstract tendencies that follow from the particular capitalist way of 
organising social (re-)production and that result in a complex set-up of unequal 
social power relations. One of these tendencies is that capital must circulate or die 
(Harvey, 2014: 73). Investments need to be understood as part of the continued 
accumulation and profitable re-investment of surplus capital. Foreign investment 
protection and regulation forms part of the broader political, legal and institutional 
architecture that is designed to secure and facilitate the general process of capital 
accumulation. The content, form and scope of foreign investment regulation at a 
particular historical juncture are never set in stone but contingent on political 
power struggles between different social forces that emanate from the material 
structures of capitalist production. Such regulation forms part of the broader 
political, legal and institutional architecture that is designed to secure and 
facilitate the general process of capital accumulation. Therefore, the point of 
vantage for theorising EU investment policy is thus to accept that contemporary 
societies are capitalist societies and that the social relations underpinning the 
struggle over the EU investment policy are rooted in capitalist social power 
relations. 
2.1.1  The accumulation of capital
At the general level, the capitalist mode of production is characterised by the 
unequal ownership and control over the material means of production. Out of this 
structural inequality emerges an antagonistic relationship between capital and 
labour that both depend on the market for their reproduction. This leads to one of 
the primary logics of capitalism, that is, the accumulation of capital utilised for 
the accumulation of more capital. Such increased capital is generated through the 
circulation of capital in the production process, which exhibits an intrinsic 
imperative towards constant growth and expansion. In the second volume of 
Capital, Marx presents how value is created by the circulation process. The 
peculiarity of capital as an economic form is that an initial amount of money is 
exchanged for commodities, typically involving both labour power and means of 
production, that are used in the production process in order to create new 
commodities that in turn are sold for a larger amount of money, thereby allowing 
the investor who advances the initial capital to realise a profit. The initial 
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investment is in this sense crucial to set the production process into motion as the 
capitalist needs to buy means of production and labour power in order to produce 
and sell the commodity. The investment of capital is, thus, the most important 
form of spending required for the successful functioning of capitalism (Harvey, 
2010: 40-1). This simplified process of circulation represents a process of capital 
accumulation in which the initial investment is recovered and profits are created 
through the generation of new value, or surplus	value. Capital should therefore be 
understood not as a mere thing or a ‘factor’ of production but as a process (Harvey, 
2006: 21); it is value-in-motion, or ‘self-valorising’ value, ultimately rooted in 
human labour (Charnock et al., 2014: 13; Marx, 1990). This implies that capital 
itself is self-expanding value as long as money is used as capital to generate more 
money in the production of surplus value (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2004: 34-5). 
 At the same time, capitalists are forced to reinvest their accumulated wealth 
into the circulation of capital, facing a ‘Faustian conflict’ between renewed 
accumulation or the consumption of the appropriated wealth (Marx, 1990: 594). As 
capitalists are forced to reproduce themselves through the market, they constantly 
seek to ensure competitive advantage over their rivals. It is the capitalist who 
reinvests that can gain the competitive edge over those who enjoy their surpluses 
as mere revenues (Harvey, 2006: 29; Heinrich, 2012: 106-8). Such competition 
subordinates every individual capitalist to the ‘immanent laws’ of capitalist 
production, in the shape of ‘external and coercive laws’ (Marx, 1990: 739). The 
coercive logic of competition thus compels capitalists to reinvest their accumulated 
surplus capital as they are forced to adopt and internalise the profit-seeking motive 
for their survival. Capitalists seek therefore a stable and continuous flow in the 
circulation of capital and have put much effort in reducing regulatory, 
technological or spatial constraints to the process of capital accumulation (Harvey, 
2010: 42-4; see also Jessop and Sum, 2006). This inner logic of capitalism in the 
relentless search for higher rates of profits does however not come without 
problems and is pervaded by a range of inherent contradictions that inhibit the 
continued accumulation of capital. One of the contradictions of capitalism stems 
from the long-term structural problem of ‘overaccumulation’, which refers to the 
lack of profitable investment outlets to absorb ever-increasing quantities of surplus 
capital to be reinvested in the real production economy (Harvey, 2006). Overaccu-
mulation occurs when capitalists are unable to reinvest their profits in the 
expansion of their primary activities. It recurs periodically and can appear in 
different forms, such as a glut of commodities on the market leading to surpluses 
of productive capacity, which can stem from a lack of effective demand and/or 
overproduction, or a surplus in labour power, money or excess credit, speculative 
surges in stocks and bonds, commodity or currency futures, which can lead to 
financial and monetary crisis and/or inflation (Harvey, 2006: xxiv, 195). 
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Such crises can be overcome in a number of ways. Marx and Engels referred in 
the Communist	Manifesto	to, on the one hand “the enforced destruction of a mass 
of productive forces; on the other through the capture of new markets and a 
more thoroughing exploitation of old ones” (Marx and Engels, [1848] 2008: 38). 
Capital may seek access to new markets and locations for cheaper production 
costs in competition with other capitalists. This may result in the geographical 
displacement of surplus capital into foreign activities, either through foreign 
direct investment or through foreign mergers and acquisitions, thereby 
incorporating new regions into the capitalist world order with the purpose of 
finding new markets and enhancing profitability, or by deepening capitalist 
production through the commodification or marketisation of social relations that 
were previously outside the logic of profit-making. (Overbeek, 2012: 32; Robinson, 
2004: 6-7). David Harvey (2003, 2006) refers to such displacements as spatial	fixes, 
whereby capital seeks new channels to accelerate capital accumulation that may 
help to stabilise the system because it opens up the demand for investment goods 
and consumer goods in new territories and provide for access to cheaper inputs, 
for example raw materials and labour power, to maintain opportunities for profit 
open. This suggests that capitalism depends on the constant possibility of outward 
expansion and requires non-capitalist social relations to secure the expanded 
reproduction, and, in general, the accumulation of capital. Harvey draws 
extensively on the works of Rosa Luxemburg ([1913] 2003) when positing that 
“capitalism must perpetually have something ‘outside of itself’ in order to stabilise 
itself” (Harvey, 1985: 144). The internalisation of the ‘outside’ is referred to as 
‘accumulation by dispossession’, in which practices for privatisation, trade 
liberalisation and market deregulation release a set of assets at very low costs for 
surplus capital to overcome the problem of overaccumulation (Harvey, 2003: 154).
 Another type of ‘fix’ that Harvey identifies is the temporal	fix, referring to the 
temporal displacement of surplus capital orchestrated through the financial and 
credit system into long-term capital investments (Harvey, 2006: xiv). Financial 
capital is thereby linked to productive accumulation through credit and 
accumulates on the basis of a claim on interests and future profits generated by 
productive capital (Wigger, 2012: 626). These temporal fixes through credit 
financing leads inevitably to the expansion of financial markets, marked by the 
process of financialisation, which involves a pattern of accumulation in which 
profits primarily accrue through financial channels rather than through trade 
and commodity production (Krippner, 2005: 174). The financial system also 
comprises the capital market effectively referring to a range of securities and 
speculative markets in which ‘fictitious capital’ is traded as both equity and debt 
(Lapavitsas, 2013: 133). Fictitious assets become important in case of stagnating 
productive accumulation, and in the face of a looming crisis of overaccumulation, 
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non-financial capital with limited outlets for productive investments can channel 
capital into financial markets, thereby intertwining the profit agendas between 
financial and productive capital (Becker et al., 2010; Wigger, 2012; Krippner, 2005). 
 The pressures emanating from the structural conditions of competitive 
accumulation also tend to strengthen the process of concentration and 
centralisation of capital into large oligopolies and monopolies. Large investors 
tend to be better able to invest larger sums in the long run and select among a 
broader range of production techniques and employ the best workers (Fine and 
Saad-Filho, 2004: 84; Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 15). In the end, all these 
centrifugal pressures provide for a general expansive outward dynamic of 
capitalism. Spatio-temporal fixes are crucial for the expansion and reproduction 
of capitalism by offering a temporal solution to the problem of overaccumulation, 
however without resolving the problems of capitalism in the long-term. As Harvey 
(2014: 4) writes, “contradictions have the nasty habit of not being resolved but 
merely moved around”. The spatial and temporal displacement of capital into new 
domains of economic and social life do not only facilitate renewed rounds of 
accumulation, but also brings with it renewed potentialities for crisis inherent to 
the internal contradictions of the capitalist system.
2.1.2  Capitalist expansion and the interstate system
The expansionary dynamic of global capitalism raises important questions about 
its spatially variegated nature. In the Grundrisse, Marx argues that “while capital 
must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e. to 
exchange, and conquer the world earth for its market, it strives on the other hand 
to annihilate this space with time […] The result is: the tendentially and potentially 
general development of the forces of production […] as a basis; likewise, the 
universality of intercourse, hence the world market as a basis” (Marx, 1993: 539, 
542). For Marx, thus, the appropriation and production of value and commodities 
through the exploitation of labour takes place in spatially places of production, yet 
the circulation of commodities and the distribution of value in exchange flows is 
potentially not bound to any particular place (Albo, 2004: 91). The outcome of 
capitalist expansion is that it tends to lead to an uneven and unequal division of 
labour, in which capital concentrates in some locations and marginalises others, 
resulting in uneven and unequal effects of capital accumulation (Kiely, 2010: 149; 
see also Rosenberg, 2013; Callinicos, 2009; Allison and Anievas, 2009; Davidson, 
2009). Hence, the competitive imperatives of capital accumulation crucially drive 
and sustain the economic divisions of the world market as expressed through the 
existence of multiple capitalist territories, thereby giving rise to a complex and 
contradictory relationship between the dynamic logic of capital accumulation and 
the fixed logic of territorial control and power.
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The dynamics between inner and outer transformations of capitalism have given 
rise to various theories on the notion of imperialism. The classical Marxist theories 
on imperialism emerged against the historical background of increasing inter-im-
perialist rivalries in the second decade of the 20th century and were premised on 
two key assumptions about the characteristics of the capitalist developments at 
the time (for an overview, see Kiely, 2010; Milios and Sotiropoulos, 2009; Callinicos, 
2009; Brewer, 1990). First, these theories argue that increased competition induces 
the concentration and centralisation of capital into large monopolies and the 
subsequent internationalisation of capital, which was in turn closely related to the 
rise of limited liability, joint stock companies and the fusion with financial capital 
under the dominance of the latter into what was called ‘finance capital’ (Hilferding, 
[1910] 1981: 21). Secondly, the subordination of the state to monopolies and finance 
capital gave rise to the emergence of an expansionist policy in search for new 
markets for expanding industries, investment opportunities and access to raw 
materials, which would inevitably lead to inter-state rivalry and conflict among 
the imperial powers (ibid.: 324; see also Kiely, 2010: 58). Likewise, Bukharin saw the 
‘national organisation’ of capitalism through the formation of monopolies and 
finance capital, merging with the national state into ‘state capitalists trusts’, and 
took the global economy as the arena in which the international competition 
between various state capitalist trusts are played out (Bukharin, [1915] 2010: 
116-20). Imperialism thus entailed the division of the world market between 
international monopolies and the concomitant conflicts among the major 
imperialist powers. For Lenin, the export of capital was necessary and inevitable 
due to the fact that in the advanced states capitalism had become ‘overripe’ for 
investment at home so that “capital cannot find a field for ‘profitable’ investment” 
(Lenin, [1917] 1939: 63). At the same time, Lenin recognises the territorial logic of 
capitalist expansion as the export of capital to new territories “greatly affects and 
accelerates the development of capitalism to those countries to which it is 
exported” (ibid.: 65-6). The export of capital would therefore expand and deepen 
the further development of capitalism throughout the world, as it becomes a 
means for stimulating an export of commodities, thereby contributing to the 
unevenness and territorial divisions of the world. Hence, the spatial expansion of 
capitalism was inherently marked by an intensified inter-imperialist and 
geopolitical rivalry.
 Generally, these classical theories tend to universalise their historically 
specific observations of the characteristics of capitalism that were distinctive to 
late 19th century Europe. There is an overgeneralisation of the assumption that 
there is a causal relationship between the structural features of monopoly and 
finance capital, the export of capital and imperialist expansion, following from a 
‘decaying capitalism’ (Hobson, 2005: 364-6) at home. This overlooks both the 
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possibility of other means whereby capitalism creates fresh room for accumulation 
through a variety of strategies (Bieler et al., 2016: 438) and the role of competition 
between individual capitalists as the driving force behind the relentless search for 
extra profits of a global scale.4 Moreover, it contradicts also the historical dynamics 
of the international movement of capital among capitalist formations in the late 
19th and early 20th century (Kiely, 2010: 76-82). Finally, the exclusive focus on the 
national organisation of the world economy into a ‘plurality of rival national 
economies’ (see also Hobsbawm, 1989: 69) is less useful to account for the 
transnational dimension of capital accumulation. National states are hereby 
understood in a functionalist relationship to the processes of capital accumulation, 
best expressed by both Bukharin and Lenin’s conceptualisation of the state as a 
mere ‘executive committee’ of the ruling classes (Bukharin, 2010: 127). Such a 
position neglects the relative autonomy of the political, legal and cultural realms 
expressed by specific interests emanating from geopolitical pressures. 
 Contemporary Marxist scholars have extended these insights to understand 
the complex relationship between the two distinctive, but interrelated, logics of 
geopolitical competition and the economic imperative of capitalist expansion. 
Most notably, Harvey (2003) takes capitalist imperialism as the contradictory 
fusion of the ‘politics of state and empire’ and the ‘molecular processes of capital 
accumulation in space and time’. The former comprises thereby the political 
project of territorial command invoked by the political, economic and military 
strategies of particular state actors, and the latter resembles the flows of economic 
power through “practices of production, trade, commerce, capital flows, money 
transfers, labour migration, technology transfer, currency speculation, flows of 
information, cultural impulses and the like” (Harvey, 2003: 26-7). In distinguishing 
between these two spheres of imperialism, Harvey separates the ‘territorial’ from 
the ‘capitalist’ logics of power, but, at the same time, they are intertwined and 
often contradictory. In other words, both logics are dialectically related to each 
other rather than a functional outcome of the other, leading Harvey to define 
capitalist imperialism in terms of the “intersection of these two distinctive but 
intertwined logics of power” (ibid.: 30). Alex Callinicos, in turn, distinguishes 
more explicitly between these two logics of power and argues that there is 
necessarily a ‘realist moment’ in any Marxist analysis of international relations, as 
it has to “take into account the strategies, calculations and interactions of rival 
political elites” (Callinicos, 2007: 542; 2009). However, this suggests that the two 
4 Bukharin criticises the theory of underconsumption and formulates a different interpretation of 
capital export. In Imperialism	and	 the	Accumulation	of	Capital, he writes: “The expansion of capital is 
conditioned by the movement of profit […] If cheaper means of production and cheaper labour are 
available, the rate of profit climbs accordingly, and capital tries to exploit this situation. […] As a result 
of that, the roots of capitalist expansion lie in the conditions of buying as well as in the process of 
production itself, and finally in the conditions of selling” (Bukharin, [1924] 1972: 256-7).
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logics are externally related to each other, which runs the risk of giving ontological 
autonomy to extra-economic factors or the geopolitical relations between states as 
operating independently from their underpinning capitalist social relations.
 In order to make sense of the spatial effects of capital accumulation within 
the context and dynamics of geopolitical conditions, it is necessary to take into 
account historical specification of the conditions under which capitalist class 
relations took shape politically. Historically, capitalism emerged within a pre- 
existing international system of territorially demarcated states (Teschke, 2003; 
Lacher, 2006; see also Skopcol, 1979). The capitalist social relations of production 
initially developed in medieval England from a particular set of social property 
relations based on a landlord/capitalist tenant/wage-labourer structure (Brenner, 
1985: 46-9; Wood, 2002). These key developments gave rise to a “mode of societal 
organisation that involved both a particular organisation of production and 
exploitation and a particular differentiation between the private and the public” 
(Teschke and Lacher, 2007: 568). What distinguishes capitalist societies from 
non-capitalist societies is that in the latter, economic powers of dominant classes 
rely on ‘extra-economic’ coercion such as political and military power to extract 
surplus. In a capitalist society, capitalists generally do not need direct control of 
coercive military or political force to exploit their workers as the appropriation of 
surplus is granted through the process of capital circulation, which is mediated by 
the market relations of exchange making the worker ‘free’ to sell his labour power 
in exchange for a wage in order to work and live (Wood, 2005: 10-1). This has 
created a formal separation of capitalism’s purely economic modes of production 
from the production sphere, which enables capital to extend beyond the border of 
direct political domination (ibid.: 12). Hence, the two moments of class exploitation 
in capitalist societies – the appropriation of surplus labour and the coercive power 
that enforces it – are divided between private corporations and the public power of 
the state controlling the legal authority and military capacity necessary to exert 
direct coercive force (ibid.: 14). 
 Hence, there is an intrinsic connection, or an inherent internal	relation, between 
the two spheres of power. Capitalists continue to depend on the coercive functions 
of the state to secure the social order of private property relations and to maintain 
the favourable conditions for the accumulation of capital by providing a legal and 
institutional framework that guarantees stability and predictability in its social 
arrangements (Harvey, 2003: 94; Wood, 2005: 10-4). Crucially, while the basic 
condition of capitalist expansion beyond the limits of political domination is the 
imposition of economic imperatives, it can only do so if the ‘laws’ of the capitalist 
economy are themselves extended, something that needs extra-economic help 
(Wood, 2005: 20). In other words, the export of the productive forces means export 
of the ‘whole package’ of the capitalist mode of production that includes class 
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relations and modes of distribution and consumption (Harvey, 2006: 434). 
These observations are relevant for grasping the outward and uneven expansion 
of capitalism and the concomitant incorporation of peripheral regions into an 
expanded free trade regime since the 1980s and, more specifically, the particular 
nature and function of IIAs and the role of states in extending a legal framework 
enhancing private property rights and contractual relations to other parts of 
the world.
2.1.3  The legal dimension of capitalist expansion
Capitalist expansion and the concomitant inclusion of new markets as prerequisites 
for the stabilisation and reproduction of the capitalist system requires various 
forms of regulation. As the process of capital accumulation is permeated by a 
range of contradictions that inhibit the self-valorisation of capital, the reproduction 
of capitalism depends, albeit in an unstable and contradictory way, on various 
extra-economic mechanisms “whose efficacy depends on their location beyond 
market mechanisms” (Jessop, 2002: 19; Jessop and Sum, 2006: 15). Such mechanisms 
are crucial in stabilising and facilitating the ongoing process of capital 
accumulation in the context of the dynamic and expansionary nature of capitalism. 
This implies that markets are not merely economic phenomena that exist 
externally to extra-economic interferences, but they are rather inherent social 
and political constructs that need different types of regulation for their 
reproduction (Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 15; Van Apeldoorn and Horn, 2007: 
211-5). Although capitalist reinvestment, driven by the coercive logics of 
competition, is necessary for the self-valorisation of capital as the process through 
which capital expands, there are no guarantees that capitalists will indefinitely 
reinvest their accumulated capital into the production process. Whether a 
company or an investor decides to actually invest capital into new markets depends 
also on the different characteristics pertaining to a particular market that may 
enhance or affect the profitability of such an investment. These may include 
factors such as market growth prospects, unit labour costs, infrastructure, 
taxation, access to international capital markets, and the overall political and 
legal environment. This makes an investment an inherent ‘forward-looking decision’ 
(Stanford, 2008: 143) that relies on a variety of extra-economic mechanisms aimed 
at ensuring and facilitating not only the stable accumulation and expansion of 
capital, but also at conditioning and securing claims to future extraction and 
appropriation of surplus value. 
 Legal rules on the promotion and protection of foreign investment enshrined 
in bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements embody the construction 
of rights around private property and therefore need to be understood as an 
integral and crucial part of the broad ensemble of extra-economic mechanisms to 
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sustain capital accumulation. It is the particular legal form through which the 
social relations of capitalist production are expressed that warrants further 
attention. In his seminal publication A	 General	 Theory	 of	 Law	 and	 Marxism (1978 
[1929]), the Soviet jurist Evgeny Pashukanis draws on the fetishisation of social 
relations, whereby he seeks to elucidate the “deep interconnection between the 
legal form and the commodity form” (Pashukanis, 1978: 63; Hunt, 2010). In his 
analysis, Pashukanis builds on Marx’s assertion that a commodity is ‘a very strange 
thing’. Commodities cannot themselves go to market and perform exchanges; 
markets depend on people as the ‘possessors of commodities’, as ‘owners of private 
property’ (Marx, 1990: 178). This creates a juridical moment – or relation – as these 
owners of private property must recognise each other as equal for exchange to 
take place. As Pashukanis (1978: 85) writes, “[i]n as much as the wealth of capitalist 
society appears as ‘an immense collection of commodities’ (Marx, 1990: 125), so 
this society itself appears as an endless chain of legal relations”. For Pashukanis, 
the role of law is equivalent to the role of money in the process of exchange, 
implying “the idea of society as a contract society, in which individual subjects 
recognise each other as equals and enter on a voluntary basis into exchange 
relations with one another” (Hartmann, 2011: 566; Mieville, 2005: 88; see also 
Harvey, 2014: 39). The importance of property rights should therefore be 
understood within the context of social power relations. In a capitalist society, 
market relations between people owning commodities are relations of formal 
equality (Jessop, 2002: 39; Marx, 1990: 271). Yet this equality is only present in the 
realm of exchange, and conceals the fundamental power asymmetry residing in 
the social relations of capitalist production as constituted by capitalist property 
relations. The legal form thus simultaneously materialises and mystifies the social 
relations of production by creating illusionary forms of equality, thereby 
neutralising and depoliticising relationships that “are by definition coercive, 
exploitative and inherently political” (Cutler, 2005: 532; see also Kennedy, 1985: 
976-7; Pashukanis, 1978). In the end, the legal structures of contract and property 
are prerequisites for the establishment and enforcement of the private ownership 
of the means of production, which in turn allows for the private appropriation of 
produced commodities, the private appropriation of surplus value, and thus the 
private accumulation of capital. Private property rights are thus at the very basis 
of the capital relation.
 Taking a structuralist approach, Pashukanis’ theory runs the risk of being 
viewed as deterministic and detached from politics. The legal form is considered 
as the form of a particular kind of relationship, suggesting that legal rules can 
only follow from that relationship and that their specific socio-economic content 
is contingent (Mieville, 2005: 85). This assertion has raised some criticism as 
Pashukanis “isolated law from its content and reduced quite different forms of 
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law, expressing qualitatively different social relations, to a single, static and 
illusory ‘legal form’” (Fine, 2002: 159; Bowring, 2008). In that sense, Pashukanis 
seemingly fails to address questions of politics and tends to ignore the role of the 
state in advancing and shaping the law, and the role of class struggle therein. At 
the same time, as Pashukanis was primarily concerned with the legal form rather 
than its content, it would be overly simplistic to consider this theory as an “empty 
bottle into which any content can be poured” (Mieville, 2005: 119). Indeed, both 
form and content ought to be understood and conceptualised as dialectically or 
symbiotically related qualities of social formation rather than being separate and 
isolated from each other. Giving ontological primacy to non-economic factors 
would imply taking the law as a mere tool or instrument at the disposal of the 
dominant classes. Such an instrumentalist understanding of law remains within 
the fallacy of distinguishing between economics and politics and associating the 
law with the political and ideological superstructure (Cutler, 2003: 96; see also 
Holloway and Picciotto, 1978). In other words, separating content and form would 
produce an ‘apolitical’ understanding of law by perceiving law as a mere 
“expression” of what is “rather than an arena of struggle, a forum with potential 
political and economic effects” (Hirst, 1979: 137-8; quoted in Cutler, 2003: 96).
 Whereas Pashukanis’ theory could offer a helpful understanding of wider 
processes of legalisation	(Abbott et al., 2000), juridification	(Cutler, 2005) or constitu-
tionalisation (Schneiderman, 2008) of social and economic relations, his theory 
seems less adequate to explain the political struggles informing the particular 
socio-economic content of legal norms and rules. There are many different ways in 
which the social relations of capitalism can be inscribed into law, and this does 
not necessarily have to be in favour of the interests of capital (cf. Van Apeldoorn, 
2004: 154; Jessop, 2002: 41). Hence, it is necessary to account for the continued 
importance of agency in this respect; dominant classes are still able to “force 
particular political contents into the abstract legal form” (Mieville, 2005: 120). The 
potential for the imposition of a particular content into the legal form mirrors 
Marx’s discussion of factory legislation: “There is here therefore an antinomy, of 
right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchange. Between 
equal rights, force decides” (Marx, 1990: 344).
 A critical understanding of legal rules on the protection of foreign investment 
should reject a rigid distinction between an economic base and a politico-juridical 
superstructure and should take international investment law as inherently 
political and hence internally related to the underlying capitalist social relations. 
E.P. Thompson (1975: 262) contends that law functions as an instrument mediating 
and reinforcing existent class relations; as an ideology, legitimating class relations; 
and as a material expression of class relations through legal forms. Likewise, Ellen 
Meiskins Wood (1995: 27) argues that “relations of production themselves take the 
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form of particular juridical and political relations – modes of domination and 
coercion, forms of property and social organisation – which are not mere secondary 
reflexes, nor even just external supports, but constituents of the productive 
relations”. It is therefore important to highlight and acknowledge the role of law, 
and of international investment law in this regard, in the reproduction of the 
structural inequalities that characterise capitalist societies. 
 Hence, there is an inherent imperialist element to international investment 
law inasmuch as it purports to bridge the dialectically related logics of capitalist 
expansion and territorial power. Although the transnational rules on investment 
protection are drawn from the legal conceptions of property rights originated in 
the juridical traditions of the core capitalist states, particularly those of the US 
(Schneiderman, 2008), their ambiguous and expansive interpretation and 
application in the context of ISDS suggests that they in fact constitute a greater 
and expanded set of substantive rights that go well beyond current national legal 
systems (Nichols, 2018; Johnson and Volkov, 2013; Schneiderman, 2014). The 
transnational regime of investment protection could be understood then as an 
emergent form of supranational legal order that operates beyond the domestic 
legal orders of states as a manifestation of what has been referred to as ‘deterrito-
rialisation’ (Brenner, 1999: 43) or ‘globalised localism’ (Santos, 2002: 179; see also 
Schneiderman, 2013) where particular national projects have become hegemonic 
on a global scale in terms of their expanded geographical and substantive scope 
and their deep penetration into domestic political, legal and social orders (Cutler, 
2005: 532; Schneiderman, 2008: 111-12). At the same time, the modes and ways 
through which dominant legal rules and norms in the transnational sphere are 
being incorporated in domestic orders – or hence ‘reterritorialised’ (Brenner, 1999: 
43) – are actively shaped and managed by the state and state projects underpinned 
by a particular configuration of social forces within a given space. The 
commodity-form of this transnational legal regime, that is, the form of investment 
treaties between states, has thereby the effect of obscuring, under the guise of 
notions of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘reciprocity’ (Anghie, 2005; Mieville, 2005; Pashukanis, 
1978), the underlying hierarchical and uneven nature of the global political 
economy (Hartmann, 2011: 566). The aspect of homogenising states as legal 
subjects into equals thus disguises the actual power relations and patterns of 
extraction and accumulation between those states. The imperialist nature of 
international investment law is thus reflected by the uneven relationship in which 
particular socio-economic power constellations seek to construct hegemony 
through ideational domination, backed by the coercive powers of the state, to 
impose and expand a capitalist legal framework with the aim to secure and 
facilitate a stable accumulation of capital. The evolution of the transnational 
investment regime is therefore intrinsically connected to the wider developments 
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of transnational capitalism, which are crucial for grasping the realities and 
contradictions of the EU investment policy.
2.2  Agency: class and class fractions 
The coming about and transformation of the EU investment policy should not be 
merely understood in the context of the abovementioned structural pressures and 
tendencies inherent to capital accumulation, but above all as the result of ongoing 
and open-ended political struggles between opposing social forces and class 
fractions. This section conceptualises class by distinguishing between its 
structural and agential dimension, by highlighting the functional and 
geographical fractionalisation of class, and by looking at class beyond its traditional 
categorisation in terms of capital and labour to account for the manifold ways in 
which power structures are challenged by the agency deployed by social 
movements and other subaltern social forces. 
2.2.1  Class formation in capitalist societies
As Marx and Engels famously wrote in The	Communist	Manifesto, “[t]he history of all 
hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” and that capitalist 
societies are “more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two 
great classes directly facing each other; bourgeoisie and proletariat” (Marx and 
Engels [1848] 2008: 30-1). The critical political economy perspective adopted here 
takes these social forces engendered by the material process of capitalist production 
as the most important collective actors. Social forces are rooted in capitalist social 
relations that result from the unequal distribution of material resources based on 
the unequal ownership and control over the means of production. Workers, who 
are deprived of their property under capitalism, must sell their labour power in 
exchange of a wage in order to survive, whereas capitalists own the means of 
production and hire workers in order to extract the surplus value produced by the 
workers (Wright, 2000: 13-4). These fundamental unequal social relations of 
production are obfuscated by the seemingly voluntary character of market 
relations of exchange, which mediates the appropriation of surplus value produced 
by the workers through the process of capital circulation (Wood, 2002: 96-7). The 
unequal power relations in capitalist production can therefore be understood in 
terms of the underlying class	structure of capitalist society, which refers hereby to 
the “structure of social relations into which individuals enter which determine 
their class interests” (Wright, 1985: 9; Poulantzas, 1978). 
 Notwithstanding this, it would be mistaken to understand the actions of 
individual agents as determined by their class position in capitalist society. As E.P. 
Thompson (1966: 9) writes, “class happens when some men [sic], as a result of 
common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their 
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interests as between themselves, and as against other men [sic] whose interests are 
different from (and usually opposed to) theirs”. Hence, for Thompson, class is a 
historical relationship as it is “defined by men [sic] as they live their own history” 
(ibid.: 11). Class can indeed be defined as a social construction, albeit one that is 
shaped by the material structures of the capitalist production process. Class agents 
are not puppets on a string but also not omnipotent puppet masters (see Wigger 
and Horn, 2016), which implies that within each given structural setting, agents 
are not entirely free in their actions. The class structure of capitalist society may 
generate class	 formation, which involves the formation of collectively organised 
social forces within and across different locations in a class structure in pursuit of 
their class interests. This includes creating both formal institutions as well as 
informal networks than enhance class capacities and thus shape the balance of 
power within class struggles (Wright, 2000: 191; Wright, 1985: 9-10). 
 The concept of class thus refers both to the structural position from which 
agents operate as well as to the particular form of agency eventually engendered 
by that position. The artificial duality in such conceptualisation relates to Marx’s 
distinction between a class-in-itself as something shaped by the mode of production, 
and a class-for-itself as an active and self-conscious group with similar preferences 
and actions (Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 22; Robinson, 2004: 43). The transition from a 
class-in-itself to a class-for-itself is made in class struggle referring to the organised 
forms of antagonistic class practices (Wright, 2000: 192-3). Class struggle thus 
takes place within the context of objective social structures of the capitalist 
system, but becomes manifest through the particular agency of individual and/or 
collective agents that transform and reproduce the structures of capital domination 
over labour. Both the structural and the agential dimension of the concept of class 
should therefore be understood in relational terms as constituting “different 
expressions of a single phenomenon which arises out of concrete historical 
processes” (Colas, 2002: 196; see also Joseph, 2006: 23). Crucially, classes are not 
static but instead continuously shaped through various socio-economic, political 
and ideological factors that are dialectically related to the broader transformation 
of capitalism.
2.2.2  Capitalist class and class fractions
Neither capital nor labour is a unified class with homogenised interests, but 
instead consist of internal fractions that have their own specific preferences. 
Following the scholars of the Amsterdam Project (Van der Pijl, 2012, 1998; 
Overbeek, 2004; Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Overbeek and Van der Pijl, 1993; see also 
Palloix, 1975; Poulantzas, 1975), the defining aspect of a class	 fraction is that its 
members are “unified around a common economic and social function in the 
process of capital accumulation and sharing particular ideological propensities 
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organically related to those functions” (Van der Pijl, 1989: 11; Buch-Hansen and 
Wigger, 2011: 19). The basis for the analysis of capital fractions as part of the 
capitalist class is found in Volume 2 of Capital, in which Marx considers the 
different functional forms capital assumes in the circuits composing the overall 
reproductive circuit of capital: commodity capital, money capital, and productive 
capital (Marx, 1993: 109-79; Overbeek, 2004: 118; Macartney, 2009).5 The particular 
ideological outlook and orientation of money and commodity capital may 
potentially differ from those bound up with productive capital. In particular, 
money capital would be naturally more inclined to the principles of what Polanyi 
referred to as economic liberalism, which strives for the “establishment of a 
self-regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using 
largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods” (Polanyi, 2001: 132). On the 
other hand, productive capital tends to be more oriented towards the principles of 
social protection, understood as “aiming at the conservation of man and nature as 
well as productive organisation […] and using protective legislation, restrictive 
associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods” (ibid.). This is 
due to the fact that productive capital is more embedded in the network of social 
relations that are directly tied to the production process. Productive capital is thus 
more rooted in territoriality since it is structurally tied to previously made 
investments in fixed capital, machinery, infrastructure, labour and the like (Van 
der Pijl, 2012: 16). The productive capitalist is therefore primarily concerned with 
securing the preconditions necessary for capital accumulation through the 
production process and the reproduction of the capital-labour relation, which 
ultimately place certain limits on the liberal worldview pertaining to money 
capital. 
 Next to this functional differentiation, capital can also be geographically 
fractionalised along the “spatial coordinates of capital accumulation” into 
nationally and transnationally oriented capital (Overbeek and Van der Pijl, 1993: 
5). Money capital is inherently more mobile than productive capital and therefore 
“can not but have a strong international aspect” (Van der Pijl, 2012: 10). Productive 
capital tends to be spatially constrained as argued above and relies heavily on state 
regulation to further its particular interests. However, as outlined in Section 2.2, 
capital exhibits an inherent tendency towards outward expansion, thereby 
intensifying the process of transnationalising productive capital. Productive 
capital can thus be subdivided into production sectors that produce for national or 
regional markets, and production sectors that produce for the transnational 
5 Fractions of capital based on this functional division would incorporate for example banking and 
insurance capital (money capital); various forms of commercial capital such as wholesale and retail or 
import/export capital (capital engaged in trading activities) (commodity capital); and manufacturing, 
natural resource extraction and processing, transportation and other activities based on their real 
value adding function (productive capital) (Van der Pijl, 1998: 52).
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market (Bieler and Morton, 2001: 17). This means that transnational productive 
capital naturally leans towards the principles of the free markets and free trade, 
whereas national productive capital has a natural inclination towards 
protectionism and state interventions in the face of foreign competition. 
 The transnationalisation of capital can lead to the rise of transnational class 
agency. One way through which transnational capitalist class formation takes 
place is through so-called ‘interlocking directorship’, in which corporate elites 
take seat in the board of directors of other companies (Heemskerk et al., 2016; Van 
der Pijl et al., 2011; Carroll, 2010). Such networks contribute to the domination of 
a small group of people that exercises control over a large number of companies, 
thereby taking leadership over the capitalist class as a whole. Secondly, and more 
relevant for the present study, transnational capitalist class formation occurs 
through the creation of various formal institutions, business associations, think 
tanks and lobby groups (Van der Pijl, 2012, 1998; Robinson, 2004; Van Apeldoorn, 
2002; Sklair, 2001; Gill, 1990). Within the European context, business associations 
such as BusinessEurope and the European Roundtable of Industrialists tend to 
represent primarily transnational industrial capital, whereas groups such as the 
European Services Forum or the European Financial Services Roundtable represent 
transnational financial capital. However, this does not mean that those groups 
exclusively represent one particular fraction of capital. Many European business 
associations, such as BusinessEurope and Eurochambres, have a membership 
consisting of national industry federations that represent different capital 
fractions. However, those national federations do not necessarily defend the 
interests of nationally oriented capital. These groups, in turn, increasingly defend 
the interests of transnational capital and are often directly involved in lobbying 
processes at the European level as well. Nevertheless, while organised capital at 
the European level may cut across the axes that delineate class fractions, one could 
speak of the emergence of a ‘European capitalist class’ (Van Apeldoorn, 2014) that 
has become inextricably bound up with the interests of transnational capital since 
the late 1980s. 
2.2.3  Class analysis beyond capital and labour
Like capital, labour should not be conceptualised as a unitary actor but rather as 
internally divided along certain fractions with contradictory material interests. 
The pressures on labour emanating from structural changes in global capitalism 
have been well documented (e.g. Silver, 2003; Dunn, 2004; Bieler and Lindberg, 
2010). The key challenges for and responses by labour have often been understood 
in terms of the material position of workers in relation to their form of employment 
and within economic or industrial sectors. As Clua-Losada and Horn (2014: 104) 
write, “industrial workers may be seen to have conflicting interests to those in the 
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services industry or vice versa”. The agency of labour is not only shaped by those 
material conditions, for example by the organisational capabilities and resources 
of workers and trade unions, but also by the changing institutional terrains and 
forms of state in which labour is embedded. The integration of European trade 
unions into the hegemonic structures of the EU institutional ensembles, for 
example through social partnership agreements, has led to tensions with more 
radical and marginalised grassroots unions, thereby ultimately weakening the 
position of organised labour (Horn, 2012a; Wigger and Horn, 2014). In addition, 
workers in some locations may be pitted against workers in another location in 
cases of companies moving abroad. The spatial division of workers and trade 
unions across the world has been associated with the ‘problem of transnational 
solidarity’ (Bieler et al., 2014; Bieler, 2013; Bieler and Lingberg, 2010). The uneven 
development of global capitalism has placed workers in different structural 
positions, whereby trade unions in the Global North tend to be more ideologically 
inclined to support trade liberalisation and other export-oriented policies, albeit 
conditionally, in comparison to their counterparts in the Global South. This poses 
a major challenge for the transnational labour movement as trade unions are 
forced to choose to take side: “as junior partners of capital based on shared interests 
with their national industries, or as active members of an internationalist 
movement, the role of which is to contest the power of capital on behalf of the 
working people the world over” (Bieler et al., 2014: 7). 
 At the same time, it warrants to be careful with overly pessimistic accounts 
that highlight the structural weakness of labour when facing organised capital 
supported by the capitalist state. In order to grasp the manifestation of various 
forms of social mobilisation and the emancipatory dynamics of social resistance, 
particularly in the context of the making of the EU investment policy, it is 
necessary to go beyond an exclusive focus on the struggle between capital and 
labour at the workplace by including other forms of social struggles related to 
deeper structures of exploitation and contestation. The critical political economy 
perspective taken here builds on a broad understanding of class agency by not 
looking simply at the strategies by trade unions and business associations, but by 
extending that analysis to broader social movements that engage in challenging 
processes of capitalist exploitation, commodification and privatisation (e.g. Barker 
et al., 2013). Such an expanded view on class struggle suggests that the production 
and reproduction of capital and labour does not only take place in the workplace 
in a narrow sense, but also in what Cleaver ([1979] 2000) has called the ‘social 
factory’, which allows for the extension of exploitation into the entire sphere of 
social reproduction. This means that the notion of class struggle should also 
unravel the social relations of race, gender, ecology and other areas of struggle, 
albeit as internally	 constitutive	 of class (McNally, 2015). As capitalist expansion 
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induces processes of commodification and marketisation, this then also extends 
the scope of capitalist accumulation and concomitant forms of exploitation into 
new realms of social, economic and ecological life. “In response to the commodifi-
cation of social services and the intensified destruction of the biosphere as well as 
the disruption of traditional life, a whole range of new, progressive but also 
nationalist right-wing social movements have emerged to defend the environment 
and sphere of social reproduction” (Bieler, 2014: 124-5; see also Van der Pijl, 1998: 
36-49 Bakker and Gill, 2003). Hence, focusing on issues within and across the 
entire social factory beyond the mere workplace allows for an analysis of organic 
cross-linkages between trade unions and other social movements and, ultimately, 
a broader understanding of social resistance.
 Much has been written about the role of social movements in resisting and 
contesting global trade and investment rules (see for example Gill, 2000; Walter, 
2001; Egan, 2001; Johnston and Laxer, 2003; Hardt and Negri, 2004; Scholl, 2013; 
Choudry, 2014). These movements – often referred to as ‘counter-globalisation 
movements’ (Scholl and Freyberg-Inan, 2013), ‘ethical globalists’ (Gill, 2008: 260; 
see also Clark, 2003; Pobodnik and Reifer, 2005) or ‘transnational advocacy 
networks’ (Johnston and Laxer, 2003; see also Keck and Sikkink, 1998) – typically 
consists of a myriad of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that work on a 
wide array of different issues, such as human rights, environmental protection, 
public health, consumer rights, food safety, gender equality, indigenous rights, 
development aid, and digital rights. Such groups tend to coalesce around normative 
principles that seemingly transcend class issues, including diversity, participatory 
democratic governance, anti-consumerism and respect for ecological boundaries, 
thereby seeking inter	 alia more equitable redistribution of wealth and power, 
better representation of ordinary citizens and developing country perspectives at 
the global level, limits to the influence of markets and corporate power, and the 
protection and fostering of public spaces and commons (Scholl and Freyberg-Inan, 
2013: 620; Freyberg-Inan, 2006). These diverse forms of political action could be 
understood in terms of what Stephen Gill has referred to as the ‘postmodern 
prince’ when observing the emergence of counter-globalisation movements and 
protests towards the end of the 1990s (Gill, 2000; see also Sanbonmatsu, 2004). 
These movements do not necessarily embody a collective actor but rather represent 
“a strategy or agenda of a collective political subject directed at constructing a 
more ethical, just and sustainable world order” (Wigger and Horn, 2014: 250). 
While such a strategy or agenda has to be understood as embedded in wider 
political, economic and ecological conditions, its class character is not always 
apparent and tends to be overlooked. Indeed, not all forms of collective action are 
necessarily rooted in class or class awareness, yet such agency may nonetheless 
have ‘conjuncturally determined’ class relevance (Jessop, 2002: 32). This is reflected 
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by what Harvey asserts that “if it looks like class struggle and acts like class war 
then we have to name it unashamedly for what it is” (Harvey, 2005: 202). In that 
sense, one could conclude that any struggle against capitalist exploitation – either 
in the social, economic or ecological sphere – can be seen as class struggle.
 At the same time, class struggle should not be confined to the agency of trade 
unions and NGOs. Many of the Marxist and neo-Gramscian scholarship tend to 
reduce social struggles to top-down institutional arrangements by highlighting 
the nature and direction of particular hegemonic state projects that are bound up 
with particular fractions of capital. Subsequently, emerging forms of resistance 
are often perceived as limited or as reactive only (Featherstone, 2015; Wigger, 
2018). Many accounts that conceptualise the role of social movements in contesting 
global trade and investment rules and practices tend to exclusively focus on 
organised forms of resistance. Some scholars have identified an increasing ‘corpo-
ratisation of activism’ or ‘NGOisation’ of social movements, understood as the 
“professionalisation and institutionalisation of social resistance through the 
participation of a politically rather moderate yet growing stratum of transnational 
activists” (Wigger and Horn, 2014: 253-4; see also Dauvergne and LeBaron, 2014). 
Some of the larger trade unions and NGOs may in fact be co-opted within the 
institutional terrains of the European state project. This may also have implications 
for the ideological orientations of those organisations. De Ville and Siles-Brügge 
(2015: 100-1) make a useful distinction between ‘rejectionists’ who fundamentally 
oppose the expansion of global capitalism and ‘reformists’ that seek to improve 
the structures of global economic governance from within the system. At the same 
time, they suggest that there is a certain fluidity between these categories as 
evidence suggests that NGOs increasingly position themselves in the latter camp 
to gain credibility among policymakers and subsequently turn from activists into 
the providers of technical expertise (see also Hannah, 2014; Hopewell, 2009). 
Moreover, European and transnational NGOs and think tanks tend to be implicitly 
oriented towards the EU terrain, which potentially limits their capacities to 
articulate and translate more locally rooted struggles into proper counter-hegemonic 
projects. 
 While the agency of certain ‘vanguard’ organisations is certainly important 
for the formulation of critiques and alternatives, it remains crucial to look for the 
potential of establishing cross-linkages with more disruptive forms of dissent, 
protest and resistance outside the remit of the institutional realms of the state, 
such as demonstrations, strikes, square occupations, as well as more concrete 
material economic practices, in order to evaluate whether a counter-hegemonic 
project can truly generate radical social change (e.g. Huke et al., 2015; Bailey et al., 
2017; Wigger, 2018). This allows for an analysis of a wide array of different 
progressive moments and forms of resistance and contestation across the ‘social 
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factory’ in Europe. Mobilisations and protests against the EU trade and investment 
policy do not necessarily involve specialised and technically informed people and 
organisations with clear-cut visions on how to organise and shape trade and 
investment rules. Rather, these mobilisations consist of human agency rooted in 
micro-level interactions with the global political economy and concerned with 
what has been referred to as ‘the everyday’ (Hobson and Seabrooke, 2007). This 
type of contestation takes primarily place in the sphere of social reproduction and 
is reflected for example in the form of urban-based social movements grounded in 
grassroots democracy and practices of civil disobedience in occupying prominent 
public squares (Harvey, 2012) or European protests against further privatisation 
and deregulation of crucial spheres of social life, such as public health, housing, 
education and other public services (Bieler, 2017; Jordan, 2017; Kishimoto and 
Petitjean, 2017; Bailey et al., 2017).
2.3  A strategic-relational approach to the state and state institutions
The state offers a social terrain on which political struggles take place in capitalist 
societies. The relationship between the state and capitalism should be grasped 
dialectically inasmuch that both are internally related forms or expressions of the 
same underlying configuration of social production relations (cf. Bieler and 
Morton, 2018; Van Apeldoorn et al., 2012; Morton, 2007a; Van der Pijl, 2007; 
Robinson, 2004). The social relations of production as well as the social forces with 
their particular social struggles and political strategies are the key feature of 
capitalist societies and provide therefore an adequate starting point for the 
analysis and conceptualisation of the state. 
 The state is considered here as a social relation and needs to be seen as a 
form-determined	condensation of the balance of political forces (Jessop, 1990: 149; 
Poulantzas, 1978). Social class relations do not exist in an exterior relation to the 
state, but are inscribed in the state itself. As Nikos Poulantzas (1978: 132) writes, “[t]
he state is the condensation of a relationship of forces between classes and class 
fractions, such as these express themselves, in a necessarily specific form, within	
the	state	 itself” (original emphasis). For Poulantzas, the state condenses dominant 
societal interests and forms thereby a ‘site and a centre of the exercise of power’, in 
which various social forces struggle for the recognition and pursuit of their 
interests and values (ibid.: 148). This condensation takes the shape of a network 
of different institutions and agencies that do not necessarily constitute a 
homogeneous block, but rather may stand in a contentious relationship to each 
other. Despite such differences between state institutions, a certain coherence can 
emerge and be institutionalised over time. Political struggles of the past are 
inscribed in the state, materialising it as an institutional ensemble of underlying 
power relations between social groups (Jessop, 1990: 260-2; Jessop, 2008: 37; see 
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also Hirsch and Kannankulam, 2011: 16; Brand et al., 2011: 158). The state as an 
institutional ensemble constitutes hence a social terrain “upon which different 
political forces attempt to impart a specific strategic direction to the individual or 
collective activities of its different branches” (Jessop, 1990: 268). State power can 
thus be understood as “a power relation that is mediated in and through this 
institutional ensemble” (Jessop, 2002: 6). 
 This means that the state cannot be seen as a neutral social terrain nor as a 
terrain that is equally accessible to all social groups. Insofar as the dominant 
classes are internally fractionalised, the state has to mediate between the specific 
interests of the various class fractions, implying that state policies may not 
necessarily favour the interests of a particular fraction. The state enjoys thus a 
certain relative	autonomy vis-à-vis classes and class fractions (Poulantzas, 1975: 97; 
Poulantzas, 1978: 127). In his strategic-relational understanding of the state and 
state power, Bob Jessop assigns the capitalist state with a certain ‘strategic 
selectivity’, which means that the state has an in-built structural bias that makes 
it more open to some types of political strategy than others and more readily 
mobilised for capitalist policies (Jessop, 1990: 147-8, 260; Jessop, 2008: 127). 
As Jessop (2002: 40) writes:
By strategic selectivity, I understand the ways in which the state considered as a 
social ensemble has a specific, differential impact on the ability of various political 
forces to pursue particular interests and strategies in specific spatio- temporal 
contexts through their access to and or control over given state capacities – 
capacities that always depend for their effectiveness on links to forces and powers 
that exist and operate beyond the state’s formal boundaries.
While accepting that the state is capitalist itself since it is an integral part of the 
capitalist relations of production, it does not function as the immediate instrument 
of the dominant classes (Hirsch and Kannankulam, 2011: 15). The interests and 
strategies of state managers are informed by their institutional position within 
the capitalist state, which, in turn, itself is structurally dependent economically 
and politically on the capitalist economy and on those who control the production 
process (Drahokoupil et al., 2009: 8; Jessop, 2002: 41). Yet, the institutional 
separation of the state from the capitalist economy may lead to the prevalence of 
“different and potentially contradictory institutional logics and modes of 
calculation in the state and the economy” (Jessop, 2002: 41). In other words, 
political outcomes not necessarily always favour the interests of capital or certain 
capital fractions. The operational autonomy of the state allows state managers to 
pursue particular interests that favour (fractions of) capital over other societal 
interests at	the	general	level, but it also enables them to harm those very interests at 
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the same time. The certain degree of independence that the state enjoys cannot be 
assumed, however, but has to be investigated empirically in order to understand 
that autonomy as part of an institutional mediation of the broader balance of 
social forces.
 Such an understanding of the state should not be confined to the national 
level. As the transnationalisation of capital “neither suppresses nor bypasses the 
nation states” (Poulantzas, 1975: 73), it induces instead the reproduction of capital 
through a process of internalisation within and across different national states as 
the key sites for the mediation and containment of social struggles (Bieler and 
Morton, 2013/14: 42; Bruff, 2012: 184). Against the backdrop of transnationalisa-
tion processes, the social base of the state is thereby no longer located purely at the 
national level as the material condensation of the class compromises increasingly 
includes the interests of transnational capital. Hence, the processes of the 
transnational organisation of production relations, which are internalised 
through the social struggles within each social formation, effectively lead to a 
profound restructuring of the state and state forms. Such restructuring processes 
have been identified as the ‘internationalisation of the state’, which can be 
understood as the fundamental process of transforming the state and the state 
system under the external economic pressures of global capitalism (Cox, 1987). 
Although the internationalisation of the state in a Coxian sense often entails the 
conception of the state as a political-institutional system which operates as a 
‘transmission belt’ for global power constellations into the national societies (Cox, 
1992: 31; see also Robinson, 2004), such internationalisation should not be 
understood as a process influencing the state from the outside, but as a development 
internal to it (Wissel, 2011: 216). It is certainly true that national states are no 
longer autonomous international actors as they have become increasingly 
embedded in an ever-expanding network of regulations across different spatial 
levels, resulting in a complex spatio-institutional configuration (Wissen and 
Brand, 2011: 2). Although ‘the international’ has become an increasingly 
conditioning feature of global capitalism (Bruff, 2010: 616; Morton, 2007b: 170), 
this does not mean that the state disappears or becomes increasingly irrelevant in 
socio-economic policy-making processes. Instead, the process of global 
restructuring materialises “through an internalisation within different state 
forms of new constellations of social forces expressed by class struggles between 
different (national and transnational) fractions of capital and labour” (Bieler and 
Morton, 2018: 128). The emphasis on the internalisation of class interests within 
the state ultimately dismisses any assumptions involving the ‘retreat’ of the state 
(Strange, 1996; Ohmae, 1995) or the emergence of a ‘transnational state’ (Robinson, 
2004).
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 The strategic-relational approach to the state can also be applied to the EU and 
European statehood. The renewed integration processes since the 1980s and 1990s 
that pushed for comprehensive market integration and the concomitant transfers 
of national sovereignty to the European level has resulted in what Bieling (2012) 
calls the ‘communitisation’ of political regulation. This suggests that the EU is 
increasingly becoming an important and complex site for political activity and 
struggles between social forces, which shapes the contours of an emerging yet 
incomplete European state. Within the European context the EU increasingly 
plays a key role in providing the regulatory framework necessary for capitalist 
market economies to thrive, instead of – or next to – national states. This would 
require not only an analysis of the manner in which the interests of transnational 
capital have become internalised within the individual EU member states, but also 
of the way these interests have become internalised and inscribed within the 
institutional set-up of the EU form of state. Rather than viewing the EU as a mere 
‘second order condensation’ that is added on top of nation-states (Brand et al., 
2011), the EU as an institutional ensemble should be understood in terms of its 
transnational nature (Drahokoupil et al., 2009; Van Apeldoorn, 2004), or what 
Jessop (2008: 199-224) refers to an evolving system of ‘multi-scalar meta-governance’. 
The supranational governance structures of the European multi-level polity should 
hence be seen as increasingly embedded within transnational networks of social 
and political forces. 
 In particular, the political role of the European Commission as the central 
node of supranational agency warrants further attention. The European Commission 
should not be portrayed as an autonomous actor as institutionalist accounts often 
do, but as a key public actor deeply embedded within the wider institutional 
configuration of the EU against the backdrop of transnationalising social forces 
and interests (Drahokoupil et al., 2009: 13). Nor should the European Commission 
be viewed as a unitary actor, but rather as an institutional ensemble of its own 
whereby its different branches are bound up with different class fractions 
representing different interests that may conflict with each other. For example, 
DG Trade is by nature of its transnational focus more structurally inclined to serve 
and articulate the interests of transnational capital than for example DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. Such a strategic selectivity is crucial to 
grasp the particular nature and direction of European integration and the 
particular content and form of EU policy decisions. At the same time, this strategic 
selectivity should not be assumed but instead be seen as resulting from specific 
political struggles that reflect wider societal power asymmetries over time. While 
the European Commission operates on the basis of a relative autonomy, it remains 
a crucial site for political struggles in the European Union. 
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 The Council of the European Union represents another important node within 
the European state formation. Critical approaches to European integration tend to 
ignore or underestimate the role of the Council, but as one of the two legislative 
bodies of the EU it constitutes an essential intergovernmental arena where 
different national state projects are transposed to the European level and where 
opposing interests and conflicts between those projects are mediated and 
compromised. Likewise, the European Parliament as the other legislative body of 
the EU plays a key role in supporting and legitimising or contesting particular EU 
policies and should be viewed as an increasingly important institution where 
ideas and interests bound up with particular social forces are politically articulated 
and mediated within the EU as a ‘multilevel state formation’ (Jessop, 2002: 205). 
Lastly, the role of the European Court of Justice as part of the institutional 
ensemble of European governance should be recognised as inherently political as 
its decisions and opinions tend to have far-reaching consequences for the course of 
further market integration within the EU. Although the ECJ itself does not exhibit 
proactive agency, its actions should not be seen autonomously from underlying 
power balances between different social forces.
 Recent scholarship has highlighted the increasingly authoritarian nature of 
EU governance in response to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-9 
(Bruff, 2014; Sandbeck and Schneider, 2014; Oberndorfer, 2015; Tansel, 2017; 
Wigger, 2019). These accounts highlight the “reconfiguring of state and 
institutional power in an attempt to insulate certain policies and institutional 
practices from social and political dissent” (Bruff, 2014: 115). This reconfiguration 
typically involves a strengthening of the executive and judicial branches of the 
state to the detriment of the legislative branch, thereby moving economic deci-
sion-making outside democratic accountability. Particularly, new economic 
governance structures that emerged from several anti-crisis measures in the EU 
have strengthened the surveillance powers of the European Commission as well as 
boosting the role of the European Central Bank as supervisor of the European 
financial system (Radice, 2014; Erne, 2015; Schimmelfennig, 2014). At the same 
time, crisis management in the EU has also revealed the dominance of member 
state coordination in steering EU governance, which underscores the continued 
relevance of the EU member states in shaping the content and form of EU policies. 
Likewise, the crisis itself should be mainly understood in the context of the 
asymmetric and uneven process of capitalist restructuring within the EU (Jäger 
and Springler, 2015; Becker and Jager, 2012; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Bellofiore et al., 
2011) or in terms of ‘variegated capitalism’ (Jessop, 2012; Peck and Theodore, 2007), 
highlighting the dominant role of particular Western member states that are 
bound up with outward looking and capital exporting interests in formulating 
and articulating responses to the crisis. These developments point to the critical 
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role that national states continue to play within the broader and multi-scalar 
institutional ensemble of the EU.
2.4  Regulatory discourses and hegemonic projects
As posited earlier, capitalist markets need different types of extra-economic 
regulation by the state and its juridical and coercive apparatuses for their 
stabilisation and reproduction. A mode of regulation has been understood as an 
“emergent ensemble of norms, institutions, organisational forms, social networks 
and patterns of conduct that can temporarily stabilise an accumulation regime 
despite the conflictual and antagonistic character of capitalist social relations” 
(Jessop and Sum, 2006: 42; see also Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1987; Boyer and Saillard, 
2002). The legal rules aimed at the promotion and protection of foreign investment 
enshrined in regional and bilateral free trade and investment agreements can 
be seen as a specific element of wider fields of regulation (such as competition, 
taxation, trade, labour, environment or monetary issues). Yet, these rules must not 
be understood as imposed in a fixed and pre-given way, but rather as being 
informed by particular ideas and discourses that prevail at a given historical 
juncture. Discourses can be identified as “structured sets of ideas, often in the 
form of implicit and sedimented assumptions, upon which actors might draw in 
formulating strategy and, indeed, in legitimating strategy pursued for quite distinct 
ends” (Hay and Rosamond, 2002: 9). State agents and social forces in general need 
to reduce socio-economic realities in all their complexities by focusing selectively 
on certain aspects. In that sense, discourses provide a “cognitive filter, frame or 
conceptual lens or paradigm through which social, political and economic 
development might be ordered and rendered intelligible” (ibid.: 151; see also Sum, 
2009: 185; Jessop, 2010a). Buch-Hansen and Wigger (2011: 17) distinguish thereby 
between on the one hand a ‘general discourse of regulation’ that “entail more 
encompassing perspectives or structured sets of ideas, on how the economy in a 
given social space ought to be regulated”, and on the other hand, ‘unit-specific 
discourses of regulation’ that “emerge from general discourses, and translate 
them into perspectives on how to deal with the various objects making up the field 
of regulation”. Foreign investment regulation is thus informed by particular 
discourses on how to regulate foreign investment, embedded in wider general 
discourses that are in turn shaped by underlying power relations. 
 The making of the EU investment policy should be understood then as being 
shaped by discursively and hence politically mediated social struggles at a specific 
point in time. The Gramscian notion of hegemony captures both the material and 
ideational dimension of social leadership on the basis of a combination of consent 
and coercion, with the latter “always looming in the background” (Gramsci, 1971: 
169-70). Ideas and discourses are crucial for forging alliances between rival social 
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groups as they shape the interests of particular groups while at the same time also 
helping to legitimise these interests vis-à-vis other social groups (Drahokoupil et 
al., 2009: 9). Subsequently, not all ideas are relevant. As Stuart Hall (1986: 42) 
writes, “[i]deas only become effective if they do, in the end, connect with a 
particular constellation of social forces. In that sense, ideological struggle is a part 
of the general social struggle for mastery and leadership – in short for hegemony”. 
The assumption of hegemony thus relies on the ability to develop a so-called 
‘hegemonic project’ (Jessop, 1990; see also Van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012), 
which is premised on a specific set of ideas on how to organise the market 
underpinned by a specific constellation of social forces. 
This involves the mobilisation of support behind a concrete, national-popular 
programme of action which asserts a general interest in the pursuit of objectives 
that explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class 
(fraction) and which also privileges particular ‘economic-corporate’ interests 
compatible with this programme. Conversely, those particular interests that are 
inconsistent with the project are deemed immoral and/or irrational and, in so far 
as they are still pursued by groups outside the consensus, they are also liable to 
sanction (Jessop, 1990: 208).
This means that the hegemonic power of dominant social groups is not simply 
obtained from their dominant economic position, but has to be constructed and 
compromised. Hegemonic social groups and alliances must therefore present their 
particular interests as ‘the general interest’, but also incorporate certain 
preferences and interests of subordinate groups into a hegemonic discourse 
(Drahokoupil et al., 2009: 9-10; Joseph, 2006: 52). ‘Organic intellectuals’ play a key 
role in formulating and disseminating the ideological and strategic conceptions of 
the world that ultimately serve as a rallying point for organising social forces into 
particular hegemonic projects. According to Gramsci (1971: 9), “all men [sic] are 
intellectuals […] but not all men [sic] have in society the function of intellectuals”. 
These intellectuals are thus organically and fundamentally linked to social forces. 
However, the role of organic intellectuals cannot be perceived as an immediate 
translation and articulation of class interests. For Gramsci, “organic intellectuals 
engage in active participation in everyday life, acting as agents or constructors, 
organisers and ‘permanent persuaders’ in forming social class hegemony […] that 
is then ‘mediated’ by the whole fabric of society” (Bieler and Morton, 2018: 71; see 
also Gramsci, 1971: 12). Accordingly, organic intellectuals are key agents in 
transcending the particular fractional interests and bringing the “interests of the 
leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporate 
these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms” (Cox, 1983: 
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168). Such intellectuals, including experts, think tanks, institutions and other 
agents are crucial in formulating and implementing hegemonic projects and in 
translating narrow self-interests into ‘common sense’.  
 The formulation and concrete materialisation of such hegemonic projects 
centres on the organic articulation of material elements of social practice. In order 
to become hegemonic, a project must articulate a feasible ‘accumulation strategy’, 
which defines a specific economic ‘growth model’ including various extra-economic 
preconditions and general strategies appropriate for its realisation (Jessop, 1990: 
198). An accumulation strategy is primarily oriented at the relations of production, 
while hegemonic projects are typically oriented to broader issues grounded not 
only in the economy but the whole sphere of state-society relations. Both realms 
are internally related and thus constitute two aspects of political action grounded 
in the same relations of production (Morton, 2006: 67). As Jessop highlights (1990: 
201), “the crucial factor in the success of accumulation strategies remains the 
integration of the circuit of capital and hence the consolidation of support within 
the dominant fractions and classes”. Importantly, hegemonic projects are not 
static or everlasting, but are subject to change due to the structural pressures of 
the global political economy and the changing power constellations between 
different social forces. Hegemony needs to be reproduced constantly and its 
stability and endurance can never be guaranteed. For Gramsci, hegemony is never 
complete and remains continuously challenged by subordinate groups. 
 Generally, hegemonic projects tend to follow particular trajectories during 
their ‘life course’, which have been identified as phases of deconstruction, 
construction, consolidation, maturation and delegitimation (Van Apeldoorn and 
Overbeek, 2012: 6-8; see also Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011; Overbeek, 2000). 
During the phase of deconstruction, dominant regulatory discourses are increasingly 
being challenged and delegitimised as a result from the mounting contradictions 
of the existing hegemonic project and rising contestation by rivalling social forces. 
Organic intellectuals play a key role in formulating and articulating new 
regulatory discourses centred on the interests of new fractional configurations. 
The phase of construction involves the normalisation of the new regulatory discourse 
as ‘common sense’ that enjoys the support of a majority of capital fractions and 
social forces and that gets implemented in social practices and policy changes. 
During the phase of consolidation, a new regulatory discourse becomes internalised 
and deeply embedded into the institutional ensembles of the state. It is during this 
phase that regulatory discourses become truly hegemonic and political 
contestation is being insulated and/or contained. A hegemonic project turns to the 
phase of maturation when regulatory discourses are fully ‘normalised’ but 
contradictions are increasingly becoming visible in their practical implementation. 
Finally, a hegemonic project enters into crisis during the phase of delegitimation 
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when dominant forces increasingly have to rely on other – often more coercive – 
methods than hegemonic consent to secure continued implementation of the 
regulatory discourses. This phase also provides for the circumstances in which 
contours of alternative projects are being explored and shaped.
 The transition from one hegemonic project to another never brings about a 
complete break away from previously existing structures, but is informed by “the 
paradoxical simultaneity of continuity/discontinuity in the flow of historical 
time” (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 324). Such transitions, understood here as ‘moments 
of disjunction and relative openness’, are marked by the “trial-and-error search for 
new institutional fixes to restore accumulation and restabilise social relations” 
(ibid.: 326). The extent to which a new regulatory discourse marks a radical shift 
away from previously dominant discourses depends on various different but 
interrelated factors:
[A] paradigm shift is more likely if a crisis is construed as a crisis of existing 
accumulation structures; if there is a fundamental shift in the balance of power 
between social forces related to the ascendancy of new accumulation structures; if 
a clearly identifiable counter-project to existing regulatory arrangements surfaces; 
if existing regulatory institutions are able to block fundamental change; and 
finally, if there are broader and more encompassing changes in other parts of the 
regulatory architecture (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2014: 118-9).
In the context of the present study, these five factors will have to be taken into due 
consideration in order to examine and explain whether and to what extent the 
content, form and scope of the EU investment policy constitute a fundamental 
regulatory paradigm shift away from dominant mode of foreign investment 
regulation in the wake of its unfolding ‘legitimacy’ crisis, or whether these reflect 
social power relations that remain deeply embedded within the existing 
institutional structures and strategic selectivities of the EU without a clear coun-
ter-hegemonic project in sight.
2.5  A typology of rival discourses of foreign investment regulation
The following chapters identify three main discourses regarding foreign 
investment regulation that are associated with particular rivalling projects at 
different points in time and that struggled over the making and transformation of 
European foreign investment regulation: a neoliberal discourse, a mercantilist 
discourse, and a centre-leftist discourse. These regulatory discourses are not 
mutually exclusive but reflect ideal-types in a fluid and open-ended political 
continuum. They often co-exist and tend to incorporate certain elements of 
multiple types. Nevertheless, they entail certain distinctive views on what the 
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social purpose of investment rules should be and what kind of objectives they 
ought to achieve (content), how investment rules should be enforced ( form), and 
what their jurisdictional reach should be (scope). The nature of European foreign 
investment regulation thus reflects, albeit imperfectly, the relative power balances 
between different social forces formulating and articulating their preferences on 
the basis of these discourses.
 First, the neoliberal discourse is rooted in a liberal philosophy and based on 
the assumption that “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” 
(Harvey, 2005: 2). In line with neoclassical economic theories, it is believed that 
wealth can be produced and accumulated through efficiency gains in the 
allocation of resources. States are expected not to intervene in the market to 
produce particular outcomes, but instead establish and enforce general rules to 
enhance market efficiency. Hence, neoliberal states typically seek to reduce 
regulatory barriers that hinder the free movement of capital, facilitate entre-
preneurial activities and foster competition by creating and expanding markets 
and correct market failures (De Ville and Orbie, 2014: 151; Van Apeldoorn et al., 
2012: 474). The global political-judicial dimension of neoliberalism has been 
described by Stephen Gill as the ‘new constitutionalism’, which refers to the 
growing institutionalisation of neoliberal frameworks and policies into legal and 
quasi-legal arrangements. The key characteristic of the new constitutionalism is 
the “insulation of key aspects of the economy from the influence of politicians or 
the mass of citizens by imposing, internally and externally, ‘binding constraints’ 
on the conduct of fiscal, monetary, trade and investment policies” (Gill, 1995: 412). 
Thus, the new constitutionalism aims to ‘lock in’ commitments to such 
‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, while constraining the avenues for other potential 
alternative projects (Gill, 2008: 79). As written above, the separation of the 
economic from the political is a crucial condition for capitalist economies to 
thrive, and therefore, the separation or rather the ‘encasement’ of the economy 
from democratic demands lies at the heart of the neoliberal discourse (Slobodian, 
2018: 13; Harvey, 2005: 66). 
 In terms of content, the neoliberal discourse rests on the principle of investment 
neutrality, whereby states refrain from discriminating among investments on the 
basis of nationality of ownership and leave the allocation of capital to market 
forces; the principle of investment security, or the sanctity of investment-related 
property and contractual rights; and the principle of market facilitation, whereby 
states seek to create, expand and correct markets (see also Vandevelde, 2016). 
Hence, the neoliberal discourse gives primacy to a narrow focus on the promotion 
and protection of foreign investment, rather than broader societal considerations, 
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such as industrial, social, environmental and sustainable development policy 
goals. According to the neoliberal discourse, foreign investment regulation should 
primarily aim at the treatment and protection of foreign investment by placing 
legally binding and enforceable obligations limiting a wide range of state behaviour 
and interference that may affect the use and enjoyment of property or that could 
affect the investment’s expected economic benefits. Through broad and open-ended 
legal concepts, such as ‘fair and equitable treatment’, ‘legitimate expectations’, 
‘full protection and security’ and ‘indirect expropriation’, neoliberal investment 
rules seek to discipline states to create and enhance regulatory stability and 
predictability for foreign investors. Foreign investment regulation should establish 
high threshold protection by allowing foreign investors to challenge a broad range 
of regulatory measures and to bring a case for damages against the host state, 
while at the same time guaranteeing the free movement of capital through market 
access commitments and investment liberalisation as well as the prohibition of 
capital controls and performance requirements. Moreover, foreign investment is 
preferably regulated at supranational or global level through multilateral, regional 
and bilateral legal treaties to advance and secure transnational processes of capital 
accumulation and expansion.   
 In terms of form, the neoliberal discourse favours to take investment disputes 
out of their local or national contexts and prefers resolving them through 
de-politicised forms of dispute settlement and international arbitration, where 
they are being handled in an ostensibly ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ manner by 
politically independent arbitrators and lawyers. Such arbitrators are expected to 
maintain a narrow investment law focus and to operate in relative isolation from 
other areas of domestic and international law. At the same time, they ought to be 
given wide discretionary powers to apply and interpret, and potentially expand, 
investment protection rules and to determine the exact delineations of tolerable 
state action. It is also considered desirable that investment disputes are settled 
without the involvement of home state governments or the participation of 
political decision-makers and representatives of other stakeholders and affected 
parties. Finally, with regard to scope, the neoliberal discourse supports a broad 
understanding of what constitutes property and favours the marketisation and 
protection of a wide range of assets. These typically include direct forms of 
investment and tangible and physical assets, but also portfolio investment, 
financial assets, and other intangible assets. 
 Second, the mercantilist discourse is premised on a statist political economy 
whereby the states play a central role in coordinating and directing economic 
development and industrialisation. Mercantilism is typically advanced by what 
Van der Pijl refers to as ‘Hobbesian Contender’ states understood as relatively 
strong states organising their societies from above with varying degrees of central 
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planning and coercion (Van der Pijl, 2006). The key feature of mercantilism is the 
protection of strategic and infant industries from foreign competition, for example 
through raising tariffs, and the facilitation of economic catch-up through national 
industrial and state interventionist policies to foster national champions that are 
able to compete in global markets (Selwyn, 2014: 29-52; Chang, 2002; List, 2017 
[1841]). In terms of content, the mercantilist discourse does not necessarily oppose 
foreign investment, but seeks to subordinate foreign investment to national 
industrial and developmental policy strategies, rather than allowing its free reign. 
It favours the adoption of discriminatory policies in favour of domestic industries 
by providing supportive subsidies, tax incentives and state aid, while controlling 
investment flows through a range of interventionist measures. These may include 
tight screening mechanisms, capital controls and performance requirements, 
such as the requirements to use local content, employ local workers, or export a 
certain percentage of the production, to ensure that foreign investment would 
further national development needs. At the same time, outward foreign investment 
can also be promoted through the provision of information, technical assistance, 
financing and investment insurance. In terms of form, the mercantilist discourse 
foresees a strong control by the home state over the resolution of investment 
disputes. This means that investment disputes need to be primarily resolved by 
domestic courts and domestic legal systems. Overseas investment interests are to 
be protected through more direct forms of intervention, for example through 
diplomacy, economic sanctions or the use of military force, or through formal 
state-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms that allow for sufficient home state 
involvement. And with regard to scope, the mercantilist discourse gives primacy to 
types of investment that comply with national industrial and development policy 
goals. 
 And third, the centre-leftist discourse is primarily concerned with the 
distributional consequences of global capitalism and appeals to the principles of 
social protection by favouring state intervention in the economy to advance the 
redistribution of wealth and public welfare. Foreign investment ought to be 
subjected to broader societal considerations, such as the generation of employment, 
sustainable economic growth, financial stability, social and environmental policy 
objectives, democratic accountability and inclusivity. In terms of content, the 
centre-leftist discourse seeks to establish a balance between the protection of 
private property rights and safeguarding the policy space for states to regulate in 
the wider public interest. At the same time, it also seeks to establish a proper 
balance in the allocation of rights and obligations for investors by taking into 
account other relevant areas such as labour rights, environmental standards, 
sustainable development objectives and corporate social responsibility. In terms of 
form, the centre-leftist discourse favours to resolve investment disputes in an 
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independent, fair, balanced, transparent, inclusive and democratically accountable 
way, and with respect for domestic courts and institutions. This means among 
other things a stronger involvement of representatives of different stakeholders 
and affected parties to accommodate the different societal viewpoints in the 
investment dispute as well as greater political control over the structure of dispute 
settlement. This also makes it, generally, the most variegated and mutable of the 
three discourses. And with regard to scope, the centre-leftist discourse promotes 
responsible and sustainable forms of foreign investment that produces tangible 
beneficial effects to the host economy and contributes to social, environmental 
and sustainable development policy goals, while shielding off certain sensitive 
sectors such as public services from private investments. Table 2.1 provides a brief 
overview of the preferred content, form and scope of each of the three discourses.
2.6  Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the theoretical and conceptual framework for the study 
of the struggle over the EU investment policy. It has first theorised the broader 
structural tendencies that emanate from the capitalist social relations of 
productions, that is, the tendency of capital to accumulate and expand. Moreover, 
it has looked at the crucial role of the state in facilitating and guaranteeing this 
process and how to conceptualise the dialectical and contradictory relationship 
between ever-expanding capital and the territorially demarcated competition 
between states by critically engaging with the notion of imperialism. In addition, 
the chapter has discussed the role of law, and international investment law in 
Table 2.1  Three ideal-type discourses in foreign investment regulation
Neoliberal discourse Mercantilist discourse Centre-leftist discourse
Content Primacy of narrow 
focus on promotion and 
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particular, as ‘extra-economic’ mechanisms necessary to advance the expansion of 
capitalism. Importantly, the chapter has further conceptualised the role of class 
agency and the fractionalisation of classes by arguing that the struggle over the 
EU investment policy should not be narrowly understood in terms of conflicts 
between capital and labour, but also involving broader social organisations and 
movements and other forms of resistance that challenge dominant patterns of 
capitalist power and exploitation. In addition, the chapter has theorised the role of 
the state from a strategic-relational understanding, as well as the EU as a particular 
multi-scalar state form, to allow for an understanding of the EU investment policy 
as resulting also from the strategic action of key state agents and institutions 
whose relative autonomy and structurally inscribed strategic selectivities are in 
turn understood in terms of material condensations of wider and underlying 
social power balances at a given time in history. Finally, the last part has 
highlighted the role of regulatory discourses in informing and shaping the 
particular content, form and scope of the EU investment policy and how these 
constitute important markers for different social forces to construct, consolidate 
and ultimately challenge particular hegemonic projects. 
 The broader theoretical point and contribution of this study is to explain how 
the coming about, transformation and contestation of transnational legal rules 
aimed at the promotion and protection of foreign investment are contingent on 
social struggles that are materially rooted in the social relations of production but 
discursively and politically mediated through particular hegemonic discourses 
and projects bound up with particular state projects. In contrast to dominant 
state-centric explanations of the transnational investment regime, this study 
seeks to open up the ‘black box’ of the state by looking at the broader social purpose 
of transnational investment rules and by unravelling through the following 
empirical analysis which social forces have sought to formulate a hegemonic 
project around a certain set of ideas informing the particular content, form and 
scope of the EU investment policy, and how and why these have been contested by 
subordinate social groups. The next two chapters provide for the important 
structural context from within which to understand the changing strategic and 
ideological underpinnings of the EU and EU member states with regard to the 
promotion and protection of foreign investment, and how these relate to the 
changing social power constellations against the backdrop of broader capitalist 
restructuring processes. 
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3.   European Foreign Investment Regulation in 
the Era of Embedded Liberalism
“The	 rule	 of	 the	 jungle	 apparently	 prevails	 in	 Indonesia.	 Dutch	 national	 banks	 and	
business	 operations	 have	 been	 expropriated	 without	 notice	 […]	 Wild	 men	 bent	 upon	
revenge	seem	to	be	masters.”
Chairman of the US House Committee on the Judiciary Emanuel Celler, 1958 
“It	is	not	desirable	that	important	sectors	of	the	Common	Market’s	economy	depend	on	
outside	decisions.”
France’s Minister of Finance Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 1963
This chapter analyses and explains the historical transformation of European 
modes of foreign investment regulation and places these within the broader 
structural changes that have taken place within the global political economy since 
the end of the Second World War until the end of the 1970s. The chapter is divided 
into three main sections. The first section deals with the key aspects of the process 
of global capitalist restructuring and the concomitant shifting patterns of 
international production during the post-war hegemonic order of ‘embedded 
liberalism’. The second section traces the historical origins of foreign investment 
protection and the rise of European bilateral investment treaties that emerged 
largely in response to nascent decolonisation processes and the subsequent 
increased challenges to capitalist private property relations in the Global South. 
The third section explains why these early initiatives did not result in a common 
European approach to foreign investment regulation. It is argued that post-war 
European integration processes should be understood in the context of the broader 
post-war hegemonic order of embedded liberalism, that gave rise to national and 
later gradually European circuits of accumulation sustained by state intervention-
ist and Keynesian welfare policies. National mercantilist and eventually Euro-mer-
cantilist responses to the ‘American challenge’ ultimately inhibited the further 
development of foreign investment regulation at EEC level.
3.1  Foreign investment in the era of embedded liberalism 
The end of the Second World War gave rise to a new global economic order of what 
has been referred to as ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1982), which rested on a 
compromise between the principles of economic liberalism and national state 
intervention. The US assumed leadership of the capitalist world and maintained 
the strategy to establish an open and liberal world economy, based on international 
cooperation, the promotion of international organisations and multilateral 
agreements, the liberalisation of trade and investment, and a strong commitment 
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to the breakdown of the old colonial structures (Kiely, 2010: 93; Panitch and 
Gindin, 2012: 73-4). The socio-economic configuration underpinning the post-war 
order in the industrialised West was characterised by a particular synthesis 
between the interests of productive and money capital that became domestically 
articulated through a particular class compromise with organised labour (Van 
Apeldoorn, 2002: 51-2; Van der Pijl, 2012). Notwithstanding the capitalist 
variegations characterising the post-war European economies, generally speaking, 
this synthesis gave rise to Fordist production regimes sustained by Keynesian 
welfare states under the international order of the Pax	 Americana (Buch-Hansen 
and Wigger, 2011: 58).
 Fordism was predicated upon the rise of mass-producing industrial capital 
that coupled the increasing levels of nationally oriented companies with mass 
consumption and rising real wages. It was premised on the idea of economic 
expansion and technological progress through the manufacturing of large-scale 
cheap standardised consumer goods using special purpose machinery and 
low-skilled labour, led to a massive expansion of the industrial and related services 
sectors (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 124-5; Dunford, 2000: 149-53; Jessop, 2002: 55-8). 
The central place of consumer goods such as automobiles, record players, washing 
machines and refrigerators in the economies of North America, Western Europe 
and Japan provided an advantage to firms that had innovated their development, 
production and marketing. Many of these were American and superior to their 
international competitors in terms of technological progress, managerial expertise 
and organisational capabilities (Frieden, 2006: 295; Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 
186). Large corporations sought to internalise their sources of supply by vertically 
integrating the different parts of the production process and dominating entire 
production lines through their subsidiaries (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 14-5; Buch- 
Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 58). Moreover, new technologies in transport and 
communications meant that productive activity could increasingly be geographically 
dispersed (Dicken, 2011).
 At state level, Fordism was sustained by national welfare states that promoted 
Keynesian macroeconomic and social policies. Western European governments 
were generally committed to the principles of full employment through coun-
ter-cyclical and demand management interventions, complemented with proactive 
social and welfare programmes (Jessop, 2002: 59-61; Dunn, 2014: 99). Importantly, 
the Keynesian welfare states did not emerge in order to make Fordism work, but 
resulted primarily from working class pressures for higher wages and social 
security rights with political leaders and national industrial capital seeking to 
minimise working class support for communism (Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 
58; Lipietz, 1992: 5-8). At international level, the establishment of the General 
Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1947 and the subsequent elimination of 
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trade barriers increased the opening of national markets to foreign trade, which 
were accompanied by the international monetary regime of fixed exchange rates 
sustained by the Bretton Woods institutions (Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 58-9; 
Helleiner, 1994). At the same time, the facilitation of international capital flows 
was accompanied by the flexibility for national states to maintain capital controls 
and to intervene in the domestic economy to ensure stability through economic 
growth and social security, thereby allowing for “Keynes at home and Smith 
abroad” (Gilpin, 1987: 355; Bieler, 2000: 18). As a result, the post-war European 
economies developed strongly national circuits of accumulation sustained by in-
terventionist states, which were externally linked to each other through 
commodity exchanges and capital flows (Robinson, 2004: 10; Dunn, 2014: 97; 
Dunford, 2000: 152). 
 The processes of sustained capital internationalisation during embedded 
liberalism differed, however, qualitatively from those taking place during an 
earlier period of what has been identified as ‘liberal internationalism’, stretching 
from the 1820s to 1914 (Overbeek and Van der Pijl, 1993: 7-9). During this period, 
international capital had primarily taken the form of money capital as international 
financial markets were considerably integrated and financial capital flows 
increased dramatically. The vast majority of British – and to a lesser extent French 
and German – capital was stalled in government and municipal bonds, and shares 
in railways, utilities and public works mostly concentrated in a handful of rapidly 
growing economies in Europe, Russia, Japan, Argentina and the British Dominions 
(Bairoch and Kozul-Wright, 1998: 11-4; Hobsbawm, 1989: 66). Investment was 
primarily foreign portfolio investment. At the outbreak of the First World War, 90 
per cent of all foreign investment was in fact portfolio investment (Jenkins, 1987: 4). 
At the same time, the industrial transformation towards large-scale manufacturing 
and capitalist developments in transportation, storage and communications 
alongside the continued concentration and centralisation of capital allowed for an 
early international expansion of productive capital, particularly in the chemicals, 
metal fabricating, textiles and electrical engineering sectors (Jenkins, 1987: 4; 
Lipson, 1985: 4-6). Overseas productive capital, or foreign direct investment, mostly 
targeted the primary sectors of developing countries and colonies. Demand for 
certain crucial raw materials grew rapidly and exceeded domestic production 
capacity in the advanced capitalist economies (Jenkins, 1987: 5). Foreign 
investments at the time were mainly resource-seeking	investments in order to “obtain 
and control the production and marketing of intermediate products which are 
inputs to other value-adding activities” (Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 156; UNCTAD, 
1999). These typically involved investments in primary resources such as 
hydrocarbons, industrial minerals, metals and agricultural products, and were 
relatively location bound. In addition, resource-seeking investment also sought 
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cheap unskilled or semi-skilled labour mostly for manufacturing and services 
industries to supply labour-intensive intermediate or final products (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008: 68). The majority of the output of resource-seeking subsidiaries was 
exported mainly to the advanced industrialised economies, reflecting the colonial 
production structures underpinning the liberal internationalist order. Before the 
outbreak of the First World War, over 60 per cent of worldwide FDI was located in 
the developing world including the colonies; some 55 per cent was in the primary 
sector and only 15 per cent in manufacturing (Dunning, 1983: 89).  
 After the collapse of the international financial system in 1929 and the 
following decades of increased protectionism (Hobsbawm, 1994), world trade 
and investment flows plunged. Only after the end of the Second World War trade 
and investment took off again. With the primacy of industrial capital over 
money capital, the emerging embedded liberal order was marked by a significant 
internationalisation of productive capital that became manifest in the growing 
international activity of Fordist companies reflected by increased volumes of FDI. 
The surge of FDI was initially led by the outward expansion of US capital, but since 
the late 1960s European and Japanese firms were growing at a faster rate than 
their US competitors (see Table 3.1). By 1975, internationally operating firms had 
invested approximately US$350 billion of which almost half came from the US, 
and nearly a fifth of all US corporate profits were made on foreign investments 
(Frieden, 2006: 293; Dunning, 1983). US subsidiaries produced nearly three times 
as much abroad as the country exported – US$292 billion in overseas production 
and US$110 billion in exports in 1973 – and intra-firm trade accounted for 
one-third of all US imports. For the US as well as for the other advanced 
industrialised economies, internationally active corporations relied heavily on 
their overseas investments, making FDI the leading edge of international economic 
integration in the post-war era (Frieden, 2006: 294; Bergsten et al., 1978). 










France 5.0 1.0 12.9 1.2
Germany 1.0 0.1 22.4 1.8
Japan 0.6 0.1 19.3 1.0
UK 15.1 2.2 45.0 4.5
US 38.8 1.3 151.1 2.9
World 82.4 0.7 343.1 1.4
Source: Dunn, 2009: 144
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Generally, foreign capital became increasingly concentrated in the industrial and 
manufacturing sectors in the advanced capitalist economies. This involved a 
structural shift towards market-seeking investments in order to supply goods or 
services to new markets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 70; UNCTAD, 1999: 19). 
Although foreign investment in natural resources remained important in the 
wake of the growing demand for raw materials to sustain Fordist production, 
post-war FDI became increasingly influenced by market-seeking motivations and 
provided for an important alternative to trade. Also referred to as ‘tariff-jumping’ 
investments, various corporations sought to set up production sites in new markets 
rather than facing tariffs on their exports or other costly barriers (Manger, 2009; 
Jenkins, 1987; Caves, 1996). 
A key development in this regard was the increasingly nationalist orientation 
among the newly independent states in the developing world. The process of 
decolonisation after the Second World War had led to a broad wave of economic 
nationalism and host state policies asserting national control over natural 
resources, often involving the nationalisation and expropriation of foreign assets 
(see Figure 3.1). At the same time, the spread of communism into Eastern Europe 
and China involved the expropriation of foreign assets and further access by 
foreign investors was curtailed (Vandevelde, 2005). 
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 Many leaders of the newly independent states were influenced by theories of 
underdevelopment and dependencia school, which became increasingly fashionable 
in the developing world (Baran, 1957; Frank, 1967; Emmanuel, 1972; Rodney, 1972; 
Amin, 1976). These theories foresaw modernisation through the promotion of 
 industrialisation policies, which would diminish the dependence on primary 
commodity exports and manufactured imports, and thus reduce their subordinate 
and dependent position in the global economy (Kiely, 2007: 51). Such import- 
substitution-industrialisation (ISI) policies were rooted in the structuralist 
economics associated with the works of Hans Singer (1950) and Raúl Prebisch 
(1959), who argued in favour of industrialisation in order to overcome the (semi-) 
colonial legacies of specialisation in the export of a few primary commodities. 
These infant industries would thereby be protected through high tariffs or import 
controls as well as protection from foreign competition. Foreign investors were 
selectively allowed to enter these markets in order to stimulate the industrialisa-
tion process and were often offered incentives such as tax breaks and subsidies as 
state officials felt that rapid industrialisation was possible only with substantial 
contribution of foreign capital and know-how. At the same time, these investments 
were subjected to tight screening mechanisms, performance requirements, capital 
transfer restrictions and fierce royalty rates in order to harness the benefits of 
foreign investments (Manger, 2009: 7-8; Bergsten, 1974; Caves, 1996). This strategy 
had particularly been enacted in the independent economies of Latin America 
during the 1930s-1950s period, but it became more or less generalised in other 
parts of the developing world during the post-war era. 
 Roughly stretching from the 1950s to the early 1970s, the ‘Golden Age’ of 
embedded liberalism was marked by extraordinary economic growth. Western 
European economies grew with an average of 4 per cent between 1950 and 1973, 
while the US saw a growth rate of 2.5 per cent and Japan a staggering 8 per cent 
(Maddison, 2003). The world output of manufacturing industries quadrupled and 
world trade in manufactured products increased tenfold (Hobsbawm, 1994: 261). 
The exceptional growth was not only confined to Western industrialised 
economies, but also developing economies in Latin America, Asia and Africa 
experienced significant growth, albeit, from much lower starting points (Dunn, 
2009: 132; Kiely, 2010: 124; Chang, 2002: 132). The next section will examine the 
broader historical developments in the field of foreign investment regulation and 
how these came to inform much of the post-war struggles over the establishment 
of multilateral and bilateral investment protection rules.
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3.2   The development of European foreign investment regulation 
in the post-war era of embedded liberalism 
The post-war period of embedded liberalism, which had fostered the sustained 
internationalisation of capital, saw concerted efforts among the advanced 
capitalist economies to establish a multilateral framework for the protection of 
foreign investment. These efforts were part and parcel of the US strategy to create 
multilateral institutions that would include and bind all major powers to create 
a stable and sustainable global economic order through expanded trade and 
investment. A first instance to create such a framework arose during the 
negotiations for the proposed International Trade Organisation (ITO) after the 
Second World War. The ITO was originally intended as the third pillar of the 
unfolding international financial regime of Bretton Woods alongside the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (the World Bank) (Wilcox, 1949; Dattu, 2000; Kurtz, 2002). 
Although the ITO was supposed to govern international trade flows, the US 
government proposed to include strong provisions on foreign investment, 
including national and most- favoured nation treatment and just compensation 
for expropriation, at the strong instigation by influential US productive capital 
actors (Fatouros, 1961: 80; Kurtz, 2002: 718; Newcombe and Paradell, 2009: 19). 
These proposals were significantly watered down after fierce opposition from 
other delegations, particularly from developing countries. As a result, the final 
draft of the Havana Charter for the ITO of 1948 did not incorporate substantive 
investment protection rules, but instead expressly recognised the rights of states 
to interfere with foreign investments through screening, restrictions on the 
ownership of enterprises, and ‘other reasonable requirements’ (Article 12(1)(c)), 
thereby reflecting the primacy of national policy objectives as part of the embedded 
liberal compromise. This was considered unacceptable for the US government 
(Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 226; Wilcox, 1949: 145-8), which abandoned the Havana 
Charter so that the entry into force of the GATT in 1947 was applied provisionally 
without an overarching ITO framework. Henceforth, foreign investment would be 
regulated outside the GATT framework until the 1990s. 
 Subsequently, various proposals for a multilateral investment code emerged 
during the 1950s and 1960s, but these generally failed to generate sufficient 
political support. On the one hand, their inherent (neo)liberal contents in favour 
of transnational capital fundamentally contradicted the hegemonic Keynesian 
ideas of national state intervention and capital controls to curtail international 
capital flows in order to sustain the domestic class compromise between nationally- 
oriented industrial capital and organised labour. On the other hand, the breakdown 
of the colonial order after the Second World War, which effectively put an end to 
the imperial legal and institutional frameworks that regulated and facilitated the
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 expansion of European capital into the colonised territories, gave rise to renewed 
challenges to the capitalist notion of private property rights in the developing 
world. These challenges were, in turn, rooted in the ideological cleavages regarding 
foreign investment regulation that emerged with, and in response to, the spread 
of global capitalism and European imperialism. In order to understand the 
post-war configurations and contestation of foreign investment regulation, it is 
necessary to first briefly highlight the historical origins and the imperialist nature 
of international investment law. 
3.2.1  The historical origins of foreign investment protection
The historical origins of international rules on foreign investment protection are 
inextricably bound with the global expansion of European trading and investment 
activities. The first notions on the protection of foreign property emerged in the 17th 
century when major European powers concluded reciprocal agreements that were 
intended to secure certain minimum standards of treatment to protect the foreign 
person and his property within the region (Lipson, 1985: 11-2). It was in the 
application of these rules to non-European territories through the ‘colonial 
encounter’ (Anghie, 2005), involving colonial expansion, oppressive protection of 
capitalist interests and military force, that transformed such early protection 
standards into international norms on foreign investment. During the 18th and 19th 
century, the protection of European investment flowing to the colonies became 
ensured by imperial legal systems that “authorised and regulated the conduct of 
business across the empire, and the law generally ensured a high degree of business 
freedom in order to facilitate the economic penetration of colonised areas” (Van 
Harten, 2007: 14-5). In territories remaining outside the scope of the imperial 
powers, European investors could receive extensive protection through a system of 
‘extraterritoriality’ in which they held the nationality of their home state and their 
property was protected by its law (ibid., 2007: 15; Sornarajah, 2010: 20). This extension 
of European jurisdiction often came imposed by ‘unequal or capitulation treaties’ 
that followed military conflict, which were primarily designed to force reluctant 
non-European territories to open their economies to European trade and investment 
by granting extensive and non-discriminatory rights (Miles, 2013: 25-8).6 In addition, 
the US concluded bilateral treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) 
even since gaining independence in 1776, which typically included provisions on 
commercial and navigation matters but also incorporated early notions on national 
and most-favoured nation treatment for foreign investors and compensation for 
expropriation (Vandevelde, 2005: 159; Miles, 2013: 24-5). 
 In the course of the 19th century, European states and the US strongly 
propagated an international minimum standard on the treatment of foreign 
6 Examples are the Treaty of Nanking (1842) and the consecutive treaties between China and Western 
powers in the aftermath of the Opium Wars. Similarly, the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1838 
provided European business with extensive access to the Ottoman economy.
562932-L-bw-Verbeek
Processed on: 15-7-2021 PDF page: 97
97
EUROPEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION IN THE ERA OF EMBEDDED LIBERALISM
3
investment as part of the legal doctrine of diplomatic protection of aliens under 
customary international law. Such a minimum standard would provide for the 
protection of foreigners, including foreign companies, against uncompensated 
expropriation, and its violation would allow for home state intervention (Miles, 
2013: 47-69; Dolzer and Schreuer, 2008: 11-6; Newcombe and Paradell, 2009: 3-18). 
Such interventions frequently involved the practice of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, in 
which European governments and the US used military force to enforce diplomatic 
protection and to settle investment-related disputes (Montt, 2009: 36-8; see also 
Maurer, 2013; Vandevelde, 2005; Lipson, 1985). Governments in Latin America, 
which were hit frequently by such interventions, started to resist the imposition of 
an international minimum standard and the invocation of diplomatic protection. 
Subsequently, Latin American jurists developed legal doctrines that would embody 
the principle of national treatment in which foreigners ought to be subjected to 
domestic legal systems rather than to an external and international standard. The 
emerging Calvo Doctrine, named after the writings of the Argentinean jurist 
Carlos Calvo, underscored that the notion of state sovereignty would render 
foreign intervention through either diplomatic or military means illegal, and 
pleaded that foreigners should be entitled no better treatment than host state 
nationals and that they should be subjected to the host state laws and host state 
courts.7 Latin American governments formally adopted the Calvo Doctrine at the 
First International Conference of American States in 1889 (Vandevelde, 2005: 159; 
Newcombe and Paradell, 2009: 13; Poulsen, 2015: 48). 
 Western powers fiercely opposed the Calvo Doctrine and continued to push 
for an international minimum standard and diplomatic protection for their 
overseas investors.8 Their positions, particularly on the obligation to compensate 
for expropriation, were reaffirmed by a series of tribunal decisions in the 1920s 
(Newcombe and Paradell, 2009: 14-5).9 However, these views remained severely 
contested. This became particularly apparent in the wake of the Russian Revolution 
of 1917 when the newly established Soviet regime eradicated all private property, 
7 Importantly, as pointed out by Montt (2009: 33-9), the Calvo Doctrine did not challenge the notion of 
capitalist property rights as such. Instead, it formed part of a liberal framework aimed at facilitating 
immigration and foreign investment into the newly independent republics of Latin America by 
placing great importance to property rights and individual economic freedom, including the rights of 
establishment for foreign investors and to acquire key assets of their national economies. Foreigners 
were granted with full legal equality and were offered the same rights and protection in domestic courts 
as given to national citizens, which was a revolutionary movement in the 19th century.
8 A classical formulation of the international minimum standard of treatment was articulated in the 
Neer	v.	Mexico case in 1926, in which the Mexico-US Claims Commission required the following: “The 
treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an 
outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far 
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognise its 
insufficiency”. L.F.H.	Neer	and	Pauline	Neer	(USA)	v.	United	Mexican	States, 15 October 1926, United Nations 
Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Volume IV, 61-61.
9 In 1922, the US government was ordered to provide ‘just compensation’ for its requisition of Norwegian 
ships during the First World War. The Case	concerning	certain	German	interests	in	Polish	Upper	Silesia of 1925 and 
the subsequent Case	concerning	the	factory	at	Chorzów of 1928 before the Permanent Court of International 
Justice ruled that illegal takings of foreign property took place, which must be compensated.
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both foreign and domestic, on the basis of communist and inherently anti-capitalist 
developmental discourses (Sornarajah, 2010: 21; Newcombe and Paradell, 2009: 
13). Moreover, further challenges arose out of a series of disputes between the 
governments of Mexico and the US in the 1930s regarding the Mexican seizure of 
various agrarian lands and oil concessions owned by US investors. In 1938, US 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote to his Mexican counterpart that “no 
government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, 
without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore” (cited in 
Guzman, 1998: 645). Such a formulation, later referred to as the Hull Rule and to 
be found in many of today’s bilateral investment treaties, was rejected by the 
Mexican government, responding that “there is in international law no rule 
universally accepted in theory nor carried out in practice, which makes obligatory 
the payment or immediate compensation nor even of deferred compensation, for 
expropriations of a general and impersonal character” (ibid.: 646). 
 Disagreements also flared up during the discussions on a Draft	Convention	on	
the	 Treatment	 of	 Foreigners of 1929 under the auspices of the League of Nations. 
Western capitalist states together with the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) pushed for the international minimum standard, thereby drawing attention 
to “the expediency of drafting the proposed convention on the most liberal lines” 
(League of Nations, 1930: 171), whereas many capital-importing states mainly in 
the developing world favoured national treatment in line with the Calvo Doctrine, 
ultimately leading to the breakdown of the negotiations in 1930 (Kuhn, 1930: 571; 
Borchard, 1930: 538). These developments underscored the inherently contested 
nature of foreign investment protection under customary international law, 
which foreshadowed the rivalling discourses that came to underpin much of the 
post-war regulation of foreign investment at the multilateral level, eventually 
leading Western states to develop bilateral alternatives.
3.2.2  The German proposal for a Capitalist Magna Carta
During the early post-war years, various private proposals for multilateral 
conventions on foreign investment developed within and among the Western 
capitalist states. These would often originate primarily from within the fractions 
of internationally operating capital, in particular those fractions related to 
 resource-seeking FDI such as the oil industry and the banking sector involved in 
financing foreign investment projects as well as from within liberal academic and 
legal circles (Slobodian, 2018: 136-42; see also Brandon, 1959; Miller, 1959; Fatouros, 
1961; Schwarzenberger, 1969).10 But the most influential proposal for a multilateral
10 Notable examples are the ‘International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investment’ proposed 
by the International Chamber of Commerce in 1949 (ICC, 1949), the ‘Draft Statutes of the Arbitral 
Tribunal for Foreign Investment and the Foreign Investment Court’ developed by the International 
Law Association in 1948 (UNCTAD, 2005: 259-272), and the ‘Draft Convention on the International 
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens’ prepared by the Harvard professors Louis Sohn and 
Richard Baxter at the request of the UN Secretariat in 1961 (Sohn and Baxter, 1961).
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framework for foreign investment emerged in (West-) Germany. This was no 
coincidence. The rapid post-war recovery of the German economy and the subsequent 
period of sustained economic growth (Wirtschaftswunder) gave rise to an export- 
oriented growth regime that fostered the international expansion of German 
capital (Brenner, 2006: 68-70; Dunn, 2014: 101). This growth model was premised 
on the rapidly growing productivity rates achieved by German manufacturing 
and its highly skilled labour force, combined with redistributive fiscal policies 
such as “price stability, the creation of favourable conditions for production, a 
system of social security, and international free trade” (Van der Wurff, 1993: 164-5; 
Brenner, 2006: 69). The German banking sector played a crucial role in the success 
of the German post-war economy and was structurally tied to German industry 
through the financing of investments, thereby intertwining the interests of 
productive and money capital (Van der Wurff, 1993: 167; Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 75). 
 At the level of regulation, much of the ensuing German social market economy 
became underpinned by ideas associated with ‘ordoliberalism’ as a distinctive 
branch of neoliberalism (Peck, 2010a: 55-61; Vanberg, 2004; Young, 2014). 
Originating with the Freiburg School in the 1930s, ordoliberalism sought a 
“political- economic order (Ordnungspolitik) that organises competitiveness and 
competitive markets in such a way to prevent private power (in the form of 
industrial cartels and labour unions) and public power (socialist nationalisation) 
from interfering with market forces” (Young, 2014: 277-8). For ordoliberals, 
the state must create the proper legal environment for sustained capitalist 
accumulation by laying down the rules of the game via an ‘economic constitutional 
order’ (Vanberg, 2004). One of the most influential ordoliberals, Wilhelm Röpke, 
particularly argued against the “erroneous belief in the autonomy of the economic 
sphere as dominated by economic law independent of institutions, legal forms and 
social habits”, which underpinned much of the classical liberal economic thinking 
of the 19th century (Röpke, 1954). Instead, an ordoliberal regime was considered to 
presuppose “a juridical framework which fixes the regime of property, contracts, 
patents, bankruptcy, the status of professional associations and commercial 
societies, the currency, and banking, none of which are given by nature […] but are 
contingent creations of legislation” (Rougier cited in Foucault, 2008: 161; see also 
Schneiderman, 2014: 168-9). The idea of a strong judiciary safeguarding economic 
regulation from both excessive state sovereignty and democratic pressures 
strongly resonated in post-war Germany.
 Against this background, Hermann Josef Abs, the chairman of the Deutsche 
Bank and personal advisor to Germany’s long-serving Minister of Economics 
Ludwig Erhard, emerged as the strongest advocate for international rules on 
foreign investment protection during the late 1950s. Although he himself had 
overseen the Deutsche Bank’s expropriation of Jewish property in the Third Reich, 
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Abs’s motivations were primarily related to the lack of compensation for German 
assets that were confiscated after the Second World War with the aim of partly 
repairing the war damages, but also out of the Allied interest in rooting out 
German commercial interests abroad (St. John, 2018: 74-80; Dolzer and Schreuer, 
2008: 18; Kindleberger, 1984: 422). He also took duly note of the emerging wave of 
nationalisations and expropriations of Western assets taking place in the 
developing world, such as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1951), the United Fruit 
Company in Guatemala (1954), the Suez Canal Company (1956), Dutch assets in 
Indonesia (1957), and electric utilities in Argentina (1958) (Slobodian, 2018: 139). 
At the same time, these developments were not only confined to the developing 
world but also appeared in Western Europe where various social democratic 
governments nationalised parts of their economies in the wake of their post-war 
recovery, most notably in the UK and France (see also Section 3.3.1). These global 
trends towards nationalisation endangered sustained capital accumulation as, 
in the words of Ludwig Erhard, “especially in the Western world, infractions 
against private property are eating further and further in, like a sneaking poison” 
(cited in Slobodian, 2018: 138).  
 Responding to these trends, the German Society to Advance the Protection of 
Foreign Investment, with Abs as its president, drafted a ‘Magna Carta’ for foreign 
investment, “to serve as a standard and guide to the free world, embodying a firm 
declaration of principle on the sanctity of private property wherein that which 
belongs to the alien investor or owner is not subject to arbitrary confiscation or 
expropriation” (Abs, 1956). Abs presented the proposed International	Convention	for	
the	Mutual	Protection	of	Private	Property	Rights	in	Foreign	Countries	in a speech, titled 
‘The Safety of Capital’, at the International Industrial Development Conference in 
San Francisco in 1957, which was reported in Time magazine under the headline 
‘A Capitalist Magna Carta’ (Time, 1957). The proposal consisted of extensive 
protection of foreign investment and provided for non-discrimination, compensation 
for direct and indirect expropriation and investor-to-state dispute settlement 
through the set-up of an international court and an arbitral tribunal to determine 
the amount of compensation, and enforcement through economic sanctions. 
The purpose was thereby “to arrive, on an international plane, at a system of 
effective and universally guaranteed legal protection such as applies on the 
national level” (Miller, 1959: 373-4; see also Fatouros, 1961: 87). 
 The proposal was warmly received by the international business community 
and attracted considerable attention, but was unlikely to be supported by 
governments from developing countries. One representative from the Philippines 
expressed concerns that foreign investments would come to dominate the 
economic and political affairs of developing states, while another representative 
from Cuba denounced the proposal as ‘a return to the Gay Nineties’, thereby 
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referring to the period of imperialist exploitation during the late 19th century 
(Miller, 1959: 375; Van Harten, 2007: 12). Hence, Abs favoured the adoption of his 
draft by a limited number of like-minded states in Western Europe in the context 
of the European Economic Community (EEC), which was newly created under the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957. At the suggestion of Abs, the European League for Economic 
Cooperation (ELEC) launched a study in 1958 that proposed the formulation and 
implementation of a common EEC policy regarding foreign investment protection. 
The proposed Common	Protection	for	Private	International	Investments, prepared by an 
ad hoc working party consisting of representatives of Western European industrial 
and financial capital as well as legal scholars, was to be adopted by the six founding 
members of the EEC with the aim of ‘setting a good example’, making it “first and 
foremost […] an instrument of pressure to induce third countries” to protect 
European investments (ELEC, 1958: 17). 
 Although these proposals failed to attract political support among the EEC 
members, mostly for reasons explained below and in Section 3.3, they received 
attention from a group of European lawyers led by the former Attorney-General of 
the United Kingdom and Director at Royal Dutch Shell Lord Hartley Shawcross, 
who worked on a similar draft proposal on foreign investment protection. Like 
Abs, Shawcross had extensive experience with expropriation both in his role as 
counsel for Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later British Petroleum) after the nation-
alisation by the Mossadegh-regime and in his role as director at Royal Dutch Shell 
during the nationalisation of Dutch property in Indonesia (St. John, 2018: 84-5; 
Bonnitcha et al., 2017: 184). Shawcross’ proposal eventually amalgamated with the 
proposal by the German Society in the Abs-Shawcross	Draft	Convention	on	Investments	
Abroad in May 1959. Although the draft convention reflected a compromise 
between Abs’ far-reaching proposals and the more modest proposals of Shawcross, 
it was essentially a neoliberal document of extensive foreign investment protection 
and included provisions such as fair and equitable treatment, broadly defined 
protection against expropriation, and investor-to-state dispute settlement without 
requiring foreign investors first to exhaust domestic remedies (Abs and Shawcross, 
1960; Fatouros, 1961; Brandon, 1960).
 The German government submitted the draft to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), where it eventually served as the basis for 
the 1962 OECD	Draft	Convention	on	the	Protection	of	Foreign	Property, which was revised 
and approved by the OECD in 1967. It ultimately failed to generate the necessary 
political support from the OECD members and was never opened for signature. 
Particularly, the US government did not actively push toward the conclusion of the 
draft convention in the face of deteriorating prospects for the successful integration 
of the developing countries into a multilateral framework on foreign investment. 
Moreover, the UK government had strong reservations about facilitating outward 
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investment due to its balance of payment difficulties and its tight exchange control 
policies, and feared potential liability for future nationalisations. Other capi-
tal-importing members such as Greece, Turkey and Portugal also objected (St. 
John, 2018: 88-9; Schill, 2009: 39). In the end, these consecutive attempts to 
establish a multilateral agreement on the protection of foreign investment along 
neoliberal lines failed largely because they were successfully challenged not only 
by the developmentalist discourses in the Global South, which found its apex in 
the struggle over the New International Economic Order in the 1970s (see Section 
3.2.4), but also because they were considered incompatible with the Keynesian 
discourses prevailing within the Western capitalist world.
3.2.3  Taking the bilateral route: The first European BITs
The post-war stalemate on a multilateral regime for the governance of foreign 
investment provided the conditions for bilateral instruments to emerge in order to 
advance the international expansion of capital. As international trade was 
increasingly regulated through the GATT, it was the US government that started 
to expand its existing network of bilateral treaties by incorporating more invest-
ment-related issues. After the Second World War, investment protection and 
facilitation became the focal point of the US FCNs to enhance the international 
expansion of US capital. Between 1946 and 1966, the US government concluded 
around 22 additional FCNs that increasingly included provisions on the right of 
establishment, protection of foreign property from arbitrary or discriminatory 
measures, dispute settlement mechanisms and the protection of patents and 
trademarks (Salacuse, 1990: 656; Vandevelde, 2010). 
 In Western Europe, it was the German government that first set up a network 
of BITs that exclusively focused on the legal protection of foreign investment in 
comparison to the US FCNs, which were still essentially trade agreements. As 
Germany lacked the same political and diplomatic strength as the US to protect its 
foreign interests and did not enjoy the historical ties with former colonies as other 
Western European powers, German officials were in favour of narrow legal rules 
of protection and started to pursue an investment-centred type of treaty on a 
bilateral basis towards the end of the 1950s (Dolzer and Kim, 2013: 295; see also 
Poulsen, 2015: 50-4). Typical FCN issues such as the protection of natural persons, 
the establishment of enterprises and commercial navigation were dropped and, 
instead, German BITs emphasised the protection of foreign property without 
reference to overarching policy goals of peace, security and progress. The first 
worldwide BIT was concluded between the governments of Germany and Pakistan 
in 1959, and in 1960 the first German model BIT was adopted. 
 The development of the German BITs served as a model for other European 
governments and influenced the ongoing discussions within the OECD. In 
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particular, the 1967 OECD Draft Convention became recommended to the OECD 
members as a model for the conclusion of BITs with developing countries (Dolzer 
and Stevens, 1995: 2; Schill, 2009). France concluded its first BIT in 1960, followed 
by Switzerland (1961), the Netherlands (1963), Italy and Belgium-Luxemburg 
(1964), Sweden (1965), Denmark (1966) and Norway (1966) (UNCTAD, 2000a; 
Vandevelde, 2005; Poulsen 2015). These first BITs were generally short and uniform 
in terms of content,	scope and form. With regard to content, they incorporated core 
protections such as compensation for direct and indirect expropriation, fair and 
equitable treatment, full protection and security, non-discriminatory standards of 
national and most-favoured nation treatment, umbrella clauses obliging states to 
observe their contractual obligations vis-à-vis foreign investors, and rights to 
transfer capital and returns (Newcombe and Paradell, 2009: 43; Dolzer and Stevens, 
1995). With regard to scope, such ‘post-establishment’ protections were granted to 
a broad definition on investment, understood as ‘any-kind-of-asset’ including direct 
and portfolio investment and other forms of financial and intangible property, 
and to a broad definition of investors as any national or company operating in the 
territory of either contracting party. 
 Regarding form, BITs started to provide for private enforcement through ISDS 
before international and private arbitration tribunals particularly after the 
adoption of the Convention for the establishment of an International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1965. The ICSID Convention, created 
under the auspices of the World Bank, established a procedural framework for the 
settlement of investment disputes between foreign investors and host states 
through binding arbitration (St. John, 2018; Schreuer et al., 2009; Parra, 2012). The 
novelty was that the ICSID Convention allowed for the application of international 
law to disputes over foreign investment, thereby allowing foreign investors direct 
recourse to international arbitration against host states without having to exhaust 
local remedies. The possibility to assume jurisdiction to “any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment” (Article 25(1)) allowed for investment arbitration to 
extend beyond mere commercial claims to a wide range of public regulatory 
disputes (Poulsen, 2011: 40). Awards resulting from ICSID arbitration became 
directly enforceable within all contracting states “as if it were a final judgment by 
a court in that State” (Article 54(1)). The settlement of investment disputes would 
become ‘depoliticised’ in the sense that foreign investors did not have to depend 
upon military action or espousal of their claim by their home state (Shihata, 1986). 
 The vast majority of these early European BITs were concluded between the 
advanced industrialised states and former colonies in the developing world. 
Nevertheless, the number of BITs grew slowly. Between 1959 and 1979, only a 
number of 165 BITs were concluded worldwide (UNCTAD, 2000a). A number of 
developing country governments, particularly in Latin America, refused to sign 
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up to the ICSID Convention, fearing it would grant foreign investors a privileged 
position by giving them direct access to international arbitration against host 
state governments (Poulsen, 2015: 57; St. John, 2018). The neoliberal discourse 
underpinning these BITs was still far from hegemonic, even within the Western 
capitalist states, and prospects for its advancement on a global level further 
diminished as a group of developing countries engaged in concerted efforts to 
reconfigure the post-colonial economic order.
3.2.4  Towards a New International Economic Order
The processes of decolonisation after the Second World War gave rise to a group of 
newly independent states in the developing world that sought to reaffirm their 
economic independence. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, these states attempted 
to reconstruct the legal framework for international economic relations that 
would improve their relative position in the global economy (Dolzer and Schreuer, 
2008: 15; Schrijver, 2008). The worsening crisis conditions of the early 1970s, and 
in particular the dissolution of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates, 
generated a “narrow and specific window of geopolitical opportunity” (Gilman, 
2015) for developing countries to establish an alternative international order that 
would redirect more of the benefits of global economic integration to the global 
South. An increasingly important avenue for the assertion of such a renewed order 
was through the United Nations General Assembly in which the developing 
countries together with the Soviet bloc of socialist states maintained a numerical 
advantage. The success of the oil embargo of the OPEC nations in raising and 
sustaining high oil prices, starting in 1973, prompted a coalition of non-OECD 
developing countries (the G-77) to propagate a series of resolutions that culminated 
in a proposal for a New	International	Economic	Order (NIEO) adopted by the United 
Nations in 1974 (Cox, 1979; Murphy, 1984; Van der Pijl, 1993). 
 The NIEO was based on a series of interrelated proposals to reform the 
structures, governance and norms of the global economy with the purpose to 
“improve the conditions under which the integration into the capitalist world 
economy was to proceed, not its destruction” (Van der Pijl, 2006: 122). These 
proposals included issues such as favourable terms of trade for primary commodity 
exports, international monetary reforms, the financing of development and the 
technology of transfer (Newcombe and Paradell, 2009: 31). The core principle of the 
NIEO involved the full and permanent sovereignty of states over their natural 
resources and all economic activities, thereby expressly recognising the state’s 
right to regulate and control the activities of transnational corporations within its 
national jurisdiction including the right to nationalise, expropriate or transfer 
ownership of foreign assets (UN, 1974a: Article 4(e)(g)). In the same year, the UN 
General Assembly also adopted the Charter	 for	 Economic	 Rights	 and	 Duties	 of	 States 
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(CERDS), which reaffirmed the notion of state sovereignty vis-à-vis capital (UN, 
1974b: Article 2). 
 These stipulations expressed the increased political opposition to the customary 
international law requirement to provide compensation for the expropriation of 
foreign assets, and reflected a fundamental challenge to the notion of private 
property rights and hence the capitalist social relations of production in the 
developing countries. Moreover, the drive to curb the activities of TNCs emanating 
from the NIEO led to the creation of the United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC) in 1974, which was primarily preoccupied with the aim to 
achieve a multilateral framework for the regulation of transnational capital in the 
shape of a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (Poulsen, 2015: 88-90; 
Sagafi-Nejad, 2008). Crucially, the NIEO movement also found resonance within 
the dominant classes of the Western capitalist societies, particularly within the 
political circles of social democracy and some elements of organised labour, as a 
preferable solution in response to the unfolding crisis of the 1970s (Van der Pijl, 
1993: 35; Augelli and Murphy, 1988). This prompted the rapid mobilisation of a 
fraction of capitalist social forces in the Western states that would give rise to what 
Van der Pijl (2006: 122) refers to as the ‘neoliberal counterrevolution’ in which 
capital accumulation and profits on the part of Western-originated transnational 
capital became restored during the 1980s and 1990s. 
3.3  Foreign investment regulation at EEC level
Within the European integration project, a harmonised supranational investment 
policy did not become manifest until the 1980s and 1990s, eventually culminating 
into a full transfer of FDI competencies to the European level with the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 (see next chapter). Foreign investment 
remained largely regulated at the national level during the post-war processes of 
European integration. The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC), which was signed in Rome on 27 March 1957, entered into force on 1 January 
1958 and abolished tariffs and trade-related quotas among the six member states, 
resulting in the creation of a customs union with a common external tariff and a 
common commercial policy. However, the latter was limited to tariffs and 
trade-related issues and did therefore not contain any specific provisions on 
foreign investment with third countries. Such focus reflected the then still limited 
working agenda of the GATT, which would only expand its work to issues such as 
trade in services, technical barriers to trade, intellectual property rights and 
trade-related investment issues during the course of the 1980s and 1990s. The lack 
of a common investment policy should also be understood against the backdrop of 
the wider hegemonic order of embedded liberalism and the prevalence of state-or-
ganised capitalism, which rested on the national class compromise between 
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organised labour and industrial capital fractions of the post-war economies in 
Europe.  European leaders sought to enhance European integration with the aim 
of restructuring growth strategies and patterns of accumulation and to align 
them with the Fordist principles of economic production, which was in turn 
kick-started in Europe through the financial aid of the Marshall Plan (Van der Pijl, 
2006: 38; Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 89). The establishment of the EEC in 1958 
sought to supplement the national Keynesian policies in fostering growth 
through the liberal pursuit of a large free and common market that would allow 
manufacturing firms to realise gains associated with economies of scale. At the 
same time, the EEC also marked a structural “shift in economic power from the 
traditional colonialist configuration of the European imperialism under 
Franco-British leadership to the Fordist, corporate-liberal configuration centring 
on West-Germany and the Common Market” (Van der Pijl, 2012: 29). In what 
follows, the developments of foreign investment regulation at EEC level in the 
1960s and 1970s will be outlined, which became largely shaped on the basis of two 
rivalling regulatory discourses, namely the emerging neoliberal and national 
mercantilist discourses, and formed part of the political responses to the increased 
pressures emanating from the ‘American challenge’. 
3.3.1  Responding to the American Challenge 
The creation of the Common Market and the full currency convertibility in 1958 
turned the European economies into highly attractive destinations for US 
producers and investors. The influx of US capital was crucial for kick-starting the 
Fordist project in Western Europe under the foundations of the Marshall Plan and 
after the establishment of the customs union with a common external tariff in 
1968, US firms increasingly used FDI to hop over the existing trade tariffs to gain 
access to the entire European market (Van der Pijl, 2006: 94; Panitch and Gindin, 
2012: 113). US firms quickly established subsidiaries in major parts of the European 
economies, such as the automotive, pharmaceutical, electrical goods, industrial 
instruments, and computer industries, thereby putting nationally oriented 
European industries under increased competitive pressure (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008; Panitch and Gindin, 2012). Between 1950 and 1962, the value of US FDI in 
the EEC grew from US$637 million to US$3,671 million, which represented 42 per 
cent of the total of US private capital invested abroad. More than half of US FDI in 
the EEC was located in the manufacturing industries and the largest US investors 
in Europe were responsible for 88 per cent of the industrial research undertaken 
in the US (Balekjian, 1967: 18-9).
 The dominant presence of US capital in the productive sectors of the European 
economies provoked a growing concern among European political decision- 
makers and organised capital. The publication of the book	Le	Défi	Americain or the 
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‘American Challenge’ by the French journalist Jean-Jacques Servan-Schneider in 
1967 captured well the existing sentiments at that time. For Servan-Schneider, the 
influx of abundant US investments in the Common Market undermined national 
industrial development objectives, which would bring the European economic 
system “in a state of collapse […] [as] [w]e see a foreign challenger breaking down 
the political and psychological framework of our societies” (Servan-Schneider, 
1968: 31). It was deemed necessary to create large European corporations that 
would be able to invest in technological innovations in order to form a 
counterweight to the dominant US industries (ibid.: 53-61). Servan-Schreiber 
referred thereby to a 1965 report from the European business association Union	des	
Industries	 de	 la	 Communauté	 Européenne (UNICE – now BusinessEurope), which 
expressed concerns about the size of US companies in Europe that led to difficulties 
for European companies to access European capital markets, labour shortages and 
rising wages, and decreased profit margins because US companies did not respect 
European cartel arrangements (ibid.: 49ff; see also Linsi, 2016: 107; Balekjian, 1967: 
264). Subsequently, European governments started to adopt the strategy of creating 
‘national champions’ by means of far-reaching industrial policies aimed to boost 
the growth of ‘strategic’ national industries. This strategy consisted of targeted 
state intervention to improve the performance of national industries such as 
subsidies for research and development, preferential procurement by public 
agencies, and the promotion of mergers among national companies (Buch-Hansen 
and Wigger, 2011: 61; Owen, 2012: 5). 
 Such a national-mercantilist discourse was the strongest in France. The post- 
war recovery of the French economy was facilitated by active state intervention. 
The French state nationalised various private companies in key sectors such as 
banking, energy and infrastructure as well as Air France and the largest insurance 
companies (Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 37; Hall, 1986: 139-41). The entry of 
foreign capital was considered as a direct threat to the objectives of national 
economic planning or dirigisme in France, and French industrialists feared vigorous 
competition from large-scale US enterprises, particularly in sensitive industries 
such as the automotive, food, and electronics sectors (Gillespie, 1972: 410; 
Johnstone, 1965: 36). The French government started to enforce the tight screening 
of foreign investments after a series of well-publicised incidents in 1962-4, 
involving mass-layoffs and controversial takeovers by US corporations (Johnstone, 
1965: 14-5).11 Subsequently, the French government introduced a series of 
restrictions on foreign investment outside the EEC, whereby foreign takeovers 
were to be strictly controlled while foreign capital creating new productive 
11 Particularly, three events involving subsidiaries of US corporations were commented on very 
critically by the French media: the sudden layoffs at General Motors France and Remington Rand 
France; Chrysler’s hostile takeover of French carmaker Simca, and attempts by US canning factory 
Libby McNeill to influence French agricultural policy (Linsi, 2016: 104; Johnstone, 1965).
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facilities was expected to comply with the objectives of French economic planning 
(Balekjian, 1967: 49; Dickie, 1969: 67-73). The restrictive policy on foreign 
investment was further consolidated with the adoption of a new law in 1966, 
which intensified control over FDI in the hands of the French Ministry of Finance 
(Gillespie, 1972: 412).
 Similar to France, a mixed-market economy with a strong emphasis on a 
comprehensive welfare state emerged in the UK after the end of the Second World 
War. The new Labour government under Clement Atlee (1945-1951) undertook a 
radical programme of nationalising crucial sectors of the economy, including the 
Bank of England, health services, the railways, energy, and iron and steel, and 
implemented rigid Keynesian macroeconomic and social policies (Buch-Hansen 
and Wigger, 2011: 39; Hall, 1986: 70-6). While largely continuing with these 
policies, the succeeding Conservative government (1952-1965) adopted a rather 
liberal type of FDI regulation in comparison to the one adopted in France. 
Historically, the UK has been the main source and destination of FDI for the US. In 
1958, the UK accounted for 47 per cent of all US investment in Europe, and still 35 
per cent in 1968 after the establishment of the Common Market, which reflected 
the ‘special relationship’ between the two after the end of the Second World War 
(Gillespie, 1972: 417). The Conservatives unconditionally approved a number of 
high-profile takeovers by US investors, thereby referring to the potential benefits 
of strengthening the balance of payments, the transfer of technology and the need 
to protect British investment abroad from retaliatory restrictive policies. The 
succeeding Labour government (1965-69) largely continued the liberal policies on 
foreign investment, but sought to address the concerns arising over foreign 
takeovers of British firms by imposing certain conditions regarding export efforts 
and stipulations on British majorities in the board of directors, thereby reinforcing 
domestic ownership over the economy (ibid.: 400-1). Rather than restricting the 
entry of foreign investment, the Labour government started to develop industrial 
policies to strengthen national industries that would be less vulnerable to foreign 
takeovers, in line with the burgeoning national mercantilist discourse (Owen, 
2012: 8-9; Gillespie, 1972: 400-3).  
 In Germany, the initial attitudes towards the influx of US capital reflected 
much more the neoliberal discourse. FDI inflows were virtually unrestricted as 
the growing presence of foreign capital in the German economy was not considered 
problematic. In 1966, the German Minister of Economic Affairs Karl Schiller 
reiterated that foreign investments would strengthen the economy by enhancing 
competition and introducing new ideas and techniques (Gillespie, 1972: 415). The 
increased volumes of incoming US investment led, however, also to certain 
concerns among German officials and parts of national industrial and banking 
capital, which advocated some form of supranational harmonisation of foreign 
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investment policy in order to enhance the competitiveness of EEC firms vis-à-vis 
foreign competitors (Balekjian, 1967: 233; Der	Spiegel,	1965; The	New	York	Times, 1966; 
Dickie, 1969: 73). German officials became particularly wary of the potentially 
detrimental effects of highly concentrated industries on the general levels of 
competition in the German economy. The German government started to closely 
observe key industries in order to identify and prevent monopolistic tendencies 
within the German economy, in line with the ordoliberal ideas present at that 
time (see Section 3.2.2). 
 Attempts to counter the American challenge at EEC level were spearheaded 
largely by the French. Already in 1958, the French member of the European 
Parliament Michel Debré warned the European Commission that under the Treaty 
of Rome provisions on the right of free establishment (Article 52), foreign investors 
could freely invest in one or the other of the members of the common market, and 
strongly advocated for strict supervision of such investment on the part of the 
Commission “to provide for equality in the benefits and burdens resulting from 
foreign investment” (quoted in Balekjian, 1967: 309). The Commission rejected 
such views and remained convinced that the maximum development of private 
investment from non-EEC members was to be favoured. As Walter Hallstein, the 
first President of the European Commission stated in a speech in Washington D.C. 
in June 1959, “it seems to me that our Community has received no more gratifying 
vote of confidence than American industry’s rapidly mounting investment in the 
Common Market […] We welcome this import of capital and know-how from 
America, and we hope in the future to see a reciprocal movement of European 
investment in your country” (Hallstein, 1959). Throughout the 1960s, the European 
Commission kept underscoring the liberal and open character of the Common 
Market and continued to promote inward FDI by highlighting the benefits for 
Europe (Balekijan, 1967: 309-11). 
 It was particularly the French government under the leadership of President 
Charles De Gaulle that strongly advocated for the adoption of a common policy to 
curb US investments. De Gaulle ascribed an important role to the French state and 
held on to its sovereignty from foreign influences, thereby strongly rejecting 
European ‘federalism’. In January 1963, De Gaulle vetoed the entry of Britain into 
the EEC for among other reasons the “undesirability of Anglo-American economic 
influence” (cited in Johnstone, 1965: 17). In the frigid aftermath of De Gaulle’s veto, 
a proposal for a common EEC policy towards US investment by the French Minister 
of Finance Giscard d’Estaing was rejected by the other five EEC member states 
during a meeting in March 1963 in Baden-Baden, Germany. Given that the 
governments of Germany, the Benelux and Italy maintained less restrictive 
investment policies, it was concluded that any measures designed to block foreign 
investors ran counter to the freedom of capital enshrined in the Treaty of Rome 
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and that the issue of US dominance in some sectors of the European economies 
was best dealt with by national laws and by the EEC antitrust laws (Johnstone, 
1965: 18-21; Dickie, 1969: 73; Gillespie, 1972: 406). The only agreement was reached 
on a proposal by Giscard d’Estaing that each member state supply the Commission 
with detailed figures on third-country investments in the member states, and that 
the Commission collate and publish these figures, which would lay the groundwork 
for Community control (New York Times, 1963). 
 Despite renewed calls for a Common Market Investment Policy by the French 
Minister of Industry Michel Maurice-Bokanowski in May 1965 (Linsi, 2016: 105), no 
further efforts were made on an agreement to regulate third-country FDI at the 
EEC level as the crisis-ridden process of European integration reached a low point 
towards the end of the 1960s. When the Commission President Hallstein put 
forward proposals for financing the common agricultural policy, which would 
have allowed for more budgetary powers for the EEC and qualified majority voting 
(QMV) in the Council, the French government subverted further economic 
integration by recalling its representatives from the Council meetings between 30 
June 1965 and 29 January 1966, giving rise to the so-called ‘empty chair crisis’. The 
eventual Luxembourg Compromise safeguarded the intergovernmentalist 
preferences by the French government by allowing for veto power on issues 
considered affecting the ‘national interest’. 
 With the resignation of De Gaulle in 1969, the European project experienced 
a short-lived moment of renewed integration efforts, culminating in the EEC 
accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark in 1973. This also reinvigorated 
supranational initiatives to revitalise and enhance the competitiveness of 
European capital in the global economy in response to the American challenge. As 
industrial policies of creating national champions remained largely at the national 
level, throughout the 1970s the Commission proactively sought to foster ‘Euro-
champions’ that would be able to compete on a global level (Buch-Hansen and 
Wigger, 2011: 66-7). Reflecting a Euro-mercantilist discourse, the Commission 
proposed a pan-European industrial policy that would advance economic 
integration through the elimination of technical barriers to trade, the liberalisation 
of public procurement, and the harmonisation of legal, fiscal and financial 
frameworks within which firms had to operate in order to promote transnational 
activities and industrial restructuring (European Commission, 1970; Michalis, 
2007: 82). During the early 1970s, the European Commission sought to establish a 
European export policy as an integral part of the common commercial policy. 
Most notably, a draft regulation in 1972 foresaw the creation of a European 
investment guarantee agency to insure European investors against non-commercial 
investment risks in third countries, but this initiative failed to generate support 
from the member states, which preferred their own national investment insurance 
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schemes (Basedow, 2016: 746; Shan, 2005: 66). While these developments marked 
the rise of a proactive European Commission in the field of foreign investment 
regulation, member states increasingly turned to national mercantilist responses 
to the American challenge in the context of worsening crisis conditions of the 
mid-1970s, which effectively undermined further European integration. 
3.3.2  Controlling capital movements
In the absence of any specific provisions on foreign investment in the EEC’s 
common commercial policy, the main source for the regulation of non-EEC foreign 
investment was to be found in the Treaty’s chapter on capital (Articles 67 to 73). 
Article 67 required member states to progressively abolish between themselves all 
restrictions on the movement of capital, but only “to the extent necessary to ensure 
the proper functioning of the common market”. Article 71 prohibited the 
introduction of new exchange restrictions and encouraged the elimination of 
existing ones as much as possible. Such a standstill clause meant that the Treaty 
started with a ‘clean sheet’ and that the liberalisation of capital movements would 
proceed through secondary legislation (Bakker, 1996: 41). With regard to capital 
movements from third countries, Article 70 empowered the Commission to 
progressively coordinate common policies vis-à-vis third countries, whereby 
member states were required to inform the Commission on any capital movements 
to and from third countries (Article 72). Exemptions from liberalisation were 
allowed in case of disturbances on national capital markets (Article 73) and balance 
of payments problems (Article 108 and 109). 
 The conditionality of capital liberalisation enshrined in the Treaty of Rome 
reflected the embedded liberal compromise whereby capital flows should be 
regulated in order to avoid financial crises and ensure monetary policy autonomy. 
At the same time, the text of the Treaty also resulted from specific struggles among 
competing neoliberal and national mercantilist discourses among the EEC 
members (see also Abdelal, 2007; Bakker, 1996; Hindelang, 2009). The issue of 
capital liberalisation featured prominently in the preparatory talks in the run up 
to the negotiations on the Treaty of Rome. An intergovernmental committee under 
the chairmanship of the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak was tasked to 
prepare a draft treaty that would serve as a basis for the negotiations. The so-called 
Spaak report envisaged the free movement of capital to be among the fundamental 
freedoms of the common market and members of the committee considered its 
full liberalisation as the ultimate goal. The Spaak committee took, however, a 
rather cautious approach to ease the existing sensitivities among the prospective 
EEC members regarding capital liberalisation and recommended to prioritise 
certain types of capital transactions, including FDI, to be liberalised first (Bakker, 
1996: 33). The report called thereby for a common approach to the free movement 
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of capital with third countries to avoid a regulatory gap since foreign capital could 
enter and leave the common market with liberal capital regimes and then enter 
member states with more restrictive capital regimes (Basedow, 2016: 746). 
 In line with the neoliberal discourse, the German government was in favour 
of the inclusion of the free movement of capital as a common goal in the Treaty. 
Germany had experienced capital surpluses and the German government actively 
encouraged the export of capital by eliminating all remaining controls on capital 
outflows, with only a small number of inward capital controls retained (Bakker, 
1996: 34). Belgium and Luxembourg also adopted a liberal attitude as their dual 
exchange market, introduced in 1955, consisted of a free financial market separated 
from the official exchange market for current payments. In line with the national 
mercantilist discourse, the French government maintained significant exchange 
controls, including screening procedures for FDI flows, as France still lacked 
official exchange reserves during the mid-1950s. For the French it was of utmost 
importance that the Treaty provisions would not undermine the national economic 
plans and the complete liberalisation of capital movements was deemed impossible 
under the dirigiste	approach. Hence, the French government insisted on safeguard 
clauses that would allow for restrictive measures with ex	 post approval by the 
Commission in case of emergency (ibid.: 35). Likewise, Italy generally favoured 
capital liberalisation, but insisted to retain the right to control issues on the 
national capital market through domestic regulations, whereas the Netherlands 
was opposed to full liberalisation in order to protect domestic capital market and 
to control domestic monetary expansion (ibid.: 36).
 After the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission sought to expand 
the liberalisation of capital movements within the Common Market with two 
directives adopted in 1960 and 1962.  These provided for among other things the 
full liberalisation of direct investment between the EEC members as well as real 
estate investment, personal capital movements, short and medium-term credits 
and service-related transactions (Usher, 2007: 1536; Egan, 2015: 140). While the 
Commission pushed for full liberalisation of all capital movements, member state 
governments in turn disagreed on the liberalisation of short-term capital movements 
and preferred to maintain control over domestic monetary policy. Therefore, the 
directives merely consolidated to a large extent the liberalisation steps previously 
undertaken by the individual member states (Bakker, 1996: 88). The issue of 
liberalising capital movements between EEC members and third countries, also 
known as the erga	omnes principle, was not touched upon despite strong insistence 
by the German government (Hindelang, 2009: 33). During the 1960s, following 
attempts by the Commission to enhance further capital liberalisation all failed 
to succeed as “opposition came from all sides” (Bakker, 1996: 96). The surge of 
speculative capital flows throughout the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the
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unregulated Eurodollar market, inhibited any further discussions on capital 
liberalisation and national governments increasingly adopted or tightened their 
capital controls. The Commission’s drive towards liberalisation ultimately lost its 
momentum after the adoption of the 1972 directive, which authorised governments 
to maintain the apparatus of capital controls to curtail undesirable capital flows 
(ibid.: 116-8). Against the background of the oil crisis and the 1973 collapse of 
the Bretton Woods regime, national governments adhered to a variety of policy 
responses to curb the inflow of capital and at the end of the 1970s financial markets 
in Europe were less integrated than during the previous decade. Eventually, it took 
almost two decades before a directive on the liberalisation of capital movements 
at the EEC level finally could be adopted in 1988.
3.4  Conclusion
This chapter has examined the post-war development of European foreign 
investment regulation against the backdrop of the rise and fall of the broader 
international order of embedded liberalism. Between the 1950s and 1970s, 
European foreign investment regulation was marked by a dual development. First, 
BITs emerged from within neoliberal circles in Western Europe, particularly in 
Germany, with the aim to secure capitalist property relations in the developing 
world in the wake of nascent decolonisation and economic nationalism. In line 
with the neoliberal discourse, these BITs exclusively focused on the protection and 
promotion of foreign investment, to be enforced through investor-state arbitration, 
and as such pertained to the ‘Smith abroad’ part of the post-war order of embedded 
liberalism. Efforts to transpose such neoliberal rules to the multilateral level 
failed largely due to increased challenges from developmentalist discourses 
prevalent in the developing world, most notably through the NIEO, but also 
because of Western capitalist states considering these rules as incompatible 
with their own national economic strategies. As a result, European governments 
launched a first series of BITs with developing countries, thereby imposing 
neoliberal investment rules that they were not prepared to accept among 
themselves. Secondly, the lack of a common EEC approach to foreign investment 
regulation should be understood as a result from national class compromises 
between industrial capital and organised labour, reflected in the rise of national 
circuits of accumulation along Fordist production lines that were sustained by 
state interventionist and national welfare policies associated with the ‘Keynes at 
home’ part of embedded liberalism. Control over cross-border capital flows was 
deemed necessary to use monetary policy and interest rates for Keynesian 
macroeconomic steering. Although minor steps towards enhanced integration 
were taken throughout the 1960s and 1970s, national mercantilist responses to 
the aggravated economic crisis and the American challenge eventually prevailed 
over joint European solutions.
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4.   The Neoliberal Transformation of European  
Foreign Investment Regulation
“[W]e	need	 to	 tear	down	existing	obstacles	 to	 investment	and	 stop	new	hurdles	being	
thrown	up	in	its	way.	Nothing	short	of	a	comprehensive	set	of	binding	international	rules	
will	create	the	level	playing	field	which	is	so	vital	for	the	European	economy”
EU Trade Commission Sir Leon Brittan, 17 March 1995
This chapter examines the neoliberal transformation of European modes of foreign 
investment regulation since the 1980s. Neoliberalism is presented here as a counter- 
project that emerged in the wake of the crisis of overaccumulation of the 1970s 
and the concomitant breakdown of the post-war social order of embedded liberalism. 
The neoliberal project aimed at restoring capitalist class power by freeing capital 
from the shackles of the previous state interventionist model under embedded 
liberalism and to facilitate the continued accumulation of capital globally. 
The chapter is divided in two main sections. The first section outlines the broader 
processes of transnationalising production and finance accompanied by the 
ascendency of neoliberalism as the hegemonic discourse underpinning the global 
governance of foreign investment. It is during this period that BITs became the 
preferred legal instruments to promote and protect European foreign investment, 
mainly in the developing world, in line with the neoliberal prescriptions reflected 
in the Washington Consensus. The second section examines how the relaunch of 
the European integration project in the 1980s was informed by the neoliberal 
offensive by the European Commission, who came to enjoy ever more regulatory 
powers as a result of various institutional reforms, and the emergent transnational 
capitalist class, who pushed for the liberalisation and protection of foreign 
investment flows beyond its home market. It also reveals the contradictions and 
limitations of this offensive manifested in challenges posed by an emergent centre- 
leftist discourse propagated by counter-globalisation movements consisting of 
trade unions, NGOs and other grassroots organisations.
4.1   Foreign investment regulation in the era of  
neoliberal globalisation
What has also been referred to as the Golden Age of Capitalism consisting of 
economic liberalism and national state intervention came to an end after the 
global capitalist system entered into a period of deep crisis in the early 1970s. 
This became manifest in sharp decreases in output, productivity, export growth, 
and rising levels of unemployment and inflation in the industrialised West 
(Frieden, 2006: 363-91; Glyn et al., 1990: 43-7). The Fordist production regime had 
exhausted itself towards the end of the 1960s, while wages had progressively 
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increased partly due to the increased bargaining power of organised labour 
(Armstrong et al., 1984). The enhanced international expansion of capitalist 
production increasingly challenged the Fordist growth model and intensified 
competition from newly emerging economies, particularly in East Asia, further 
aggravated the difficulties of the Fordist industries of the capitalist heartland 
(Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 73; Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 54; Jessop and Sum, 
2006: 126). This became exacerbated by the rising budget deficits that resulted 
from the fiscal burdens of the Keynesian welfare states trying to cope with 
mounting unemployment. In addition, the massive outflow of US capital through 
military interventions, foreign investment and developmental aid as well as the 
increasingly successful export-oriented strategies of Europe’s North, in particular 
Germany but also Japan led to significant trade and balance of payments deficits 
in the US (Brenner, 2006). The emergence of the ‘Eurodollar markets’ in the 1960s 
put increased pressure on the position of the US dollar and after the Nixon 
administration decided to end the convertibility of dollars to gold in 1971, the 
Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates collapsed altogether (Helleiner, 
1994). The challenges emanating from these different but interrelated global 
developments provided thereby the structural conditions for a fundamental 
transnational restructuring of the global political economy. 
4.1.1  The transnationalisation of production and finance
As explained in the previous chapter, the post-war economic boom had already 
fostered the international expansion of capital, which only further accelerated 
and deepened in the wake of the structural crisis conditions of the 1970s. 
The following decades indeed witnessed a qualitative shift towards the trans-
nationalisation of production understood as “the integration of production processes 
on a transnational scale, with different phases of a single process being carried out 
in different countries” (Cox, 1981: 146). Innovations in information and communication 
technologies as well as novel organisational forms, management techniques and 
subcontracting/outsourcing have provided for the transition from Fordism to new 
post-Fordist flexible regimes of production (Lipietz, 1987; Jessop, 2002; Robinson, 
2004; Dicken, 2011). Post-Fordism entails flexible and networked production, 
in which increased productivity is based on the operation of flexible machines and 
flexible systems that are combined to secure economies of scope (Jessop, 2002: 96-103). 
The concomitant decentralisation and fragmentation of the production process has 
subsequently allowed for dissolving previously national circuits of accumulation, 
which have in turn become functionally integrated and geographically dispersed 
into new globalised circuits of accumulation (Robinson, 2004: 11; Dicken, 2011). 
The transnationalisation of production can therefore be characterised by the ‘deep 
integration’ of the global economy, which is “primarily organised within and 
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between geographically extensive and complex global production networks, and 
through a variety of mechanisms” (Dicken, 2011: 7). This has been accompanied by 
an increasing number of foreign subsidiaries of globally operating companies 
forming part of complex networks of transnational production and value chains, 
giving rise to the preeminent role of transnational corporations (TNCs). TNCs have 
been the embodiment of transnational capital and constitute thereby the “agents 
that integrate trade, technology transfer and financial flows for the purpose of 
[transnational] production in the context of the firms’ strategy” (UNCTAD, 1991: 
81). The number of TNCs has increased significantly from 7,000 at the end of the 
1960s to around 60,000 in 2000. In 2010, there have been more than 100,000 
parent corporations with almost 900,000 foreign affiliates (UNCTAD, 2000b, 2011). 
 The rise of transnational capital through TNCs is best reflected by the dramatic 
increase of FDI since the 1970s. The total global inward FDI flows has grown from 
around US$54 billion in 1980 to a record peak of approximately US$2,000 billion 
in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2015b). After the outbreak of the global financial and economic 
crisis in the second half of 2008, global FDI inflows dropped to a total of US$1,222 
billion in 2009. Growth has picked up since then, leading to a total of US$1,470 
billion of global FDI inflows in 2013 (ibid.). The total amount of outward FDI stock 
Figure 4.1  Annual inward FDI flows, 1980-2013
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was US$548 billion in 1980, and grew from US$2.092 billion in 1990 to a staggering 
US$26,312 billion in 2013 (ibid.). These developments not only indicate that the 
growth of FDI has been enormous, but also that FDI flows have played a critical 
role in integrating different regions into the global economy. Although global FDI 
was still concentrated in the triad of North America, Europe and Japan, further 
contributing to processes of transnationalistion in those regions, flows to 
developing and transition economies have become increasingly important in 
recent years. In 2010, these regions absorbed for the first time more FDI flows than 
developed economies (52 per cent – see Figure 4.1).
 The fragmentation and decentralisation of global production has given rise to 
efficiency-seeking	investments as the predominant form of FDI, in which TNCs relocate 
different parts of their value-added chain abroad in order to improve the 
profitability of their overall operations through the supply of multiple markets 
(UNCTAD, 1999: 21-4; Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 72). This typically involves the 
relocation of labour-intensive segments of the production process to areas where 
labour costs are low and usually takes place in the manufacturing and services 
sector in low-wage economies. Efficiency-seeking FDI has been the main driver 
behind the growth of manufactured exports of the developing economies but it 
also involves horizontal FDI in differentiated products associated with FDI flows 
between developed economies in automobiles, computers, chemicals, and 
consumer goods (UNCTAD, 1999: 24). Efficiency-seeking FDI requires open and 
relatively well-developed markets, and tends to flourish in regionally integrated 
markets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 72). At the same time, increased FDI has 
taken place in research and development capabilities in order to sustain or advance 
global competitiveness, also referred to as strategic-asset-seeking	investments (UNCTAD, 
1999: 24-5; Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 73-4). 
 The transnationalisation of production has enhanced the increased concentration 
and centralisation of capital on a global level. This is reflected by the surge in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which involves the partial or full 
takeover or the merging of the capital and assets of an existing enterprise in a host 
economy and represent a change in ownership that does not necessarily involve 
any immediate additions to investment or employment in the host economy. M&As 
form an important part of corporate strategies to transform themselves into global 
players in the context of intensified global competition. In contrast, Greenfield FDI 
refers to the establishment of new production facilities and the movement of 
intangible capital abroad, thereby directly adding to the production capacity and 
potentially contributing to capital formation and employment generation in the 
host economy (Colen et al., 2013: 78). The vast majority of global FDI flows during 
the 1990s consisted of M&As with a share increase from 52 per cent in 1987 to 83 
per cent in 1999 (UNCTAD, 2000b: 14). An important part of these M&As has been 
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directed to the strategic-asset-seeking knowledge and information technology 
sectors, such as telecommunications, electronics and business services, whereas 
the main objective of a considerable number in the food and beverages and tobacco, 
public utility, retail trade and financial services has been to protect or gain market 
share (Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 74; UNCTAD, 2000b). These developments point 
towards the global transformation from industrial production towards services. 
Between 1990 and 2012, the share of services in global FDI stock has increased 
from 49 to 63 per cent with a corresponding decrease in manufacturing from 41 
to 26 while the share of the primary sector has remained around 7 per cent 
(UNCTAD, 2015b: 12-3; UNCTAD, 2004).
 In more recent years, the dominance of transnationally circulating capital 
has been particularly reflected by the substantial and growing part of global FDI 
structured through offshore investment hubs (on offshore financial centres, 
see for example Palan, 2006; Hendrikse and Fernandez, 2019). These are for a great 
part motivated by tax avoidance practices, typically by either transfer pricing 
manipulation on intangible assets such as intellectual property rights, brands, 
business services and risks (and associated royalties and licensing fees), and through 
financing schemes to use loans from an offshore-based entity to maximise the 
payments of passive interests at the level of the high-tax jurisdiction loan recipient 
(UNCTAD, 2015b: 193-5). Offshore investment hubs typically involve tax havens or 
jurisdictions offering special purpose entities (SPEs), of which the latter entail 
directly or indirectly foreign owned legal entities without substantial economic 
links to the host economy aimed at the “passing of through of all types of financial 
and non-financial assets, liabilities and related income to third countries” (IMF, 
2004b: 6). FDI flows to offshore investment hubs is identified here as fiscal-incentives-	
seeking	investments, which involves practices of so-called ‘round-tripping’ defined as 
the “channelling by direct investors of local funds to SPEs abroad and the subsequent 
return of the funds to the local economy in the form of direct investment” (IMF, 
2004a: 70; see also Geng, 2004; Ledyaeva et al., 2015). The role of fiscal-incentives- 
seeking investment has gained prominence particularly during the second half of 
the 2000s, and it is estimated that around 30 per cent of cross-border corporate 
investment stocks have been routed through offshore investment hubs before 
reaching their destination as productive assets (UNCTAD, 2015b: 188). 
 Lastly, the emergence of transnational accumulation structures has been 
underpinned by the shift in gravity from productive to financial capital. The 
collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in the early 1970s and the subsequent 
liberalisation of financial markets led to the increased integration of global 
finance. The emergence of the Eurodollar markets in London in the 1960s already 
underscored the crucial role of offshore markets for the transnationalisation of 
finance, which made it more difficult for national states to control global capital 
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flows (Helleiner, 1994). The gradual deregulation and the abolition of capital controls 
initiated an unprecedented financial expansion captured by the magnitude of 
speculation and the proliferation of financial instruments such as stocks, futures, 
options, derivatives and currency markets. Such short-term financial transactions, 
also known as ‘portfolio investments’, generally reflect an interest only in securing 
an ample return on investment without exercising any direct role in the company 
in which they are invested (Robinson, 2004: 25). The rise of financial capital 
has been engendered by various processes of ‘financialisation’, which has been 
considered as one of the key drivers in the broader societal shift from Fordist 
production towards a finance-led growth regime (Boyer, 2000; Harvey, 2005; 
Stockhammer, 2010). Financialisation involves a pattern of accumulation in which 
profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade 
and commodity production (Krippner, 2005: 174; see also Erturk et al., 2008; 
Montgomerie and Williams, 2009; Harvey, 2010). As also non-financial corporations 
increasingly derive profits from financial activities, they have come to withdraw 
capital from investments in productive activities to more liquid assets, reflected by 
global trends of decreased gross fixed capital formation (Dunn, 2014: 112; Krippner, 
2005; Crotty, 2005). 
 The transnationalisation of production and finance, marked by the rise of 
transnationally mobile capital, has been accompanied by the ascendancy of 
neoliberalism as the global hegemonic discourse, and in particular by the rise of 
transnational legal rules and institutions aimed at sustaining and protecting the 
transnational patterns of capital accumulation.
4.1.2  The neoliberal counterrevolution and the rising number of BITs
Neoliberalism is understood here as an inherent political project aimed at 
restoring capitalist class power after the economic and social crisis of the 1970s. 
This project is characterised by liberal pro-market, supply-side and monetarist 
discourses underpinned by a constellation of social forces configured around the 
hegemonic fraction of transnational (financial) capital (Van Apeldoorn and 
Overbeek, 2012: 5; see also Harvey, 2005; Cahill, 2014). The spread of neoliberal 
ideas has been uneven and follows different trajectories (Brenner et al., 2010; 
Jessop, 2010b), but they tend to involve the principles of privatisation of state-run 
assets, liberalisation of trade in goods and investment, monetarist focus on 
inflation control and supply-side dynamics, deregulation of labour and product 
markets to reduce impediments to business, and the marketisation of society 
through public-private partnerships or other forms of commodification (Birch and 
Mykhnenko, 2010: 5). These principles are premised upon the assumption that 
“human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong 
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private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005: 2). Neoliberal 
ideas originated in a group of think tanks, most notably the Mont-Pèlerin Society 
(for a genealogy, see Slobodian, 2018; Peck, 2010a), and primarily aimed at 
countering Keynesian policies and government intervention in markets 
underpinning the previous order of embedded liberalism (Birch and Mukhnenko, 
2010; Dumenil and Levy, 2004). In the early 1980s, neoliberalism rose to political 
power with the election of Margaret Thatcher as prime minister of the UK and 
Ronald Reagan as president of the US. The global ‘roll-out’ of neoliberalism (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002), particularly after the fall of communism in 1989, has involved 
“processes of intensifying and deepening the scope of market disciplines associated 
with the increasing power of transnational capital in organising social and world 
orders” (Gill and Cutler, 2014: 6), while compelling states and societies to conform 
to those market disciplines.
 The rise of neoliberalism as the global hegemonic discourse emanated from 
the structural crisis conditions of the 1970s and came largely in response to the 
increased challenges to continued capital accumulation as posed by the NIEO 
movement, and its ultimate demise. The NIEO movement, reaching its peak in the 
mid-1970s, was globally dismantled by a combination of forces and developments. 
From the onset, the driving coalition of developing countries was internally 
divided, which undermined its ability to impose its counter-hegemonic demands. 
The success of the OPEC oil boycott and the sharp increase in oil prices not only 
affected the Western economies but also the oil-dependent economies in the global 
South (Augelli and Murphy, 1988). The oil-exporting countries deposited their 
windfall profits in the expanding Eurodollar markets, where these ‘petrodollars’ 
were then loaned to governments in particularly Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. In the 1970s, private bank lending represented the main avenue for these 
governments to gain access to international capital, which, by 1980, accounted for 
half of all capital flows to developing countries (Kiely, 2007: 67; Vandevelde, 2005: 
178). At the same time, the ISI strategies placed great financial burdens on the 
developmental states, which faced increasing budget deficits. These were 
accompanied by increasing trade deficits resulting from an increase in the 
dependence on the imports of capital goods necessary to develop new industries 
(Kiely, 2007: 53). Moreover, the economic growth experienced by the export-orient-
ed economies in East Asia further undermined the ISI model. By the early 1980s, 
many developing countries were unable to finance the huge foreign debt payments 
of international loans they had been accumulating in the previous decades. The 
Mexican default on its foreign debt in 1982 and the subsequent debt crisis in Latin 
America, often referred to as the ‘lost decade’, marked the final blow to the NIEO 
ideology and initiated a fundamental restructuring away from strategies of import 
substitution industrialisation. 
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 The debt crisis had put the developmental and often authoritarian states in 
the developing world under increased pressure and enabled an ostensibly 
democratic revolution across the global South, which was in great part fostered by 
the rise of neoliberal forces and technocratic ‘cadres’. To avoid a complete collapse 
of their highly inflated and indebted economies, most of the developing world 
governments opted to devalue their currencies, refinance their foreign debts, 
reduce government expenditures and restructure their economies according to 
the neoliberal terms set by the US government and multilateral institutions such 
as the IMF and the World Bank. This group of creditors was influential in shaping 
the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, which has been often referred to as a 
package of policies emphasising on privatisation, price stabilisation, reduction of 
import tariffs, liberalisation of financial markets, and the opening of economies 
to foreign investment (Williamson, 1990). The structural adjustment programmes 
imposed on national governments, explicitly designed to weaken the role of the 
state, were crucial in the shift towards an export-oriented accumulation regime, 
thereby enhancing the transnationalisation of the developing world economies 
(Robinson, 2008; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005). The debt crisis had reduced the 
availability of private lending and development assistance, particularly in the 
wake of the massive US federal deficits and the concomitant borrowing under the 
Reagan administration, leaving developing countries with little alternative but to 
seek foreign private investment (Vandevelde, 2005: 178; Augelli and Murphy, 1988). 
Governments sought to attract FDI by creating favourable conditions for foreign 
investors, reflected by the continuing liberalisation of national regulatory frameworks 
to improve their investment climates and to accommodate the increased inflows 
of transnational capital, although the share of restrictive measures grew in the 
run up to the global and financial crisis of 2008-9 (see Figure 4.2).
 The global capitalist restructuring and the concomitant ascendency of 
neoliberalism generated a renewed political impetus for the enhancement of global 
rules on foreign investment. Organised fractions of transnational capital, in 
particular the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), started to push for the 
adoption of international instruments on foreign investment in the wake of the 
mounting nationalisations and expropriations of foreign assets in the course of 
the 1970s (ICC, 1977). The 1976 OECD Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises and the attached voluntary Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises in 1976 formed a direct response by the OECD member states to the 
challenges posed by the NIEO movement, in particular its demand for a legally 
binding TNC Code of Conduct (Van der Pijl, 1993). 
 At the same time, Western powers started to develop or accelerate their 
BIT networks to enhance the expansion of transnational capital. Following the 
 recommendations of a White Paper published in 1971, the UK government began 
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to develop its BIT programme with the explicit purpose to secure favourable 
conditions for British investors in the context of increased protectionism in the 
developing world, leading to the conclusion of the first UK BIT with Egypt in 1975 
(Denza and Brooks, 1987: 911; Brown and Sheppard, 2013: 703). In 1977, the US 
government abandoned its FCN strategy and proposed a new series of BITs, which, 
at the strong instigation of US capital actors, were specifically targeted at 
developing countries. The FCNs were stripped of provisions unrelated to investment 
protection to strengthen and expand greater specificity to FCN formulations and 
bring them more in line with the European BITs. In 1982, the US concluded its first 
BIT with Egypt (Vandevelde, 1988: 208-10).
 Towards the end of the 1980s, BITs became the preferred legal instruments for 
the promotion and protection of foreign investment (see Figure 4.3). Particularly 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, inducing the process of rapid 
transition towards market-based economies in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet bloc, the number of worldwide BITs increased dramatically. In 1989, 386 
BITs had been concluded, whereas at the end of 1999 their number quintupled to 
1,857. At the time of writing, almost 3,000 BITs have been concluded worldwide 
(UNCTAD, 2021a). The processes of liberalisation and deeper integration have also 
been accompanied by the rise of bilateral and regional trade agreements and other 
economic partnership agreements with provisions on investment, such as the 
Figure 4.2   FDI regulatory changes undertaken by national governments, 
1992-2009, in percentages
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North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada and 
Mexico, the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). The number of bilateral and regional agreements with 
investment provisions worldwide has been growing steadily, reaching more than 
400 by 2021 (UNCTAD, 2021a).
 Transnational institutions played a crucial role here as they increasingly 
regarded foreign investments as one of the main drivers of economic growth and 
development along neoliberal lines. In particular, the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) became instrumental in advising and 
assisting governments of developing countries in restructuring their national 
regulatory frameworks in favour of foreign capital. This was part of a larger 
institutional shift within the UN, which sought to re-establish itself as a key locus 
in foreign investment policy-making after the demise of the NIEO in the late 1970s 
and the concomitant ideological shifts towards FDI among developing countries 
(Poulsen, 2015: 88-99; Sagafi-Nejad, 2008). UNCTAD actively facilitated the proliferation 
Figure 4.3   Number of newly signed BITs and other treaties with investment 
provisions per year, 1980-2015
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of BITs by organising ‘BIT signing rounds’ in the early 2000s, in which a great 
number of developing country officials gathered to conclude BITs (Poulsen, 2015: 
92-6). Developing countries also increasingly signed up to the ICSID Convention 
and the vast majority of BITs has come to include arbitration clauses with reference 
to ICSID. Moreover, the World Bank created the Multilateral	 Investment	 Guarantee	
Agency (MIGA) in 1985 to issue guarantees against non-commercial risks and to 
advise developing countries in creating favourable conditions to foreign investment 
accompanied with its structural adjustment loans (Newcombe and Paradell, 2009: 
40; Shihata, 1987). Of particular importance were the 1992 World	Bank	Guidelines	on	
the	Treatment	of	Foreign	Direct	 Investment, which highlighted the important role of 
foreign investment in economic development and set out the neoliberal policy 
framework for regulating FDI (World Bank, 1992).
 These developments also reinvigorated renewed discussions on investment at 
the multilateral level (see Section 4.2.1). The successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round of the GATT in 1994 significantly expanded the global trade agenda into the 
realm of new issues such as intellectual property rights, services and investment, 
giving rise to so-called ‘behind-the-border’ liberalisation (cf. Young and Peterson, 
2006). The creation of the World Trade Organisation in 1995 entailed the inclusion 
of investment-related issues through the Agreement	 on	 Trade-Related	 Investment	
Measures (TRIMs) and the General	Agreement	 on	Trade	 in	Services (GATS). The TRIMs 
primarily prohibits the imposition of certain performance requirements on foreign 
investment such as local content requirements, trade balancing requirements, 
foreign exchange restrictions and export restrictions. The GATS liberalises trade 
in services and includes a commitment with regard to commercial presence 
under Mode 3, which essentially regulates the entry of foreign investment in the 
services sectors covered by GATS commitments. Although these agreements 
greatly facilitated the liberalisation of global trade and investment, they did not 
contain specific provisions on investment protection or investor-state arbitration. 
Investment became one of the so-called ‘Singapore Issues’ in 1996, but the issue 
was finally dropped from the WTO agenda in 2003 after strong opposition from 
developing country members (Van Harten, 2007: 22-3; Muchlinski, 2000). Similarly, 
discussions to create a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) under the 
auspices of the OECD, which took place between 1995 and 1998, ultimately failed 
as a number of OECD members started to oppose the ambitious proposals for 
investment protection after strong mobilisation of domestic and transnational 
activists (Walter, 2001; Egan, 2001). In the end, transnational capital remains 
facilitated and protected largely through a dispersed network of bilateral and 
regional trade and investment treaties in the absence of a multilateral code.
 To recapitulate, the global embrace of BITs as the main instruments to enhance 
and protect foreign investment has to be understood against the backdrop of the 
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transnationalisation of production and finance and the concomitant ascendancy 
of neoliberalism as the hegemonic regulatory discourse. The dramatic increase in 
global FDI flows, and in particular the shift towards efficiency-seeking, strategic- 
asset-seeking, and fiscal-incentives-seeking FDI, came to reflect the set-up of complex 
and geographically dispersed transnational value chains and accumulation 
patterns, sustained and facilitated by BITs and FTAs and other treaties with 
investment provisions (see Figure 4.4). This does not necessarily mean that other 
modes of FDI that dominated under embedded liberalism have become obsolete. In 
contrast, a large part of global FDI remains informed by strategies centred on 
‘spatial fixes’ and access to new markets and cheap resources, including labour. 
While BITs are quintessential neoliberal documents, particularly the European 
ones traditionally focus only on post-establishment protection of foreign assets with 
governments retaining control over the admission and entry of foreign investment 
according to their national policy objectives. With the transnationalisation of 
production and finance, reflected in the shift towards newer FDI modes, regulatory 
frameworks both at the national and the global level, including BITs and FTAs, 
have increasingly centred on market access and pre-establishment liberalisation 
of foreign investment that would further bind governments to the commitments 
of disciplinary neoliberalism.
4.2   EU foreign investment regulation in the era 
of neoliberal globalisation
Foreign investment regulation at EU level also underwent a profound transformation 
since the 1980s, which should be understood as part of the general ascendancy of 
neoliberalism in Europe. The breakdown of the post-war order of embedded 
liberalism, and the European integration project related to it, provided for the 
structural conditions for alternative discourses to emerge on how to restore and 
enhance European economic growth and competitiveness in the aftermath of the 
exhausted Fordist accumulation regime. During the ‘phase of deconstruction’, the 
European project became increasingly associated with terms such as ‘Eurosclerosis’ 
(cf. Giersch, 1985) whereby European industry was perceived as suffering from a 
lack of competitiveness and dynamism in the wake of increased international 
competition. In the course of the 1980s, European political and capitalist elites 
gradually turned to neoliberal principles and ideas as an ideological alternative to 
Keynesian macroeconomic management in the face of mounting budget deficits 
and growing inflation (Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 72-6; Bieler and Morton, 
2001; Van Apeldoorn, 2002). Notwithstanding the variegated nature of European 
capitalism (Jessop, 2012; Brenner et al., 2010) as well as the continuing contestation 
by various social groups (Bieler, 2009), European economies have been generally 
moving in a neoliberal direction since the 1980s.
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 During the ‘phase of construction’, neoliberalism first arose in the UK where 
the Conservative Party under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher came to power 
in May 1979. In the course of the early 1980s, other European countries followed 
suit and started to promote monetarism, the liberalisation of trade and investment, 
the abolition of capital controls, privatisation, deregulation and re-tasking the 
role of the state. Initially, governments pursued their own divergent national 
responses, but during the early 1980s an elite consensus began to take shape in 
favour of a European solution to the crisis. This reinvigorated the process of 
European integration particularly under the French President of the European 
Commission Jacques Delors (1985-1995). Most notably, the European Commission 
published in its 1985 White Paper a number of detailed proposals aimed at the 
completion of the internal market by 1992 through the abolition of non-tariff 
barriers to trade, which still impeded the full-fledged liberalisation of trade within 
the European market (European Commission, 1985). These proposals became insti-
tutionalised in the Single European Act (SEA), which came into force in 1987 and 
constituted the first amendment to the original Treaty of Rome. The SEA introduced 
the principle of mutual recognition to facilitate market access, which greatly 
enhanced the comprehensive liberalisation of the European market through 
‘negative integration’ (cf. Scharpf, 1999). 
 Capital movements were fully liberalised with the adoption of the landmark 
1988 Capital Directive, which placed the freedom of capital on the same footing as 
the freedom of goods, services and people within the European market (Council of 
the EU, 1988). During the ‘phase of consolidation’, the freedom of capital became 
constitutionalised with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1994 
establishing the European Union (EU), which now also included the liberalisation 
of capital between member states and third countries according to the erga	omnes 
principle (Basedown, 2016: 750; Abdelal, 2006; Bakker, 1996), thereby contributing 
to the further transnationalisation of European economies. Hence, the Maastricht 
Treaty effectively created an external capital regime by giving the EU a role in 
regulating cross-border capital movements and direct investments. 
 The neoliberal orthodoxy of monetarism was further consolidated as national 
governments became increasingly limited in financing welfare state expenditures 
under the constraints of the Maastricht convergence criteria and the subsequent 
Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, the European Central Bank established in 
1998 was designed to administer the monetary policy of the Eurozone and ensure 
price stability and low inflation while being institutionally independent from 
democratic pressures (Ryner and Cafruny, 2017: 90-1; Gill, 1998). Finally, the 
supremacy of EU regulatory and judicial frameworks over national ones was also 
strengthened by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), whose jurisprudence since 
the 1960s and 1970s provided a crucial catalyst for the relaunch of European 
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integration by extending the reach of EU law and subsequently constraining the 
autonomy of national institutions and policy choices (Scharpf, 2010; Stone Sweet, 
2004). Concomitantly, these developments have contributed to the strengthening 
of the EU as an emerging institutional ensemble with its structurally inscribed 
strategic selectivities in favour of transnational capital interests. 
 The relaunch of European integration in the 1980s and the concomitant 
neoliberal turn should, however, not be understood as an inevitable and path- 
dependent process, but rather as resulting from the struggle between rival 
ideological and strategic orientations underpinning the contending projects of 
neoliberalism and Euro-mercantilism, with a third project of social democracy (or 
‘centre-leftism’) in the background as a potential counter-hegemonic force as well 
as a possible point of convergence (Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 78-82; Overbeek, 2012; 
Holman, 1992). The Euro-mercantilist discourse was particularly dominant during 
the 1980s and early 1990s and centred on the idea of a strong European home 
market that would shield European capital from outside competition, above all 
from US and Japanese companies. Euro-mercantilism was supported mainly by 
fractions of European industrial capital primarily, but not exclusively, located in 
Southern Europe, for example in France, Spain and Italy, where former ‘national 
champions’ came to pursue internationalisation strategies mainly oriented 
towards the European market (Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 82; Overbeek, 2012: 227; Van 
der Pijl, 2006: 264). 
 With the deepening of neoliberal globalisation and the concomitant rise of 
transnational capital, the neoliberal discourse increasingly challenged Euro- 
mercantilist projections in the early 1990s and sought the further breakdown of 
regulatory market constraints on capital mobility and capital accumulation 
beyond the European market. The neoliberal discourse is bound up with the 
interests of transnationally mobile and globalised fractions of European capital 
that compete directly on global markets. These fractions include transnational 
industrial capital or ‘superstar exporters’ (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007) as well as 
global finance and services capital, both of which tend to be dominated by Western 
European firms (Overbeek, 2012: 227; Van der Pijl, 2006: 262; see also Van der Pijl 
et al., 2011). With regard to industrial capital fractions, these typically involve 
sectors such as oil and gas, chemicals, utilities, food and beverages and other 
manufacturing industries that actively pursued an accumulation strategy 
consisting of ‘spatial fixes’, including the opening of new markets for reallocation 
of productive parts of the industrial chains and access to resources and cheap 
labour. EU trade policy became inextricably bound up with the neoliberal 
discourse since the 1980s with the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
for Trade (DG Trade), backed up by organised transnational capital, becoming the 
global vanguard of neoliberal investment rules.
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4.2.1  The EU crusade for multilateral and bilateral investment rules
The European Commission already became active in the field of foreign investment 
promotion and protection with third countries since the late 1970s and 1980s. In 
1978, the Commission presented a communication with guidelines for joint action 
to encourage European investment in developing countries (European Commission, 
1978). Since then, it proposed to include a number of investment provisions during 
trade talks with developing countries, for example during the Euro-Arab dialogue, 
the renewal of the development framework with African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries under the Lomé Convention, and the Cooperation Agreements 
with five ASEAN countries, Yugoslavia, Brazil, India and the Andean Pact (European 
Commission, 1980; see also Shan, 2005; Voss, 1981). In 1988, the Commission 
launched the EC-International Investment Partners (EC-IPP) programme in which 
it started to promote European investment in Latin America, Asia and the 
Mediterranean by financing joint ventures with local businesses (European 
Commission, 1991). Finally, the EU also became part of the Energy Charter Treaty 
in 1994, which bound together the EU and its member states and the states in the 
former Soviet Union under a multilateral legal framework, including BIT-style 
investment protection provisions and ISDS, to promote the principles of openness 
of global energy markets and non-discrimination to enhance foreign investment 
in the abundant energy supplies in the former socialist countries (Konoplyanik 
and Wälde, 2006: 524-9; see also Wälde, 1996). These efforts mark the increased 
pro-activeness of the European Commission to develop a common approach to 
enhance European FDI abroad, reflecting a shift towards an outward and export- 
oriented outlook, which only accelerated and deepened with the rise of neo- 
liberalism. 
 The neoliberal focus of EU trade policy emerged during the Uruguay Round 
(1986-1994) of the GATT and became consolidated under the tenure of Sir Leon 
Brittan as EU Trade Commissioner and Vice-President of the European Commission 
(1993-1999). The ‘Thatcherite’ Brittan, originating from the right-wing of the 
Conservative Party in the UK, was a neoliberal hardliner and previously spear - 
headed the neoliberal restructuring of EU competition policy as EU Competition 
Commissioner (1989-1993) (see Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011). Nicknamed ‘the 
Bulldozer’ in the Brussels bubble (Financial	Times, 2015), Brittan actively sought to 
boost EU competitiveness through the progressive eliminations of restrictions to 
trade and investment and it was under his leadership that the EU became probably 
the strongest advocate for multilateral trade and investment rules in the 1990s 
and thereafter. The 1995 communication A	Level	 Playing	Field	 for	Direct	 Investment	
World-Wide was one of the first testimonies of the neoliberal competitiveness 
discourse in the field of EU investment policy, which was first introduced in the 
Commission’s 1994 White	Paper	on	Growth,	Competitiveness	and	Employment	and which 
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came to underpin much of the EU’s subsequent socio-economic policy objectives 
(cf. Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 170-80). In the communication, the Commission expressed 
its concerns about the legal patchwork of BITs and FTAs that created a non- 
transparent and discriminatory regime for European investments abroad and 
considered the elimination of unequal conditions for European investors “an 
essential part of its strategy for an open world economy” (European Commission, 
1995a: 5). Hence, the Commission stressed that it was “of vital interest to the 
Community and its Member States to actively pursue the establishment of 
multilateral rules for FDI” that would guarantee “a high uniform standard of 
liberal rules governing FDI combined with its effective protection” (ibid.: 6, 8). 
 After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the European Commission and 
the EU member states became actively involved in the discussions on a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) under the auspices of the OECD between 1995 and 
1998. Although the European Commission saw the WTO as a more appropriate 
venue for such multilateral investment negotiations, with better prospects for 
garnering support from developing countries (European Commission, 1995a: 10; 
Walter, 2001), it strongly supported the negotiations for an ambitious agreement 
that would establish high-level investor protection at a global level. In terms of 
content, form and scope, the draft text prepared by the OECD secretariat mirrored 
the substantive investment protection and ISDS provisions and definitions typically 
found in many European BITs, but also added new pre-establishment obligations 
of investment liberalisation, inspired by the US model BIT and NAFTA Chapter 11, 
which would create a general ‘open door’ for all investments (OECD, 1998; see also 
Egan, 2001: 81-3; Picciotto, 1998: 756; Muchlinski, 2000). 
 At the same time, the ambitious scope of the negotiations led to major 
disagreements between the OECD members. Particularly, tensions arose over the 
scope of investment liberalisation as many EU member states, but also the US and 
Canada, submitted extensive lists of reservations and exemptions from the core 
elements of the MAI, with some governments excluding several key economic 
sectors, such as for example France demanding a general carve-out for its cultural 
industries (Julliard, 1998: 480-3; Muchlinksi, 2000: 1047-8; Egan, 2001: 87-8). 
Moreover, contestation by labour unions, environmental groups, consumer groups 
and other NGOs in the OECD countries arose especially after a draft text of the 
MAI was leaked and posted on the Internet in February 1997. Both national and 
transnational campaigns perceived the proposed MAI as a ‘charter of rights for 
TNCs’ or ‘NAFTA on steroids’ and fiercely opposed the primacy of strong and 
enforceable provisions for liberalising and protecting transnational capital over 
the protection and advancement of broader public interests (Walter, 2001: 63; 
Egan, 2001: 88-9; Johnston and Laxer, 2003). These concerns were further fuelled 
by a highly publicised dispute between US chemical firm Ethyl and the Canadian 
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government over the ban of gasoline additive MMT. Ethyl considered the Canadian 
ban as ‘tantamount to effective expropriation’ and sued the government for 
compensation under NAFTA Chapter 11 in 1997, after which the Canadian 
government unexpectedly settled for US$13 million.12 
 The increasingly unpopular MAI faced another blow when a massive majority 
in the European Parliament approved a resolution criticising both the intransparent 
process and the neoliberal content of the negotiations (European Parliament, 
1998). And after a French task force headed by MEP Catherine Lalumière concluded 
that the MAI was fundamentally flawed, the French government withdrew from 
the negotiations with support of several other OECD members, eventually leading 
to the demise of the MAI at the end of 1998 (Balanyá et al., 2003: 118; Egan, 2001: 
88). The failure of the MAI not only revealed the political limitations to the 
neoliberal project, it also set the stage for further political contestation and the 
increased role of social movements and alter-globalisation forces in the conduct of 
transnational economic regulation, most visibly in the ‘Battle of Seattle’ at the 
WTO Summit in Seattle in 1999 as well as during later summits. These counter- 
hegemonic forces would eventually provide the social foundations of what will 
be identified in subsequent chapters as the ‘centre-leftist discourse’.
 With the stagnation of the MAI, the European Commission moved its focus to 
the WTO as the venue for the establishment of a multilateral agreement on 
investment protection and liberalisation. Between 1996 and 2003, the Commission 
was an active member of the WTO Working Group on the Relationship between 
Trade and Investment and was one of the driving forces behind the proposal to 
include investment in the WTO Doha Development Agenda in 2001. The strong 
commitment to multilateralism constituted a cornerstone of the economic 
discourse of ‘managed globalisation’ propagated by the new EU Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy (1999-2004), a member of the French Socialist Party and Jacques 
Delors’ adviser and chief of staff in Brussels. The discourse of ‘managed globalisation’ 
sought to promote openness through the harnessing of codified rules and institutions 
rather than mere deregulation and elimination of institutional constraints (Lamy, 
1999, 2004; see also Meunier, 2007; Abdelal and Meunier, 2010). It was still based 
on the neoliberal premise of trade liberalisation and economic competitiveness, 
but incorporated also certain elements of the centre-leftist discourse by taking 
social, environmental and developmental issues into account (De Ville and Orbie, 
2014: 152). 
 These principles were reflected by the EU proposals within the realm of the 
WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun in 2003, where the Commission sought to 
launch negotiations on investment with almost religious fervour. Particularly, the 
12 Ethyl	v.	Canada, UNCITRAL, 1997.
562932-L-bw-Verbeek
Processed on: 15-7-2021 PDF page: 133
133
THE NEOLIBERAL TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATION
4
Commission strategically framed its proposals for a multilateral investment 
agreement in terms of an ‘Investment for Development Framework’, which foresaw 
far-reaching investment liberalisation on the basis of non-discrimination, that 
“must be shaped in a way not to inhibit any country’s policy space for development 
or, in general its right to regulate” (European Commission, 2003a; see also 
European Commission, 2002a; European Commission, 2002b). This was a direct 
response to the strong concerns existing among many developing country 
governments, including India, Brazil, China and Indonesia, that had been fiercely 
opposing the negotiation of a WTO investment agreement out of fears that this 
would restrict their ability to pursue industrial and development policies (ICTSD 
and IISD, 2003: 1-4; Khor, 2004: 23; ActionAid, 2003). Despite the lack of an ‘explicit’ 
consensus among the WTO members, a prerequisite for launching negotiations, 
EU Trade Commissioner Lamy successfully pushed to include a reference into a 
draft ministerial text calling for modalities “that will allow negotiations on a 
multilateral investment framework to start” (WTO, 2003: 3; see also Hillary, 2004: 
7-12). After four days, the WTO talks in Cancun already resulted in a stalemate and 
the issue of investment was eventually dropped from the agenda together with the 
other Singapore Issues. 
 The EU’s neoliberal quest for multilateral investment rules was strongly 
supported by and closely coordinated with the emerging transnational capitalist 
class. The European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), bringing together the top 
executives of Europe’s largest industrial conglomerates, had been pushing hard 
for a “GATT for investment” and “an institution […] able to lock in the process of 
liberalisation” (ERT, 1993: 35). Business groups like the ICC, the US Council for 
International Business, the Japanese Keidanren, UNICE and the ERT were all either 
directly or indirectly involved in the MAI negotiations. The ERT chairman at the 
time and Nestlé President Helmut Maucher was also the chairman of the ICC, 
which worked closely with the Business and Industry Advisory Council (BIAC) as a 
formal OECD consultative body, and maintained in close contact with the MAI 
negotiators. Most notably, the ICC’s Multilateral	 Rules	 for	 Investment of April 1996 
effectively served as a blueprint for the first MAI draft in 1997, which notably 
proposed the ICC’s own arbitration court as one of the three possible bodies for 
dispute resolution (ICC, 1996; Balanyá et al., 2003: 112). Other European business 
associations such as UNICE also strongly supported the MAI and took part in the 
negotiations through BIAC membership, while national industry federations 
lobbied their national trade ministries directly (CEO, 1998). It was only when 
OECD negotiators incorporated non-binding and voluntary references to labour, 
environment and corporate social responsibility standards in the draft text, in 
response to mounting societal pressures, that business groups started to lose 
interest in the MAI – in the words of Helmut Maucher, “because they added social 
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wording in at the very last moment” (cited in Balanyá et al., 2003: 119) – and turned 
their attention to the WTO (Egan, 2001: 89; Walter, 2001: 63-4). 
 In order to generate support for a new sweeping round of WTO negotiations, 
the Commission set up new business structures for delivering input for the 
negotiations. In 1998, the Commission set up the Investment Network (IN) as an 
informal network for business leaders representing Europe’s most competitive 
TNCs, including Fiat, ICI, Daimler-Benz, Carlsberg, British Petroleum and 
Rhône-Poulenc in order to coordinate business input for a WTO investment 
agreement (European Commission, 1998a; Balanyá et al., 2003: 135; Dür, 2008: 39). 
Under the leadership of Leon Brittan, the Commission also pushed European 
corporations operating in the services sector to create the European Services 
Forum (ESF) to assist EU negotiators in the WTO negotiations on services and 
investment.13 From a survey in 2000 among IN members it resulted that European 
business was eager to get rid of a wide range of restricting policy instruments 
enacted by developing country governments to ensure that FDI contributed to the 
local economy, such as obligatory joint-ventures, limits on ownership of local 
subsidiaries, local content requirements and exchange controls on capital transfers 
(Hoedeman, 2002: 13). In Cancun, both the ICC and UNICE pushed hard for a broad 
and ambitious WTO investment agreement including also investment protection 
standards to provide maximum ‘added value’ for business. Other groups such as 
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the OECD’s BIAC, European lobby groups 
such as ESF, Eurocommerce and Foreign Trade Association, and national business 
associations from Germany, Canada and the UK strongly advocated for the 
expansion of the WTO agenda, with the Japanese Keidanren even submitting its 
own Model WTO Investment Agreement (Hillary, 2004: 21; ActionAid, 2003: 4).
 The collapse of the WTO talks in Cancun was marked by an underpinning 
shift in the global economic order and the emergence of new power blocs such as 
Brazil and India. As the US government turned increasingly to bilateral and 
regional trade agreements under the credo of ‘competitive liberalisation’ (Zoellick, 
2002; Phillips, 2008: 151), the Commission started to revise its trade strategy and 
the commitment to an informal ‘moratorium’ on FTAs since the 1990s (Woolcock, 
2007; Siles-Brügge, 2014). European business groups began to lobby the Commission 
to open up the bilateral route for trade and investment agreements that would 
enhance the global competitiveness of European business. Their general concern 
was that EU industry was losing market share, particularly in East and South Asia, 
13 Former EU Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan remained closely involved in EU investment policy-
making. After resigning as EU Commissioner, he became vice-chairman of the US investment bank 
Warburg Dillon Reed and joined London-based law firm Herbert Smith as a consultant on WTO 
issues. In 2001, Brittan also became the chairman of the LOTIS Committee of International Financial 
Services London, which represents UK financial capital, and has strongly pushed for more services 
liberalisation in the WTO.
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to key competitors that had already launched bilateral trade negotiations (ESF, 
2003, 2007; UNICE, 2005; see also Siles- Brügge, 2014). The arrival of Peter 
Mandelson as new Trade Commissioner in November 2004 marked an intensifica-
tion of the neoliberal competitiveness discourse within DG Trade. Mandelson had 
been one of the chief architects of the reincarnation of the Labour Party as ‘New 
Labour’, which embraced aspects of the Thatcherite legacy in the UK (Siles- Brügge, 
2011: 635; Hay, 1999). Under his leadership, and with strong pressure from 
organised transnational capital, the Commission changed track and abandoned 
its multilateral orientation. 
 In 2006, DG Trade published the Global	Europe:	Competing	in	the	World strategy, 
which aimed at the opening of new markets “in which European companies can 
compete and provide new opportunities for growth and development” (European 
Commission, 2006a: 2) through the active promotion of a new generation of 
bilateral FTAs to enforce the Singapore Issues that could not be enhanced at the 
multilateral level. The document established a link between the internal neoliberal 
restructuring deemed necessary to counter external competitive challenges, as set 
out by the Lisbon Agenda in 2000, and the external objectives of ensuring greater 
openness in other markets. As put by the Commission, “rejection of protectionism 
at home must be accompanied by activism in creating open markets and fair 
conditions for trade abroad” (ibid.: 5). Therefore, the Commission called for a new 
generation of comprehensive and ambitious bilateral FTAs “aiming at the highest 
possible degree of trade liberalisation, including far-reaching liberalisation of 
services and investment” (ibid.: 11). Such bilateralism subsequently became the 
new avenue for spreading neoliberalism onto the global realm. 
 In the wake of the Global	Europe strategy, the Commission sought to expand its 
negotiating powers with regard to foreign investment in trade negotiations. Since 
the 2001 Treaty of Nice, the Commission enjoyed exclusive competence to negotiate 
the liberalisation of investment solely in ‘mode 3’ services (see Section 4.2.2). In an 
Issues	 Paper of May 2006, the Commission called for an upgrade of the EU’s 
investment policy, thereby arguing that “in comparison to NAFTA countries’ 
agreements, EU agreements and achievements in the area of investment lag 
behind because of their narrow content” and that “European investors are 
discriminated vis-à-vis their foreign competitors and the EU is losing market 
shares” (European Commission, 2006b: 1). In November 2006, EU member states 
empowered the Commission to cover the negotiation of investment liberalisation 
(‘establishment’) in all sectors with the adoption of the Minimum	 Platform	 on	
Investment	 for	 EU	 FTAs, which would serve as a basis for negotiations on market 
access for services and investment in future EU FTAs (European Commission, 
2006c; see also Heron and Siles-Brügge, 2012). The Minimum	 Platform provided a 
template for a ‘Title on “Establishment, trade in services and e-commerce” that, for 
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the first time, would handle both services and investment liberalisation under one 
chapter in EU FTAs. Notably, it would grant market access and national and 
most-favoured nation treatment premised on the GATS model with a positive list 
in which only sectors explicitly committed would be liberalised. The negotiation 
of investment liberalisation was thereby formally placed in the hands of the 
Commission, while the post-establishment protection of investment and ISDS 
remained to be regulated through the EU member states’ BITs. 
 Subsequently, the EU member states authorised the Commission to launch a 
raft of new bilateral negotiations with emerging markets and developing countries, 
including ASEAN, India and South Korea starting in April 2007, and Canada in 
April 2009. Most notably, the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement 
signed in 2008 and the EU-Korea FTA signed in 2010 both include a chapter on 
investment liberalisation reflecting the principles of the Minimum	 Platform 
(Woolcock, 2010a; Dimopoulos, 2010b; Siles-Brügge, 2014). These agreements 
foresaw a degree of liberalisation that went beyond the FTAs that the EU had 
negotiated up to that point, such as those with Mexico (2000), Chile (2002) and 
Mercosur (launched in 1999 but only regaining momentum after 2016). 
4.2.2  The supranationalisation of European foreign investment regulation
The increasingly assertive role of the European Commission in the field of foreign 
investment has been accompanied by the gradual strengthening of its regulatory 
powers. The renewed European integration process in the 1980s and 1990s and the 
overall consolidation of neoliberalism set in motion a series of institutional reforms 
that shifted competences and national sovereignties to the EU level, resulting in 
the supranationalisation or what has been referred to as the ‘communitisation’ of 
socio-economic policy-making (cf. Bieling, 2011, 2012). The changing nature of 
global trade and cross-border exchange in the context of neoliberal globalisation 
spurred the reshaping of the EU’s common commercial policy (CCP) to reflect the 
key trends of the so-called ‘new trade agenda’ after the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round (Young and Peterson, 2006: 796). At the same time, the expansion 
of the political authority of the European Commission also resulted from its 
strategic action and its geopolitical ambitions to become a global actor in the field 
of transnational economic governance. Ever since the Single Market Programme, 
the Commission proactively and persistently sought to extend the scope of the CCP 
with the aim to enhance its negotiating powers in trade and investment 
negotiations in order to keep up with its competitors from the US and Japan and to 
enable the EU to set global rules and standards. The eventual extension of the CCP 
to foreign investment established with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
on 1 December 2009 was, however, not self-evident and resulted foremost from an 
intense struggle between the European Commission and the EU member states.
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 The Commission’s quest to strengthen its negotiating powers initially 
provoked much resistance from both the national mercantilist and neoliberal 
camps. The disagreements over the scope of the CCP particularly crystallised 
during the Uruguay Round in which the European Commission championed an 
offensive agenda to include the new trade issues such as services, intellectual 
property rights and investment. During the intergovernmental conference in the 
run up to the Treaty of Maastricht, the Commission proposed to extent the CCP 
to include in addition to trade in goods also those issues that were reflecting in the 
agenda of the Uruguay Round (Niemann, 2011: 13; Devuyst, 1992). This was rejected 
by many EU member states. Particularly, the French government grew a certain 
mistrust vis-à-vis the Commission after the latter had autonomously negotiated 
the Blair House agreement on agriculture with the US in 1992, which was fiercely 
resisted by the French government. The French opposition to the extension of the 
CCP also received support from Germany, the UK, Portugal, Spain, Greece, the 
Netherlands and Denmark (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 1999: 483; Basedow, 2016: 
752). In 1994, the Commission sought to revise the scope of the CCP through 
judicial review and requested the ECJ for an advisory opinion to clarify the issue 
of competence over the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the subsequent 
membership to the WTO, including the GATS and the Agreement	on	Trade-Related	
Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights (TRIPs). In its Opinion 1/94, the ECJ ruled that 
these were to be concluded as mixed agreements as the EU did not hold the 
required competences under the CCP.14 Shortly after, the ECJ upheld this view in 
Opinion 2/92, which ruled that the EU member states and the EU were jointly 
competent to adhere to the Third	Revised	Decision	of	the	OECD	on	National	Treatment, 
which dealt with the post-establishment treatment of foreign investment in the 
OECD countries.15 
 Both ECJ decisions rendered a narrow understanding of the scope of the CCP, 
which meant a serious blow in the face of the Commission. With regard to 
investment, the Commission flagged that “the structure of Community law has 
manifestly been overtaken by commercial reality” and complained that despite its 
limited investment powers, “these cannot be exercised effectively while the 
Member States continue to conclude bilateral investment treaties” (European 
Commission, 1995b: 58).16 Subsequently, the Commission proposed to extend the 
14 ECJ, Opinion 1/94, Competence	of	the	Community	to	Conclude	International	Agreements	Concerning	Services	and	
the	Protection	of	Intellectual	Property	–	Article	228(6)	of	the	EC	Treaty, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384.
15 ECJ, Opinion 2/92, Competence	of	the	Community	or	One	of	its	Institutions	to	Participate	in	the	Third	Revised	
Decision	of	the	OECD	on	National	Treatment, ECLI:EU:C:1995:83.
16 The EU held several limited powers to regulate FDI with third countries based on the competencies 
with regard to establishment (Article 47(2) TEC), supported with secondary legislation (Directive 
2000/12/EC and Directive 2002/83/EC), and the free movement of capital (Articles 56-60 TEC). In 
Opinion 1/92, the ECJ confirmed that these competencies would enable the European Union to enter 
into international agreements on investment but due to the limited scope of those competencies only 
with participation of the EU member states.  
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scope of the CCP during the intergovernmental conferences of Amsterdam and 
Nice, which was deemed necessary to strengthen the EU’s bargaining power in 
international trade negotiations (European Commission, 1996; European Commission, 
2000: 26). In the words of EU Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan, expanding the 
Commission’s powers and an end to unanimity voting procedure in the new trade 
issues would “speed up negotiations, simplify decision-making and increase the 
EU’s trade policy influence in relation to the US and Japan” (Financial	Times, 1997; 
see also Meunier, 2005: 88). While opposition slowly decreased, EU member states 
failed to reach a consensus so that the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam only included a 
short amendment that allowed for future expansion through unanimous vote in 
the Council. The 2001 Treaty of Nice extended the scope of the CCP to trade in 
services and intellectual property rights, but the issue of investment was dropped 
from the agenda at the instigation of the French government, which was holding 
the EU Presidency at that time (Niemann, 2011: 38; Krajewski, 2003). The Treaty of 
Nice did, however, extend the coverage of the CCP to investment through ‘Mode 3’ 
services in line with the GATS. This allowed the Commission to negotiate and 
conclude trade agreements encompassing market access and treatment for services- 
related investment, which was effectively extended to all types of investment with 
the adoption of the Minimum	Platform in 2006.17
 In practice, the EU regulatory landscape with regard to foreign investment 
became increasingly complex with some aspects dealt with at the EU level while 
other aspects remained firmly rooted at the national level. At the same time, the 
Commission’s competence crept into the area of FDI through a number of ‘stealth’ 
measures since the 1980s that could influence, regulate, and even vet FDI through 
areas in which it was formally competent, including EU competition policy, trade 
defence instruments, and critical infrastructure programmes (Meunier, 2014a; 
Zhang and Van den Bulcke, 2014; Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011). In the Laeken 
Declaration of December 2001, the EU member states called for further 
institutional reforms of the EU that would “shoulder its responsibilities in the 
governance of globalisation” by means of clarifying the division of competencies 
and enhancing democratic accountability and transparency (European Council, 
2001: 3). Subsequently, a Convention on the Future of Europe was set up between 
28 February 2002 and 20 July 2003, which was expected to usher in a new European 
Constitutional Treaty. During the deliberations of Working Group VII on external 
action, then EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy strongly pushed for an ambitious 
reform of the CCP as he viewed the required unanimity in the fields of services, 
investment and intellectual property rights as a “considerable impediment for 
17 The Minimum Platform indeed marked a significant leap for the European Commission and its ability 
to act in global investment rule-making. As a mere negotiation template, however, its direct and legal 
impact on the division of competences between the European Union and the EU member states was 
unlikely. 
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new agreements that the (enlarged) Union will be called to conclude in coming 
years”, thereby suggesting to bring the issue of investment under the scope of the 
CCP (European Convention, 2002a: para 13). In the wake of increased political 
contestation to the neoliberal trade agenda, as witnessed during the MAI and WTO 
negotiations, Lamy also called for more involvement of the European Parliament 
in decision-making processes, more transparency and a better structured dialogue 
with civil society (ibid.: para 14). 
 Even though the Working Group did not include any major proposals to 
reform the CCP in its recommendations to the Convention’s Praesidium (European 
Convention, 2002b), the latter unilaterally included the proposal to bring the issue 
of ‘foreign direct investment’ under the scope of the CCP “in recognition of the 
fact that financial flows supplement trade in goods and today represent a 
significant share of commercial exchanges” (European Convention, 2003: 54). This 
proposal came reportedly from the former prime minister of Ireland and member 
of the Praesidium John Bruton and was enthusiastically supported by both the 
chair of the Praesidium and former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing – 
whose proposal for a common European foreign investment policy failed to 
materialise in the 1960s – and a representative of the European Commission 
Michel Barnier (Basedow, 2016: 706-1; Meunier, 2014a: 9; Ceyssens, 2005: 273). 
During the plenary of the Convention, more than thirty amendments, including 
from high-profile politicians such as the French minister of Foreign Affairs 
Dominique de Villepin, the German minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer 
and Peter Hain, a British member of cabinet representing the Blair government at 
the Convention, sought the deletion of the reference to FDI. Some amendments 
criticised the unilateral action to extend the scope of the CCP without a specific 
recommendation from the working group (Earl of Stockton, 2003; Heathcoat- 
Amory, 2003), others strongly argued that FDI remained a shared competence or 
even an exclusive competence of the member states and its insertion into the 
CCP would render “an immense and possibly unintended increase in EU 
competence” (Voggenhuber et al., 2003; Teufel, 2003; see also Meunier, 2014a: 
9-10). These amendments remained largely unnoticed among the several thousands 
of amendments that were proposed on the EU’s external action so that the 
delegates ultimately adopted a draft Constitutional Treaty to be considered by the 
EU member states. Several member state governments, most notably the French 
and German governments with support from the Portuguese and Irish 
governments, remained critical regarding the shift of competence over FDI to the 
EU level. Given the breadth of institutional changes that the Constitutional Treaty 
was about to bring, these governments accepted the extension of the CCP to FDI as 
‘part of the package’ and were reportedly unwilling to problematise a ‘technicality’ 
in light of the fragile consensus over a wide range of controversial issues. Instead, 
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they successfully pushed for a last minute change requiring unanimity for 
agreements covering FDI where “such agreements include provisions for which 
unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules” (Article 207(4)) (Basedow, 2016: 
766; Krajewski, 2005: 105). The Constitutional Treaty was signed by the EU member 
states on 29 October 2004 and would, after almost five decades, constitutionalise 
European foreign investment regulation at the supranational level.  
 In the end, the Constitutional project turned out to lack the necessary popular 
legitimacy, as shown by its rejection through referenda in two of the founding 
member states (France and the Netherlands), thereby revealing the political limits 
of neoliberal governance and European integration. When the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel assumed the Presidency of the European Council in 2007, renewed 
efforts were made to recuperate as much as possible from the Constitutional 
Treaty while throwing all constitutional symbolism overboard. By putting changes 
in the format of a traditional amending treaty rather than a constitution, European 
leaders explicitly wanted to avoid new referenda. The negotiations on a new treaty 
focused mainly on technical and legal aspects without reopening the discussions on 
the CCP (Devuyst, 2012: 165-67; Meunier, 2014a: 10). Hence, the resulting Treaty 
of Lisbon was formally signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 
1 December 2009.
 The Treaty of Lisbon radically reshuffled the institutional and political 
terrains of European foreign investment regulation in three important ways (see 
also Woolcock, 2010b; Hermann, 2010). Most notably, it brought the exclusive 
competence over FDI into the neoliberal framework of the CCP as enshrined in 
Articles 206 and 207 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). Article 206 TFEU sets out the objectives of the CCP and adds ‘foreign direct 
investment’ next to ‘international trade’ as the areas in which the EU aims to 
progressively prohibit restrictions. Likewise, Article 207 TFEU forms the core of 
the CCP as it determines its scope and adds ‘foreign direct investment’ to the areas 
on which the CCP shall be based. Secondly, Article 207(1) TFEU stipulates that the 
CCP “shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the 
Union’s external action”, which refer inter	 alia to broader policy goals such as 
democracy, rule of law, human rights, sustainable development and poverty 
eradication (Article 21(2) TEU). This implies that future EU agreements with FDI 
provisions should contribute to, or at least not derogate from these broader policy 
objectives. And thirdly, the European Parliament acquired full legislative powers 
together with the Council in the area of the CCP, meaning that these two EU 
institutions are to define the framework for implementing the CCP according to 
the ordinary legislative (co-decision) procedure (Article 207(2) TFEU). Crucially, the 
European Parliament is now required for the conclusion of international trade and 
investment agreements in addition to the consent of the Council (Article 218(6)(b) 
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TFEU). The European Commission is now under the legal obligation to regularly 
report to the European Parliament on the progress it is making in each negotiation 
(Article 207(3) TFEU) and must ensure that the “European Parliament shall be 
immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure” (Article 218(10) 
TFEU). Although the European Parliament does not have any formal powers in the 
drafting of the negotiating directives – such powers remain conferred to the 
Council and the Commission – the Treaty of Lisbon effectively requires the 
involvement of the European Parliament in the formulation of the EU trade and 
investment policy. 
 In sum, these institutional reforms reflect elements pertaining to both the 
neoliberal discourse and the centre-leftist discourse in the field of trade and 
investment regulation. First and foremost, the European Commission has acquired 
expanded powers to negotiate and conclude international agreements to further 
liberalise and protect FDI, thereby further deepening its strategic selectivity 
vis-à-vis other societal interests. At the same time, the supranationalisation of FDI 
regulation has opened up new avenues for political contestation and social 
resistance to neoliberal investment rules that re-appeared during the struggles 
over the content, form and scope of the EU investment policy after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. As explained in the next chapter, these combined 
developments crucially shape the making of the EU investment policy along the 
lines of what will be associated with ‘embedded neoliberalism’. 
4.3  Conclusion
This chapter has examined the neoliberal transformation of European foreign 
investment regulation since the 1980s until the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009 against the backdrop of global capitalist restructuring. Since the 
mid-1980s, a neoliberal regulatory discourse came to dominate European modes of 
foreign investment regulation, underpinned by the processes of transnationalisation 
of production and finance and the concomitant shift in the underlying power 
balance in favour of transnational capital. EU member states developed a large 
network of BITs as these became the hegemonic mode through which foreign 
investment, mainly with the developing world, was protected and promoted. In 
the wake of the relaunch of the wider European integration process, EU trade 
policy became increasingly informed by the neoliberal discourse that centred on 
enhancing EU competitiveness through the progressive abolition of restrictions 
on trade and cross-border investment in overseas markets and creating a ‘level 
playing field’ for European investors abroad. The neoliberal turn in EU trade policy 
was accompanied by a proactive European Commission, which, in close alliance 
with the emergent transnational capitalist class, zealously pushed for the 
establishment of multilateral and bilateral investment rules. At the same time, 
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the Commission also persistently sought to acquire significant regulatory powers 
in the wake competitive pressures particularly from the US and Japan that would 
enhance its strategic selectivity to pursue neoliberal investment policies, culminating 
in the full transfer of FDI competencies from the national to the EU level with the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Finally, the rise of a centre-leftist 
discourse regarding foreign investment regulation, which became manifested in 
the fierce societal and political opposition to the MAI and WTO investment talks, 
reveals the fragile and contested character of the neoliberal hegemonic project.
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5.   Consolidating Neoliberalism and the Making of 
the EU Investment Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era
[B]ilateral	agreements	can	go	further	and	faster	in	promoting	openness	and	integration	
by	tackling	issues	which	are	not	ready	for	multilateral	discussion
Karel De Gucht, DG Trade Commissioner, 10 January 2010
[W]e	must	not	let	legitimate	calls	for	transparency	weaken	Europe’s	negotiating	position	
or	undermine	our	search	for	further	trade	liberalisation
Karel De Gucht, DG Trade Commissioner, 2010
This chapter explains the politics that has shaped the developments of European 
FDI regulation during the first four years after the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon on 1 December 2009. With the incorporation of FDI into the regulatory 
framework of the EU’s common commercial policy, marking a significant 
centralisation of key competences at EU level, the European Commission became 
entrusted with the exclusive powers to formulate, negotiate and conclude 
international agreements encompassing both the liberalisation and the protection 
of foreign investment. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon therefore 
generated a political momentum for the building of what will be referred to as the 
‘EU investment policy’ – a heuristic device to characterise the political construction 
of the EU mode of foreign investment regulation. The first section uncovers the 
resilience of the neoliberal discourse that continued to inform EU trade policy 
since the global economic and financial crisis of 2008/9. The second section 
identifies two rivalling regulatory discourses within the institutional ensembles 
of the EU – a dominant neoliberal one and a subordinate centre-leftist one – that 
crucially informed the first policy debates and actions regarding the preferred 
content, form and scope of future EU investment agreements, and how these 
related to the uneven and asymmetric nature of the European political economy. 
The third section explains how and why these rival discourses also shaped the 
struggle over Regulation 1219/2012 regarding the maintenance in force of the 
existing EU member state BITs. The fourth section examines the wider social 
power relations underpinning the neoliberal and the centre-leftist discourses by 
looking at the agency of different social forces, whereas the fifth section explains 
the politics of managing financial responsibility and state liability in ISDS 
proceedings under Regulation 912/2014.
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5.1.  Consolidating neoliberalism in times of crisis 
The challenges posed by the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-9 did not 
result in a major break away from dominant modes of neoliberal governance 
within the EU and globally. The ‘strange non-death’ (Crouch, 2011) or ‘ecological 
dominance’ (Jessop, 2010b) of neoliberalism in fact revealed its resilience in times 
of crisis and showed its flexibility and organicity to venture into new pathways 
(Crouch, 2011; Mirowski, 2014; Brenner et al., 2010). This implies that neoliberalism 
should not be conceptualised as a static and automatic system, but rather as “an 
earthly process, realised through political action and institutional reinvention” 
(Peck, 2010a: 33). Neoliberalism is characterised by a certain degree of fluidity as it 
is deeply embedded in class relations, institutional configurations and ideological 
norms that are open-ended and subject to constant change. While the internal 
contradictions of neoliberal capitalism ultimately gave rise to the global crisis, at 
the same time, its socially embedded nature has also made it highly resistant to 
retrenchment (Cahill, 2014: ix). As Cerny (2008: 39) writes, “[n]eoliberalism, with 
its mixture of free-market liberalism, arms’ length regulation, institutional 
flexibility and international openness, has proven to be a relatively manipulable 
and fungible platform for actors to use to reconstitute their strategies and tactics”. 
In that sense, the crisis conditions not only posed major constraints and limitations 
to the continued dominance of neoliberalism, it also generated new political 
opportunities for a wide range of actors to both reinforce, modify or contest 
processes of neoliberalisation. As posited in Chapter Two, the neoliberal project 
must always incorporate certain elements of alternative projects in order to 
become or remain hegemonic and its diffusion thus takes place in a highly uneven 
and mediated manner rather than following pre-fixed trajectories. As Peck (2010: 
31) concludes, “[t]he actually existing worlds of neoliberalism are not pristine 
spaces of market rationality and constitutional order; they are institutionally 
cluttered places marked by experimental-but-flawed systems of governance, 
cumulative problems of social fallout, and serial market failure”.
 The post-Lisbon EU investment policy that emerged against the backdrop of 
the structural crisis conditions is identified here as one of the key manifestations 
of ‘embedded neoliberalism’ as a conceptualisation of the European socio-economic 
order (cf. Van Apeldoorn, 2002; 2009). Embedded neoliberalism is taken here as the 
hegemonic articulation of the still dominant neoliberal discourse propagated by 
social forces bound up with European fractions of transnational capital, thereby 
seeking to advance and legitimise neoliberalism by incorporating – and, thus, 
neutralising – different elements of alternative discourses (Van Apeldoorn, 2009: 
22). The concept of embedded neoliberalism is drawn from Polanyi (1957) and his 
notion of a ‘double movement’ or the dialectical relationship between the 
contradictory principles of ‘economic liberalism’ and ‘social protection’ (Polanyi, 
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2001 [1957]: 138). While embedded neoliberalism constitutes an inherently 
neoliberal political project aimed at the expansion of capitalist class power, the 
‘embeddedness’ component refers to the role of the state in sustaining and 
reproducing markets by “protecting society from the destructive effects of the 
self-regulating market” (Van Apeldoorn, 2009: 24). In that sense, embedded 
neoliberalism addresses the concerns of alternative projects, particularly those 
bound up with the centre-leftist discourses, albeit, in such a way that these are in 
the end subordinated to the overriding objective of neoliberal competitiveness 
(Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 180-1). Although fragile and highly contested, embedded 
neoliberalism offers a temporary stabilisation of its internal contradictions while 
giving primacy to the neoliberal objective of free markets and free enterprise 
necessary for the expansion and reproduction of European and global capitalism. 
 The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon took place amidst the global 
financial and economic crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis that hit the 
Eurozone as of 2010. The turmoil in the financial markets and the concomitant 
worldwide economic downturn that started in the course of 2007 severely affected 
global FDI flows. After uninterrupted growth in FDI activity between 2003 and 
2007, global FDI inflows declined by 14 per cent in 2008 to US$1,697 billion from a 
historical high of US$1,979 billion in 2007 (UNCTAD, 2009a). In particular, global 
FDI flows began to plunge as the financial crisis entered into a tumultuous new 
phase in September 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This brought 
economic recession to the major industrialised economies, whose FDI inflows 
sharply dropped by 30 to 50 per cent in the first half of 2009 (ibid.: 4). The overall 
decline in FDI flows resulted from reduced access to finance for TNCs as stricter 
and less abundant credit together with lower corporate profits curtailed their 
financial resources to invest in further expansion of productive capacity. This led 
to a sharp plunge in FDI primarily in the form of divestment, including repatriated 
investment, dwindling intra-firm loans, and relocation of activities to emerging 
markets that maintained relatively high economic growth rates (UNCTAD, 2009b; 
Alfaro and Chen, 2010; Poulsen and Hufbauer, 2011). 
 The severe economic and financial crisis also had important repercussions for 
European FDI. For the EU, FDI inflows fell by 45 per cent in 2008, to a total of €583 
billion. EU outward FDI fell to €919 billion in 2008, constituting a sharp decline of 
30 per cent. By 2010, both outward and inward flows have decreased more than 50 
per cent compared with the record peaks reached in 2007 (Eurostat, 2014a). At the 
same time, FDI statistics clearly point towards a crucial geographical shift in 
global capital relations. While EU FDI flows to and from the main economic 
partners were considerably affected by the global crisis, particularly with the US 
and Canada, FDI flows to new poles of capital accumulation such as Brazil, China, 
India and Russia increased during the crisis years (Eurostat, 2014b; Hunya and 
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Stöllinger, 2009). The US, Switzerland and Canada remained the main destinations 
for EU FDI in terms of stocks, but the EU presence in Russia, Brazil and China rose 
steadily over the period 2007-2010, which, in turn, also dramatically increased 
their presence in the EU over the same period (see Table 5.1). With outward EU FDI 
flows originating in the EU surpassing intra-EU flows in 2009 (European Commission, 
2013a: 4-5), the better relative growth prospects and market potential of these 
emerging economies offered European investors with an important ‘spatial fix’ in 
the face of stagnating capital accumulation in a crisis-ridden EU.  
 The worsening crisis conditions increasingly challenged the hegemonic 
neoliberal discourse. What was heralded as the largest financial shock since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s (IMF, 2008: 4) led some scholars and commentators 
to speculate about the end of neoliberalism or even global capitalism (Altvater, 
2009: 75; Wolf, 2008; Hobsbawm, 2009). EU member states adopted interventionist 
measures in the form of national rescue packages to support and boost ailing 
corporations, most notably in the financial sector. The national bailouts and rescue 
packages often resulted in the partial or total nationalisation of domestic financial 
institutions, thereby reducing the possibility for private (foreign) investment. 
National industries occasionally received forms of state aid with the purpose to 
protect them from foreign takeovers and safeguard domestic employment 
(The	Guardian, 2009), while trade protectionist measures such as export subsidies, 
‘buy national’ policies, trade defence measures and non-tariff barriers further 
discriminated against foreign producers (Evenett, 2009; Bussière et al., 2010; Henn 
and McDonald, 2011). Several governments also introduced measures to review 
foreign investment on national security grounds, particularly when target firms 
were considered ‘strategic industries’ or when investment was facilitated through 
sovereign or quasi-sovereign entities (Sauvant, 2009: 9-10; Van Aaken and Kurtz, 
2009). 
 Neoliberal forces increasingly warned that such government measures would 
result in a wave of economic nationalism by protecting ‘national champions’ from 
foreign takeovers, or by introducing obstacles to outward investment in order to 
keep capital at home (UNCTAD, 2009b: 31; Sauvant, 2009; Erixon and Sally, 2010). 
Many observers and policy-makers also anticipated a protectionist turn in EU 
trade policy. Indeed, fears that the crisis would lead to a de-legitimisation of 
the neoliberal trade regime and a resurgence of protectionist sentiments were 
widely present among high-ranked officials, opinion leaders and transnational 
capital actors (Lamy, 2008; Beattie, 2008; Altman, 2009; ERT, 2009; BusinessEurope, 
2009; Cernat and Susa, 2010). Similar concerns were articulated at the international 
level during the G-20 Summit on 14 November 2008, where world leaders 
underscored the “critical importance of rejecting protectionism” and renewed 
their political commitment to an open global economy by promising to “refrain 
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Table 5.1  Main EU FDI Partners, 2007-2012, in billions of Euros
Outward FDI stock




Extra EU-27 3,201.2 3,322.0 3,751.1 4,237.0 4,940.9 5,206.8 62.7
United States 1,051.1 1,079.2 1,204.7 1,266.9 1,598.9 1,655.0 63.0
Offshore financial centres 636.4 578.8 659.6 692.0 702.8 760.1 19.4
Switzerland 454.8 463.3 518.5 555.5 683.5 679.0 49.2
Canada 141.9 141.9 166.2 197.7 228.6 258.0 81.8
Brazil 106.3 108.5 139.7 198.9 248.2 246.8 132.2
Russia 72.3 89.1 99.1 130.6 169.4 189.5 162.1
Australia 69.2 76.3 81.2 120.2 128.0 141.6 104.6
Hong Kong 89.2 89.9 90.2 112.3 119.8 132.9 49.0
Singapore 66.6 90.7 95.6 109.5 124.8 118.7 78.2
China 41.7 54.7 63.9 81.0 103.0 118.1 183.2
Japan 74.2 79.5 81.8 98.1 100.5 98.8 33.2
Inward FDI stock




Extra EU-27 2,415.4 2,496.0 2,783.4 3,144.7 3,768.1 3,947.4 63.4
United States 1,012.7 1,005.4 1,089.7 1,247.7 1,526.8 1,536.4 51.7
Offshore financial centres 537.9 557.9 642.1 709.2 920.0 931.3 73.1
Switzerland 314.3 303.4 340.0 394.8 482.6 505.2 60.7
Japan 120.4 122.0 126.8 133.4 147.0 161.5 34.1
Canada 102.7 112.7 125.0 146.1 139.0 142.6 38.9
Brazil 41.1 52.3 63.9 90.4 96.9 98.1 138.7
Russia 24.6 30.0 47.0 50.3 57.2 76.6 211.4
Singapore 44.9 41.1 50.1 56.5 60.3 68.6 52.8
Hong Kong 16.8 26.0 27.5 41.5 64.7 50.2 198.8
Australia 25.6 21.7 30.2 30.4 35.9 34.3 34.0
China 4.7 5.6 5.9 6.1 18.5 26.8 470.2
Source: Eurostat (online data code: bop_fdi_main), 2014
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from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services” (G-20, 
2008). 
 These warnings against protectionism were also echoed by the European 
Commission, which increasingly framed neoliberal trade policy as necessary in 
response to the crisis and to foster economic growth. As pointed out by De Ville 
and Orbie (2014), the EU’s internal economic agenda, particularly in the wake of 
the unfolding EU sovereign debt crisis, has played a crucial in reinforcing its 
neoliberal trade agenda. Increasing the EU’s external role in global markets 
became a major tenet of the EU’s crisis management policies. In particular, the 
new Europe	2020 strategy adopted by the Council in June 2010 identified the lack of 
EU competitiveness, exacerbated by the crisis, and macroeconomic imbalances 
within the EU as the main problems that needed to be addressed by means of 
structural reforms (European Commission, 2010a: 24). Hence, the European 
post-crisis growth regime envisaged by Europe	 2020 would entail, among other 
things, structural adjustment of the internal market, and, crucially, the expansion 
of the external role of the EU in global markets. The EU trade policy, thus, became 
directly embedded within the wider context of the EU’s neoliberal macroeconomic 
strategy of fostering supply-side focused export-led accumulation expecting a 
trickle-down effect that would contribute to economic growth and jobs, and, in 
the end, restoring EU competitiveness. In this sense, the specific focus on the 
expansion of the external role of the EU in global economic relations enhanced 
the reproduction of the hegemonic EU discourse of competitiveness, in which the 
crisis has been framed as a crucial opportunity to consolidate the neoliberal 
modes of economic regulation (see also Chapter Four).
 The overall emphasis on enhancing EU competitiveness through internal and 
external market liberalisation also became the cornerstone of the EU trade policy 
under Karel De Gucht, who took over as EU Trade Commissioner in February 2010. 
In one of his first public interventions in the European Parliament plenary, De 
Gucht argued that “external sources of growth will be crucial to EU economic 
recovery”, thereby concurring that “European industry should target the new and 
fast growing emerging markets” (De Gucht, 2010). In the 2010 Trade,	Growth	and	
World	 Affairs communication, which was presented as a core component of the 
broader Europe	 2020 strategy, the European Commission underscored its 
commitment to continue the ongoing FTA agenda initiated under the previous 
Global	 Europe strategy, which had already set in motion a renewed engagement 
with emerging economies, particularly in Asia, through a series of FTAs with 
India, Korea and South East Asian countries. Such a strategy was deemed necessary 
to “further	 enhance	 the	 coherence	 and	 complementarity	 between	 the	 EU’s	 internal	 and	
external	 policies	 as	 a	 whole” (European Commission, 2010b: 4; emphasis original). 
Enhancing EU competitiveness was thereby to be achieved through ambitious 
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regulatory liberalisation of third markets as “many of the challenges are all about 
regulations and rules rather than traditional tariffs” (ibid.: 2, 6). In the face of 
internal fiscal constraints, neoliberal trade policy as stimulating internal and 
external liberalisation thus became the panacea for economic growth and would 
enable the EU to kick-start a renewed phase of sustained capital accumulation. 
Hence, the new EU investment policy emerging from the supranationalisation of 
FDI regulation under the Treaty of Lisbon would become part and parcel of the 
consolidated neoliberal discourse within the ranks of DG Trade.
5.2   The struggle over the emerging EU model for foreign 
investment protection
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the European 
Commission became empowered with the exclusive competence to formulate, 
negotiate and conclude bilateral and regional investment agreements. This led 
foremost to an institutional reconfiguration within the ranks of the European 
Commission’s DG Trade. A separate working unit was set up within DG Trade’s 
Services and Investment Unit and various legal experts and BIT negotiators from 
the member states were subsequently recruited to work exclusively on the issue of 
investment protection (for an overview, see ESF, 2010a).18 During the first months 
following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, DG Trade officials were busy 
preparing two documents that would set the contours of an emerging EU 
investment policy. This so-called ‘investment package’ was published on 7 July 
2010 and consisted on the one hand of a policy communication to flesh out the 
main principles and objectives for future EU investment agreements, and on 
the other hand a draft regulation aimed at establishing transitional arrangements 
for the existing bilateral investment agreements between EU member states and 
third countries. While Section 5.3 will discuss the latter, this section examines 
the ideological struggles within the EU institutional ensembles regarding the 
content, form and scope of future EU investment agreements.
5.2.1  The European Commission’s 2010 Communication
At the outset, the Commission was determined to use its new FDI competences and 
continued pushing its ambitious investment policy through a new generation of 
FTAs in the wake of the post-Lisbon EU trade strategy.19 The 2010 communication 
Towards	 a	 Comprehensive	 European	 International	 Investment	 Policy	 represented an 
important first step in the development of the EU investment policy in which the 
Commission explored how such a policy could enhance EU competitiveness and 
18 The terms ‘Commission’ and ‘DG Trade’ are interchangeably used and refer to the Investment Unit 
unless stated otherwise.
19 This section draws on: interview, DG Trade official I, 2 April 2013; interview, DG Trade official II, 29 
August 2014; interview, DG Trade official III, 18 September 2014.
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therefore contribute to the objectives as set out in the Europe	2020 strategy. Along 
neoliberal lines, the Commission ascribed importance to the role of FDI in 
“creating jobs, optimising resource allocation, transferring technology and skills, 
increasing competition and boosting trade” both in and outside the EU (European 
Commission, 2010c: 3). Therefore, the future EU investment policy would have the 
fundamental purpose of “assuring investors that they are able to operate in an 
open, properly and fairly regulated business environment, both within and across 
a host country’s borders” (ibid.: 4), providing both ‘uniform and optimal’ conditions 
for sustained capital accumulation through the progressive abolition of investment 
restrictions. In that sense, the Commission considered the newly acquired powers over 
investment protection as complementary to preferential investment liberalisation. 
Investment agreements in the wake of the ongoing FTA negotiations with Canada, 
India, Singapore and Mercosur were flagged as the top priority, with investment 
negotiations with China and Russia on the short to medium term (ibid.: 7). 
 In terms of content, form, and scope, the communication remained rather short 
and vague. The Commission explicitly rejected a one-size-fits-all model for future 
EU investment agreements, thereby arguing that such an approach “would 
necessarily be neither feasible nor desirable” (ibid.: 6). The vast majority of EU 
member states negotiated BITs on the basis of a model text that often resulted 
from a long process of policy coordination among different governmental 
departments and public consultations with business associations and civil society 
organisations (OECD, 2006; Woolcock and Kleinheisterkamp, 2010; Swedish 
National Board of Trade, 2011). The deliberate decision by the Commission not to 
enter into a potentially lengthy process of public consultation with European 
stakeholders, which would effectively undermine its short-term ambitions to 
consolidate its newly bestowed competence in the ongoing FTA negotiations with 
Canada, India and Singapore, gave a first indication that the EU investment policy 
was likely to be further developed without major public discussion (Calamita 
Jansen, 2012: 322; IISD, 2010), thereby inherently and actively contributing to 
processes of depoliticisation.
 With regard to content, the communication proposed a number of substantive 
investment protection provisions to be included in future EU IIAs, such as the 
traditional elements of non-discriminatory treatment (national and most-favoured 
nation), ‘fair and equitable treatment’, ‘full security and protection’, protection of 
contractual rights under the so-called ‘umbrella clause’, ‘adequate compensation’ 
for non-discriminatory expropriation, and ensuring the free transfer of funds of 
capital and payments by investors (ibid.: 8-9). These provisions formed a crucial 
inheritance from the member states’ BITs, thereby transposing their neoliberal 
core to the EU level. At the same time, the Commission proposed for a “clear 
formulation of the balance between the different interests at stake, such as the 
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protection of investors against unlawful expropriation or the right of each Party 
to regulate in the public interest” (ibid.: 9). Appealing to the centre-leftist discourse, 
it was suggested that future EU investment agreements should be consistent with 
other EU policies, including environmental protection, decent work, health and 
safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, developmental policy and 
competition policy, and would continue to “allow the Union and the member 
states to adopt and enforce measures necessary to pursue public policy objectives” 
(ibid.). The Commission referred hereby to the principles and objectives of the EU’s 
external action enshrined in Article 205 TFEU and Article 21 TEU, pointing to the 
promotion of the rule of law, human rights, and sustainable development, and 
suggested including the voluntary and non-binding OECD Guidelines for Multi -
national Enterprises as an instrument for balancing the rights and obligations for 
investors.
 With regard to form, the Commission was clearly in favour of enforcing the 
investment provisions through a ‘state-of-the-art’ investor-to-state dispute settlement 
mechanism (ISDS), which was considered “such an established feature of investment 
agreements that its absence would in fact discourage investors and make a host 
economy less attractive than others” (ibid.: 10). The Commission also proposed 
certain reforms in the form of ensuring more transparency, including requests for 
arbitration, submissions, open hearings, amicus	 curiae briefs and publication of 
awards, the atomisation of disputes and interpretation through the use of quasi- 
permanent arbitrators and/or appellate mechanisms, as well as rules for the 
conduct of arbitration (ibid.: 10). 
 With regard to scope, the communication underscored the importance of 
enabling and protecting not only FDI but also all additional capital transfers that 
accompany investment, including payments, loans, and intangible assets such as 
intellectual property rights. Although Article 206 and 207 TFEU did not provide a 
clear definition of FDI (cf. Hermann, 2010; Bungenberg, 2011; Dimopoulos, 2011; 
Chaisse, 2012), the Commission claimed that the exclusive competence with 
regard to portfolio investment implicitly rested with the EU on the basis of the 
Treaty’s Chapter on capital and payments (Articles 63-66 TFEU), which provide, in 
principle, for the prohibition of restrictions on capital and payments movements, 
including both direct and portfolio investments, both between member states and 
between member states and third countries (European Commission, 2010c: 8).20 
Such a broad understanding of a full and exclusive competence including portfolio 
20 The chapter on capital and payments itself does not provide for the exclusive competence to conclude 
international investment agreements including portfolio investment. According to the Commission, 
the ‘implicit’ exclusive competence follows from Article 3(2) TFEU that provides that “the Union shall 
also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion 
is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its 
internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope”.  
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investment would enable the Commission to enter into the negotiation of 
comprehensive investment agreements without the direct involvement of the 
member states through so-called ‘mixed agreements’.
 The communication clearly revealed that the European Commission was not 
planning to completely break away with the neoliberal investment rules of the 
member states’ BITs, but rather to consolidate and anchor them into its FTA agenda. 
While the Commission gave a nod to the centre-leftist discourse by calling for 
certain types of reform, primarily in procedural issues without questioning the 
substantive investment protection rules, the Commission’s conclusion and 
recommendation going forward were that “the Union should follow the available 
best practices to ensure that no EU investor would be worse off than they would 
under Member States’ BITs” (ibid.:  11). The ultimate goal thus set by the European 
Commission is to ensure that future EU investment agreements provide the 
highest level of protection currently available for EU investors abroad. 
5.2.2   The ‘Taliban’ of neoliberal investment rules and the asymmetry of  
European integration
The overall consolidation of the neoliberal investment discourse not only reflected 
the ideological preference of the European Commission, as inscribed in the 2010 
communication, but also largely resulted from fierce pressures by EU member 
state governments.21 The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 
2009 and the concomitant shift of competence over FDI sparked major controversies 
between the European Commission and the EU member states, first of all on the 
division of their respective powers in the field of FDI regulation. These controversies 
were fuelled by the ambiguous wording of the FDI competence in the TFEU that 
failed to clarify the exact scope of FDI under the CCP (for commentaries, see 
Hermann, 2010; Woolcock and Kleinheisterkamp, 2010; Bungenberg	et al., 2011; 
Dimopoulos, 2011; Shan and Zhang, 2011; Chaisse, 2012; Reinisch, 2014). Many 
national governments rejected the European Commission’s claim that the newly 
acquired powers also covered portfolio investment on the basis of the TFEU 
provisions on capital movements, and favoured an EU competence limited to FDI. 
For example, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
suggested that portfolio investment was not covered by the scope of FDI in Article 
207 TFEU and thus remained within the competence of the member states (German 
Federal Constitutional Court, 2009). Other member state officials also suggested 
that issues related to substantive standards of investment protection, such as 
compensation for expropriation, would fall outside the scope of the exclusive 
competence of the EU (Lavranos, 2013a: 165; see also Ceyssens, 2005: 276). Both 
21 This section draws on: interview, EU member state official I, 26 April 2013; EU member state official 
II, 26 July 2013; interview, EU member state official III, 25 October 2013.
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limitations would have significant implications for EU trade policy-making 
processes as future EU investment agreements covering provisions falling within 
the realm of competence shared between the EU and the member states would 
require additional ratification by member state parliaments (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 1999: 50). Such ‘mixed agreements’ would prevent the EU from quickly 
ratifying and implementing FTAs and national legislators would still retain a 
certain degree of control over EU trade policy.22
 Secondly, various member state governments feared that the institutional 
changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon would inevitably lead to lower protection 
standards for European investors abroad. Particularly, member state governments 
with long-standing outward investment interests, reflected by a large number of 
BITs (most prominently, Germany, the Netherlands, France, the UK, and Spain – 
see Figures 5.1 and 5.2), fiercely defended their own ‘gold standard’ BIT models 
(see for example Lavranos, 2011, 2013b). This resulted in a ‘well-orchestrated 
advocacy’ targeted at the Commission to promote the superiority of their 
investment protection standards and to oppose concessions on issues such as 
respect for human rights, environmental concerns, or labour standards, which 
were considered as impediments to existing levels of investment protection under 
their BITs (Inside	US	Trade, 2010a).23 As a result, officials from these member states 
were often referred to as ‘investment Taliban’ as a way to refer to their almost 
religious commitment to strong and uni-dimensional investment protection in 
the wordings of their BITs (Parello-Plesner and Ortiz de Solórzano, 2013: 7). These 
neoliberal hardliner views also frequently clashed with those of DG Trade officials, 
who noted that “some of them continue to think that if you change one comma to 
the BIT that they have since 1959, you are inevitably going to lower the standards”.24 
The perceived lack of experience regarding foreign investment protection among 
DG Trade officials further contributed to such animosities between Western 
European member state officials and the European Commission.
 The hegemonic neoliberal discourse became also reflected in the Council’s 
Conclusions	on	a	 comprehensive	European	 international	 investment	policy of 25 October 
2010. In this document, EU member state governments strongly endorsed the 
Commission’s communication, but placed an even greater emphasis on the 
22 The disagreement over the division of competences with regard to investment continued to underpin 
the contentious relationship between the European Commission and the EU member states during 
most of the early trade policy debates after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Ultimately, on 
16 May 2017, the European Court of Justice found, in its Opinion 2/15 on the EU’s powers to conclude 
the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, that the EU has exclusive competence only with respect to 
direct investment (European Court of Justice, 2017a). According to the ECJ, Article 207 TFEU could 
not be construed as conferring on the EU exclusive external competence with respect to indirect 
investment, rendering EU FTAs covering indirect investments as mixed agreements.
23 DG Trade Mission Report to 50 Years of Bilateral Investment Treaties Conference 1-3 December 2009, 
4 December 2009. 
24 Interview, DG Trade official I, 2 April 2013.
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outward interests of EU investors as it stressed that the future “EU international 
investment policy should increase the current level of protection and legal security 
for	the	European	investor	abroad” [emphases added] (Council of the EU, 2010: para 8). It 
was considered that the main pillars of future EU investment agreements should 
be based on the fundamental standards of the member state BITs, such as fair and 
equitable treatment, non-discrimination (national and most-favoured nation 
treatment), protection against expropriation, free transfer of funds, and an 
effective investor-to-state dispute settlement system (ibid.: paras 14 and 18). While 
recognising the importance of the social and environmental dimensions of FDI 
and stressing the necessary policy space for EU governments to pursue public 
policy objectives (ibid.: paras	16 and 17), the Conclusions ultimately reiterated that 
“the main focus of international investment agreements should continue to be 
effective and ambitious investment protection and market access” (ibid.: para 16). 
These general principles found their way also into the mandates granted by the EU 
member states to the European Commission to negotiate investment protection as 
part of the ongoing FTA negotiations with Canada, India and Singapore in 
Figure 5.1   Direct investment positions, outward and inward  
(US dollars, millions), 2010
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September 2011 (Bilaterals, 2011). In terms of content, form and scope, these mandates 
clearly reflected the broad, unqualified and open-ended provisions in line with the 
member states’ BITs, whereas the Commission had proposed qualifications on 
investor rights and transparency requirements in ISDS in an earlier draft, in line 
with the 2010 communication (Inside	US	Trade,	2011; see also Chapter Six).
 The neoliberal discourse underpinning both the Council’s Conclusions and 
the first negotiating mandates for investment protection in EU FTAs revealed the 
deeper structural asymmetries among the different national accumulation 
regimes within the European political economy (see also Stockhammer, 2010; 
Bellofiore et al., 2011; Becker and Jäger, 2012; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Charnock et 
al., 2014; Jäger and Springler, 2015). The strong emphasis on the protection of EU 
investors abroad was clearly informed by the continued hegemony of the out-
ward-oriented and transnationalised growth regimes located in Western Europe. 
In contrast, the economies of Central and Eastern European (CEE) states that joined 
the EU in 2004 and 2007 had virtually no outward investment interests, while at 
the same time they relied relatively much more on inward FDI (see Figure 5.3). As 
Figure 5.2  Number of concluded BITs per EU member state, May 2010
Source: UNCTAD, 2010: 179-81
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well-documented elsewhere (e.g. Drahokoupil, 2009; Bohle, 2009; Dale, 2011; 
Shields, 2012), these transition economies became highly attractive destinations 
for Western capital by the second half of the 1990s when the CEE states fully 
turned to FDI as the main source to spur economic growth. Although such FDI 
contributed to the upgrading and expansion of their industrial bases, CEE 
economies became highly reliant on Western productive and finance capital, and 
“the result was a dependent status as outposts for foreign [T]NCs” (Drahokoupil 
and Myant, 2011: 332). With the turn to neoliberalism and the transnational 
orientation among domestic elites, CEE states became entangled in a fierce 
competition for FDI. Such ‘competition states’ (cf. Drahokoupil, 2009; Jessop, 2002) 
mediated the interests of transnational capital in transition through the 
imposition of neoliberal discipline and by providing generous incentives to FDI. As 
part of these economic and legal reforms, CEE states also concluded many BITs as 
a tool to attract more FDI (Poulsen, 2015: 83-7; see also Chapter Four).
 As shown in Figure 5.4, these CEE member states experienced the sharp end of 
ISDS claims under their BITs, mounting to almost 70 in total at the end of 2010, 
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while Western European member states hardly faced any ISDS cases at that time.25 
In these cases, the respondent CEE states were ordered – or agreed through 
settlement – to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to foreign investors.26 Notably, 
a substantial number of these cases were filed by Western European investors on 
the basis of BITs with other EU member states such as Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK, or under the Energy Charter Treaty, that were signed prior to CEE 
accession to the EU. Hence, surplus extraction from the CEE economies not only 
occurred through high rates of return on Western private investment in the form 
of net outflows of profits and incomes (Piketty, 2018; see also Kekic, 2018; Tilford, 
25 At the end of 2010, only three ISDS cases against Western European governments were publicly 
known. Maffezini	 v.	 Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, 13 November 2000; Sanchetti	 v.	 United	
Kingdom, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, arbitration filed in 2005 under the UK-India BIT; Vattenfall	v.	
Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/06. 
26 For example, CSOB	 v.	 Slovakia, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Final Award, 29 December 2004 (award of 
US$868 million plus interest); CME	 v.	 Czech	 Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Final Award, 14 
March 2003 (award of US$270 million plus interest); Saluka	v.	Czech	Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, Partial Award, 17 March 2006 (award of US$281 million through settlement); Eureko	v.	Poland, 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Partial Award, 19 August, 2005 (award of US$4.4 billion through 
settlement.
Figure 5.4  EU member state exposure to ISDS, at the end of 2010
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2017), but also through high arbitration awards resulting from investment 
disputes involving compensations for government measures inhibiting foreign 
capital accumulation in those locations. 
 Moreover, some of the ISDS cases under these so-called ‘intra-EU BITs’ were filed 
against CEE states for implementing the acquis	communautaire in the context of EU 
accession, including on the prohibition of state aid under EU competition law and 
EU agricultural quotas.27 CEE governments frequently argued that these intra-EU 
BITs had become invalid after their accession and were superseded by EU law, but 
arbitral tribunals consistently rejected such reasoning.28 Moreover, the European 
Commission strongly condemned such ISDS interferences with EU law in a series 
of amicus	 curiae interventions, thereby calling intra-EU BITs an ‘anomaly within 
the EU internal market’ that needed to be terminated as they exhibited inter	alia a 
serious potential for discrimination between EU investors covered by those BITs 
and those that were not.29 At the same time, Western European governments 
fiercely rejected such views, which were perceived of as undermining the ‘rights 
and legitimate expectations’ of their investors, and continued to defend the legal 
validity of their intra-EU BITs (Council of the EU, 2008: para	17; see also Olivet, 
2013).30 The matter was settled only in 2018 when the ECJ opined in a landmark 
judgment that these intra-EU BITs, and in particular their ISDS provisions, were 
incompatible with EU law, implying that these BITs needed to be terminated or 
amended.31 While this ruling would ultimately mark a major blow to the neoliberal 
discourse regarding the protection of intra-EU FDI, thereby highlighting the 
negative impact of ISDS on the autonomy of the EU legal order, much of the post- 
Lisbon EU investment policy-making processes regarding extra-EU FDI remained 
strongly dominated by the outward-oriented and transnational interests rooted 
in the Western European economies. 
27 For example, Eastern	 Sugar	 v.	 Czech	 Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, 27 March 2007 
(award of US$33.7 million); Micula	v.	Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, 11 December 
2013 (award of US$116.2 million); EDF	 v.	 Hungary, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Final Award, 3 
December 2014 (award of US$132.6 million). In the Micula case, the European Commission found that 
the compensation paid by the Romanian state to the investors in breach of EU state aid rules and 
ordered Romania to recover the compensation from the beneficiaries (European Commission, 2018a).
28 Eastern	Sugar	v.	Czech	Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, 27 March 2007, para 97; Oostergetel	
v.	Slovakia, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Decision on Jurisdiction, 30 April 2010, paras 65-68; Achmea	v.	
Slovakia, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26 October 2010, 
para 165.
29 Eastern	Sugar	v.	Czech	Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, 27 March 2007, para 119; Achmea	v.	
Slovakia, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26 October 2010, 
para 177); Interview, DG Internal Market official, 18 September 2014.
30 Written observations of the Netherlands government, Achmea	v.	Slovakia, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award 
on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26 October 2010, para	163.
31 ECJ, Case 284/16, Slovakia	v.	Achmea, 6 March 2018.
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5.2.3  Contestation in the European Parliament
As explained in the previous chapter, the institutional reforms resulting from the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon enhanced the involvement of the European 
Parliament in the formulation and implementation of EU trade policy by granting it 
full legislative powers together with the EU member states in the area of the CCP 
and by requiring its consent for the conclusion of international trade and investment 
agreements.32 The enhanced role of the European Parliament opened up new 
avenues for the centre-leftist discourse to challenge the neoliberal discourse 
underpinning much of the proposals and positions by the European Commission 
and the Western European member states. This became reflected in the European 
Parliament’s resolution on the future EU international investment policy, prepared 
by special	rapporteur and French MEP for the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) Kader Arif, 
adopted on 6 April 2011. As a member of the French Socialist Party, Arif had 
previously worked with former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and former 
French Minister of Culture Jack Lang, who had both played a decisive role in the 
French opposition to the MAI in the 1990s (interview S&D trade advisor, 3 April 
2013). Subsequently, the resolution emphasised that the European Commission 
should not merely focus on investment protection, but also on better addressing 
“the right to protect the public capacity to regulate and meet the EU’s obligation to 
exercise policy coherence for development” (European Parliament, 2011a: para 6). By 
highlighting the role of the EU as both a major source and destination of global FDI, 
the resolution stressed the need for the EU “to protect itself against potentially 
aggressive investment” and to limit potential liability for adopting new legislation. 
The resolution referred thereby to an ICSID decision of 30 July 2010 that found 
Argentina in breach of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘direct and indirect 
expropriation’ standards when freezing prices paid by consumers for water following 
its 2001 economic crisis (ibid.: 11).33 Hence, the Parliament considered that the EU 
member states’ request – that new EU investment agreements should not negatively 
affect investor protection and guarantees under existing BITs – could create a risk of 
having any new agreement opposed [by the Parliament], and could potentially put at 
risk the balance between investor protection and the protection of the right to 
regulate in the context of increased inward FDI (ibid.: para 17).
 In terms of content, the resolution called for future EU agreement to include 
substantive protection standards drawn from the EU member state BITs, including 
non-discrimination (national and most-favoured nation treatment), fair and equitable 
32 This section is drawn on: interview, Greens/EFA trade advisor, 3 April 2013; interview, S&D trade 
advisor, 3 April 2013; interview, EPP trade advisor, 4 April 2013; interview, chairman of the European 
Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, 4 September 2013.
33 Suez	and	Interagua	v.	Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010; Suez	and	
Vivendi	v.	Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and AWG	Group	v.	Argentina, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010.
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treatment, and protection against direct and indirect expropriation. At the same 
time, the Parliament expressed its deep concern regarding the discretionary 
powers of ISDS arbitrators to broadly interpret investor protection clauses, thereby 
leading to the ruling out of legitimate public regulations, and called on the 
Commission to produce clear definitions of such clauses to strike a clear and fair 
balance between public welfare objectives and private interests (ibid. paras 19 and 
24). Hence, future EU agreements should include “specific clauses laying down the 
right of parties […] to regulate, inter alia, in the areas of protection of national 
security, the environment, public health, workers’ and consumers’ rights, 
industrial policy and cultural diversity” (ibid.: para 25). Moreover, it was reiterated 
to include corporate social responsibility and social and environmental clauses in 
order to harness future EU agreements for sustainable development (ibid.: para 28). 
With regard to form, both state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute settlement 
procedures were deemed desirable, with the latter being conditioned by a number 
of reforms in line with the Commission’s proposals on greater transparency, 
possibilities for appeal and third-party interventions. In addition, the Parliament 
called on the Commission to include an obligation for foreign investors to exhaust 
local judicial remedies where reliable enough to guarantee due process and to 
select one single place of ISDS procedures (ibid.:	para 31-32). And regarding scope, 
the Parliament stressed the need for a clear definition of the investments to be 
protected and insisted to exclude speculative forms of investment from the scope 
of future EU investment agreements. Moreover, it urged the Commission to 
provide a clear definition of a foreign investor to limit abusive practices of so-called 
‘treaty-shopping’, whereby foreign investors could file ISDS cases against their own 
governments by means of a BIT signed by a third country (ibid.: paras 11-14). 
 The adoption of the resolution also revealed the strong political cleavages 
within the ranks of the European Parliament, which were to a great extent defined 
by the underlying ideological and political orientations of the different political 
groups. Reflecting the neoliberal discourse, centre-right groups such as the 
European People’s Party (EPP), the European Conservatives and Reformist Group 
(ECR) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) held on to the 
view that the EU investment policy should be based on the member states’ ‘best 
practices’ and generally opposed major reforms of such established practices. 
Particularly, the EPP attacked an earlier draft by proposing as many as 88 
amendments (out of a total of 167) that mainly called for broad definitions of 
investor and investment, including portfolio investment and intellectual property 
rights, watering down any proposed references to the right to regulate, social and 
environmental clauses, and explicitly including ISDS, thereby ensuring that the 
level of investment protection ensured under the EU member states’ BITs would 
not be abrogated by future EU agreements. 
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 From a centre-leftist perspective, political groups including the Socialists & 
Democrats (S&D), the Greens/EFA and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(GUE/NGL) took the newly acquired FDI competence with the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon as a window of opportunity to challenge the hegemonic 
neoliberal mode of foreign investment regulation. Most notably, the Greens/EFA 
cautioned against the possibility of foreign investors aggressively using ISDS to 
widely claim foregone profits through environmental legislation, thereby referring 
to a number of ISDS cases under NAFTA, and proposed to condition the ISDS 
mechanism by embedding it “in a clear framework of investors’ social and 
environmental obligations, transparency requirements in litigation procedures, 
and the possibility of third party involvement” (European Parliament, 2011b: 
amend. 154). This proposed amendment was defeated in the vote, whereby the S&D 
abstained, and instead, an EPP amendment was voted in, expressly demanding 
that “in addition to state-to-state dispute settlement procedures, investor-state 
procedures must also be applicable in order to secure comprehensive investment 
protection” (European Parliament, 2011a: para 32). Despite its non-binding character, 
the European Parliament’s resolution had significant political importance in 
conveying the centre-leftist discourse into the newly emerging EU investment 
policy, and most importantly, influencing the course of future EU investment 
negotiations.
5.3   The struggle over the EU member states’ BITs: The adoption of 
Regulation 1219/2012
With the supranationalisation of FDI regulation with the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, major disagreements also flared up on the validity of the 
approximately 1,200 BITs that the EU member states had concluded with third 
countries since the late 1950s, and their abilities to conclude ongoing negotiations 
and to negotiate new ones. A protracted political battle emerged between the 
European Commission and the European Parliament on the one hand, seeking to 
bring the member states’ BITs in line with EU law, and a large coalition of EU 
member state governments that were keen to maintain their extensive BIT 
networks without any interference from the Commission. Already prior to the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission concluded that many 
member states’ BITs with third countries contained provisions that were considered 
incompatible with the EU, thereby affecting their legal validity under EU law 
(Woolcock and Kleinheisterkamp, 2010: 54-8; Dimopoulos, 2011: 310-8; Eilmans-
berger, 2009; Bungenberg, 2011; Shan and Zhang, 2011; Kleinheisterkamp, 2012b). 
As outlined in Section 5.2.2, the issue of incompatibility between BITs and EU law 
first arose in the context of the CEE accession to the EU when the Commission 
recognised the potential limitations that these BITs could pose on the capacities of 
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the CEE states to implement the acquis. In September 2003, the Commission and 
eight CEE governments (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia) signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
US government clarifying that US investors could not rely on the protection 
provided by these BITs for seeking remedies for the consequences that the 
implementation of EU legislation in the most sensitive sectors (e.g. agriculture, 
audiovisual, transports, financial services, fisheries and energy) would have 
(European Commission, 2003b; see also Radu, 2008). 
 The assessment of compatibility of BITs with EU law in the light of these BITs 
with the US also led the Commission shortly afterwards to take on the previously 
acceded countries. In 2004, the European Commission notified the governments of 
Austria, Sweden, Finland and Denmark that several of their pre-accession BITs 
with third countries were in conflict with certain aspects of EU law (European 
Commission, 2004a). Particularly, the clauses that guarantee foreign investors the 
free transfer of capital and payments related with an investment was considered 
an impediment to the application of Council measures restricting the free 
movement of capital and payments in exceptional circumstances pursuant to 
Article 64(2), 66 and 75 TFEU, for example to freeze financial assets of individuals 
or organisations engaged with sponsoring terrorist activities (Shan and Zhang, 
2011: 1053). The governments of these member states rejected the Commission’s 
request to bring their BITs in line with EU law after which the Commission 
initiated infringement procedures against Austria and Sweden before the ECJ in 
2006 and began a similar case against Finland later. The case against Denmark 
was dropped following the notification by the Danish government that it would 
terminate and renegotiate its respective 1968 BIT with Indonesia (Burgstaller, 
2011: 60). In March 2009, the ECJ found that the Austrian and Swedish governments 
had not fulfilled their obligations to bring their BITs in line with EU law and ruled 
that these BITs would either have to be modified or terminated.34 In November 
2009, a similar ruling was delivered against Finland.35 
 These ECJ judgments had severe repercussions for the continuing validity of 
member states’ BITs under EU law. Importantly, the ECJ explicitly held that its 
findings were “not limited to the Member State which is the defendant in the 
present case”36, thereby suggesting that the vast majority of member states’ BITs 
could also be deemed to be in breach with EU law to the extent that they contained 
similar free transfer of capital and payments clauses. However, after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, EU member states lost the competence over FDI, 
leaving only the possibility to terminate the respective BIT as renegotiation was no 
34 ECJ, Case C-249/06, Commission	v.	 Sweden, 3 March 2009; ECJ, Case C-205/06, Commission	v.	Austria, 3 
March 2009.
35 ECJ, Case C-118/07, Commission	v.	Finland, 19 November 2009.
36 ECJ, Case C-249/06, Commission	v.	Sweden, 3 March 2009: para 43.
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longer an option. This was particularly noted during a conference organised by 
the German Society to Advance the Protection of Foreign Investment that took 
place, suitably, in the Hermann Josef Abs Room at the Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt 
on 1-3 December 2009, which brought together different member state and EU 
officials, business representatives and legal practitioners, to celebrate the 50th 
anniversary of the first BIT worldwide.37 The governments of Germany and 
Pakistan planned to ceremoniously renew their 1959 BIT at the conference, but 
received a warning from DG Trade officials that Germany was no longer competent 
to conclude new BITs as of 1 December 2009 (Meunier, 2014a: 13). This situation 
provoked major upheaval among many member state governments, thereby 
fearing ‘legal uncertainty’ for their investors abroad, with the Commission noting 
that “[t]he investment community is clearly in need of reassuring signals on the 
EU/Commission intentions in this area”.38
 In response, DG Trade officials worked on a draft of what would later become 
Regulation 1219/2012, which aimed to flesh out transitional arrangements for 
bilateral investment treaties between EU member states and third countries. The 
proposed Regulation was first and foremost intended to provide for an ‘explicit 
guarantee of legal certainty’ to foreign investors by authorising the continued 
existence of all BITs in force between EU member states and third countries in the 
wake of the EU’s exclusive competence on FDI (European Commission, 2010d: 2). 
Moreover, the Commission sought to empower EU member state governments on 
the basis of Article 2(1) TFEU to renegotiate and continue negotiating and 
concluding their own BITs under the conditions set out by the proposed Regulation. 
Particularly, EU member states would be required to notify the Commission of all 
their BITs that they wished to maintain in force. In turn, the Commission would 
be empowered to review these notified BITs whether these (a) conflict with EU law 
(b) overlap with an EU agreement, or (c) constitute an obstacle to the development 
and implementation of EU policies regarding investment, including in particular 
the common commercial policy (Article 5(1)). In case of a negative finding, the 
Commission would be able to withdraw authorisation for these BITs as outlined in 
Article 6. In addition, such authorisation could be withdrawn where “the Council 
has not taken a decision on the authorisation to open negotiations on an 
[investment] agreement […] within one year of the submission of a recommendation 
by the Commission” (Article 6(d)). This article, also referred to as the ‘vendetta’ or 
‘blackmail’ clause, would enable the Commission to oblige member states to 
authorise new EU negotiations by retaining the ability to deprive them of their 
37 “50 Years of Bilateral Investment Treaties Conference 2009: Taking Stock and a Look into the 
Future”, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 1-3 December 2009. Programme available at: http://icsidfiles.
worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/StdntWrtngCmptnEn/StdntWrtngCmptnEn-50YearsBITCnfPrg.pdf
38 DG Trade Mission Report to 50 Years of Bilateral Investment Treaties Conference 1-3 December 2009, 
4 December 2009. 
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own BITs (Woolcock and Kleinheisterkamp, 2010: 64-5; see also Kleinheisterkamp, 
2012a; Lavranos, 2013b; Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, 2013). 
 The proposal also foresaw the possibility for EU member states to continue 
negotiating and concluding BITs, albeit, under the strict conditionality of the 
terms outlined in Article 5 and 6 (Articles 8-12). Moreover, the Commission could 
require member states to “include in such negotiation any appropriate clauses” 
(Article 9(2)), and should “be kept informed of the progress and results throughout 
the different stages of negotiations” and could “request to participate in the 
negotiations between the Member State and the third country concerning 
investment” (Article 10). Hence, the subsumption of the member states’ BITs under 
EU law effectively constituted a political strategy that would equip the Commission 
with unfettered discretionary powers over national BIT policy-making processes. 
It would not only empower the Commission with authorisation over existing BITs 
previously concluded by EU member states, but it would also set the regulatory 
conditions for further advances at national level, thereby representing a stepping 
stone towards further centralisation of FDI regulation at EU level. 
 Not surprisingly, the export-oriented EU member state governments vehemently 
opposed the Commission’s proposal.39 Particularly, Western European governments, 
spearheaded by those from Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland, 
generally feared that the high level of investment protection ensured by their BITs 
would be unlikely to be replicated in future EU investment agreements. Hence, 
they were prepared to fight hard for the continued legal validity of their BITs, 
which, as demanded by the German government, should continue to apply 
“without time-consuming examination” by the Commission (BMWI, 2010; see also 
CEO, 2010; Peterson, 2010). Subsequently, member state governments started 
concerted efforts to defend their own BITs. This culminated in the formation of an 
informal ‘Friends of Investment’ group that encompassed all but six EU member 
states.40 In a joint position paper, released prior to the Commission formally 
unveiling its proposed Regulation, these governments opposed the possible review 
and withdrawal of their BITs and demanded the complete deletion of Articles 5 
and 6 of the Commission’s proposal (Inside	US	Trade, 2010b). In their view, European 
companies would be put in a ‘legal limbo’ in case of a lag between the withdrawal 
of a BIT and the implementation of a new EU investment agreement, thereby 
potentially jeopardising the global protection of their investors. Notably, they had 
already successfully intervened via their Commissioners to strike down a provision 
in an earlier draft proposal that would have authorised existing BITs only for a 
39 Drawn from: Interview, EU member state official I, 26 April 2013; Interview, EU member state official 
II, 26 July 2013; Interview, EU member state official III, 25 October 2013.
40 This group consisted of the following member states: Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden.
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seven-year time span (Peterson, 2010; CEO, 2010; Lavranos, 2013b). For the member 
state governments, the existing BITs would simply remain in force until EU 
investment agreements would replace them. This was also put forward in the 
abovementioned Council Conclusions, wherein the EU member states argued that 
the new legal framework should not “negatively affect investor protection and 
guarantees enjoyed under the existing agreements” and strongly advocated that 
these existing BITs should continue to provide investment protection until they 
would be replaced by at least equally effective EU agreements (Council of the EU, 
2010: para 9). Such a replacement system was considered the only viable solution, 
which, according to member state governments, would provide for a clear transition 
and maximum legal certainty for their investors. 
 At the same time, the Regulation was the first legislative dossier with regard 
to investment in which the European Parliament was to be involved through the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Particularly, political groups pertaining to the 
centre-leftist discourse saw the shift of competence after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon as a window of opportunity to challenge the neoliberal content of 
the member states’ BITs by empowering the Commission to review them and to 
embed them into the wider principles and objectives of the EU’s external action. 
Swedish MEP for the Greens/EFA Carl Schlyter took a leading role as rapporteur in 
drafting two sets of additional proposals that would strengthen the Commission’s 
powers to interfere with existing and future member state BITs. First, a cut-off date 
for the authorisation of existing BITs to a maximum of thirteen years was 
introduced, similar to what the Commission had proposed at an earlier stage, 
which was deemed necessary to avoid “the emergence of parallel, potentially 
incompatible investment regimes” (European Parliament, 2010: Amendments 10 
and 26). Second, Schlyter suggested to further specifying the criteria for 
withdrawal of authorisation of existing and future BITs by adding a reference to 
the general principles set out in the EU Treaties (Articles 3(5) and 6(1) TEU and Title 
II of Part I TFEU). In line with centre-leftist perspectives, this reference would 
place EU member state governments under the obligation to bring their BITs in 
line with broader principles such as the promotion of sustainable development, 
eradication of poverty, environmental, human rights protection, and the 
promotion of a high level of employment and adequate social protection, which 
was considered “all the more important in a sensitive area like investment 
protection law […] applied and interpreted by international arbitration tribunals” 
(ibid.: Amendment 12). In addition, it was also suggested to add an obligation to 
member states in the case of renegotiating existing BITs or negotiating new ones 
to provide for more transparency in ISDS procedures and to allow the Commission 
to participate at least as amicus	curiae (ibid.: Amendment 13). 
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 These proposals did not receive the necessary support from the centre-right 
political groups. In line with neoliberal perspectives, groups such as the EPP, ECR 
and ALDE sought to eliminate or water down the review and withdrawal of 
authorisation of existing BITs, including the proposed expiry date of thirteen 
years, as well as the reference to the general principles and objectives of the EU’s 
external action (European Parliament, 2011c). Particularly, the EPP tabled more 
than half of the total amendments (155 out of 213). As a result, the final report 
adopted by the European Parliament on 10 May 2011 diverged significantly from 
the initial draft and would grant the Commission weaker powers of review over 
existing BITs (European Parliament, 2011d). The European Parliament refused to 
make such reviews mandatory and narrowed their scope to cases where BITs would 
constitute ‘a serious obstacle’ to the conclusion of future EU investment agreements 
with third countries, while also limiting the criteria for withdrawal of 
authorisation. The adoption of the report meant a serious setback for the 
centre-leftist discourse after which Schlyter resigned as rapporteur as he felt that 
the report one-sidedly favoured the interests of investors and failed to adequately 
take into account environmental, social and other legal requirements (Schlyter, 
2011). 
 Under the Polish Presidency, a process of conciliation was initiated in July 
2011 to facilitate a common position between the Council and the Parliament, 
with the Commission as mediator. These informal ‘trilogue negotiations’ have 
been described as extremely tense.41 EU member state governments proved 
unwilling to change their strong position with regard to the existing BITs and 
negotiations seemed completely blocked. Subsequently, the Commission issued a 
set of compromises and essentially gave up the withdrawal of authorisation 
mechanism, thereby accepting the replacement mechanism that would authorise 
the existing BITs until they were replaced by EU agreements. For the Commission, 
the need to keep Article 6, including the ‘vendetta’ clause, became also weaker 
after the EU member states agreed on the Commission’s recommendation for the 
modification of the existing negotiation directives for the ongoing FTA negotiations 
with Canada, India and Singapore to include investment protection chapters.42 
Moreover, the European Parliament successfully pushed for the creation of a 
separate category of BITs signed after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
and before the entry into force of the Regulation.
 Officially adopted on 12 December 2012 and coming into force on 9 January 
2013, Regulation 1219/2012 effectively ties the hands of the Commission to review 
and possibly withdraw authorisation over existing BITs, even when they are clearly 
41 Interview, chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, 6 September 
2013.
42 Interview, DG Trade official III, 18 September 2014; interview, DG Trade official IV, 29 October 2014.
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against the principles and established policies of the EU (European Parliament and 
Council of the EU, 2012). Article 3 contains the long-sought replacement 
mechanism that automatically authorises the member states to maintain in force 
their BITs upon notification “until a bilateral agreement between the same third 
country and the Union enters into force” (Article 3). The revised Articles 5 and 6 
stipulate that the Commission may assess, in close consultation with the member 
state involved, the provisions of these agreements by evaluating whether they 
constitute ‘a serious obstacle’ to the negotiation or conclusion by the EU of bilateral 
investment agreements with third countries. The proposed criteria for withdrawal 
of authorisation, including the ‘vendetta clause’, were dropped. As such, the 
Regulation marks a clear victory for the EU member states and further solidifies 
the neoliberal status	 quo at national level. With regard to the authorisation to 
amend or conclude new BITs, member states are required to notify the Commission 
(Article 8), which, in turn, shall authorise the member states to open negotiations 
unless such negotiations would (a) be in conflict with EU law, (b) be superfluous in 
case the Commission pursues negotiations with the same third country, (c) be 
inconsistent with the EU’s principles and objectives for external action, or (d) 
constitute a serious obstacle to the negotiation or conclusion of BITs with third 
countries by the EU (Article 9). With regard to BITs concluded after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon and before the entry into force of the Regulation, the 
member states shall notify the Commission upon which the Commission shall 
make an assessment as to whether the BIT conflicts with the requirements of 
Article 9 and may withdraw authorisation in case of a negative finding (Article 12). 
In the end, Regulation 1219/2012 constitutes a crucial element in the making of 
the EU investment policy in the sense that it further constitutionalises under EU 
law the neoliberal regulation and protection of EU FDI through the existing BIT 
regime, while foreseeing the expansion of this regime under the supervision of 
the Commission.   
5.4   Social forces in the making of the post-Lisbon  
EU investment policy
Much of the dominant literature has identified states and state agents as the 
central driving forces behind the emergence and expansion of the global network 
of IIAs. Such state-centric views however, tend to ignore or downplay the critical 
role of non-state actors in supporting and contesting the content, form and scope 
of investment treaties, thereby failing to acknowledge the importance of the social 
foundations of political power. Some accounts indeed recognise the role of capital 
actors in developing and disseminating neoliberal investment rules (Bonnitcha et al., 
2017; Poulsen, 2015; De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2015), whereas others have 
highlighted their contestation by subaltern forces (Strange, 2015; Siles-Brügge, 
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2017), but most of these accounts generally conceptualise non-state actors as 
externally related to the state and state institutions. In contrast, the critical political 
economy approach deployed here seeks to unravel the deeply political nature of 
foreign investment regulation and protection by examining the underpinning 
power balances between rivalling social groups and how these are structurally 
inscribed in, and thus internally related to, the institutional terrains of the state. 
5.4.1  Organised transnational capital 
Organised transnational capital played a pivotal role in driving and sustaining 
the broader neoliberal discourse of EU trade policy. European business groups 
were quick in seizing the organic momentum offered by the global economic and 
financial crisis conditions and managed to consolidate the hegemonic discourse 
of neoliberal competitiveness that came to inform much of the EU’s crisis 
management policies. These groups crucially emphasised the EU’s external role in 
global markets as part of the EU’s overall macroeconomic strategy in response to 
the crisis, which became reflected in the Europe	2020 strategy. Particularly, the ERT 
argued for structural reforms of the European economy, while at the same time 
calling for the expansion of EU bilateral free trade agreements (ERT, 2009; ERT, 
2010). As such, the ERT established a crucial link between the internal and external 
dimensions of EU crisis management, thereby arguing that “Europe’s ability to 
reaffirm its position as a major player in the global economy would be reinforced 
by the further strengthening of competition within the Single Market” (ERT, 2010: 
6). Along similar lines, also BusinessEurope called for stricter enforcement of 
EU rules to prevent protectionism within the Single Market and pushed for more 
EU action on the international level to ensure broad-based market access for 
EU companies, providing non-discriminatory and effective protection for EU 
investment, and eliminating unfair subsidies and export restrictions (Business 
Europe, 2009: 9). The emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
others in South East Asia, were particularly singled out as major targets, as export- 
oriented industries restructured their accumulation strategies towards an expansion 
to these markets in the wake of the crisis (ESF, 2010b: 3; BusinessEurope, 2010a: 5; 
see also Section 5.1). During the public consultation in the run-up to the Trade,	
Growth	and	World	Affairs communication, organised business clearly indicated that 
the “EU must strongly promote its export and investment interests” in bilateral 
negotiations with third countries with the purpose to eradicate ‘damaging 
regulatory divergences’ in order to restore competitiveness, thereby explicitly 
referring to emerging economies (BusinessEurope, 2010a; see also ESF, 2010b). 
Such an agenda was taken up by the European Commission and translated into a 
comprehensive EU growth narrative and strategy aimed to increase the global 
competitiveness of the EU through the deepening of neoliberal trade and 
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investment policy against the backdrop of the structural crisis conditions.
 At the same time, the consolidation of the neoliberal discourse of the 
post-Lisbon EU investment policy was not self-evident but crucially shaped through 
the political agency of organised transnational capital. First of all, both European 
and national fractions of transnational capital feared that there would be a 
substantial legal risk for the pre-Lisbon member state BITs and the continued 
protection under these treaties. Prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the French Mouvement	des	Enterprises	de	France (MEDEF) and the German Bundesverband	
der	 Deutschen	 Industrie (BDI) warned in a letter to then Trade Commissioner 
Mandelson for “a step backwards in terms of legal certainty and legal protection 
that business requires”, thereby urging the Commission to confirm that “existing 
BITs will remain valid after the Treaty’s entry into force […] by rapidly correcting 
the misleading comments of certain officials” (MEDEF and BDI, 2008). Subsequently, 
organised business both at national and EU level joined forces and pushed the 
Commission in private meetings to prepare legislation in order to clarify the legal 
status of the existing BITs (BDI, 2010; BusinessEurope, 2010a; ESF, 2010c; see also 
CEO, 2011).43 Their message was to maintain the member state BITs intact without 
any legal review, and, at the same time, leaving the possibility to negotiate and 
conclude new BITs to improve conditions for European investments. 
 After the Commission had published its proposal for a regulation in July 2010, 
organised business set up an enormous lobby effort towards the European 
Parliament.44 National industry federations from Western European member 
states, such as the Dutch VNO-NCW and the German BDI, took a leading role in 
formulating the positions of BusinessEurope, which were, in turn, presented 
together with the ESF in numerous seminars, breakfast debates and in behind-
closed-doors meetings with MEPs, particularly those from the EPP and ALDE (see 
also CEO, 2011).45 These business groups primarily sought to alter the proposed 
regulation and suggested specific amendments to the Parliament’s draft report 
aimed at eliminating or watering down the withdrawal of authorisation 
mechanism (Article 5 and 6). Moreover, officials from Western European member 
states frequently joined or co-organised such meetings and actively encouraged 
business to step up its lobbying efforts, particularly after Schlyter published his 
43 DG Trade report of meeting with BusinessEurope, 22 September 2009; DG Trade report of meeting 
with BDI on 28 January 2010, 8 February 2010.
44 Drawn from: interview, BusinessEurope representative, 17 April 2013; interview VNO-NCW 
representative, 9 July 2013; interview, MEDEF representative, 13 August 2013; interview, BDI 
representative, 18 October 2013; interview, Greens/EFA trade advisor, 3 April 2013; interview, S&D 
trade advisor, 3 April 2013; interview, EPP trade advisor, 4 April 2013.
45 DG Trade report on investment breakfast hosted by German MEP Michael Theurer (ALDE) and 
BusinessEurope, with participation from ESF, BDI and German Chemicals Industry Association, 26 
January 2011; DG Trade report on EU Foreign Direct Investment Roundtable organised by Hogan 
Lovells with participants from the European Parliament, European American Business Council, 
Alstom, GDF Suez, German Permanent Representation to the EU, Shell International BV and Canada 
EU Mining Council on 7 December 2010, 21 December 2010.
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draft report. In an informal meeting between the ESF and member state officials, 
a representative of the Belgian government, which was holding the Presidency at 
that time, warned that the proposed expiry date for the existing BITs was 
‘worrying’ and instructed business to start lobbying the European Parliament.46 
Such efforts became reflected in many of the proposed amendments to the 
Schlyter-report. Some MEPs proposed to clarify that the member state BITs would 
remain in force, “whereas the Commission shall take the necessary steps towards 
a progressive replacement of all existing agreements on investment with new 
agreements that should provide for the best possible level of protection” (European 
Parliament, 2011b: Amendment 39). Other MEPs, who openly admitted having 
received the blueprints from their governments – regardless of their party 
affiliation – went as far as conditioning the replacement of existing BITs by future 
EU agreements by proposing that these would “provide for at least the same level 
of investor protection” (ibid.: Amendments 34 and 35; see also CEO, 2011). The final 
version voted by the plenary followed the line of the former, but such amendments 
clearly revealed the supremacy of the neoliberal project bound up with the 
interests of transnational capital within the institutional terrains of the EU.
 Furthermore, European business feared an increased ‘politicisation’ of 
investment protection as a result from the institutional changes brought by the 
Treaty of Lisbon and worried that the future EU investment agreements would 
inevitably lead to lower protection standards for European investors abroad.47 
Particularly, BusinessEurope was ‘not comfortable’ with any possible reduction of 
the level of protection currently enjoyed under the member state BITs “that could 
result, for example, from [European Parliament] and civil society pressure to 
pursue other policy objectives”.48 Likewise, the German BDI opposed the inclusion 
of investment protection in negotiations for free trade agreements, which was 
feared to be subject to a ‘grand bargain’ with concessions in other areas ultimately 
resulting in the weakening of investment protection (BDI, 2010: 4).49 Instead, it 
preferred to “either keep the German BITs or to isolate investment protection in 
self-standing agreements”.50 BDI also conducted, together with the German 
government, a study of German companies’ experience with BITs, which praised 
the existing system and warned of the danger of weaker standards resulting of 
Brussels’ new powers, thereby calling for joint action to secure the ‘high German 
46 DG Trade report of informal meeting between the ESF and the Trade Policy Committee Services and 
Investment, held on 16 November 2010, 23 November 2010.
47 DG Trade report of meeting with BusinessEurope on 6 January 2010, 8 January 2010.
48 DG Trade flash report of meeting with BusinessEurope, 25 November 2010.
49 DG Trade report on investment breakfast hosted by German MEP Michael Theurer (ALDE) and 
BusinessEurope, with participation from ESF, BDI and German Chemicals Industry Association, 26 
January 2011.
50 DG Trade report of meeting with BDI, 25 October 2011.
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standard’ of investment protection (CEO, 2010).51 Hence, European business 
strongly pushed for EU agreements that would guarantee the ‘same level of 
protection’ as the member state BITs, which were considered “the best protection 
available [to] address the behaviour of states” (BDI, 2010: 3).52
 In various position papers and during private meetings with DG Trade officials 
and MEPs, European business groups made clear what content, form and scope of the 
EU investment policy they desired. With regard to content, EU investment agreement 
should include investment protection standards on non-discrimination (national 
and most-favoured nation treatment), fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection of EU investments, protection against direct and indirect expropriation 
with adequate, effective and prompt compensation, and umbrella clauses 
(BusinessEurope, 2010c: 7; BusinessEurope, 2010b: 14; ESF, 2010c: 2; ESF, 2010b: 10). 
At the same time, European business groups fiercely rejected any inclusion of 
provisions on environmental and social policy or corporate social responsibility 
guidelines, as they feared potential abuse by host states to expropriate or interfere 
with European investment interests abroad (BDI, 2010: 5; ESF, 2010c: 3; 
BusinessEurope, 2010c: 7).53 In a private meeting with DG Trade officials, the ESF 
strongly demanded that “investment protection should not be traded off against 
public policy objectives, including human and labour rights”, thereby warning 
that if this was going to happen, “both EU industry and member states would 
oppose”.54 
 With regard to form, ISDS was to be included in future EU investment 
agreements without requiring investors to first exhaust domestic remedies (BDI, 
2010: 3; ESF, 2010c: 2; BusinessEurope, 2010b: 14; BusinessEurope, 2010c: 7). At the 
same time, business groups attacked the Commission’s line on bringing more 
transparency in arbitration proceedings, and thereby more public scrutiny, as this 
would go against the interests of investors keen on preserving confidentiality of 
sensitive commercial information (BDI, 2010: 3-4).55 And with regard to scope, EU 
investment agreements should include a broad definition of investment, including 
portfolio and indirect investment through ‘simple holding structures’ (ibid.: 3). 
Particularly, both BusinessEurope and the ESF strongly advocated for the 
liberalisation of investment on the basis of a negative list approach, whereby only 
the exceptions would be listed, thereby ensuring the future liberalisation and 
51 DG Trade report of meeting with BDI on 28 January 2010, 8 February 2010.
52 DG Trade report of meeting with MEDEF on 2 March 2010, 4 March 2010.
53 DG Trade report on EU Foreign Direct Investment Roundtable organised by Hogan Lovells with 
participants from the European Parliament, European American Business Council, Alstom, GDF 
Suez, German Permanent Representation to the EU, Shell International BV and Canada EU Mining 
Council on 7 December 2010, 21 December 2010.
54 DG Trade report of meeting with AmCham and representatives of law firms, public policy advisors, 
business associations and banks, 8 July 2011.
55 DG Trade report of meeting with MEDEF on 2 March 2010, 4 March 2010; DG Trade flash report of 
meeting with BusinessEurope, 25 November 2010.
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protection of new business models and economic sectors (ESF, 2010c: 2-3; 
BusinessEurope, 2010b: 14). 
5.4.2  The political agency of the investment arbitration industry
The legal industry consisting of professional service companies was also very 
active and influential in advancing the neoliberal project. Law firms specialised in 
the legal interpretation and adjudication of investment rules have been the main 
beneficiaries of investment arbitration. With US$575 million in damages per 
average case and average legal and arbitration costs of US$8 million, exceeding 
US$30 million in some cases, investment arbitration has become a lucrative 
business (Gaukrodger and Gordon, 2012: 19; UNCTAD, 2015b). With the number of 
ISDS cases growing each year, lawyers have already referred to a ‘golden age’ of 
investment arbitration (Posner and Dozsa, 2013: 2-9). Anglo-Saxon law firms like 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, White & Case, and King & Spalding have made 
investment arbitration part of their core business, with caseloads running into the 
tens of billions of dollars in terms of ISDS claims. These firms have been actively 
encouraging investors to pursue arbitration and exploit loopholes in investment 
protection clauses, advising corporations on how to restructure their investments 
to make the best use of investment treaty protection and ISDS opportunities 
(Eberhardt and Olivet, 2012). 
 The inner circle of the private arbitration industry consists of a small and 
close-knit community of a dozen of Western elite arbitrators that are represented 
in over one-third of all arbitral appointments, although they only account for a 
tiny fraction of all available investment arbitrators (Langford et al., 2017). This 
small group of private lawyers, sometimes referred to as an ‘arbitration mafia’ that 
is primarily ‘pale, male and stale’ (see for example, Puig, 2014; Greenwood and 
Baker, 2012; Van Harten, 2012; Yackee, 2012; Franck, 2007; Goldhaber, 2004), often 
sit on the same arbitration panels, act as both arbitrators and counsels, and even 
call on each other as witnesses in arbitration cases. This had led to growing 
concerns, including within the broader legal community, over the impartiality 
and independence of the arbitrators. The fact that ISDS claims are handled by 
three arbitrators appointed and paid on a case-by-case basis creates incentives for 
arbitrators to rule in favour of the foreign investor as the only party that can bring 
a claim in the one-sided system of investment arbitration. Research has found 
clear indications of systemic bias in ISDS, with arbitrators showing a tendency to 
favour foreign investors, particularly from major Western capital-exporting states, 
over respondent states (Behn et al., 2018; Van Harten, 2016a; Schultz and Dupont, 
2014). 
 This elite group of private arbitrators forms the core of a wider transnational 
network extending across associated institutions and the wider academic 
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community that is highly influential in driving and sustaining the global 
investment treaty regime. Members of this network include government repre-
sentatives and officials at international organisations such as the OECD, World 
Bank, and UNCTAD, private lawyers at leading global law firms, international 
arbitral institutions such as ICSID, PCA and ICC, international professional 
organisations such as the International Bar Association, and academics promoting 
specific understandings of international investment law through scholarship. 
This network should be understood as a collective group of ‘organic intellectuals’ 
to highlight their ‘social function’ in shaping and framing the ideological elements 
of the hegemonic neoliberal project (cf. Gramsci, 1971: 9; see also Chapter Two). 
They generally share normative and causal beliefs about the merits of investment 
arbitration in promoting foreign investment and advancing the rule of law. They 
gather frequently at conferences, consultation meetings and workshops to 
facilitate discussion and, to some extent, coordinate investment rule-making and 
practices. Moreover, they shift relatively easy between the public and the private 
sector and between adjudication and scholarship, and “they self-police each other’s 
commitment to the common cause” (Yackee, 2012: 402-3; see also Sornarajah, 
2006: 30-1, 40-3). They exhibit a problem-solving attitude in the sense that they are 
primarily concerned with finding solutions to problems that stem from the 
interpretation and application of international investment law. While willing to 
explore options for reform, they frequently suggest mere institutional tweaks 
designed to streamline arbitration and make it more consistent, accessible and 
efficient, without further questioning the core principles and normative values 
underpinning the system.
 It is this particular attitude that makes the role of the investment arbitration 
community essentially political. Its members are committed to a political goal and 
interpret their knowledge in such a way that it supports this goal. Their ideas and 
conceptualisations about IIAs and ISDS ultimately serve the purpose of 
strengthening and perpetuating the ideological foundations to maintain and 
expand the global network of investment treaties. Legal sociologists Yves Dezalay 
and Bryant Garth have coined the term ‘moral entrepreneurs’ in their seminal 
study on international commercial arbitrators, which could be applied also to 
investment arbitrators: “they build careers and markets […] and they build the 
legitimacy and credibility of international legal practices and international 
institutions” (Dezelay and Garth, 1996: 33). This double role cannot be seen 
separately from their own financial stakes in investment arbitration and the 
profitable avenues it generates for selling expertise and legal services.
 The anticipated ‘politicisation’ of the EU investment policy with the 
involvement of the European Parliament after the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon attracted law firms and legal experts to take action against any significant 
562932-L-bw-Verbeek
Processed on: 15-7-2021 PDF page: 176
176
CHAPTER 5
breakaway from established practices regarding investment protection and 
arbitration in a neoliberal fashion. Most notably, they expressly warned for a 
potential ‘steady deterioration’ of investment protection as witnessed earlier in 
the US, where parliamentary pressures instigated a review of US investment policy 
in an attempt to strike a better balance between investment protection and 
government capacities to regulate in the public interest.56 Law firms such as 
Herbert Smith Freehills and Hogan Lovells organised meetings for their corporate 
clients, including multinational corporations with experience in ISDS such as 
Royal Dutch Shell, GDF Suez, Alstom and Deutsche Bank, with DG Trade officials, 
EU member state officials and MEPs.57 In line with the neoliberal discourse, their 
message was to maintain the high standard of investment protection in future EU 
agreements, while warning that these “might become meaningless if many social 
obligations are imposed on investors” (Cronin, 2013: 139; see also CEO, 2011). 
Moreover, they also pushed hard for the maintenance in force of the existing 
member state BITs. In a letter to the European Parliament, Dutch law firm De 
Brauw Blackstone Westbroek heavily criticised the Schlyter draft report and 
strongly recommended MEPs to propose that “member states’ existing BITs with 
third countries should remain in force until they are replaced by EU BITs” (Van 
Geuns and Jansen, 2011). Such proposals reappeared in strikingly similar wording 
in various amendments tabled mainly by the EPP in the European Parliament 
(CEO, 2011). The agency of the investment arbitration industry became more insti-
tutionalised with the establishment of the European Federation for Investment 
Law and Arbitration (EFILA) in 2014 with the purpose “to contribute to the more 
favourable investment climate in Europe and beyond through a dialogue with the 
European policy makers, stakeholders and the society at large” (EFILA, 2014: 1). 
EFILA was set up in response to the growing contestation over neoliberal 
investment rules and arbitration in the context of the CETA and TTIP negotiations 
(see next chapters) and as such, became an important voice of the investment 
arbitration community at EU level.
5.4.3  Counter-hegemonic forces and social contestation
The neoliberal project for the EU investment policy was highly contested right 
from the outset. The global investment treaty regime already experienced its first 
56 DG Trade Mission Report to 50 Years of Bilateral Investment Treaties Conference 1-3 December 2009, 
4 December 2009. 
57 DG Trade report on EU Foreign Direct Investment Roundtable organised by Hogan Lovells with 
participants from the European Parliament, European American Business Council, Alstom, GDF Suez, 
German Permanent Representation to the EU, Shell International BV and Canada EU Mining Council 
on 7 December 2010, 21 December 2010. For other meetings between law firm representatives and DG 
Trade officials, see: DG Trade report of investment seminar on 9-12 March 2010, 12 March 2010; DG 
Trade report of meeting with Hogan Lovells, 24 May 2011; DG Trade meeting report of conference “EU 
a new actor in investment treaty arbitration” on 6 June 2011, 27 July 2011.
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cracks in the years preceding the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
number of ISDS cases worldwide had been skyrocketing since the early 2000s and 
reached a total number of over 1,000 at the time of writing (UNCTAD, 2020a). Some 
of these cases dealt with sensitive areas of public regulation, such as human rights, 
environmental protection and financial crisis management, and delivered 
multi-million or billion dollar awards against states primarily in the Global South 
(see for example, Poulsen, 2015: Chapter Six). In response, a number of countries, 
particularly in Latin America, withdrew from the ICSID Convention and started to 
review and terminate their BITs, with countries in other parts of the world 
following suit. With the societal discontent with the current regime growing 
globally, some commentators already began to refer to a ‘backlash against 
investment arbitration’ in terms of its waning popular legitimacy (Waibel et al., 
2010; see also Franck, 2007). Moreover, a number of high-profile ISDS cases against 
Western states started to make headlines, such as the cases filed by Philip Morris 
against Australia58 and Uruguay59 for introducing anti-smoking legislation and 
the cases filed by Vattenfall against Germany for imposing environmental 
obligations in the construction of a coal-fired power plant60 as well as for the 
decision to phase out nuclear energy.61 Such cases crucially shaped the public 
perception of foreign investment protection and arbitration and became key 
reference points for further cementing the centre-leftist discourse in the making 
of the EU investment policy. 
 In Europe, a small group of trade campaigners from NGOs, primarily based in 
Brussels and in Western European states such as Germany, France and the 
Netherlands, grasped the institutional consequences of the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon and the implications for EU investment policy-making processes. 
Subsequently, they forged an alliance to work on investment protection issues at 
EU level through their membership of the Seattle to Brussels Network.62 This 
network was formed in the aftermath of the 1999 WTO Ministerial Meeting in 
Seattle with the purpose to challenge the unfolding neoliberal agenda of the EU 
for continued global trade and investment liberalisation. The S2B Network brings 
together NGOs from various EU member states that share a common commitment 
towards a more “democratically accountable trading system that advances 
economic justice, social well-being, gender equity and ecological sustainability, 
and that provides decent jobs and necessary goods and services for all people” (S2B 
Network website). A working group on investment was set up within the network 
58 Philip	Morris	v.	Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12.
59 Philip	Morris	v.	Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7.
60 Vattenfall	v.	Germany	I, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6.
61 Vattenfall	v.	Germany	II,	ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12.
62 Drawn from: interview, NGO representative I, 15 January 2013; interview, NGO representative II, 15 
January 2013; interview, NGO representative III, 21 March 2013.
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consisting of a handful of NGO representatives of which most were involved in 
contesting global investment rules in the context of the MAI and the WTO in the 
1990s and early 2000s. These included representatives from, among others, the 
Brussels-based Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), the Belgian development 
organisation 11.11.11, the Netherlands-based Transnational Institute (TNI) and 
Centre for Research on Multinational Organisations (SOMO), and Germany-based 
Powershift. This working group was critical in developing and coordinating 
strategies among NGOs both within and outside Europe as well as developing 
counter-narratives to the neoliberal investment discourse, and as such became the 
main driving force behind the formulation and articulation of the centre-leftist 
discourse regarding the EU investment policy.
 A first testimony to this was the launch of a report and an accompanied civil 
society statement on the future of EU investment agreements in the Treaty of 
Lisbon era, which were launched in the same month as the European Commission 
published its ‘investment package’ in July 2010 (Seattle to Brussels Network, 2010). 
These documents expressed severe concerns with the overly corporate bias of the 
existing investment treaty regime and the negative impacts on the rights of 
governments to regulate and implement policies to advance public interests, 
human rights and sustainable development. The entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the concomitant shift of FDI competences from the EU member states 
to EU level were thereby presented as a major opportunity to reassess existing BITs 
and to better align future EU agreements with the broader principles and 
objectives of the EU’s external action. In the civil society statement, 40 European 
organisations primarily from Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy 
and Spain, strongly called for a moratorium on ongoing or newly planned BIT 
negotiations by the EU member states, a sunset clause on all existing BITs under 
which they would expire at a certain date unless they were reviewed to achieve 
greater balance between the protection of public and private interests and of 
economic, social, environmental and developmental interests, and a broad 
assessment of those BITs by the European Commission regarding their impact on 
the policy space of governments to further sustainable development, gender 
justice and social equity and to comply with international obligations on human, 
women’s and labour rights, the environment and climate change. 
 With regard to content, the signatories criticised the open and broad investment 
protection clauses on expropriation and fair and equitable treatment that were 
viewed as enabling investors to challenge a wide range of regulatory measures, 
including those in the public interest. Moreover, the MFN clause was singled out as 
problematic in light of previous decisions made by arbitral tribunals, which 
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allowed investors to import commitments from other investment treaties.63 With 
regard to form, the ISDS mechanism was to be omitted from future EU investment 
agreements as this would enable foreign investors, irrespective of their behaviour, 
to challenge host state actions and measures directly before international arbitral 
tribunals without first having to exhaust domestic legal remedies and irrespective 
of their contribution to the host state’s development. Particularly, the signatories 
referred to the lack of transparency in arbitral proceedings, the limited access to 
non-disputing third parties and the lack of adequate independence among the 
arbitrators, which contributed to the expansive and inconsistent interpretations 
of BIT provisions. And with regard to scope, the EU investment policy was to be 
restricted to a limited and clear definition of FDI as the protection of portfolio 
investment, including provisions on the free movement of capital, was considered 
undesirable in the light of speculation, tax evasion and avoidance, that enhanced 
capital flight from developing countries rather than inducing productive 
investments. 
 The S2B Network also successfully established linkages with other NGOs and 
social movements outside Europe. Most notably, a Week of Action was organised in 
Brussels in November 2011, bringing together trade campaigners and activists 
from across the globe to strategise and coordinate common messages and activities. 
The resulting Call	for	an	Alternative	Investment	Model crucially elevated criticisms to 
the investment treaty regime to a broader critique of neoliberal globalisation and 
financial liberalisation as root causes of the global economic and financial crisis. 
Hence, the 99 signatory organisations not only advocated for an international 
investment framework based on democratic principles and the prioritisation of 
public interests over private profits, including binding obligations on TNCs related 
to human, economic, environmental, labour and social rights, but also for sectors 
like health, food, public services, ecosystems and natural resources to be put 
firmly under public control (Seattle to Brussels Network, 2011). Such linkages and 
actions eventually laid the ideological groundwork for developing an Alternative	
Trade	Mandate published in 2013, in which more than 50 European NGOs from a 
wide range of perspectives envisioned an alternative EU trade policy to the 
dominant neoliberal free trade model (ATM, 2013). 
 These groups generally operated outside the confines of the European 
institutions as they did not enjoy the same level of access to EU decision-makers as 
compared to organised business. Some NGO representatives were well connected 
with a number of MEPs and their advisors, particularly from the left-leaning 
political parties in the European Parliament, which were crucial for feeding the 
centre-leftist discourse into the EU’s formal decision-making processes. However, 
63 For example, Maffezini	v.	Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000.
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the subordinate role of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the European Commission 
and the EU member states, and the marginal position of the left-leaning political 
parties within the Parliament, rather limited the avenues for challenging the 
existing power bloc and influencing the course of direction regarding the EU 
investment policy. Similarly, other NGOs participated in formal consultation 
mechanisms with DG Trade, such as the Civil Society Dialogues, but these were 
often considered as ineffective channels for policy influencing and were seen thus 
as mere ‘window dressing’ (e.g. CEO, 2015a). Subsequently, NGOs put much effort 
in raising public awareness through the organisation of various public events and 
debates, often with participation from DG Trade and EU member state officials as 
well as MEPs, and through critical analyses, online materials and videos, and 
research publications (see for example, CEO, 2010; 2011; Olivet, 2011; S2B Network, 
2012; Olivet, 2013; Knottnerus, 2013). Particularly, one influential study 
highlighting the role of law firms and arbitrators in fuelling the investment 
arbitration not only attracted the attention from those operating within the 
investment arbitration community, but also successfully brought the concerns 
related to ISDS to a wider audience (Eberhardt and Olivet, 2012). 
 At the same time, organised labour played a relatively marginal role in 
contesting the neoliberal investment discourse, at least during the early phase 
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and remained rather distanced 
from the NGOs associated with the S2B Network. The main trade union 
representation within the EU, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), 
only agreed on a common position on the EU investment policy in March 2013. 
Such delayed engagement stemmed from the fact that the ETUC represented up to 
ninety trade union confederations in thirty-eight countries, plus ten European 
trade union federations, thereby giving rise to strong internal interest cleavages 
within the structures of the ETUC. Such differences were to a large extent defined 
by the position of the different union members in national production structures 
that in turn crucially shaped their underlying ideological and political orientations 
(Horn, 2012a: 582; Gajewska, 2008: 108-9). Whereas as trade unions from Northern 
and Western European member states were typically inclined to support free trade 
policies, trade unions from Southern European member states generally adopted a 
much more critical position. At the same time, the ETUC tended to be more insti-
tutionally embedded within the structures of EU policy-making processes and 
thus largely remained within the broader political context of neoliberal 
restructuring rather than posing a fundamental alternative to it (Horn, 2012a: 
582; see also Taylor and Mathers, 2004; Bieler, 2005). This was also reflected in the 
ETUC position regarding EU’s free trade agenda. In its 2006 resolution on the 
Global	Europe strategy, for example, the ETUC expressed its support for “redirecting 
European exports to expanding markets in the emerging countries” that would 
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contribute to economic growth and the creation of jobs in Europe, albeit on the 
condition of a social dimension on the promotion and protection of decent work 
and social rights (ETUC, 2006; see also Bieler, 2013). 
 Investment protection, however, was never an issue of particular relevance for 
the ETUC as this was primarily dealt with at national level prior to the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It was only through a process of internal capacity 
building in the course of 2012 that spurred the ETUC’s executive committee to 
prepare a common position on the EU investment policy. In the wake of the 
ongoing and upcoming negotiations with Canada and the US, union leaders 
particularly feared that provisions on investment protection and ISDS would 
eventually create a ‘MAI by the back door’ that would hamper the necessary policy 
space for governments to regulate and protect public services.64 Subsequently, 
there was strong support within the ranks of the ETUC for the 2013 resolution on 
the EU investment policy. Largely reflecting the centre-leftist discourse, the 
resolution strongly called for more narrow definitions and standards on investment 
protection to be enforced through state-to-state resolution only, with specific 
carve-outs for key public policy areas such as subsidies, procurement, tax, essential 
public services and specific industries and regulatory measures. It also strongly 
advocated for the inclusion of investor responsibilities to comply with relevant 
international guidelines and standards, such as the ILO core labour standards and 
other human rights under the ILO MNE Declaration, the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, with the possibility of sanctions in the form of substantial fines in 
case of non-compliance (ETUC, 2013a). These general principles crucially informed 
the ETUC’s more specific positions during ongoing and future EU trade and 
investment agreements, most notably CETA and TTIP (see Chapters Six and Seven). 
 To recapitulate, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon spurred a rapid 
mobilisation of a wide range of social forces that sought to influence the course of 
direction of the emerging EU investment policy. On the one hand, organised 
transnational capital actors both at national and EU level sought to ensure that 
the neoliberal status	 quo with regard to current levels of foreign investment 
protection were to be upheld and forged a close alliance with member state 
officials primarily from the export-oriented Western European member states, 
with support from the private investment arbitration community, to strike down 
any dilution from the dominant modes of foreign investment regulation. On the 
other hand, counter-hegemonic forces advancing the centre-leftist discourse, such 
as NGOs and trade unions, actively challenged the neoliberal discourse and sought 
to subject existing and future European investment agreements to the broader 
64 Drawn from: interview, ETUC representative, 25 July 2013.
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principles and objectives of sustainable development, human rights, environmental 
protection and economic justice. It was the underlying structural hierarchies 
between both camps, and the neoliberal strategic selectivity of the European 
Commission, that ultimately informed the ‘embedded neoliberal’ nature of the 
emerging EU investment policy.
5.5   Managing financial responsibility and state liability in ISDS: 
The adoption of Regulation 912/2014
Another building block in the making of the EU investment policy was the adoption 
of Regulation 912/2014 on managing financial responsibility and state liability in 
the prospect of potential ISDS cases. As pointed out in Section 5.2, the European 
Commission was keen to include ISDS in future EU investment agreements. While 
seeking strong protection for EU investors abroad, the Commission also anticipated 
potential ISDS claims brought against the EU and/or its member states under those 
very same agreements. On 21 June 2012, the Commission published a proposal for 
a second regulation that would outline the way in how to handle such ISDS 
proceedings and how to allocate responsibility for the defence and payments of 
compensation (European Commission, 2012a). By that time, also Western and 
Southern European states were starting to face multi-billion ISDS claims by foreign 
investors under their BITs, or the Energy Charter Treaty, thereby revealing that 
potential liability under future EU agreements would not be confined to the CEE 
states. Notable examples were Germany being sued by Swedish energy company 
Vattenfall for phasing out nuclear energy,65 Belgium being sued by Chinese insurer 
Ping An for partially nationalising Fortis bank in the wake of the financial crisis,66 
Spain being sued by numerous foreign investors for cutting back subsidies for 
photovoltaic electricity production as part of the austerity measures in response 
to the financial crisis,67 Greece being sued by bondholders in the aftermath of 
the restructuring of Greek sovereign debt,68 and Cyprus being sued by Greek 
shareholders for taking control over the ailing Laiki bank.69
 Adopted on 23 July 2014, Regulation 912/2014 establishes a framework prescribing 
that financial responsibility flowing from ISDS cases should be attributed to the 
state actor that has afforded the treatment in dispute (European Parliament and 
Council of the EU, 2014). This means that where the treatment concerned is 
afforded by the action of the EU, it would be the EU that bears financial 
responsibility (Article 3(1)(a)). In turn, where the treatment concerned is afforded 
65 Vattenfall	II	v.	Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 (lodged in 2012, still pending at the time of writing).
66 Ping	An	v.	Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29) (lodged in 2012, decided in favour of the state in 2015).
67 The	PV	Investors	v.	Spain, PCA Case No. 2012-14 (lodged in 2011, still pending at the time of writing), 
followed by another 50 cases.
68 Poštová	banka	and	Istrokapital	v.	Greece, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8) (lodged in 2013, decided in favour of the 
state in 2015). 
69 Marfin	v.	Cyprus, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/27 (lodged in 2013, decided in favour of the state in 2018).
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by a member state, the financial responsibility should rest with that member state 
(Article 3(1)(b)). However, Article 3(1)(c) exempts member states from financial 
responsibility where such treatment was required by EU law. The apportionment 
of financial responsibility is linked to the question of who should be liable and act 
as respondent in arbitral proceedings in case of an ISDS claim. Article 9(2) allows 
for the Commission to take over the respondent status from the member state 
concerned in case where the Commission decided that (a) the EU would bear 
(partial) financial responsibility arising from the dispute, (b) the dispute also 
concerns treatment afforded by EU institutions, and (Article 9(3)) where similar 
treatment is being challenged in a related claim against the EU in the WTO to 
ensure consistent argumentation. Article 10(1)(c) permits the Commission to form 
part of the delegation representing the member state concerned in arbitral 
proceedings. In any case, close consultations between the member state, the 
Commission and the Parliament are warranted by Articles 10 and 11. On settlement, 
the Commission may decide to settle a dispute if it would be in the financial 
interests of the EU, albeit, with the agreement of the member state concerned 
(Article 14). Where the EU is the respondent in a dispute exclusively concerning 
treatment afforded by a member state, the member state concerned may decide to 
settle the dispute if (a) the member state accepts financial responsibility, (b) any 
settlement arrangement is enforceable only against the member state concerned, 
and (c) the terms of the settlement are compatible with EU law (Article 15). Finally, 
Articles 17-21 lay down the procedural framework with regard to the payment of 
final awards or settlements.
 The final regulation entails a compromise reached after almost exactly two 
years of hard negotiation. Recurring conflicts emanated from the unsettled 
division of exclusive competence on investment issues, whereby the Commission 
once again claimed a comprehensive competence covering all investment-related 
issues (European Commission, 2012a: 3-5), while many member state governments, 
most notably those of Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands and Finland, but 
also those of the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, argued that 
issues with regard to portfolio investment, property ownership and ISDS remained 
within the competence of the member states.70 Particularly, the German 
government fundamentally opposed the possibility for the Commission to take 
over the respondent status even in respect of a measure taken by the member state 
70 Comments made by the German government (m.d.: 165/12) on 15 November 2012, before the Trade 
Policy Committee (Services & Investment); comments made by the UK government (m.d.: 167/12) on 
21 November 2012; comments made by the French government (m.d.: 169/12) on 23 November 2012 
before the Trade Policy Committee (Services & Investment). See also statement by Czech Republic, 
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in areas of its own competence.71 In the original proposal, the Commission 
envisaged to take over the respondent status if (a) issues of EU law would be 
involved so that the EU may be (partially) financial responsible, (b) the dispute 
would concern treatment afforded by EU institutions, (c) it would be likely that 
similar claims may be raised in disputes against other member states, or (d) the 
disputes would raise unsettled issues of law that were likely to recur in other 
disputes (ibid.: Article 8). The Dutch, French, UK and Finnish governments shared 
the German view that this would have granted the Commission with too much 
discretion on the allocation of state liability and financial responsibility, and, 
therefore, sought to limit these broad exceptions on apportionment. In a joint 
counter-proposal, the German, Dutch and Finnish governments successfully 
objected the Commission’s proposal to require the member states to take a 
particular position in the arbitration proceedings or to settle or decline to settle a 
dispute against their consent while bearing the financial consequences (ibid.: 
Articles 9, 13-14), which constituted in their view a “disproportional intrusion into 
the sovereignty of the member states”.72 
 In November 2013, informal trilogues between the EU institutions started, 
after which Regulation 912/2014 was approved on 23 July 2014. Although the 
European Parliament adopted the Regulation without major debate in the plenary, 
two important elements pertaining to the centre-leftist discourse found their way 
in a politically powerful but legally non-binding manner. The European Parliament 
voted in favour of two recitals tabled by German MEP for the Greens/EFA Franziska 
Keller and UK MEP for the Socialists & Democrats David Martin, which ultimately 
survived the opposition by the Commission and the EU member states. Recital 4 of 
the Regulation stresses that the EU should afford foreign investors ‘not a higher 
level of protection’ than EU investors would enjoy under the laws of the EU and its 
member states. Such a statement emanated from existing concerns over potential 
EU exposure to financial responsibility for legislative acts that would be perfectly 
legal under EU law but which could be considered by ISDS tribunals to be in breach 
of investment protection standards (Kleinheisterkamp, 2014: 460-3; see also 
Section 5.2.2). Secondly, the revision of recital 2 significantly watered down the 
necessity to include ISDS provisions in future EU investment agreements, which, 
in the view of the European Parliament, “should be a conscious and informed 
policy choice that requires political and economic justification” and “should be 
decided for each international investment agreement in the light of the particular 
circumstances” (European Parliament, 2013: amendment 21). Such sentiments 
71 Comments made by the German government (m.d.: 165/12) on 15 November 2012, before the Trade 
Policy Committee (Services & Investment).
72 Alternative proposal for a financial liability Regulation submitted by Germany, the Netherlands 
and Finland (m.d.: 22/13), tabled on 15 February 2013 before the Trade Policy Committee (Services & 
Investment). 
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were directly linked to the increased political contestation over the inclusion of 
ISDS provisions in the TTIP and CETA negotiations (see Chapters Six and Seven).
5.6  Conclusion
This chapter argued that the emerging EU investment policy after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon was characterised by a contradictory dynamic between 
a persistent process of neoliberalisation that in terms of content, form and scope, 
increasingly aimed to liberalise and protect EU investments abroad at the highest 
levels possible on the one hand, and a (re-) pronunciation of social protection 
principles related to the conduct of foreign investment, including safeguarding 
regulatory policy space, human rights, labour standards and environmental 
protection. The linking of neoliberal investment rules with social protection 
principles formed a key expression of what has been referred to as embedded 
neoliberalism broadly reflecting the outcome of political struggles over the EU 
investment policy among two rivalling regulatory discourses. As outlined in this 
chapter, the neoliberal core of the EU investment policy had its social basis in the 
transnational fractions of industrial and financial capital and the state-capital 
nexuses deeply rooted in the outward-oriented and capital-exporting accumulation 
regimes among the longstanding Western European member states. The neoliberal 
discourse was politically advanced through the agency of organised transnational 
capital, with support from a burgeoning investment arbitration industry, and 
 institutionally mediated through the strategic selectivities of the European 
Commission and the centre-right parties in the European Parliament. 
 That is not to say that this was a homogeneous and unified power bloc as major 
disagreements flared up between the European Commission on the one hand, and 
Western European member state governments and transnational capital regarding 
the exact delineations of the neoliberal project and the associated division of 
regulatory powers on the other hand. This was reflected in the adoption of both 
Regulation 1219/2012 and Regulation 912/2014, whereby EU member state 
governments under the leadership of Germany, the Netherlands, France and the 
UK, successfully pushed back the proposed power grab by the European 
Commission with regard to the existing EU member state BITs and allocating 
financial responsibility and state liability in ISDS proceedings. Whereas Regulation 
1219/2012 constitutionalised the existing EU member state BITs under EU law, 
thereby further locking in the neoliberal investment rules aimed at protecting and 
facilitating transnational capital interests, Regulation 912/2014 ensured that EU 
member states retained discretionary powers in taking financial responsibility 
and liability in ISDS cases. 
 At the same time, a centre-leftist discourse emerged out of a growing European 
alliance of subordinate social forces, most notably trade unions, NGOs and other 
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grassroots movements associated with environmental, public health, human 
rights and sustainable economic development concerns. These concerns became 
manifest primarily in the left-leaning fractions within the ranks of the European 
Parliament, which formed an increasingly important platform for the articulation 
of the centre-leftist discourse and the overall politicisation of the EU investment 
policy. In sum, it was through the struggles between and within the neoliberal 
and the centre-leftist discourses that the EU investment policy gradually 
materialised along the lines of embedded neoliberalism.
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6.   Rolling Out Embedded Neoliberalism:  
The Politics of Investment Protection in 
the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
Trade Agreement (CETA)
This	 is	 an	 important	 achievement	 sustaining	 our	 quest	 for	 more	 jobs	 and	 growth	 in	
Europe	when	you	consider	the	uncertain	economic	backdrop	on	our	continent.
Karel De Gucht, former EU Trade Commissioner, 16 September 2014a
CETA	is	a	significant	step	forward	in	our	efforts	to	shape	the	future	of	the	global	economy,	
inspired	by	European	values.	
Cecilia Malmström, EU Trade Commissioner, 9 December 2015
The chapter examines and explains the politics underpinning the CETA negotiations 
on investment protection, which were officially concluded by the European 
Commission and the government of Canada on 26 September 2014. It is argued 
that the CETA investment rules are the prime manifestation of the emerging 
European model of foreign investment protection, while only partially incorporating 
elements of the North American model as well as certain elements pertaining to 
centre-leftist orientations, while still strongly informed by the overriding principles of 
disciplinary neoliberalism. The resulting compromise forms thereby a key moment 
in the construction and consolidation of embedded neoliberalism as the potentially 
hegemonic orientation of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy. The first section 
places the CETA project in the context of broader transnationalisation processes 
and the asymmetric accumulation structures between the EU and Canada. The 
second section traces the political struggles that have given shape to the content, 
form and scope of CETA’s investment chapter. The third section reveals the pivotal role 
of organised transnational capital, and its preferential access to state negotiators, 
in driving and supporting the neoliberal investment rules. The fourth section 
analyses the political contestation by counter-hegemonic social forces associated 
with the centre-leftist discourse both in Canada and Europe, and explains how 
and why such contestation resulted in the adoption of the Investment Court 
System as a new institutional form of investor-state dispute resolution. 
6.1  Unravelling the bilateral political and economic relationship
During the EU-Canada Summit in Prague of 6 May 2009, officials of the European 
Commission and the Government of Canada formally announced the launch of 
the negotiations for the EU-Canada Comprehensive	Economic	Trade	Agreement (CETA) 
(Council of the EU, 2009). This announcement came amidst the height of the global 
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financial and economic crisis, which severely affected growth dynamics on both 
sides of the Atlantic. As both the European Commission and the government of 
Canada had expressed their commitment to resist protectionism within the realm 
of the G-20 talks, the CETA would thereby, in the words of then incumbent EU 
Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton, send “a clear signal that open trade and 
investment are drivers of economic recovery” (Ashton, 2009). Both sides agreed 
that CETA would go beyond current WTO commitments and that it “should 
include, as	a	minimum, all the chapters of the most ambitious EU and Canadian 
bilateral economic agreements to date” (European Commission and Government 
of Canada, 2009: 3; emphasis added). Hence, CETA would entail a comprehensive 
agenda that focuses not only on the elimination of tariffs but also on non-tariff 
barriers in trade in goods and services, far-reaching market access and mutual 
recognition of regulations and standards, the sweeping opening of public 
procurement markets, competition policy and intellectual property rights, 
investment, as well as issues related to sustainable development such as the 
environment and labour standards – all issues that hitherto had been blocked 
within the realm of the WTO negotiations. 
 The CETA deal would furthermore enhance the process of transatlantic 
market integration and set a new standard for global rules, regulatory practices 
and institutions, and, ultimately, become a benchmark for global economic 
governance (cf. Hübner, 2011). As will be shown in this chapter, for Canada, the 
CETA project formed the hallmark of the latest phase of neoliberal restructuring 
of Canadian capitalism, which was driven by what will be identified as the rise of 
the ‘energy-finance nexus’ within Canada’s economy. Crucially, the trade deal 
would sustain Canada’s diversification strategy in order to overcome its economic 
dependency on the US (Duchesne and Morin, 2013: 15; see also Goldfarb, 2006). For 
the EU, CETA would be the first trade agreement with another major advanced 
economy. More importantly, the deal formed part of a new generation of EU FTAs 
that include provisions on investment protection and ISDS, rendering it a major 
test case for the post-Lisbon EU investment policy.
6.1.1  The political trajectory of bilateral economic cooperation
The decision to start bilateral negotiations for a comprehensive trade and 
investment deal formed part of a longer legacy of attempts and initiatives of 
economic integration across the Atlantic. Formal EU-Canada relations dated back 
to 1959 when the Canadian government and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) agreed to cooperate on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
More generally, the bilateral relationship between the EU and Canada in trade and 
economic cooperation became formalised with the Framework Agreement for 
Economic Cooperation of 1976, which represented the first European economic 
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agreement with another advanced industrialised economy (Devuyst, 2005: 176; 
Hübner, 2011: 6). The Framework Agreement created a structure for consolidating and 
deepening commercial and economic cooperation with Canada and institutionalised a 
Joint Cooperation Committee entrusted with the task to review a range of issues 
related to EU-Canada economic relations on a per year basis (Laursen, 2012: 
249-50). This institutionalised cooperation paved the way for the Transatlantic 
Declaration, signed in November 1990 in Rome, in which the EU and Canada 
agreed to “enhance their consultative arrangements” (European Community and 
Canada, 1990). Subsequently, the Joint EU-Canada Political Declaration and Action 
Plan was set up in 1996, followed by the signing of a number of bilateral sectoral 
agreements, including agreements on Science and Technology (1996), Higher 
Education and Training (1995, 2000), Custom Cooperation (1998), Mutual Recognition 
(1998), Veterinary Equivalency (1998), Competition Cooperation Agreement (1999) 
and a Wine and Spirits Agreement (2004) (Hübner, 2011: 6; Laursen, 2012: 250). 
Further bilateral cooperation frameworks were established in the second half of 
the 2000s to enhance regulatory compatibility and convergence supervised by a 
bilateral Regulatory Cooperation Committee (European Commission and 
Government of Canada, 2008: 2). 
 These bilateral efforts provided the political impetus to start negotiations on 
a bilateral Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement (TIEA) in March 2004, 
which was supposed to bring about a much larger degree of market access in areas 
still subject to regulatory barriers, such as financial services, intellectual property 
rights issues, and public procurement. However, negotiations were stalled after 
only three rounds in May 2006. The European Commission insisted that the 
agreement would also target existing market access barriers at the level of the 
Canadian provinces, which was rejected by the Canadian federal government 
(Woolcock, 2011: 27; Duchesne and Morin, 2013: 12). With the EU member states 
losing interest in a deal with Canada without the inclusion of all Canadian 
provinces, the TIEA project was then shelved by the European Commission, which 
shifted its focus instead to new FTA initiatives with emerging markets as part of 
the Global Europe agenda (see Chapter Four).
 A renewed political momentum in reopening the negotiations for a 
comprehensive bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Canada emerged 
during the course of 2006. The German government, which held the rotating 
presidency of the EU in the first half of 2007, expressed its interest in supporting 
efforts for closer economic cooperation with its North American partners (Hübner, 
2011: 1). The Canadian government put much effort to generate the necessary 
support of the provincial and territorial governments for a bilateral agreement 
that would include binding commitments on their part. Pivotal was the role of 
Quebec’s Premier Jean Charest, who believed that a trade agreement could boost 
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Quebec’s labour market and help its exporting industry, in successfully convincing 
other Canadian provinces to support the project (Woll, 2011: 52). Subsequently, 
Canadian officials started a vigorous lobbying campaign aimed at various EU 
member states, including among others Germany, France, Italy and the UK, to 
gather support for a fully-fledged bilateral agreement (Woolcock, 2011: 27; 
Duchesne and Morin, 2013: 12). At the EU-Canada Summit in Berlin in June 2007, 
the European Commission and the government of Canada agreed to launch a joint 
study assessing the costs and benefits of closer economic relations. Finally, it was 
the French President Nicolas Sarkozy who pushed for the start of bilateral 
negotiations during France’s rotating presidency of the EU in the second half of 
2008. Sarkozy’s key role in relaunching the negotiations has been ascribed to the 
close historical and economies ties between France and the French-speaking 
Canadian province of Quebec and the commercial interests of several prominent 
French companies such as Total and GDF Suez (Austen, 2008; see also Woll, 2011: 
53). The fact that the negotiations were re-initiated in May 2009, only three years 
after the demise of the previous ones, was to a great extent due to the successful 
political and strategic action by the Canadian government and provinces.
6.1.2   The transnationalisation of Canadian capital and the configuration of  
the energy-finance nexus 
The strong push for a bilateral trade deal with the EU on the part of the Canadian 
state needs to be understood against the backdrop of the profound restructuring 
of Canadian capitalism since the economic crisis of the 1970s. The aftermath of 
the Second World War had given rise to what has been referred to as a “permeable 
type of Fordism” (Jenson, 1989) whereby Canada’s economy was organised around 
the export of natural resources to the US market in exchange for imports of 
manufactured goods and FDI. Although demand-side management policies were 
less effective in Canada, Keynesian macroeconomic policies were successful in 
establishing a diverse national economy with value-added capacities and sustained 
economic growth rates (Klassen, 2014: 92-3; Hale, 2008: 722). This accumulation 
structure entered into a crisis in the late 1960s when faced with increased 
economic stagnation, unemployment and inflation. In response, the Liberal 
government of Pierre Trudeau (1968-79, 1980-84) introduced a new industrial 
policy to increase domestic ownership in key sectors such as mining, energy and 
manufacturing. Crucial elements were the creation of the Foreign Investment 
Review Agency in 1973, which required the notification and review of incoming 
foreign investment, and the nationalisation of the energy sector under the 
National Energy Program of 1980. Hence, the Trudeau government sought to lead 
a “resource-driven restructuring of the industrial sector” (McBride, 2005: 38; 
Klassen, 2014: 94). 
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 Against the background of the worsening crisis conditions of the 1970s, a 
profound transformation of the Canadian political economy took place. As 
outlined by Klassen (2014: 95; see also Carroll, 1986), foreign ownership decreased 
sharply as the crisis led to a massive flight of US capital. Subsequently, Canadian 
companies took control over key sectors of the economy, which led to increased 
levels of concentration and centralisation. This ‘national bloc’ of Canadian capital 
became increasingly active in export production and FDI, particularly within 
North America. These transnationalisation processes were further enhanced with 
the ascendency of neoliberalism under the Conservative government of Brian 
Mulroney (1984-1993). Pivotal in the neoliberal turn was the publication of the 
1985 report by the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada, an expert group chaired by the Liberal politician lawyer 
Donald Macdonald and appointed by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1982. This report 
presented a set of recommendations that centred on fostering a more flexible 
economy, a greater reliance on market mechanisms and the breakdown of the 
welfare state model, and the strengthening of Canada’s free trade policy (Royal 
Commission, 1985). The Mulroney government started bilateral trade negotiations 
with the US shortly after the report was released, which culminated in the 
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989.
 The CUSFTA marked a key turning point for the Canadian economy. This 
agreement allowed for the freeing of Canadian capital from protectionist policies 
and opened the Canadian market to more direct competitive pressures (Evans and 
Smith, 2015: 5-6). During the 1990s, especially after the entry into force of the 
succeeding North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, Canadian 
companies rapidly expanded throughout global markets, particularly the US and 
European markets, but also increasingly into developing economies. These trans-
nationalisation processes involved a deepened concentration of Canadian capital 
into transnational corporations, which became highly integrated in global circuits 
of capital accumulation. Consequently, Canada became a net exporter of capital as 
of 1997 (Klassen and Carroll, 2011). Between 1999 and 2012, the value of net foreign 
assets held by Canadian controlled firms doubled from CAD$38 billion to CAD$77 
billion (Fast, 2014: 40). According to the reports by the United Nations, in 2010 
Canada was home to 1,565 TNCs, which controlled 6,508 foreign subsidiaries and 
employed more than 1.1 million workers abroad (Klassen, 2014: 144). The relaxation 
of controls over FDI also led to the deregulation of capital markets and a significant 
expansion of the Canadian financial sectors, resulting in the quadrupling of the stock 
of financial assets abroad between 1999 and 2014 (Fast, 2014: 40; Hale, 2008: 723).
 The rise and consolidation of the transnational accumulation structures in 
Canada were mainly driven by what is denoted here as the energy-finance	nexus as 
the prime configuration in the Canadian economy. The energy-finance nexus 
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refers hereby to the synthesis of the interests of two ideal-typical fractions of 
capital around which the Canadian economy became organised, that is, natural 
resource-seeking capital and financial capital. Since the turn of the century, the 
Canadian economy became increasingly dominated by the production and export 
of raw natural resources and primary products, especially petroleum and minerals, 
while value-added export industries such as manufacturing started to decline. 
Canada began to face systematic trade deficits in consumer goods and machinery 
and equipment, while incurring systematic surpluses in energy, forestry, 
agriculture, and fishing (Klassen, 2014: 130; Stanford, 2008). 
 These trends became manifest in the changing composition of FDI stocks 
in Canada and abroad (see Table 6.1). Between 1999 and 2012, the share of 
manufacturing as part of Canada’s total FDI stocks decreased dramatically, 
while natural resources, financial and holding assets increased. Even among the 
manufacturing subsectors there was a decrease in high value-added and high-tech 
sectors in terms of inward FDI stocks, while petroleum and coal products saw a 
threefold increase and primary metals a four-and-a-half-fold increase (Fast, 2014: 
42-3). 
Strong financial interests played a key role in the shift towards neoliberal 
extractivism. The upsurge in global commodity prices in the 2000s, resulting 
from the growing demand by newly emerging economies, led to a significant 
increase in the profitability and market value of Canadian companies operating in 
natural resources (Stanford, 2015: 15). Major Canadian investment banks were 
highly involved in providing services for the resource sectors through the issuing 
of shares or through mergers and acquisitions (Fast, 2014: 44). The growing value 
of resource exports also triggered an inflow of FDI aimed largely at purchasing 
Table 6.1   Changing shares of FDI stocks as percent of total FDI stocks in 
Canada and abroad, 1999-2012
FDI abroad FDI in Canada
Sector 1999 2012 1999 2012
Mining and oil and gas extraction 14 19 10 19
Manufacturing 28 10 39 29
Transportation and warehousing 5 3 11 8
Information and cultural industries 9 4 5 5
Finance and insurance 31 40 15 13
Management of companies and enterprises 4 13 9 19
Source: Fast (2014: 42)
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Canadian resource companies (Stanford, 2008: 11). Between 1985 and 2015, 
acquisitions accounted for 77 per cent of inward FDI with a total value of CAD$1,134 
billion, whereas only 23 per cent of incoming FDI reflected Greenfield projects. 
Approximately 60 per cent of inward FDI originated from the US during the same 
period (Investment	Canada	Act, 2015). Canadian financial capital itself was relatively 
well protected from foreign competition. As the result of prudential regulatory 
measures and exemptions in trade agreements, including NAFTA and the WTO 
GATS, Canadian banks enjoyed a dominant position in the Canadian financial 
sector: the six largest banks controlled 90 per cent of the banking industry assets 
(Bernhard Jr., 2014: 32; Gould 2010). Due to their minimal exposure to US mort-
gage-backed securities, Canadian banks held relatively high average capital 
reserves as well as rigorous underwriting standards, which contributed to the 
stability of Canada’s financial sector during the height of the global financial crisis 
(Leblond, 2011: 169; Berhard Jr., 2014; Baragar, 2015). 
 Finally, the articulation of the energy-finance nexus became also entrenched 
in the Canadian state, best reflected by the rise of the Conservatives government 
of resource-rich Alberta’s Stephen Harper in 2006. Under the Harper government, 
Canada’s capitalist restructuring became intensified along the lines of what has 
been referred to as a “hyper regime of neoliberal market fundamentalism” (Albo, 
2013). Trade and investment liberalisation was a key pillar of the Harper 
government’s economic strategy. In its 2009 Global Commerce Strategy, the 
government recognised the increased challenges posed by the competitive 
pressures from emerging markets and observed that the US and the EU were 
“stepping up their own competitive strategies to ensure their businesses succeed 
on the global stage”, thereby concluding that “Canada must do the same” 
(Government of Canada, 2009: 3). The report outlined a market opening plan that 
included FTAs with Central and Latin America, the Caribbean, South Korea, EFTA 
as well as closer economic partnerships with India, the EU, and bilateral investment 
treaties with several developed and developing countries. Under the Harper 
government, seven new FTAs were concluded and entered into force73, with three 
FTA negotiations being concluded74 and eight more under negotiation.75 
 To recapitulate, the capitalist restructuring of the Canadian economy 
underwent important processes of transnationalisation since the 1980s, which in 
turn saw the configuration of the energy-finance nexus as the dominant force 
behind the neoliberal accumulation strategies. This became reflected in and 
73 Canada-EFTA (2009), Canada-Peru FTA (2009), Canada-Colombia FTA (2011), Canada-Jordan FTA (2012), 
Canada-Panama FTA (2013), Canada-Honduras FTA (2014) and Canada-Korea FTA (2015).
74 Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), Canada-Ukraine FTA (2015) and Canada-EU CETA (2015).
75 Canada-CARICOM, Canada-Guatemala-Nicaragua-Honduras-El Salvador, Canada-Dominican 
Republic, Canada-India, Canada-Japan, Canada-Morocco, Canada-Singapore and modernization of 
the Canada-Costa Rica FTA.
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supported by an ambitious free trade agenda rolled out by the Canadian state, 
including the decision to pursue bilateral trade negotiations with the EU.
6.1.3  The asymmetric nature of transatlantic accumulation structures
Against the backdrop of processes of transnationalisation of production and 
finance, the magnitude of transatlantic patterns of production, finance and 
exchange also increased significantly. The structures of trade in goods, services 
and investment between the EU and Canada reflected the general tendencies 
outlined in the previous section, thereby underlining the uneven and imbalanced 
character of the bilateral economic relations. In 2014, bilateral trade volumes 
accounted for €59.1 billion, whereby the EU exported goods worth €31.7 billion to 
Canada and imported Canadian goods valued at €27.4 billion. This made Canada 
the EU’s twelfth largest trading partner, accounting for 1.7 per cent of the EU’s 
total external trade. In return, the EU was Canada’s second largest trading partner, 
after the US, with approximately 9.5 per cent of Canada’s total external trade. 
Moreover, the value of EU exports of services to Canada was €15.9 billion in 2014, 
while the value of Canadian services exported to the EU were €11.3 billion 
(Eurostat, 2015). These trade imbalances expanded considerably since the early 
2000s. Moreover, Canada’s exports to the EU were primarily based in primary 
resources and basic processing, including minerals, agricultural and forestry 
products, and petroleum. In contrast, EU exports to Canada originated in a more 
diverse mix of transformed and value-added products, including pharmaceuticals, 
motor vehicles and machinery (see also Stanford, 2010: 10-1). 
 The asymmetric nature of the transatlantic economic relationship was further 
reflected by the structural differences in FDI positions. The EU was Canada’s 
second largest source of FDI with a total stock valued at €225.2 billion at the end of 
2013, which equals 26.3 per cent of FDI stocks in Canada. At the end of 2013, the 
total stock of Canada’s FDI in the EU totalled €117 billion, or nearly a third of 
Canadian overseas direct investments. Canada was the fourth largest investor in 
the EU, accounting for 4.3 per cent of FDI stocks in the EU (Eurostat, 2015). 
As Figure 6.1 shows, Canadian investors held the vast majority of their corporate 
assets in the EU’s financial services sector, the management of companies and 
enterprises, and mining and oil and gas extraction, whereas European companies 
primarily focused on Canada’s manufacturing sector. As shown in Figure 6.2, 
transatlantic capital flows were primarily routed through the UK and offshore 
financial hubs such as the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland.  
 In spite of these imbalances, the European Commission and the Canadian 
government estimated in their 2008 Joint Study that a comprehensive trade 
agreement would lead to annual real income gains of approximately €11.6 billion 
for the EU and €8.2 for Canada within seven years following the implementation 
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of the agreement (European Commission and Canadian government, 2008: 55). In 
terms of economic growth measured as a percentage change in GDP, this would 
translate into a meagre 0.77 per cent for Canada and an even lower 0.08 per cent 
for the EU (ibid.). Half of these gains were expected to originate from the 
liberalisation of services, with 25 per cent from tariff reductions on goods and the 
remaining from the removal of non-tariff or regulatory barriers (ibid.). These 
projections revealed that the CETA deal was first and foremost intended as a 
project of liberalisation and deregulation. Particularly, telecommunications and 
financial services were identified as important targets for further liberalisation. In 
Canada, foreign ownership caps and citizenship or residency requirements for 
managers persisted for facilities-based telecommunication service providers, 
although certain limitations in commercial presence market access and national 
treatment for cross-border services also remained in force in a number of EU 
member states (ibid.: 48-9, 92). Likewise, various market access restrictions in 
Canada’s financial services sector limited the presence of European companies in 
the sector (ibid: 42). Efforts to eliminate remaining restrictions would thereby dis-
proportionally favour European companies. Average import tariffs in Canada were 
3.5 per cent against 2.2 per cent in the EU, while average barriers to bilateral 
services imports were 42.6 per cent in Canada against 31 per cent in the EU (ibid.: 
37, 45, 59). Notably, remaining restrictions on foreign investment in Canada were 
also substantially higher than average restrictions in the EU.76 Evidently, the 
liberalisation efforts in the context of the CETA deal, on top of the existing trade 
imbalances in goods, services and capital, were set out to further exacerbate the 
asymmetric and uneven transatlantic economic relationship.77 
6.2  The politics of negotiating CETA’s investment chapter
Investment protection and ISDS only became part of the negotiations after the 
European Commission acquired an additional mandate by the EU member state 
governments in September 2011. Between October 2009 and October 2011, nine 
formal rounds of negotiations were held in turn in Brussels and Ottawa. In spite of 
the political break-through with the Harper-Barroso agreement on 18 October 2013, 
negotiations on a number of sensitive issues, including investment, continued 
until the official conclusion of the CETA negotiations at the EU-Canada Summit in 
Ottawa on 26 September 2014. The European Commission released the negotiated 
text on the same day after it had been leaked and published by a German news 
76 The study referred to the OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index of 2006. Canada maintained a score of 
0.263 against a score of 0.046 as the unweighted average of 22 EU member states.
77 The European Commission was very much aware of the asymmetric and uneven impact of the CETA 
deal. During the negotiations, the European Commission admitted in an internal document that 
“this package in unbalanced in favour of the EU” and that “most of the Canadian requests would only 
entail binding existing liberalisation for the EU, whereas most of our outstanding requests do require 
genuine new market access from Canada” (European Commission, 2012b: 3-4).
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broadcaster in the previous month. The final text was published on 29 February 
2016 after a protracted period of legal scrubbing, whereby both Canada and the 
European Commission agreed to replace the ISDS provisions with an Investment 
Court System that the European Commission prepared during the TTIP negotiations. 
This section critically assesses the original CETA text on investment as published 
Figure 6.1  Sectoral breakdown of bilateral FDI stock, 2013
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6in September 2014, while the Investment Court System will be dealt with in more 
depth in Chapter Seven. As such, this section traces and unravels the political 
dynamics behind the CETA negotiations on investment that crucially shaped the 
further construction of the EU investment policy. The reconstruction of the 
investment negotiations in is based here on inferences drawn from the scarce 
proposals available and informally leaked draft texts, discussion papers and other 
documents.
6.2.1  Canada’s mode of foreign investment regulation
The neoliberal restructuring of Canadian capitalism, underpinned by the increasingly 
transnational outlook of Canadian capital, involved the development of an extensive 
network of bilateral investment treaties. In 1989, the Mulroney government signed 
the first Foreign	 Investment	 Protection	 Agreement (FIPA) with the USSR, and FIPAs 
Figure 6.2  Geographical breakdown of bilateral FDI stock, 2013
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gradually became a cornerstone to Canada’s neoliberal trade strategy under 
consecutive governments. In 2009, the Harper government set the goal to double 
the number of FIPAs signed within five years, concurrently leading to a surge in 
FIPA signings in recent years (International Market Access Report, 2009). At the 
time of writing, Canada signed 36 FIPAs with 29 currently in force, and concluded 
negotiations for seven new FIPAs in 2014 alone, rendering it the most active 
country worldwide in concluding BITs (UNCTAD, 2015c: 2). Canada had seven 
FIPAs in force with European member states, which were concluded with former 
socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and renegotiated upon their EU 
accession to bring them in line with both the acquis as well as with the 2004 FIPA 
model (De Mestral, 2010: 388-9; Radu, 2008: 238; Levesque, 2013: 129; see also 
Chapter Five).78 
78 Canada has FIPAs with Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Latvia, Czech Republic, and Slovakia.  
Table 6.2  Timeline of the CETA negotiations
April 2009 Council approves EU-Canada FTA negotiating directives
May 2009 EU-Canada Summit in Prague and launch of the negotiations
October 2009 First round of negotiations in Ottawa
January 2010 Second round of negotiations in Brussels
April 2010 Third round of negotiations in Ottawa
July 2010 Fourth round of negotiations in Brussels
October 2010 Fifth round of negotiations in Ottawa
January 2011 Sixth round of negotiations in Brussels
April 2011 Seventh round of negotiations in Ottawa
July 2011 Eighth round of negotiations in Brussels
October 2011 Ninth and final round of negotiations in Ottawa
October 2013 Harper-Barroso political agreement
September 2014 Official conclusion of the negotiations
February 2016 Official publication of the legally scrubbed text
October 2016 Signature by European and Canadian leaders
February 2017 Ratification by European Parliament
May 2017 Ratification by Canadian Parliament
September 2017 Provisional application of the agreement 
(except for parts on investment protection and ISDS)
Source: Author’s compilation
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 Canadian investors frequently initiated arbitral proceedings under the ISDS 
provisions in bilateral trade and investment agreements. A total number of 55 
known ISDS claims were brought by Canadian investors, which were 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the natural resource and energy sectors. 
Particularly since 2006, the natural resource and energy sectors accounted for 78 
per cent of new cases and an even higher 94 per cent of all pending cases (Mer-
tins-Kirkwood, 2015: 17-24). These arbitrations reflected the growing transnational 
activities of Canadian investors, particularly those associated with the underlying 
energy-finance nexus. For example, a Canadian gold mining company filed an 
ISDS claim against Romania in 2015, whereby it sought US$4 billion in 
compensation after the Romanian government revoked its earlier decision to host 
Europe’s largest gold mine due to mounting public pressures (IA Reporter, 2015; 
Ciobanu, 2015).79 Likewise, the Canadian energy company TransCanada sought 
US$15 billion in a claim to arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11 over the Obama 
administration’s rejection to grant a permit to build the Keystone XL oil pipeline 
(Financial	Times, 2016).80 
 At the same time, Canada faced itself a significant number of ISDS claims. 
Most notably, Canada was the target of 37 claims under NAFTA’s Chapter 11 on 
investment, all but one brought by US investors, challenging a wide range of 
government regulatory measures in areas such as public health care, environmental 
protection, natural resource management, tax laws and public utilities (Sinclair, 
2015). The proliferation of investment arbitration under NAFTA provoked increased 
concerns within the Canadian government as well as among the other NAFTA 
governments, which feared that the expansive interpretation of the investment 
provisions in Chapter 11 by the arbitral tribunals was significantly restricting the 
capacity to regulate in the public interest (Weiler, 2001: 493; Poulsen, 2011: 199). 
Particularly, in the Pope	and	Talbot	v.	Canada case, the arbitral tribunal interpreted 
the fair and equitable treatment provisions of NAFTA’s Chapter 11 expansively 
beyond customary international law.81 This was strongly rejected by the US, 
Canada and Mexico, leading to an interpretative note issued by the NAFTA’s Free 
Trade Commission stating that the three governments did not intend the provision to 
go over and beyond what is required by the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment (NAFTA Free Trade Commission, 2001). 
 In response to the rising number of investment claims, both the Canadian and 
US governments revised their BIT models in 2002-3 with the purpose to enhance 
clarity in the substantive obligations and provide more transparency and efficiency 
in the dispute settlement mechanism. The Canadian government published its 
79 Gabriel	Resources	v.	Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/31.
80 TransCanada	v.	United	States, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, Notice of intent, 6 January 2016.
81 Pope	and	Talbot	v.	Canada, UNICTRAL, Interim Merits Award, 26 June 2000.
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new FIPA model in 2004 (for a commentary, see McIlroy, 2004; Peterson, 2006; 
Levesque and Newcombe, 2013). The 49-pages FIPA model text substantially 
deviated from the short and open-ended EU member state BITs in a number of 
ways. In terms of scope, the 2004 FIPA model contained a narrower definition of 
investment, which presented a relatively closed list definition consisting of an 
ample but finite list of tangible and intangible assets, including a series of specific 
clarifications and exceptions (Article 1).82 This definition moved away from the 
traditional every-kind-of-asset-based definition that sought to bring as much 
economic activity under the scope of the agreement as possible. In terms of content, 
the FIPA model limited the notion of fair and equitable treatment as equal to 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment (Article 5), while 
further clarifying that legitimate and non-discriminatory public regulations 
could not be regarded as indirect expropriation (Article 13; Annex B.13). The MFN 
standard was restricted by excluding treatment offered to investors under all 
existing bilateral or multilateral agreements (Annex III). Moreover, a reference to 
sustainable development was added to the preamble.83 In terms of form, the FIPA 
model introduced a number of procedural changes that provided disclosure of all 
ISDS arbitrations, documents and pleadings, open hearings to public participation 
and provisions for interventions by amicus	curiae in ISDS (Section C). 
6.2.2  European fears of ‘NAFTA-contamination’ 
While the Canadian government presented its FIPA model as a starting point for 
the investment negotiations, the European Commission did not (yet) have such a 
model to rely on. The EU approach was prepared by the Commission during 2011 
and 2012, in line with the general principles and objectives of the 2010 
communication (see Chapter Five). A first text on investment protection was tabled 
to Canada in March 2012, followed by a first text on ISDS in July 2012, after intense 
and heated debates with EU member state governments (Brown and Naglis, 2013: 
24; Hoffmeister and Alexandru, 2014: 396). Generally, these proposals reflected 
the neoliberal preferences of the Commission while, at the same time, incorporating 
certain elements pertaining to the centre-left discourse with the purpose to 
ensure the necessary political support for investment protection and ISDS.
 Most notably, the Commission sought to establish a better balance between 
substantive investment protection obligations on the one hand, and on the other 
hand the right of governments to adopt and enforce measures necessary to pursue 
82 In the case of Pope	and	Talbot	v.	Canada, the arbitral tribunal found that a market share through trade 
could be regarded as part of the assets of an investment. Similarly, in the S.D.	Meyers	v.	Canada case, the 
tribunal held that the establishment of a sales office and commitment of marketing time formed a 
sufficient investment.
83 The FIPA model was revised again in 2012, which builds on the provisions of the 2004 FIPA model 
with the notable addition of a provision on corporate social responsibility.
562932-L-bw-Verbeek
Processed on: 15-7-2021 PDF page: 203
203
ROLLING OUT EMBEDDED NEOLIBERALISM: THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN CETA
6
public objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety and the environment. 
Closely resembling the Canadian approach, the Commission proposed to develop an 
explanatory statement on indirect expropriation to ensure that non-discriminatory 
regulatory actions in the public interest would not constitute indirect expropriation. 
Such a statement would, for the Commission, provide arbitral tribunals with 
interpretative guidance without reducing the level of protection offered to 
investors. Importantly, this would also enhance the “legitimacy of the established 
system by addressing current civil society concerns, also expressed by the European 
Parliament” (European Commission, 2011a: 5). This right to regulate was to be 
strengthened by bringing the investment chapter under the horizontal provisions 
in EU FTAs, including in the legally non-binding preambles, the chapters on trade 
and sustainable development, and general security exceptions (European 
Commission, 2012c). 
 With regard to ISDS, the Commission identified the lack of ‘legitimacy’ and 
‘consistency’ as the most pressing concerns. The legitimacy concerns resulted 
from the ‘well-established’ fact that many persons appointed to act as arbitrators 
also act as counsel and advocates, both for investors and for states. In turn, this 
raised ‘perceptions’ of potential conflicts of interests (European Commission, 
2011b: 11). As for the consistency concerns, the Commission pointed to the 
established tendency of different arbitral tribunals to interpret common legal 
provisions in divergent ways, thereby undermining “the ability of all stakeholders 
to have a solid basis to understand their rights and obligations” (ibid.: 12). The 
Commission acknowledged the problem of parallel and multiple claims, but 
considered, however, that a possible ‘fork-in-the-road’ clause, which would 
stipulate that the investor would have to choose between national or international 
arbitration, would “appear to run counter to the idea of investor freedom” (ibid.: 5). 
The Commission was also dismissive of the inclusion of any obligation to exhaust 
local remedies before resorting to international arbitration, thereby suggesting 
that such an obligation may be ‘burdensome’ and could “defeat the purpose of 
providing access to international arbitration” (ibid.: 4). Instead, the Commission 
proposed the possibility of an effective appellate mechanism for correcting 
perceptions of conflict and ensuring greater interpretative consistency across various 
cases. In addition, the use of a “relatively small body or pre-chosen arbitrators” was 
considered useful in avoiding perceived conflicts of interest (ibid.: 12). Such a ‘fixed 
roster’ of arbitrators would, then, enhance greater consistency in arbitral rulings. 
Finally, enhancing greater transparency was viewed by the Commission as a 
means of enhancing the overall legitimacy of the ISDS system, which ought to be 
achieved through the public availability of the initiation of arbitral proceedings, 
access to pleadings and documents of the tribunals, open hearing, amicus	 curiae 
participation and the publication of the final awards (ibid.: 14-7).  
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 Many of the Commission’s proposals were heavily criticised by the so-called 
‘neoliberal hardliner’ member states identified in Chapter Five. Particularly, 
Western European member state officials feared that any form of compromise 
with the Canadian FIPA model would subsequently lead to a lowered standard of 
investment protection as compared to their own models. In the Annex to the CETA 
negotiating directives adopted in September 2011, the member state governments 
clearly instructed the Commission to ensure “the highest possible level of legal 
protection and certainty for European investors” based upon the “member states’ 
experience and best practice regarding their bilateral investment treaties” 
(Bilaterals, 2011).84 This would entail the typically unrestricted and unqualified BIT 
standards in the broadest way, thereby adhering to a rather concise treaty text 
without any clarifications limiting the scope of the standards on fair and equitable 
treatment and indirect expropriation common to the Canadian (and US) approach. 
In fact, fears of what one EU member state official described in closed-door 
meetings as ‘NAFTA-contamination’ led several other member state governments 
to argue for delaying the negotiations with Canada, so that the EU might first 
conclude an agreement with Singapore on lines that are closer to the older EU 
member states’ approach to BITs (Peterson, 2011; see also Lavranos, 2012: 306-7). 
 With regard to ISDS, both the German and the UK government pointed to the 
increased risks of ‘politicisation of disputes’ and strongly rejected the idea of a 
fixed roster of arbitrators and the possibility of an appeal mechanism. Moreover, 
both governments remained reserved on the issue of increased transparency.85 
Particularly, the German government strongly emphasised that “transparency has 
to be balanced against the rights of investors and States to keep the litigation 
secret” and that “EU investors expect that their special situation is reflected in the 
drafting of transparency rules”.86 On the other hand, governments of CEE states 
frequently facing ISDS claims supported the reform proposals of the Commission. 
Moreover, the Czech and Slovakian governments strongly pushed for the inclusion 
of a broad ‘fork-in-the-road’ clause to avoid parallel and multiple claims.87 The 
Czech government referred thereby to its experiences with the parallel claims 
filed by US investor Ronald Lauder both under the Czech-US BIT and the Czech- 
Netherlands BIT following a dispute arising out of the operation of a Czech 
television channel. Though both claims were based on the same factual and legal 
evidence, tribunals arrived to completely opposite decisions.88
84 The modification of the negotiating directives for Canada, India, and Singapore were leaked onto the 
Internet in 2011. The Council declassified both the 2009 negotiating directives for CETA as well as the 
2011 modification to include investment protection only in December 2015.
85 Comments by Germany, 10 May 2011 (m.d.: 65/11), and by the United Kingdom, 5 May 2011 (m.d.: 
63/11), before Trade and Policy Committee (Services and Investment). 
86 Comments by Germany, 14 June 2012 (m.d.: 81/12), before Trade and Policy Committee (Services and 
Investment). 
87 Comments by the Czech Republic, 29 April 2011 (m.d.:60/11), and by the Slovak Republic, 29 April 
2011 (m.d.: 57/11), before Trade and Policy Committee (Services and Investment). 
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  Ultimately, a first draft text on ISDS was shared with Canada in July 2012, 
which significantly deviated from the brief and unrestricted articles on ISDS in 
the member state BITs. Instead, the text covered 23 pages and included a wide 
range of provisions on transparency, mediation and code of conduct for arbitrators. 
Notably, the draft text proposed a special framework on the constitution of the 
tribunal in which the disputing parties appoint the arbitrators from a fixed roster 
of 15 individuals with specialised knowledge of international law, in particular 
international public law and international investment law, who are independent 
and comply with a code of conduct based on the International Bar Association’s 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests in International Arbitration. A weaker version 
of the fork-in-the-road clause would entitle investors to initiate ISDS arbitration 
on the condition that it discontinues any local proceedings (‘no U-turn’). Finally, 
the draft text proposed to set up a Committee for the Settlement of Investor-State 
Disputes in charge of the implementation and interpretation of issues and 
examining the possibility of an appellate mechanism (see also Bernasconi- 
Osterwalder, 2012, Peterson, 2012). 
6.2.3  The initial content, form and scope of CETA investment rules
This section examines the main features of the CETA investment provisions 
based on the consolidated text as initially published on the website of DG Trade on 
26 September 2014. CETA’s chapter X (now chapter 8) entails the provisions on 
investment liberalisation and investment protection. The text reflects the 
consolidation of the neoliberal discourse in terms of content, form and scope as 
the agreement will deeply expand market access and investment protection for 
investors on both sides. At the same time, the text also incorporates certain 
elements pertaining to the centre-leftist discourse, most notably expressed by the 
left-leaning political parties in the European Parliament, NGOs and trade unions 
(see also Section 6.4). Hence, the CETA investment compromise has to be understood 
here as the prime manifestation of what has been referred to in Chapter Five as the 
embedded neoliberalisation of the post-Lisbon EU trade and investment policy. 
 First of all, the CETA agreement greatly enhances market access for investors 
from both sides of the Atlantic. Both parties agreed to liberalise market access 
based on a negative list. This follows Canada’s practice in earlier BITs and FTAs 
concluded since NAFTA, but marks a radical breakaway from the European 
Commission’s previous approach to negotiate market access based on a positive list 
in earlier FTAs (Lévesque, 2013). Negotiating market access on the basis of a 
negative list profoundly broadens the coverage of liberalisation as only the listed 
88 Lauder	v.	Czech	Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Final Award, 3 September 2001 (liability found 
but no damages awarded); CME	v.	Czech	Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Final Award, 14 March 
2003 (award of US$270 million). 
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sectors or regulations will be excluded from specific treaty obligations. Any sector 
or regulation not listed is automatically covered by the treaty rules and thus open 
to foreign investment. Measures listed in Annex I are existing measures that are 
exempted from the treaty obligations, while Annex II contains reservations for 
future measures. These exemptions are however subjected to the so-called 
‘standstill’ and ‘ratchet’ mechanisms, which irreversibly bind existing measures 
and prohibit a further restriction of trade and investment (Krajewski, 2013: 9-11). 
These mechanisms thus enable further market expansion by effectively locking-in 
current and future liberalisation measures, thereby bringing more aspects of 
economic and social life into the realm of transnational capital.
 Article X.4 (now Article 8.4) prohibits government measures restricting 
foreign suppliers’ market access such as numerical quotas, economic needs tests, 
limitations on foreign capital participation in local companies, or requirements 
for specific types of legal entity or joint venture for foreign enterprises. Likewise, 
Article X.5 (now Article 8.5) prohibits governments to impose certain performance 
requirements on foreign investment, including measures to export a given share 
of goods and services, to use local goods or local suppliers, or to transfer technology, 
as potential conditions for admission.89 The European Commission considered 
such performance requirements as a “significant deterrent for EU investment 
abroad” and agreed to the Canadian practice of restricting the ability of 
governments to impose those types of requirements (European Commission, 
2012d: 2). The Canadian government furthermore accepted to substantially 
increase the threshold for review of acquisitions of Canadian companies by foreign 
investors under the Investment Canada Act from C$344 million to C$1.5 billion, 
while keeping decisions by the Investment Canada Act exempted from the scope of 
ISDS.
 As regards investment protection, the CETA text remains neoliberal at its 
core, although several important qualifications to the investment standards have 
been introduced. In terms of content, the investment chapter consists of the 
traditional BIT elements, such as non-discriminatory treatment (national and 
most-favoured-nation), both in the pre- and post-establishment phase (Article X.6 
(now Article 8.6) and Article X.7 (now Article 8.7)), fair and equitable treatment 
(Article X.9 (now Article 8.10)), compensation for expropriation (Article X.10 (now 
Article 8.11) and Article X.11 (now Article 8.12)), and free transfer of capital and 
89 Performance requirements have been used by governments to inter	alia strengthen the industrial 
base and national added value, developing national expertise, creating upstream and downstream 
economic links, ensuring technology transfer and achieving better environmental or social outcomes 
(Nikièma, 2014; UNCTAD, 2003). The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
prohibits the use of certain performance requirements, including those linked to local content 
requirements, trade-balancing requirements, foreign exchange restrictions related to the foreign 
exchange inflows of an enterprise, and export controls. Most BITs remain silent on performance 
requirements, but a number of agreements, including those concluded by Canada and the US, do 
prohibit or limit the use of performance requirements.
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payments related to an investment (Article X.12 (now Article 8.13)). Nevertheless, 
two important changes stand out. First, the fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
definition has been formulated in a novel way (Article X.9 (now Article 8.10)). For 
the first time, the FET standard has been qualified in terms of a finite list, thereby 
aiming to restrict arbitral tribunals in excessively interpreting the broad and 
vague wording associated with traditional formulations of the obligation.90 At the 
same time, an arbitral tribunal may take into account any ‘specific representation’ 
made by a government that created a ‘legitimate expectation’ in which the investor 
relied in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment (Article X.9(4) (now 
Article 8.10(4))). The European Commission and also many EU member states 
fiercely rejected the Canadian proposal to link the FET standard to the minimum 
standard of treatment under customary international law “as it may significantly 
reduce the level of protection for investment” (European Commission, 2012b: 9; 
European Commission, 2011a: 17).91 Linking the content of the FET standard to 
customary international law would not necessarily bring more clarity about its 
concrete content in the view of the Commission, which remained concerned about 
the uncertainty of interpretation of the minimum standard of treatment under 
customary international law. Instead, the Commission proposed to spell out the 
criteria for the application of the FET standard by building upon the case law of 
arbitral tribunals and the legal traditions of the EU and the member states, 
“thereby codifying a generally accepted outcome of jurisprudence that both sides 
are comfortable with” (European Commission, 2012b: 9; Hoffmeister and 
Alexandru, 2014: 390-2). 
 Secondly, Article X.11 (now Article 8.12) prohibits governments to nationalise 
or expropriate, both directly and indirectly, except for a public purpose, under due 
process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner, and against payment of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. This obligation is however conditioned in 
Annex X.11 (now Annex 8-A), which stipulates that “non-discriminatory measures 
of a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as health, safety and the environment do not constitute indirect 
expropriations”.92 Here, the European Commission proved more willing to align 
90 According to Article X.9(2), a government breaches the FET obligation if a measure constitutes (a) 
a denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; (b) a fundamental breach of 
due process, including a fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial and administrative 
proceedings; (c) manifest arbitrariness; (d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, 
such as gender, race or religious belief; and (e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress 
and harassment.
91 See also comments by for example Belgium, 10 May 2011 (m.d.: 72/11), Czech Republic, 29 April 2011 
(m.d.: 60/11), and Latvia, 10 May 2011 (m.d.: 67/10), before Trade Policy Committee (Services and 
Investment).
92 Annex X.11(3) (now Annex 8-A(3)) reads as follows: “For greater certainty, except in the rare 
circumstances where the impact of the measure or series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose 
that it appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and 
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, 
do not constitute indirect expropriations”. 
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itself to the practice of Canada. The right of states to regulate in the public interest 
is furthermore only to be found in the non-binding preamble of the agreement as 
well as in the non-enforceable chapters on labour and environment (chapters 23 
and 24 respectively).
 In terms of form, both parties agreed to include ISDS to enforce the provisions of 
the investment chapter.93 Article X.25 sets up the framework on the constitution of 
the tribunal, whereby an arbitral tribunal shall be comprised of three arbitrators 
appointed by the parties. In case the parties disagree on the third arbitrator, 
the Secretary-General of ICSID shall appoint the remaining arbitrator from a list 
of 15 individuals with expertise in public international law, in particular 
international investment law, and experience in the resolution of trade and 
investment disputes. The Committee on Services and Investment shall establish 
the list, which shall be composed of five nationals of a EU member state, five 
nationals of Canada, and five nationals of third countries. These arbitrators shall 
be independent and comply with a code of conduct based on the International Bar 
Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests in International Arbitration. 
Moreover, the ISDS provisions also include a preliminary review mechanism to 
vet claims that are manifestly without legal merit (Article X.29 (now Article 8.32)) 
or that are unfounded as a matter of law (Article X.30 (now Article 8.33)), although 
the discretionary power to review such claims still remains in the hands of the 
arbitral tribunals. Article X.21 (now Article 8.22) entitles investors to initiate ISDS 
arbitration on the condition that local proceedings have been finalised or 
discontinued. The text also provides for costs to be awarded to the losing party in 
ISDS proceedings according to the ‘loser-pays’ principle (Article X.36 (now Article 
8.39)). This would generally favour large (transnational) corporations and wealthy 
individuals with more financial resources to litigate.
 The CETA text enhances transparency through the incorporation of the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, 
which officially came into effect on 1 April 2014 (UNCITRAL, 2014). These rules 
provide for a significant degree of openness throughout the arbitral proceedings 
and allow inter	 alia for the public disclosure of documents and open hearings 
(Article X.33 (now Article 8.36)) as well as the involvement of non-disputing parties 
through oral or written submissions (Article X.35 (now Article 8.38)). The 
agreement foresees wide competences for a joint Committee on Services and 
Investment in charge of the implementation and interpretation of the investment 
provisions and examining the possibility of an appellate mechanism (Article X.42 
(now Article 8.44)). This would render the CETA as a ‘living agreement’ whereby 
93 References are made only to those new article numbers that remained unchanged in the final CETA 
text. As shown later in this chapter and the next one, the originally negotiated dispute settlement 
mechanism became replaced by the Investment Court System. 
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the provisions and rules can be continuously amended under the conditions of 
increased insulation from parliamentary and thus, democratic scrutiny. Even if 
both parties decide to terminate the agreement, the investment provisions would 
continue to be effective for a further period of 20 years for investments made 
before the termination of the agreement (Chapter 34; Article X.08(2) (now Article 
30.9(2)).  
 In terms of scope, the CETA’s investment rules cover a broad range of economic 
activities according to the traditional broad and open-ended ‘every-kind-of-asset’ 
definition. This means that investments falling under the scope of the agreement 
may include shares, bonds, loans, interests, concession contracts, intellectual 
property rights, claims to money or performance under contracts, or any other 
moveable or immoveable, tangible or intangible property and related rights 
(Article X.3 (now Article 8.1)). At the same time, the notion of investor is defined in 
a novel way, meaning a natural person or enterprise having ‘substantial business 
operations’ in the territory of the home state. Although intended to avoid the 
abusive practice of ‘treaty-shopping’ via mailbox companies (see for example, 
European Commission, 2011a: 14), the reformed definition does not require the 
investor to have its headquarters or main base of operations in the home state. Any 
type of economic actor that has ‘substantial’ business activities in one of the 
relevant jurisdictions can thus potentially be covered by this definition, including 
transnational corporations operating through locally established subsidiaries in 
Canada and Europe.
 Moreover, Article 20 in CETA’s chapter on financial services (now Article 13.21) 
also allows for ISDS with regard to financial services in case of an alleged breach 
of the investment protection standards, or in which Article 15.1 of Chapter 20 on 
prudential measures in the financial sector (now Article 13.16) has been invoked. 
A financial services committee may act as a filter in investment disputes in 
financial services by determining to what extent the prudential measures can be a 
valid defence to an investor claim. The European Commission pushed hard to fully 
extend the scope of investment protection to the financial services sector, arguing 
that “there are no sound reasons why investors in the financial sector should be 
treated differently compared to other investors”, while for Canada, protection of 
its financial services sector was a ‘very deep red line’ (European Commission, 
2012b: 4-5). Canadian negotiators warned the Commission that empowering 
investors with the possibility to sue governments over financial regulation would 
“create a chilling effect that will have negative consequences for the overall 
economy of the country” (The	Financial	Post, 2013). In the end, the filter mechanism 
entails a compromise that allows both parties to reject frivolous claims made by 
financial institutions, but only as long as both the EU and Canada fully agree. 
Ultimately, the CETA agreement opens the door to ISDS claims in the financial 
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services sector and, together with the rules on market access, greatly enhances the 
disciplining grip of (transnational) financial capital. 
6.3   Organised transnational capital as the driving force behind 
the CETA investment chapter
As outlined in Chapter Five, the transnational capitalist class became rapidly and 
increasingly mobilised after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and was 
one of the main driving forces behind the neoliberal project for the EU investment 
policy. This section uncovers the formation of the transnational capitalist class 
across the Atlantic and its strategic action in the wake of the CETA negotiations. 
Particularly, organised business groups enjoyed preferential access to state 
negotiators who also frequently and proactively solicited business input through 
what is known as the practice of ‘reverse lobbying’, which proved crucial for 
feeding corporate demands into the negotiations. 
6.3.1  Transatlantic class formation and agency
The CETA project has been strongly supported and actively promoted by key repre-
sentatives of the transnational capitalist class. Business groups from both the EU 
and Canada greatly endorsed the decision to launch the negotiations on a 
comprehensive trade agreement, which was expected to “set a new benchmark for 
bilateral economic integration” (BusinessEurope et al., 2009). Subsequently, these 
business groups called for an ambitious negotiating agenda that would foster 
market access for goods, services, and investment, regulatory cooperation, 
strengthening intellectual property rights and boosting cooperation on energy 
and raw materials. The formal decision by European and Canadian political 
leaders to kick-start the CETA negotiations followed years of joint lobbying efforts 
by various business associations from both sides of the Atlantic. A crucial role in 
forging transatlantic capitalist ties to generate support for the CETA was played by 
the Canada-Europe Roundtable for Business (CERT). The CERT was established on 
16 June 1999 in the wake of the EU-Canada Summit in Bonn, Germany, and 
resulted from an initiative of the Canadian Ambassador to the EU Jean Pierre 
Juneau, Canada’s Minister of International Trade Sergio Marchi and EU Trade 
Commissioner Leon Brittan, together with the support of more than 30 executives 
of leading European and Canadian transnational corporations. Although its 
membership is relatively small, the CERT consists of some of Europe’s and Canada’s 
largest industrial conglomerates representing production-oriented fractions of 
transnational capital, including BASF, Bombardier, GlaxoSmithKline, Glencore, 
Mercedes-Benz, Rio Tinto Alcan, Sherritt, Siemens and ThyssenKrupp.94 
94 Retrieved from CERT website, see http://www.canada-europe.org/en/ 
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 As a private elite forum, the CERT was set up with the purpose of generating 
joint corporate support for the comprehensive liberalisation of trade and 
investment between the two regions and to develop organic linkages with state 
officials. Such linkages were eased through the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon, 
whereby former government officials took prominent positions in the CERT’s 
leadership. For example, the CERT’s co-chair Roy Maclaren is the former Canadian 
Minister of International Trade, who had been pushing for bilateral trade 
negotiations already since the 1990s by suggesting to open the NAFTA agreement 
to European countries (Devuyst, 2005: 183). Moreover, several former government 
officials are currently taking a seat in the CERT’s Steering Committee, including 
Canada’s former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who spearheaded the neoliberal 
transformation of Canada’s trade and investment policy in the late 1980s. Hence, 
the CERT member companies were frequently invited to identify market-distort-
ing barriers to transatlantic trade and investment and their subsequent recom-
mendations set the wider parameters for transatlantic economic cooperation from 
the viewpoint of transnational capital, thereby substantially influencing the 
neoliberal course of the bi-regional partnership.
 One of the CERT’s key objectives was to achieve a bilateral free trade agreement 
that would “address rules and non-tariff barriers, including such areas as 
regulatory cooperation and mutual recognition, rather than strictly market access 
issues” (CERT, 2002: 2). The CERT greatly supported the TIEA proposal and also 
became one of the driving forces behind the launch of the CETA negotiations. In 
2007, the CERT launched a campaign to generate CEO-level support for an 
ambitious bilateral trade agreement that would constitute a strategic and critical 
stepping-stone towards the materialisation of a comprehensive transatlantic 
marketplace without regulatory obstacles that would hinder Canadian and 
European companies from maximising investment gains. These efforts culminated 
into a joint declaration in support of the CETA negotiations, which was signed by 
over a hundred Canadian and European chief executives and submitted to heads 
of governments, whereby the inclusion of a comprehensive investment chapter 
was one of the CERT’s key priorities right from the start (CERT, 2009: 16; CERT, 
2008). The CERT thus served as an organisational nexus for transatlantic class 
formation and played a crucial role in shaping, directing and influencing the 
further alignment of EU and Canadian trade and investment interests. 
 Most notably, the energy sector became highly mobilised with the creation of 
the Energy Roundtable in 2004 under the auspices of the CERT, bringing together 
captains of industry and high-level government officials to enhance European 
investment in the Canadian energy market. The Energy Roundtable’s conferences 
formed key moments to further the interests of transnational energy sectors on 
issues such as energy infrastructure, production and technical innovations in the 
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heavy oil, shale gas and tar sands. CETA was thereby heralded as a landmark 
agreement for diversifying Canada’s tar sands exports as well as ensuring that the 
EU remains an open market for tar sands and shale gas products (Trew, 2013a). 
Between September 2009 and July 2011, the Canadian government together with 
oil industry representatives organised more than 110 lobby events in Brussels – 
more than one per week – to promote the tar sands industry (Euractiv, 2011; The	
Guardian, 2015). Such efforts were highly influential in the removal of tar sands 
from the EU’s Fuel Quality Directive listing that would have hampered Canada’s 
exports to Europe by allocating a higher greenhouse default value for fuels derived 
from tar sands (EurActiv, 2014a). The Canadian government threatened thereby to 
block the CETA negotiations if the EU did not remove tar sands oil from its list of 
‘dirty fuels’ (Friends of the Earth, 2011; EurActiv, 2012).
 Access to raw materials and energy also formed a key priority to European 
organised capital. Strong investment rules and regulatory convergence in competition 
policy were thereby deemed necessary to enhance European investments into 
the Canadian natural resource and energy sectors (BusinessEurope, 2010d; 
BusinessEurope et al., 2012). Particularly, the vetting of inward FDI under the 
Investment Canada Act was considered a major hurdle for foreign investors 
entering the Canadian market. In 2010, the Anglo-Australian mining giant BHP 
Billiton withdrew its US$38.6 billion offer to take over Canadian PotashCorp when 
the conditions imposed under the Investment Canada Act were considered too 
onerous (CTVNews, 2010). Hence, the decision of the Canadian government to 
increase the threshold below which foreign takeovers of Canadian firms will not 
be reviewed from CAD$300 million to CAD$1.5 billion under the Investment 
Canada Act was welcomed by European business and will also likely boost 
European investments in Canadian resources (Bloomberg, 2013). Likewise, CETA 
was also expected to enhance temporary mobility of European workers to be 
employed in Canada’s energy sector, particularly in Alberta’s tar sands industries 
suffering from a shortage of high-qualified personnel (The Globe and Mail, 2013). 
6.3.2   Corporate lobbying behind the CETA investment chapter and the structurally 
inscribed strategic selectivity of DG Trade
Organised transnational capital was one of the crucial driving forces behind the 
CETA negotiations. The official proposals made by the European Commission 
incorporated many of the recommendations by European and national business 
associations, which resulted from proactive lobbying and privileged access to state 
negotiators. As the President of BusinessEurope Jurgen Thumann revealed in a 
speech to the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in 2010, organised capital did 
“work hard during this period … [to] define the challenges and help the negotiators 
overcome them”, while urging business leaders to “stay proactive to help our 
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governments find their way through complex negotiations” (BusinessEurope, 
2010e). In turn, the Commission also proactively solicited input from European 
business, a phenomenon referred to as ‘reverse lobbying’ (cf. Schaffer, 2003; Woll, 
2011). In a private meeting with the ERT, DG Trade officials reaffirmed that “the 
Commission should listen to business experience with dispute settlement and 
seek input from industry”,95 while EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht wrote 
in a letter to the Director General of BusinessEurope Philippe De Buck that the 
business recommendations were “very timely and constructive contribution to the 
Commission’s work”, thereby stressing that he counted on “continuing support in 
this endeavour”.96 Particularly, the ESF’s Policy Committee provided an informal 
platform for preferential access and close consultation between European investors 
and the Commission, thereby frequently discussing the state-of-play of the ongoing 
negotiations.97 This privileged partnership reflected what former Deputy Director- 
General of DG Trade referred to as a “systemic collusion between the Commission 
and business circles” (cited in CEO, 2015b), and revealed an important tenet of the 
underlying state-capital nexus. 
 European fractions of transnational capital strongly called for unbridled 
market access for services and investment. Notably, organised capital actors were 
highly influential in the European decision to liberalise services and investment 
based on a negative list approach. Business associations such as BusinessEurope, 
ESF, CERT and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CCC) jointly argued for the 
use of negative lists that would not only expand current liberalisation levels but, 
crucially, also lock in future liberalisation in newly evolving sectors (BusinessEurope 
et al.,2010; ESF, 2010d; BusinessEurope et al., 2012). Particularly, the European 
services sector had been lobbying the Commission and the member state 
governments for years to change its liberalisation strategy as negative lists tend to 
yield “greater liberalisation than those based on a positive list” (ESF, 2006). 
Unsurprisingly, the ESF greatly welcomed the decision by the EU member state 
governments to allow for liberalisation on the basis of a negative list, referring to 
“an important decision that the services industry must be proud of, after years of 
advocacy in that direction” (ESF, 2011). 
 Moreover, the removal of foreign ownership restrictions in among other 
things the Canadian financial and telecommunications sectors as well as the 
requirements for Canadian media content were flagged as prime targets for the 
negotiations (CERT, 2009: 7; ESF, 2010d; BusinessEurope et al., 2012). The ESF 
strongly suggested removing all remaining equity caps that “seriously hamper 
investments or proper business management of EU operations in Canada”, thereby 
95 DG Trade report of meeting with ERT, 1 October 2012.
96 Letter EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht to Director General of BusinessEurope Philippe De 
Buck, 19 March 2012.
97 DG Trade report on meeting with ESF and member state representatives, 21 June 2011. 
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referring to foreign ownership caps or residency requirements in the financial 
and telecommunications sectors (ESF, 2010d: 5). Furthermore, the ESF called for 
the full liberalisation of Canada’s postal services, the weakening of Canadian 
banking rules, the opening of new and advertising agencies to EU investors, and 
legally guaranteed access to public procurement at all levels (ibid.).
 With regard to investment protection, business support for CETA was not 
self-evident. The prospects of diminished investment protection resulting from a 
possible compromise with the Canadian BIT approach sparked major fears 
particularly among organised European capital. A recurring point of concern was 
that the inclusion of investment protection in FTA negotiations could potentially 
lead to concessions in return for gains in other areas of the agreement. This was 
unacceptable for organised capital actors, who preferred to separate investment 
protection from the CETA negotiations in fear of trade-offs resulting from 
politicised debates in other areas, such as market access reservations or the 
inclusion of corporate social responsibility issues and labour and environmental 
measures (ESF, 2014: 4; BusinessEurope, 2012a). 98  Another major concern was the 
Canadian practice of linking the FET standard to the minimum standard of 
treatment in customary international law, which was considered “less well 
defined, subject to different interpretations and […] a lower level of investment 
protection” (ESF, 2014: 5; Eurochambres, 2012; BusinessEurope, 2012a). Similarly, 
the limitations posed on the standard of indirect expropriation to safeguard 
public welfare measures, defined in the annex of the Canadian BIT model, were 
perceived as problematic as this would effectively reduce the scope for investment 
claims to compensation (Eurochambres, 2012). Any possible scenario of 
expropriation without compensation was rejected ‘a priori’, including cases of non- 
discriminatory regulatory measures under legitimate public policy objectives.99 
 Subsequently, various European and national industry associations as well as 
individual companies vociferously lobbied DG Trade officials, MEPs and member 
state representatives in numerous private and informal meetings taking place 
largely behind closed doors. Their message was clear: the investment chapter in 
CETA should provide “as good if not better protection than existing member state 
BITs”, whereby it could serve as a “useful model for future investment protection 
negotiations with key partners” (BusinessEurope, 2012a; see also ESF, 2014: 4; 
Eurochambres, 2012).100 In terms of content, the CETA investment chapter should 
therefore provide a ‘solid and comprehensive’ investment protection framework 
built around the broad and open definitions on fair and equitable treatment, 
98 DG Trade report of meeting with BDI representatives, 4 September 2012. DG Trade report of meeting 
with ESF and BusinessEurope representatives, 7 November 2012. 
99 DG Trade report of meeting between ESF and TPC SI, 17 June 2014.
100 DG Trade report of meeting with ESF and BusinessEurope representatives, 7 November 2012. DG Trade 
report on meeting with CERT, 5 March 2013.
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effective protection from direct and indirect expropriation, national and 
most-favoured nation treatment, and free transfer of capital (BusinessEurope, 
2012a; Eurochambres, 2012; ESF, 2014). In terms of form, the inclusion of ISDS was 
considered crucial in order to enforce the investment protection standards. Any 
obligations for investors to seek legal recourse to domestic remedies were fiercely 
rejected, which would “diminish investor confidence, particularly given concerns 
about delays, domestic bias, lack of due process or political interference” (ESF, 
2014: 6; Eurochambres, 2012; BusinessEurope, 2012b). And in a private meeting 
with DG Trade officials, the ESF stressed that the system of pre-established 
arbitrator rosters was “not accepted as this is perceived to put the investors, unable 
to choose their own, in a less favourable position”.101 And in terms of scope, 
BusinessEurope and the ESF successfully pushed to expand the scope of investment 
protection to the realm of financial services and limit potential carve-outs “to the 
maximum extent possible” (ESF, 2014: 5; BusinessEurope, 2012b). 
 Ultimately, such strategic action enabled organised transnational capital to 
exert significant political influence during the CETA negotiations on both sides of 
the Atlantic. This also explains, at least to a large extent, why the CETA investment 
rules do not form a radical break away from the hegemonic mode of foreign 
investment protection. Instead, the CETA investment rules are still neoliberal in 
their core, thus reflecting the outlook of transnational capital. At the same time, 
subordinate social forces increasingly contested the CETA investment rules and, as 
the next section will discuss, successfully managed to mobilise and establish the 
necessary political linkages to challenge the neoliberal discourse.
6.4  Political contestation to the CETA investment chapter
The previous chapter demonstrated that a handful of European NGOs and trade 
campaigners quickly mobilised after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon to 
contest the neoliberal path that the emerging EU investment policy was taking. 
The launch of the CETA negotiations attracted the opposition of a wider group of 
subordinate forces, such as trade unions, environmental groups and other NGOs 
both from Canada and Europe, which feared the potential negative impact of 
CETA on workers, the environment and the capacities of governments to regulate 
public services and other public interests. This section examines how and why 
these groups successfully forged a transatlantic alliance centred on the centre- 
leftist discourse that increasingly challenged the neoliberal discourse.
101 DG Trade report of meeting between ESF and Trade Policy Committee (Services and Investment), 17 
June 2014.
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6.4.1  Organised labour and transatlantic solidarity
Organised labour at both sides of the Atlantic became increasingly opposed to the 
CETA negotiations, and particularly the proposed rules on investment. European 
and Canadian trade unions successfully established cross-border alliances and 
structures to promote their shared interests as a meaningful expression of 
transnational labour solidarity (Healy, 2014; see also Bieler et al., 2014). This has 
been a remarkable achievement in the light of their historical and institutional 
differences. As discussed in Chapter Five, the ETUC has been deeply embedded 
within the institutional configurations of the EU through social dialogues and 
consultations and tends to be ideologically inclined towards a general, albeit 
conditional, support of free trade in bringing economic growth and employment. 
In turn, the Canadian labour movement has been traditionally opposed to free 
trade agreements. The rigorous industrial restructuring following the entry into 
force of the Canada-US FTA and later the NAFTA had a major impact on the 
livelihoods of Canadian workers. The period between 1989 and 1997 saw a net loss 
of 276,000 jobs (Salas et al., 2001: 23). This also brought a downward movement of 
wages and working conditions in Canada. Canada’s exports became more reliant 
on low-wage manufacturing production, as unit labour costs were forced down by US 
competition and the threat of capital flight (Klassen, 2014: 102-3; Ayres, 2004: 115). 
Unionisation rates dropped significantly, leading to an increased flexibilisation 
and, ultimately, the structurally weakening of Canadian labour (Robinson, 2007: 
273). Hence, Canadian unions became supportive of safeguard measures that would 
ensure a certain level of production and investment in Canada and increasingly 
called for state-led industrial policy with active labour market policies and enhanced 
public control of investment. However, Canada’s FTAs typically prohibited capital 
controls and performance requirements and imposed stringent investment protection 
provisions that inhibited regulatory measures favouring domestic industries. 
Subsequently, Canadian trade unions became further marginalised from Canadian 
state structures, which forced them to establish new alliances with other social 
groups in the struggle against free trade (Healy, 2014: 60-2). 
 These divergent institutional and historical trajectories became reflected in 
the initial strategic positions of European and Canadian labour with regard to the 
CETA. Rather than rejecting the CETA altogether, the ETUC opted to engage with 
the European Commission and pushed hard for the inclusion of a sustainable 
development chapter to ensure the ratification and implementation of the core 
labour standards of the ILO, a strong dispute settlement mechanism and a 
monitoring mechanism that allows for the participation of labour (ETUC, 2011). 
On the other hand, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the central labour body 
for unions in Canada, adopted a much more critical position. In a statement of 18 
October 2010, the CLC referred to the proposed CETA as a ‘grave error’ as the 
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agreement would “constrain the ability of the governments in Canada at all levels 
to meet their democratic responsibilities to citizens and residents” (CLC, 2010). 
Among its demands were strengthened labour rights, references to sound 
industrial policy to advance decent work and diversification through support for 
research and development, sustainable investments and job creation, full 
protection of public services, and affirmation of the right to regulate, ecological 
sustainability and climate action (ibid.). Moreover, it was expected that the 
agreement could provoke a massive dislocation of Canadian labour from 
non-resource goods industries, totalling between 28,000 and 150,000 jobs with a 
GDP loss of almost 3 per cent (Stanford, 2010: 36; see also Kohler and Storm, 2016; 
Raza et al., 2016). 
 Nevertheless, the ETUC and CLC put much effort in overcoming their 
ideological differences and sought to establish transatlantic linkages by agreeing 
to issue a joint statement on the CETA during the early stages of the negotiations. 
The ETUC and CLC unequivocally shared their concerns over the potential impact 
of the investment provisions and ISDS on labour rights and public services. In the 
joint statement, adopted in January 2013, the ETUC and CLC argued against the 
inclusion of the ISDS mechanism in the agreement and strongly called that the 
investment provisions must not corrode labour rights (ETUC and CLC, 2013). 
Moreover, the statement expressed a deep concern that “universal access, equal 
treatment, public administration, affordability and sustainability of public 
services cannot be maintained through further liberalisation”, thereby fearing 
that public delivery of services could be regarded as a barrier to transatlantic trade 
and investment.
 Public sector unions also successfully established transatlantic linkages and 
formulated joint positions on the CETA. The European Federation of Public Service 
Unions (EPSU), the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) and the National 
Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE) frequently expressed their 
concerns with regard to the unprecedented levels of liberalisation of services, 
investment and procurement, which was feared to enhance the commodification 
of public services and lock-in privatisation (EPSU et al., 2010: 14-5; EPSU and ETUC, 
2011). EPSU and the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour (AK) commissioned an 
academic study on the implications of the different EU approaches to liberalise 
services, which not only criticised the ‘negative list’ approach but also outlined 
how existing liberalisation schemes under NAFTA and GATS fail to adequately 
safeguard public services from liberalisation in trade agreements (Krajewski, 
2011). In particular, public sector unions concluded that the investment provisions 
would render it “impossible to fully protect public services, or any form of 
government decision making, from being challenged under an ISDS process” 
(EPSU, TJN and NUPGE, 2014). Eventually, also national trade unions started to 
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criticise the CETA agreement due to a lack of transparency during the negotiations, 
the inclusion of ISDS, the lack of full protection of the right to regulate, and the 
danger for public services as well as the lack of guaranteeing standards to protect 
health, employees and the environment (Austrian Trade Union Federation, 2015; 
German Trade Union Confederation, 2014; Trade Union Congress, 2015; 
Netherlands Trade Union Federation, 2015).
6.4.2  Mounting societal opposition
Organised labour also started to make cross-linkages with wider societal and 
environmental concerns on both sides of the Atlantic. A key moment in the 
formation of these linkages was the creation of the Canadian Trade Justice Network 
(TJN) in February 2010 with the purpose to raise public awareness and opposition 
to CETA by building alliances both in Canada and in Europe. The TJN brought 
together a wide range of NGOs, including trade unions, environmental 
organisations, food sovereignty and farmers’ organisations, student federations, 
and cultural and social justice advocates, and indigenous groups (Trew, 2013b; 
Healy, 2014). During the negotiations, the TJN together with trade unions in 
Canada and Europe jointly released leaked drafts of the proposed CETA, which 
became the basis for joint analysis and campaigning. These groups used social 
media such as Twitter and Google Groups to coordinate and disseminate their 
concerns, analyses, positions and strategies (Drache and Trew, 2011: 97). The TJN 
also organised multiple visits by representatives from Canadian NGOs and trade 
unions to speak with European NGOs and politicians in Brussels, including MEPs 
from left-leaning political parties such as S&D, the Greens and GUE/NGL. The 
main concerns expressed during these visits were related to issues that were 
considered as relevant for European decision-makers and NGOs to increase 
awareness and engagement with regard to the CETA negotiations, which were not 
yet a main priority at that point in time. These included the possible liberalisation 
of drinking water and sanitation services, the treatment in CETA of tar sands and 
EU environmental measures, GMOs, and ISDS (Trew, 2013b: 574; Healy, 2014: 64-5). 
 Hence, the TJN was essential in forging transatlantic linkages among Canadian 
and European civil society groups and investment protection/ISDS soon became a 
crucial rallying point for strengthening joint campaigns against CETA. An 
increased number of societal organisations from Europe and Canada, including 
trade unions, environmental, indigenous, women’s, academic, health sector and 
fair trade organisations strongly called for the exclusion of the investment chapter 
in various joint statements (e.g. Amis de la Terre et al., 2011; 11.11.11 et al., 2013). 
After the President of the European Commission Barroso and Canadian Prime 
Minister Harper finalised the political agreement in October 2013, more than 100 
transatlantic civil society organisations expressed their concerns that with the 
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CETA investment chapter, “Canadian and European democracy will suffer while 
corporations gain new tools to frustrate any number of policies designed to protect 
the environment, public health, public services, resource conservation and, 
crucially, to make our social-economies more sustainable and equitable” (Friends 
of the Earth Europe et al., 2013). And on the eve of the conclusion of the CETA 
negotiations, more than hundred organisations from both sides of the Atlantic 
issued a joint statement strongly opposing the CETA and the inclusion of an 
investment chapter due to the lack of transparency and public debate, presenting 
citizens and elected officials in the European Parliament with a ‘fait accompli’ 
with no possibility of amendments (CEO, 2014a). 
 NGOs and campaigning activists pointed to the risk of investment arbitration, 
particularly in the field of natural resources and mining, as Canadian mining 
corporations were described as among the “worst offenders in environmental, 
human rights and other abuses around the world” (Eberhardt et al., 2014: 7). 
Ongoing ISDS cases involving Canadian companies highlighted the potential 
impact of investment protection provisions in CETA on governments’ abilities to 
regulate or ban shale gas development through hydraulic fracturing102, to 
withdraw a mining permit in response to strong community resistance103, and on 
domestic court ruling on medicine patents104 (Eberhardt et al., 2013; Eberhardt et 
al., 2014). Crucially, NGOs warned that CETA might become a ‘Trojan Horse’ for US 
corporations, with US subsidiaries in Canada able to use CETA’s investment 
protection provisions and to launch ISDS cases against European governments 
(Eberhardt et al., 2014: 9). The reforms of the investment provisions proposed by 
the European Commission were denoted as mere ‘cosmic reforms’ that failed to 
address the fundamental problems of investment protection and ISDS. Accordingly, 
the investment chapter failed to clearly and unequivocally confirm the right for 
states to regulate in the public interest. The ‘right to regulate’ was only mentioned 
in an aspirational statement in the preamble and in two other chapters – on labour 
and environment, thus preserving the state’s flexibility in the face of international 
labour and environmental standards – not including the investment chapter. 
Likewise, the agreement lacked any obligations or responsibilities for investors 
except for certain provisions in the chapters on sustainable development, labour 
and environment with no effective enforcement mechanism (Maes, 2014; Eberhardt 
et	 al, 2014; Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2014). In sum, the CETA 
agreement was considered as highly unbalanced in the allocation of substantive 
rights and responsibilities and continued to pose a major threat to the regulatory 
capacities of governments to protect the public interest. 
102 Lone	Pine	Resources	Inc.	v.	The	Government	of	Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2. 
103 Gabriel	Resources	Ltd.	and	Gabriel	Resources	(Jersey)	v.	Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/31. 
104 Eli	Lilly	and	Company	v.	The	Government	of	Canada,	UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2.
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 Societal opposition to CETA gained particular momentum after the European 
Commission and the United States government decided to launch negotiations on 
TTIP in July 2013, which attracted attention from a wide array of organisations 
and campaigners well beyond the Seattle to Brussels Network, including among 
others farmers, consumer groups, public health groups, trade unions, critical 
legal experts and judges, small and medium enterprises and digital rights 
defenders (further examined in Chapter Seven). Much of the rapidly increasing 
contestation and opposition to TTIP, and the proposed investment protection and 
arbitration provisions in particular, also spilled over to CETA and reached its 
height in the wake of its formal signature by the European and Canadian leaders 
and its subsequent ratification process in the European Parliament. Many of these 
groups opposed CETA on the basis of its investment chapter and either called for 
improvements (for example, BEUC, 2016; Transport & Environment and ClientEarth, 
2016; ETUC, 2016) or rejected the agreement altogether (for example, CEO, 2016; 
Powershift and Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016; EPHA, 2016). By that 
time, CETA also became the target of large-scale protests and mobilisations that 
emerged in the wake of the growing societal backlash against TTIP. Such 
contestation finally culminated in massive street protests ahead of the vote in the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg with activists trying to disrupt the vote (BBC, 
2017; Euronews, 2017).  
6.4.3  Renewed challenges to the EU investment policy
The mounting societal concerns over the CETA’s investment chapter also increasingly 
resonated with parliaments and governments across Europe. Particularly, left- 
leaning political parties in the European Parliament increasingly contested the 
inclusion of the ISDS mechanism and feared that the far-reaching investment 
provisions would potentially inhibit future legislation in sensitive policy areas. 
MEPs criticised that the Commission was moving ahead with the Council to obtain 
the additional negotiating directives on investment even as the European 
Parliament was in the process of undertaking the hearings and studies that 
eventually culminated in its April 2011 resolution on the future of the EU 
investment policy (see Chapter Five) (Sopinska, 2011). In its resolution on EU-Canada 
trade relations adopted on 8 June 2011, the European Parliament called for an 
investment chapter that promotes “high-quality investments which respect the 
environment and encourage good working conditions” (European Parliament, 
2011e: para 12). Reflecting elements of the centre-leftist discourse, the European 
Parliament stressed the need to ensure the right to regulate in areas of national 
security, the environment, public health, workers’ and consumers’ rights, 
industrial policy and cultural diversity. Particularly, it recommended that “given 
the highly developed legal systems of Canada and the EU, a state-to-state dispute 
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settlement mechanism and the use of local judicial remedies are the most 
appropriate tools to address investment disputes” (ibid.: 11). Also, the authors of the 
CETA Sustainability Impact Assessment, a study commissioned by the European 
Commission itself, concluded that a “well-crafted state-state dispute settlement 
mechanism might be a more appropriate enforcement mechanism in CETA than 
ISDS” (Kirkpatrick et al., 2011: 20). The European Commission ignored this advice, 
however, and continued to vigorously promote and justify the inclusion of ISDS by 
referring inter	 alia	 to a number of incidents whereby foreign investors were 
expropriated and allegedly denied compensation and access to Canadian courts 
(De Gucht, 2013a; De Gucht, 2013b; see also Van Harten, 2015a; Babiy, 2012). 
 Critically, electoral developments generated renewed political avenues for the 
centre-leftist discourse, both at EU and member state level, to further challenge 
the EU investment policy. After the European Parliament elections of May 2014, 
the centre-left S&D (186 seats out of a total of 751) became part of a ‘grand coalition’ 
with the centre-right EPP (212 seats). During the previous 2009-2014 legislature, 
the traditionally pro-free trade political groups, the centre-right EPP and ECR 
along with the liberal group ALDE, could gather enough votes in an alliance to 
pass free trade agreements. After the May 2014 elections, the EPP now needed to 
find an arrangement with the S&D, which was frequently ambivalent on trade and 
on ISDS. Although generally supportive of the CETA for bringing economic growth 
and jobs, the S&D became increasingly critical of the inclusion of the ISDS 
mechanism in the CETA (S&D Group, 2014, 2015). Such criticism largely reflected 
the increased opposition among social democrats at member state level. 
Particularly, the return to power of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
after the 2013 federal elections in Germany was pivotal in this respect. In 
September 2014, the German Minister of Economics and Energy, Vice-Chancellor 
and leader of the SPD Sigmar Gabriel announced that he was going to oppose CETA 
with the current set of investment protection and ISDS provisions (EurActiv, 2014b). 
Much of the grassroots of the German SPD remained deeply sceptical of the 
promise of free trade and fear that the inclusion of ISDS may negatively affect 
workers’ rights, while the Vattenfall	II-case on the German nuclear phase-out had 
formed a major catalyst for the growing mobilisation of social forces against ISDS 
within German society at large (Financial	Times, 2014a; Deutsche	Welle, 2015).
 The German concerns over the CETA investment chapter were soon echoed by 
the French government. In January 2015, the newly appointed French State 
Secretary for Foreign Trade and member of France’s ruling socialist party Matthias 
Fekl declared that he would “never allow private tribunals in the pay of 
multinational companies to dictate the policies of sovereign states, particularly in 
certain domains like health and the environment” (EurActiv, 2015a). On 21 January 
2015, Fekl met with Gabriel in Berlin to discuss common grounds for opposition to 
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ISDS and issued a joint declaration pressing for the reopening of the CETA 
negotiations with the aim to examine “all the options for modifying” the ISDS 
clause (EurActiv, 2015b). The joint efforts by Fekl and Gabriel also received support 
from various social democratic leaders across Europe. At a meeting of social 
democratic leaders in Madrid in February 2015, ministers from Germany, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and France put forward a number of 
proposals for a reformed ISDS. In the resulting document Improvements	to	CETA	and	
beyond:	making	a	milestone	for	modern	investment	protection, European social democrats 
called for ‘a new approach’ with regard to the enforcement of investment rules and 
proposed the creation of a new arbitration mechanism with a permanent 
secretariat.105 A so-called ‘Trade and Investment Court’, whose task is to judge on 
investment protection cases, was suggested to constitute this new mechanism, 
which would contribute to enhancing legitimacy and consistency to the ISDS 
system. Such a permanent court should thereby introduce an appeal mechanism, 
a fixed pool of arbitrators bound to strict codes of conduct to prevent conflict of 
interest, increased transparency, the deterring of frivolous claims to prevent 
abusive litigation, and a mandatory clause to choose between ISDS and local 
remedies to prevent national court decisions to be challenged by arbitral tribunals 
(‘fork-in-road’ and ‘no-U-turn’ clauses). Hence, rather than rejecting investment 
protection and ISDS altogether, the social-democrat’s ‘new approach’ sought to 
further institutionalise and streamline arbitration with the purpose to gain 
public legitimacy.
 With the concluded CETA text entering into a process of ‘legal scrubbing’, an 
expert review process intended to remove language ambiguities and other incon-
sistencies, pressures to reopen the negotiations and reform the investment chapter 
became insurmountable. And although the newly installed EU Trade Commissioner 
Cecilia Malmström repeatedly stated that CETA was not open for renegotiation 
(European Parliament, 2014; Euractiv, 2014c), and with transnational capital actors 
strongly pushing for a rapid ratification (CERT et al., 2015), it became clear that 
political support for the investment chapter in CETA was increasingly waning. 
The societal backlash against ISDS gained particular momentum in the context 
of the TTIP negotiations – as examined in the next chapter – thereby revealing the 
political limits of neoliberal trade and investment policy. In fact, the vehement 
mobilisations and protests against ISDS and CETA/TTIP added to the already 
looming legitimacy crisis of the EU and neoliberal European governance, 
particularly against the backdrop of widespread protests against neoliberal 
austerity in Europe’s peripheral countries such as Spain and Greece. 
105 Improvements	to	CETA	and	beyond:	Making	a	milestone	for	modern	investment	protection. Available at https://
www.libre-echange.info/IMG/pdf/s_d_position_on_isds_1_.pdf 
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 In fear of a preliminary defeat on the ratification vote in the European 
Parliament, DG Trade officials approached Canada’s newly installed liberal 
government of Justin Trudeau in the fall of 2015 with a request to revisit the ISDS 
clause as part of the legal review process without reopening the concluded 
negotiations (Politico, 2015a; CBC, 2016). Finally, on 29 February 2016, the European 
Commission and the Canadian government announced the completion of the 
legal scrubbing process with both sides agreeing to modify the ISDS provisions 
along the lines of the proposed Investment	Court	System that was prepared by the 
European Commission during the TTIP negotiations with the United States (see 
Chapter Seven). And after the Walloon opposition was for the most part overcome, 
with adding a Joint Interpretative Instrument as well as thirty-eight statements 
and declarations from the EU side, both parties finally signed CETA on 30 October 
2016. The European Parliament ratified the agreement with a relatively large 
margin (408 against 254) on 15 February 2017 and most parts of CETA became 
provisionally applied as of 21 September 2017. Crucially, the investment protection 
and ISDS provisions fell outside of the scope of provisional application, as strongly 
insisted by the German and several other member state governments, meaning 
that ratification by national and some sub-national parliaments was still required 
before the definitive entry into force of the entire CETA agreement.
6.5  Conclusion
This chapter unravelled and explained the politics behind the CETA investment 
chapter as a critical milestone in the making of the post-Lisbon EU investment 
policy, which became further entrenched along the lines of embedded neo- 
liberalism. The political impetus for engaging on a project of transnational market 
expansion and protection was deeply embedded in broader processes of trans-
nationalisation and neoliberal restructuring on both sides of the Atlantic, with 
great support from organised transnational capital. With regard to the content, 
form and scope of its investment chapter, CETA marked a compromise between 
the emerging European model of foreign investment protection as identified in 
Chapter Five, reflecting mainly the interests of the Western European export- 
oriented economies while incorporating certain elements of the centre-leftist 
discourse, and the North American model seeking to incorporate certain 
clarifications and safeguards to shield public interest regulation from investor 
claims, while at the same time bringing about far-reaching market access for 
foreign investors. However, the embedded neoliberal compromise remained 
highly fragile and very contested as CETA became embroiled with a growing 
societal and political discontent with neoliberal investment rules in the wake of 
the controversial TTIP project. A broad alliance of NGOs, trade unions and other 
grassroots movements increasingly challenged the neoliberal discourse and 
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received support from various centre-leftist political leaders across Europe, 
ultimately resulting in the insertion of the Investment Court System to the 
investment chapter after the supposed conclusion of the negotiations. While this 
amendment proved crucial for generating the necessary political support for 
CETA, at least at EU level, broader societal opposition did not wither away and 
remains vivid in the context of the agreement’s required ratification at national 
level. 
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7.   The Politics of the EU-US Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Rise 
of the Investment Court System




Karel De Gucht, 21 February 2013c
“Today,	we	are	delivering	out	promise	–	to	propose	a	new,	modernised	system	of	investment	
courts,	subject	to	democratic	principles	and	public	scrutiny”
Cecilia Malmström, 16 September 2015
This chapter unravels the politics that have driven and shaped the controversial 
Transatlantic	 Trade	 and	 Investment	 Partnership (TTIP) negotiations on investment 
protection between the EU and US between 2013 and 2016. It analyses the content, 
form, and scope of the TTIP investment rules proposed by the European Commission 
and examines the scale and impact of an unprecedented wave of contestation from 
various groups and social movements. The chapter argues that despite the fact 
that the contestation of the TTIP negotiations gave rise to institutional reforms, 
the embedded neoliberal course of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy has only 
been further consolidated, without a radical break away from it. The first section 
places the TTIP project in the context of broader transnationalisation processes 
between the EU and US and the pursuit of transatlantic market integration along 
neoliberal lines. The second section unravels the key narratives underpinning the 
TTIP negotiations both in economic terms of enhancing the EU competitiveness 
of European industries and in geopolitical terms of reasserting global leadership 
over the multilateral trade and investment regime in an emerging multipolar 
world order. The third section critically examines the neoliberal preferences of the 
European Commission with regard to the proposed content, form and scope of the 
agreement’s investment rules, with the fourth section looking at the critical role 
played by organised transnational capital actors. The fifth section assesses and 
explains the vehement opposition to ISDS and TTIP whereas the sixth section 
outlines the particular responses by the European Commission and the wider EU 
power bloc to neutralise and co-opt certain elements within the centre-leftist 
project. The seventh section shows that although this was not enough to save the 
TTIP ship from sinking, the resulting Investment Court System needs to be seen as 
an incremental step towards the further ‘neoliberal embeddedness’ of the post- 
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Lisbon EU investment policy. The last section explains why a more fundamental 
change of direction away from the neoliberal discourse could not be expected, 
while highlighting the persistently contradictory and highly contested nature of 
the embedded neoliberal project.
7.1  Towards a transatlantic marketplace
The drive for transatlantic market integration dates back to a series of initiatives 
in the 1990s that need to be understood as reflection of several interrelated 
structural developments in the global political economy. First of all, the neoliberal 
capitalist restructuring of the global economy reinvigorated transatlantic 
economic relations. Bilateral trade more than doubled during the 1990s, and the 
US accounted for roughly forty per cent of the EU’s total imports and exports of 
services at the end of the decade (Pollack, 2003: 1-2). In 1988, EU outward FDI stocks 
in the US amounted to US$194 billion, while in turn US outward FDI stocks in 
Europe amounted to US$131 billion in the same year (UNCTAD, 1991: 40). The 1992 
Single Market Programme attracted increased volumes of FDI, which not only 
triggered market growth but also laid bare (potential) regulatory overlaps and 
conflicts. Alongside the transnationalisation strategies of corporations, the EU-US 
relations became a key site for organised (transnational) capital (ibid.: 40-1). 
Secondly, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism precipitated the 
political impetus for a ‘new world order’ and in extension also a ‘New Transatlan-
ticism’ as a locus for assuming leadership (Smith and Woolcock, 1993: 3-4; Peterson, 
1996: 7; Steffenson, 2005: 31). 
 Proposals for a new framework for transatlantic cooperation were initiated 
shortly after the end of the Cold War in 1989, when US President George Bush and 
the President of the European Commission Jacques Delors agreed to work together 
and ensure regular meetings between high-level EU and US officials (Pollack, 2003: 
7). This culminated in the Transatlantic Declaration, signed on 23 November 1990, 
which marked the creation of an institutional framework ‘for regular and intensive 
consultation’ on economic, cultural and security issues (Pollack, 2003: 7; Steffenson, 
2005: 31). The Transatlantic Declaration also marked a shift in the EU-US relationship 
where shared security interests were paralleled by interests to deepen economic 
integration and remove regulatory barriers. This new framework not only targeted 
barriers to trade, but it highlighted differences in other regulatory domains 
(Meyer and Barber, 2011: 106; Eichengreen, 1998). These surfaced through a series 
of transatlantic disputes during the Uruguay Round of the GATT and looming 
trade wars about bananas, beef and aircraft, and blocked mergers in the defence 
sector (Pollack and Shaffer, 2006: 63; De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2015: 660; 
Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011). Moreover, the progress in establishing European- wide 
regulatory standards in the context of the Community’s 1992 internal market 
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programme fuelled US concerns that the new regulations would disadvantage US 
producers and products, thereby bolstering the ‘Fortress Europe’ (Vogel, 1997: 8). 
 Subsequently, various efforts to open up the transatlantic market space by 
eliminating regulatory constraints and enhancing free trade were made during 
the 1990s. Most notably, then EU Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan launched an 
ambitious proposal to establish a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) 
mirroring the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that came into 
force in January 1994. The proposed TAFTA was envisaged for economic integration 
beyond the WTO by going further than merely the elimination of tariffs and other 
non-tariff barriers to transatlantic trade, but also by cutting back domestic 
regulatory barriers that impeded market access for EU and US businesses (Siebert, 
2005). When it became clear that the TAFTA project was too ambitious with little 
chances to generate sufficient political support, a slightly less ambitious New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was adopted at the EU-US Summit in Madrid in 
December 1995. The NTA’s Joint Action Plan called for the creation of a liberalised 
‘transatlantic marketplace’ through regulatory cooperation and laid down the 
foundation for a bilateral framework for the progressive reduction and dismantling 
of barriers that hindered transatlantic trade, services and investment (Pollack, 
2003: 7-8; Steffenson, 2005: 36). In the spirit of the NTA agenda, the EU and the US 
concluded six mutual recognition agreements in 1997, spanning telecommunications, 
electrical safety, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals, as well as a number of 
agreements to enhance the compatibility of their competition regimes for cross- 
border mergers and acquisitions, privacy protection, and veterinary inspections 
(Pollack and Shaffer, 2006: 32; Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 119-27). 
 Building on the institutional foundations of the NTA, renewed calls for the 
negotiations of a ‘single comprehensive agreement’ to implement a ‘New 
Transatlantic Marketplace’ were made by the European Commission under the 
leadership of EU Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan in April 1998. The proposal 
reflected the suggestions made in the context of the TAFTA idea, including the 
substantial removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, the formation of a 
free trade area in services, and the further liberalisation of government 
procurement, intellectual property rights and investment (European Commission, 
1998b; Pollack and Shaffer, 2011: 16). However, also this proposal lacked the 
necessary political support, most prominently from the French government, 
which subsequently led to the adoption of a ‘softer’ declaration entitled the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) in May 1998 (Peterson, 2001: 53). The 
TEP and its accompanying Action Plan focused on regulatory cooperation and on 
the possible harmonisation of standards as a means of removing obstacles to trade 
and investment, and committed both sides to negotiations in specific areas such as 
services, intellectual property rights, food safety and biotechnology (Pollack, 2003: 
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8-9). Despite the successes booked, transatlantic economic relations remained con-
flict-ridden. In the early 2000s, transatlantic disputes intensified over a wide range 
of issues, including the establishment of an international criminal court, the 
status of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the US conduct of the ‘war on 
terror’, and the war in Iraq. Boycotts were organised against French wines in the 
US and against US products in the EU and trade disputes escalated over steel 
tariffs, agricultural subsidies, and consumer, food safety, and environmental laws 
and regulations (Pollack and Shaffer, 2006: 63). A further expansion of the 
transatlantic collaboration was set on hold, at least temporarily.
 The transatlantic economic relationship reinvigorated again in the late-2000s. 
In its 2004 review of the process of closer bilateral cooperation, the European 
Commission identified a lack of political commitment at the highest levels and the 
tendency to overload the agenda with too many specific issues while failing to 
prioritise key strategic issues as the most pressing defects of transatlantic economic 
relations (European Commission, 2004b: 5). Several of the report’s recommenda-
tions were taken up in the subsequent Framework for Advancing Transatlantic 
Economic Integration (FATEI) adopted by US President George W. Bush, President 
of the EU Council Angela Merkel and President of the European Commission José 
Manuel Barroso at the EU-US Summit in Washington D.C. on 30 April 2007. 
Particularly, FATEI stressed the external effects of the transatlantic partnership in 
the context of geopolitical and economic challenges, especially from China, 
thereby underscoring that deeper transatlantic integration would “encourage 
other countries to adopt the transatlantic economic model of respect for property 
rights, openness to investment, transparency and predictability in regulation, and 
the value of free markets” (European Union and United States, 2007). One key 
component of this framework was the creation of the Transatlantic Economic 
Council (TEC) as the primary platform for bilateral economic dialogue. The TEC 
was set up as a permanent high-level group to foster regulatory cooperation, 
reduce or eliminate barriers to trade and investment, and to harmonise best 
practices and standards (Ahearn, 2009: 18; Meyer and Barber, 2011: 109). 
 Ultimately, these renewed efforts to strengthen transatlantic market 
integration led to the proposal for a broad and comprehensive bilateral free trade 
agreement. At the EU-US Summit of November 2011, political leaders of the EU and 
the US set up a High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) chaired by 
EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht and US Trade Representative Ron Kirk, 
which was tasked with identifying how increased trade and investment may 
contribute to job creation, economic growth and competitiveness (European 
Commission, 2011c). In its final report of February 2013, the HLWG concluded that 
“a comprehensive agreement, which addresses a broad range of bilateral trade and 
investment issues, including regulatory issues, and contributes to the developments 
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of global rules, would provide the most significant mutual benefit of the various 
options considered” (HLWG, 2013: 1). The HLWG recommended for the negotiations 
to centre on three main pillars: (1) market access for goods, services, investment 
and government procurement; (2) reducing regulatory obstacles and non-tariff 
barriers; and (3) rules addressing shared global trade challenges and opportunities, 
including on intellectual property rights, environment and labour, competition, 
and raw materials and energy. 
 Although the group did not have formally identifiable members, the HLWG 
was essentially a public expert group consisting of a number of high-level 
bureaucrats from within the European Commission and the US State Departments 
that would later become leading members of the negotiating teams. As these 
bureaucrats were tasked with the duty to analyse the potential options for 
expanding transatlantic trade and investment, the HLWG was inclined to advocate 
comprehensive trade and investment liberalisation and regulatory cooperation 
along neoliberal lines. Strikingly, the HLWG did not contain any EU representa-
tives in areas pertaining to labour and environmental issues (CEO, 2013a). The 
HLWG report was highly influential in setting the parameters of enhanced 
transatlantic marketisation and its recommendations were immediately taken up 
by EU and US leaders. Subsequently, US President Barack Obama, President of the 
EU Council Herman van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José 
Manuel Barroso formally announced the intention to start negotiations for a 
Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership (TTIP) on 13 February 2013 (European 
Commission, 2013b). On the EU side, member state governments authorised the 
European Commission to start negotiations after adopting the negotiating 
mandate in June 2013 and formal talks started one month later. After a little more 
than three years of talks, the TTIP project was stalled in the fall of 2016 (see Table 7.1).
7.2  TTIP as a post-crisis growth strategy and a geopolitical project
As argued in chapter Five, the post-Lisbon EU trade and investment policy formed 
a key component of the EU’s macroeconomic strategy in the face of the structural 
crisis conditions. Trade policy was presented as one of the few instruments at 
disposal to bolster economic growth without drawing on constrained public 
finances. In the words of the European Commission, “[r]obust external demand is 
the main source of growth for the moment, as domestic demand components […] 
remain weak”, whereby economic recovery was expected to be consolidated 
by forging “stronger links with the new global growth centres” (European 
Commission, 2012: 4). Deep and comprehensive trade agreements were depicted 
thereby as “powerful catalysts for economic change” and deemed necessary “for 
the success and sustainability of any recovery strategy” (ibid.). Hence, TTIP was 
presented as what EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht described as the 
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“cheapest stimulus packages you can imagine” (De Gucht, 2013d). From the onset, 
this narrative was placed at the centre of the Commission’s discursive strategy to 
legitimise the TTIP project. In a leaked internal memo, the Commission clearly 
sought to approach its TTIP communication strategy “in a radically different way 
to what has been done for past trade initiatives […] providing clear, factual and 
convincing arguments on all aspects of the negotiations” (CEO, 2013b). The aim 
was thereby “to define, at this early stage in the negotiations, the terms of the 
debate by communicating positively about what TTIP is about (i.e. economic gains 
and global leadership on trade issues” (ibid.).
 In order to support the ‘jobs and growth’ narrative behind TTIP, the European 
Commission contracted the Centre	for	Economic	Policy	Research (CEPR) to carry out an 
economic impact assessment of reducing transatlantic barriers to trade and 
investment (CEPR, 2013). The CEPR study was very influential and although other 
studies by Ecorys (2009), ECIPE (2010), CEPII (2013) and the Bertelsmann Foundation 
(2013) provided similar quantitative arguments in favour of TTIP, the European 
Commission relied on the CEPR study as the main analysis of the economic effects 
of TTIP going as far as presenting some of its findings as facts (e.g. European 
Commission, 2014a: 2). According to the CEPR study, an ‘ambitious and 
comprehensive’ agreement could potentially bring an extra economic benefit for 
the EU of €119 billion per year in terms of gross domestic product, which would 
Table 7.1  Timeline of the TTIP negotiations
7-12 July 2013 First round of negotiations in Washington D.C.
11-15 November 2013 Second round of negotiations in Brussels
16-21 December 2013 Third round of negotiations in Washington D.C.
10-14 March 2014 Fourth round of negotiations in Brussels
19-23 May 2014 Fifth round of negotiations in Arlington
13-18 July 2014 Sixth round of negotiations in Brussels
29 September- 3 October 2014 Seventh round of negotiations in Chevy Chase
2-6 February 2015 Eighth round of negotiations in Brussels
20-24 April 2015 Ninth round of negotiations in New York
13-17 July 2015 Tenth round of negotiations in Brussels
19-23 October 2015 Eleventh round of negotiations in Miami
22-26 February 2016 Twelfth round of negotiations in Brussels
25-29 April 2016 Thirteenth round of negotiations in New York
11-15 July 2016 Fourteenth round of negotiations in Brussels
3-7 October 2016 Fifteenth round of negotiations in New York
Source: DG Trade website, author’s elaboration
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translate to an extra €545 per average household, and €95 billion for the US, or 
€655 per family (CEPR, 2013: 47). This would mean that in the most ambitious 
scenario, TTIP would generate additional gains of 0.48 per cent of GDP for the EU, 
and 0.39 per cent for the US, only by the year 2027 (ibid.: 46). As much as eighty per 
cent of the total potential gains was estimated to come from cutting costs imposed 
by bureaucracy and regulations, as well as from liberalising trade in services and 
public procurement (ibid.: vii). These gains would result from the full removal of 
tariffs on goods and the elimination of twenty-five per cent of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) to trade in goods and services (ibid.: 2). The CEPR study also focused on 
possible benefits of reducing NTBs facing affiliates of European companies 
operating in the US, and vice versa. The study estimated that a reduction of 
twenty-five per cent in US FDI barriers against EU companies would generate an 
increased income for affiliates of European companies of roughly €10.3 billion, 
resulting in an almost ten per cent increase in employment of US workers by 
European companies and, in turn, an almost eleven per cent increase in 
employment of EU workers by US firms (ibid.: 92-3).
 The CEPR study as well as other TTIP studies have been criticised for 
exaggerating the benefits of TTIP while simultaneously downplaying the potential 
social costs. Many of these studies relied on computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models premised upon neoclassical economic theories that tend to reduce the 
complexities of the social world to a set of economic variables that are measurable 
(see for example, Stanford, 2010; Ackerman et al., 2004; Taylor and Von Arnim, 
2006; Ackerman and Gallagher, 2008; Capaldo, 2014; De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 
2015). Such models are typically based on unrealistic assumptions that do not only 
bear any resemblance to the real-world economy, but that also privilege particular 
ideological views on how economies work, or should work. Such assumptions 
typically include the belief in macroeconomic equilibrium, thereby implying that 
markets are perfectly efficient and competitive in allocating economic resources, 
including labour and savings. This implies that the possibilities of unemployment 
or capital flight resulting from shifting competitive pressures after trade 
liberalisation are simply assumed away (Stanford, 2010: 22-4). Moreover, the CEPR 
study seemingly overestimated the extent to which TTIP would be able to remove 
barriers to trade and investment and relied on biased data collected from survey 
with business representatives (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2015: 27-31). At the same 
time, macroeconomic adjustment costs such as changes to current account 
balances, losses to public revenues and changes to the level of unemployment are 
neglected or downplayed in the TTIP studies. Other types of social costs resulting 
from deregulatory pressures brought about by TTIP are far more difficult to 
quantify and may produce potential public welfare losses insofar as the elimination 
of NTBs to trade and investment as well as the threat of expensive ISDS challenges 
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could undermine public policy objectives such as consumer safety, public health 
and environmental protection (Raza et al., 2014: v-vi; see also Ackerman, 2016; 
Poulsen et al., 2015). In short, these econometric CGE models premised on 
neoclassical economics served the purpose of ‘scientifically’ legitimising neoliberal 
trade policies and practices and largely shaped the approach taken by EU and US 
negotiators to seeing regulation in narrow and economistic terms.
 Alternatively, other studies that relied on different methodologies came to 
very different conclusions. One study in particular started from the Keynesian 
assumption that economic growth and employment are driven by aggregate 
demand rather than productive efficiency and incorporated assumptions about 
the path of the real economy in different world regions (Capaldo, 2014: 10). 
According to this study, TTIP would produce largely negative effects for European 
economies in terms of net export losses, small but widespread GDP losses and job 
losses of approximately 600,000 across the EU by 2025, which would be more than 
the jobs lost during the Eurozone crisis years of 2010 and 2011 (ibid.: 15). The loss of 
employment would exacerbate the downward trend of reduced labour income and 
the share of total income accruing to labour due to the competitive pressures from 
the US where unit labour costs were already much lower than in many European 
economies, which would ultimately further weaken domestic consumption. 
Simultaneously, the share of profits and rents would increase and thus effectively 
bring about a transfer of income from labour to capital (ibid.: 15-6). In the face of 
falling wage shares and government revenues, demand would have to be sustained 
by profits and investments, which in turn are likely to be accrued through private 
lending and financial assets rather than through consumption (ibid.: 17). From this 
perspective, the growth strategy underpinning the TTIP project would actually be 
closer in line with the EU’s macroeconomic structural adjustment policies through 
so-called ‘internal devaluation’ as a way to boost industrial competitiveness 
vis-à-vis other economies by depreciating real wages and inducing further labour 
market reforms, intensifying inter-company competition to reduce prices, and 
lowering overall levels of corporate taxation (Wigger, 2019: 354; EuroMemorandum, 
2014). Broadly emulating Germany’s internal devaluation programmes that were 
at the centre of the resurgence of Germany’s export competitiveness in recent 
years (on ‘Modell Deutschland’, see Bruff, 2015; Beck and Germann, 2019), the EU’s 
crisis management strategy came to involve a new industrial policy centred on 
attracting and facilitating large-scale investments in manufacturing and pursuing 
export-driven growth models. Such a strategy may very likely increase competition 
between EU member states in a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ fashion (Wigger, 2019; 
Capaldo, 2014), which would in the end not only exacerbate existing structural 
asymmetries within the European political economy but also potentially further 
destabilise the European integration project.
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 Next to the economic case for TTIP in terms of increased growth and 
employment, arguments of a more strategic and geopolitical nature became 
prevalent, whereby the possibility to continue setting standards for the global 
economy was singled out by EU and US leaders as a second key narrative 
underpinning the TTIP project. This project sought to overcome the perceived lack 
of competitiveness of the Western economies – and the European ones in particular 
– against the backdrop of the rapid emergence of a multipolar world order in 
which the EU and US were expected to share the centre stage of global policy-making 
with new key poles of capital accumulation, most notably the so-called BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) – a term first coined by 
Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in 2001. These large emerging economies 
have not only been considerably successful in their ‘catch-up’ process in terms of 
growth rates, but also arguably came to pose a threat or an alternative to Western 
dominated neoliberal capitalism (Bremmer, 2011; McNally, 2013; Kurlantzick, 
2016). Notwithstanding their radically different development trajectories and 
different state forms, the large emerging economies associated with the BRICS 
share a few common traits pertaining to the notion of state capitalism (for a 
discussion, see Alami and Dixon, 2020). Most notably, state activity in these 
economies generally tends to rest on a “close cooperation between various state 
and domestic business coalitions at the national and sub-national level, which 
gives rise to the notion of a rather fragmented, yet dynamic, state-permeated market 
economy” (Nölke et al., 2015: 543). It must be noted, however, that the ‘rebound of 
the state’ (Van Apeldoorn et al., 2012) in the organisation of the economy is not 
merely confined to emerging and developing economies, but also extends to the 
industrialised West, as for example shown by the large-scale state interventions in 
the wake of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008/9 and the prevalence 
of several transnational state-owned enterprises in certain sectors such as utilities, 
transportation and energy (Babic et al., 2017: 33). But the strong coordinative role 
of the state in orchestrating ‘catch up’ development strategies is what makes the 
state-permeated variegation of capitalism typical for large emerging economies 
distinctive. 
 Moreover, state capitalism is not a national phenomenon but rather embedded 
in the broader processes of capitalist transnationalisation and globalisation (Nölke 
et al., 2015: 542; Van Apeldoorn et al., 2012: 472-3). State capitalism in large 
emerging economies is characterised by both a ‘deep immersion’ in global trade 
and production networks and policies of “selective and phased integration into the 
global economy” (Nölke et al., 2015: 545), including the strategic use of inward and 
outward FDI, while actively supporting the transnational expansion of domestic 
industries (Alami and Dixon, 2020: 77). As emphasised by Van Apeldoorn et al. 
(2012: 482), many of the emerging contender states, including their state-owned 
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enterprises, “display an outward-looking,	 economically	 expansionist (rather than 
protectionist) outlook, integrating themselves into transnational circuits of 
capitalist production and finance”. This creates a contradictory dynamic and casts 
some doubts about whether state capitalism in large emerging economies poses a 
real threat or alternative to the neoliberal capitalism and the Washington 
Consensus. Both models are to a great extent mutually dependent and in 
competition with each other. The neoliberal model emerged in conjunction with 
‘spatial fixes’ strategies employed in the industrialised West in response to the 
structural crisis of ‘overaccumulation’, leading export-led development particularly 
in China to be largely dominated by FDI and foreign TNCs, particularly in 
electronics and telecommunication sectors (Panitch and Gindin, 2013: 152; see 
also Chapters Four and Five). Hence, the Chinese growth model largely drives on 
cheap labour and the ‘super-exploitation’ of workers and focuses on the assembling 
of products for export to North American and European markets (Bieler and 
Morton, 2018: 187; Hart-Landsberg, 2013). At the same time, China has translated 
its increased economic clout into expansionist strategies, for example through 
military influence in the South China Sea (Glaser, 2015), large government- 
sponsored and cross-border infrastructural projects such as the Belt and Road 
Initiative (Lim, 2016; Leverett and Bingbing, 2016), trade initiatives such as the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in South East Asia (Ye, 2015), and 
economic presence in the form of FDI – first in natural resources in South America 
and Africa and US government treasuries and more recently in acquisitions of 
strategic assets in the US and Europe (Drahokoupil, 2017; Meunier, 2014b). 
 Against the backdrop of the latter tendency, EU and US political leaders viewed 
TTIP therefore very much as a geopolitical project and as a means of consolidating 
their global position by comprehensive market integration into a transnational 
sphere of capitalist power and production relations with the aim to eventually 
project the underlying neoliberal principles and values onto the global scene. This 
was clearly revealed in a leaked letter from DG Trade to EU member state officials. 
“The progress we can make together on setting the standards on various forms of 
‘state capitalist’ behaviour can be seen as an instrument to shore up a particular 
interpretation of the global liberal economic order” (cited in Seattle to Brussels 
Network, 2013a: 27). In turn, this strategy needs to be understood against the 
background of securing and enhancing the global conditions for uninhibited 
capital accumulation and expansion by the hegemonic transnational capital 
fractions. 
 The strategic dimension of the TTIP project was first identified by the 
High-Level Working Group in its final report of 2013, in which it argued that the 
deal should “pioneer rules and disciplines that address challenges to global trade 
and investment that have grown in importance in recent years” and that further 
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transatlantic cooperation and market integration “could strengthen the 
rules-based multilateral trading system” (HLWG, 2013: 1, 6). TTIP would thus serve 
the purpose of reclaiming global hegemony through leadership and control over 
the multilateral trade agenda, which had been significantly scaled back since the 
political deadlock at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancún in 2003 in the wake 
of resistance from emerging market economies like India, Brazil, and to a lesser 
extent China (see Chapter Four). The TTIP project would then, in the words of then 
US State Secretary Hillary Clinton, constitute an ‘economic NATO’ (Van Ham, 
2013: 2) that would enable the EU and US to circumvent the stalled WTO talks and 
to advance global trade and investment liberalisation by means of bilateral efforts. 
What has been referred to as a ‘Transatlantic Common Economic Space’ (Barroso, 
2014), covering almost half of global GDP and one-third of global trade, would 
essentially put the transatlantic bloc back in the driver’s seat and to reassert global 
leadership over the multilateral trading system that they once created and 
dominated, thereby “sending a strong signal to China and the rest of the BRICS 
that there is still life in the good old nations of the West” (Techau, 2013; see also 
Venhaus, 2013; Ash, 2013). Hence, commentators dubbed TTIP as a ‘global 
regulatory blueprint’ or ‘gold standard’ that would “trigger a new wave of […] 
bilateral trade agreements by countries trying to avoid exclusion” (Dadush, 2013; 
Bolliky and Bradford, 2013). Such geo-economic strategies were even more 
aggressively pursued by the US as it was also engaged in negotiations on another 
mega-regional trade deal, namely the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would 
together with TTIP comprise around sixty per cent of global trade. In his State of 
the Union of 2015, US President Obama stated that “as we speak, China wants to 
write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region […] Why would we let that 
happen? We should write those rules” (White House, 2015). Hence, the 
strengthening of the transatlantic partnership through the successful conclusion 
of TTIP would effectively tie the EU to the reasserted global leadership role of the 
US with the goal to adapt the possible rise of other poles around the BRICS, and 
China in particular, to the rules of the game of the liberal order.
 Such a narrative supporting the TTIP project gained particular traction in the 
wake of increased geopolitical turmoil, most notably with the political unrest and 
violence in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and the conflict with Russia over 
Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2015: 40). 
With regard to the latter, advocates of TTIP pointed to the strategic imperative for 
enhancing Europe’s energy security and the need to diversify European energy 
imports. With the US shale gas revolution there was substantial untapped potential 
for an influx of North American liquefied natural gas and to reduce Europe’s 
dependence on Russian gas (Brattberg, 2015: 11-2; Hamilton, 2014: xxvi). Hence, it 
was frequently emphasised that an agreement between two regions that shared 
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similar normative values on democracy with respect for human rights and the 
rule of law as well as labour, environmental and consumer protection would serve 
as a guiding light in a world of darkness. In the words of one commentator, “[a]n 
agreement that commits both parties to sustain and uphold such principles and 
protections, not only vis-à-vis each other but together around the world, would be 
a strong affirmation of common values and a powerful instrument to ensure that 
such standards advance globally” (Hamilton, 2014: xiii). It seemed however highly 
unlikely that the EU and US would be able to overcome their regulatory differences, 
and even if they did so, this would not necessarily lead to the setting of global 
standards but more probably result in trade diversion towards other regions 
instead (De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2015: 59-61; Rollo et al., 2013). 
 Both key narratives showcased a potential to transcend the narrow commercial 
interests to the ‘general interest’ and were thereby expected to effectively appeal 
to wider sections of society, including political and social forces bound up with the 
centre-leftist discourse. As such, these narratives were key to a process of 
hegemonic articulation in which an essentially neoliberal discourse sought to 
generate social and political legitimacy of the underlying disciplinary agenda 
informing the TTIP project. 
7.3   The proposed content, form and scope of the TTIP  
investment rules
Investment protection and ISDS formed a key part of the TTIP project. The shared 
commitment to the establishment of an open and liberal investment regime with 
strong investment protection particularly crystallised in the context of revived 
transatlantic cooperation. One of the main substantive outcomes from the TEC 
framework was the publication of a joint statement on shared principles for 
international investment in April 2012. This statement called inter	alia for broad 
market access for foreign investors and strong protection against ‘discriminatory, 
arbitrary, and otherwise unfair or harmful treatment’, including the right to 
‘prompt, adequate, and effective compensation’ in the event of a direct or indirect 
expropriation as well as open and transparent investor-state dispute settlement 
(European Union and United States, 2012). The purpose of such shared principles 
was to strengthen the position of the EU and the US in negotiations with third 
countries, which would effectively constitute a first step towards a global standard 
for investment rules. The decision to include investment protection and ISDS in 
the TTIP negotiations ultimately came at the recommendation by the High-Level 
Working Group, which concluded in its 2013 report that a comprehensive 
agreement “should include investment liberalisation and protection provisions 
based on the highest levels of liberalisation and highest standards of protection 
that both states have negotiated to date” (HLWG, 2013: 3). 
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 Hence, the TTIP project would potentially have major implications for the 
global governance of transnational capital, as it set out to massively expand the 
amount of FDI to be covered by investment protection and ISDS. At the end of 2013, 
EU outward FDI stock in the US amounted €1,836 billion and inward EU FDI stock 
from the US was €1,676 billion (Eurostat, 2017). About one-third of all outward EU 
FDI stock would be covered by the TTIP agreement and 40 percent of all FDI coming 
from outside of the EU. These figures dwarfed those of any other FTA partner of the 
EU (see Table 7.2). For the US, the shares would be even larger. 51 percent of US 
outward FDI stock would be covered by TTIP and 60 percent of US inward FDI stock 
(IMF, 2020). The vast majority of transatlantic capital possibly empowered by TTIP 
involved FDI channelled through offshore investment hubs and conduit economies 
such as the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Ireland, and to a lesser extent, other 
major export-oriented economies in Western Europe such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany and France (see Figure 7.1).
The underlying rationales for including investment protection and ISDS in the 
negotiations were broadly in line with the two key narratives of TTIP as a post-crisis 
growth strategy and a geopolitical project. First of all, the European Commission 
perceived of investment protection as “a tool for states around the world to attract 
and maintain FDI to underpin their economy”, which in turn was promoted as a 
Table 7. 2   Top 10 countries as extra EU-28 partners for FDI stocks,  




Share (%) Value 
(billion EUR)
Share (%)
Extra EU-28 5,456.2 100 4,130.3 100
United States 1,835.6 33.6 1,676.0 40.6
Switzerland 676.8 12.4 491.5 11.9
Brazil 276.8 5.1 101.1 2.4
Bermuda 276.2 5.1 310.8 7.5
Canada 227.5 4.2 131.4 3.2
Russia 192.1 3.5 52.6 1.3
China 126.0 2.3 36.0 0.9
Hong Kong 112.6 2.1 57.5 1.4
Mexico 111.8 2.0 25.3 0.6
Singapore 98.5 1.8 36.8 0.9
Source: Eurostat, 2017
562932-L-bw-Verbeek
Processed on: 15-7-2021 PDF page: 240
240
CHAPTER 7
‘critical factor for growth and jobs’ (European Commission, 2013c: 3). As laid out 
more extensively in the introductory chapter of this thesis, claims along these 
lines have long been used by state officials worldwide as motivations for adhering 
to neoliberal investment rules, even though evidence on the purported benefits of 
ISDS in bringing more FDI remains inconclusive (see for example, Pohl, 2018; 
Johnson et al., 2018a; Bonnitcha, 2017). Secondly, TTIP was expected to contribute 
to the setting of global standards in the field of foreign investment regulation. For 
the EU, TTIP would be a means to “convince its trading partners of the need for 
clearer and better standards” (European Commission, 2013c: 3) and, in the words 
of EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht, would then become “the source of reference 
for investment treaties globally” (De Gucht, 2014b). The CETA compromise formed 
thereby as the prime example to follow. Towards the end of the CETA negotiations, 
the Commission launched a series of factsheets, myth-busters and other materials 
to promote the CETA investment chapter, which was heralded as a “new start for 
investment and investment protection” (European Commission, 2013c: 1, 2013d, 
Figure 7.1   US direct investment positions with EU-28 as of end 2013, in millions 
of US dollars
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2013e, 2013f). The Commission pointed thereby to the reaffirmation of the right to 
regulate, more precise definitions and standards such as FET and indirect 
expropriation, and certain new features in the ISDS system, such as protections 
against possible conflict of interests among arbitrators, protections against 
frivolous and unfounded claims, increased transparency and possible appellate 
mechanism, that was subsequently hailed as “the most progressive system of 
investor-state dispute settlement yet agreed in any agreement” (European 
Commission, 2013d: 2). The European Commission therefore sought to use the 
TTIP negotiations for a “‘root and branch improvement of the system” with the 
“relevant rules and conditions set out more clearly so as to underline the right to 
regulate” and to “improve procedures to make them more transparent” (European 
Commission, 2014a: 5-6). 
 From a legal perspective, the Commission justified the inclusion of an 
investment chapter in TTIP by arguing that “the US [judicial] system does not 
allow companies to use international agreements like TTIP as a legal basis in 
national courts” (Clancy, 2013). European investors would thereby not be able to 
enforce their substantive rights before US courts, deeming international 
arbitration like ISDS necessary for the enforcement of the agreement’s investment 
provisions (European Commission, 2013c: 5). In addition, the Commission referred 
to a number of occasions whereby the US courts seemingly treated foreign investors 
unfairly and considered these as evidence for potential risks for European investors 
(De Gucht, 2014c). Particularly, the Loewen	v.	United	States	and Mondev	v.	United	States 
cases served as illustrative examples of a ‘denial of justice’. The first case involved 
a Canadian investor in funeral services that was ordered to pay US$500 million in 
damages by a jury verdict in a Mississippi state court based on allegedly 
discriminatory considerations.106 The latter case involved a Canadian real estate 
company seeking to overturn a Massachusetts State Supreme Court decision in its 
contract dispute with a local government entity over a failed commercial 
redevelopment project and challenged a state law that limited immunity against 
tort claims to the local government actors.107 Both cases were however defeated 
before ISDS tribunals and as such did not render particularly strong examples of 
systemic and widespread discriminatory behaviour within US judicial systems in 
the treatment of foreign investors as suggested by the Commission (Poulsen et al., 
2015: 12). Moreover, the Havana	Club case was also referred to as an example of 
expropriation without compensation, in which the French company Pernod Ricard 
was prevented from using its Cuban trademark Havana Club rum for over ten 
years. In a similar vein, the US practice of extraterritoriality under the Helms-Burton 
act, according to which any foreign investor or citizen involved in business 
106 Loewen	v.	United	States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3.
107 Mondev	International	Ltd.	v.	United	States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2.
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transactions with Cuba could be prosecuted under US law, was also mentioned by 
the Commission, while at the same time suggesting that there were many “other 
examples of protectionist actions by US authorities which may impact foreign 
investors” (De Gucht, 2014c; for a critical discussion of these examples, see Poulsen 
et al., 2015: 11-3). 
 With regard to the content, form and scope of the proposed investment rules in 
TTIP, a number of (leaked) documents revealed the EU approach to investment 
protection and ISDS. After controversial debates in the Council, with among other 
things the French government demanding the exclusion of audio-visual services 
from the scope of the agreement, the EU member state governments granted the 
European Commission with the necessary mandates to start the TTIP negotiations 
in June 2013. As regards investment, these mandates broadly reflected the 
neoliberal discourse in line with the interests of the export-oriented Western 
European economies. Particularly, the EU aimed to negotiate “on the basis of the 
highest levels of liberalisation and highest standards of protection that both 
Parties have negotiated to date” and such negotiations should be building upon 
the “Member States’ experience and best practices regarding their bilateral 
investment agreements with third countries” (Council of the EU, 2013: paras	22-23). 
At the same time, the mandates consolidated some of the ISDS innovations and 
reform approaches taken in the CETA negotiations that deviated from the existing 
EU member state BITs, most notably on transparency, independence of arbitrators, 
predictability, binding interpretation, safeguards against frivolous claims and the 
possibility of creating an appellate mechanism (ibid.: para 23; see also Chapter Six). 
Crucially, the inclusion of investment protection and ISDS was made conditional 
upon “whether a satisfactory solution […] is achieved” (ibid.: para 22), thereby 
suggesting that there was no broad consensus among the EU member state 
governments about the preferred content, form and scope of such provisions in TTIP.
 EU and US negotiators exchanged their initial views on investment during the 
first round of negotiations in Washington on 7-12 July 2013. The US government 
tabled its 2012 model BIT and the European Commission presented a first draft 
proposal on a chapter on trade in services, investment and electronic commerce. 
Whereas CETA contained a stand-alone chapter on investment, the European 
Commission preferred to return to the approach taken in previous FTAs that 
followed the Minimum	 Platform	 on	 Investment (see Chapter Four). Although the 
content, form and scope of the EU draft text on investment largely emulated the 
compromise that emerged during the CETA negotiations, which were reaching 
their final stages by that time, a few minor but noteworthy deviations revealed the 
European Commission’s neoliberal strategic selectivity (European Commission, 
2013g). Notably, the envisaged regulatory space for governments to pursue public 
policy objectives appeared to be more restricted than under CETA. For example, it 
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was stipulated that “[c]onsistent with the provisions of this Title, each Party retains 
the right to adopt, maintain and enforce measures necessary to pursue legitimate 
policy objectives such as protecting society, the environment, and public health”, 
with the words put in italics effectively conditioning future governmental 
regulations and subordinating them to the investment protection provisions 
enshrined in TTIP. Likewise, the proposed annex on expropriation introduced a 
necessity and proportionality test for governmental measures taken to protect and 
enhance public policy objectives, something that the European Commission had 
proposed earlier during the CETA negotiations but which was rejected by the 
Canadian government. Moreover, the criteria listed under the provision of fair and 
equitable treatment was expanded to include “a breach of legitimate expectations 
of investors arising from a government’s specific representations or investment-in-
ducing measures” and “a disregard of the principle of effective transparency in 
any applicable administrative or judicial procedures” (ibid.: Article 12.2). The 
proposal also included the so-called umbrella clause that foreign investors could 
invoke in case of alleged breach of ‘any obligations’, including contractual ones, 
which was omitted from CETA at the strong insistence of the Canadian government 
(ibid.: Article 12.3). With regard to ISDS, the European Commission only listed a 
number of issues that it wanted to address in the TTIP negotiations, which were all 
in line with what was achieved under CETA (European Commission, 2013h). 
 To recap, the European Commission was primarily keen on consolidating the 
CETA compromise during the TTIP negotiations, which reflected on the one hand 
a deepening and expansion of neoliberal investment rules on market access and 
protection while incorporating certain elements pertaining to the centre-leftist 
discourse, most notably on safeguarding the policy space for governments to 
regulate in line with public policy objectives, clarifying some of the substantive 
protection standards, and bringing more transparency and accountability in ISDS 
procedures. Early TTIP proposals and draft texts revealed however the neoliberal 
preferences of the European Commission, while EU member state governments 
were internally divided.108 As further examined below, the decision to include 
provisions on investment protection and ISDS unleashed an unprecedented wave 
of societal and political opposition that fiercely challenged the neoliberal 
discourse. Between the third and fourth negotiation round, EU Trade Commissioner 
De Gucht unexpectedly announced to temporarily suspend the investment 
negotiations in TTIP with the purpose to launch an online public consultation on 
the matter (European Commission, 2014b). This announcement came not only as a 
reaction to growing public opposition against the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP, but 
arguably also with a view to find more time to deal with the many disagreements 
108 Summary of Member States’ replies to MD 127/13 – Request for Member States’ input on selected 
elements of US Model BIT (2012), Brussels, 16 October 2013.
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between the Commission and the EU member states, and among the EU member 
state governments.
7.4  The transatlantic corporate agenda behind TTIP
Organised transnational capital actors played a critical role during the preparatory 
stages in the run up to the launch of the TTIP negotiations and crucially informed 
the proposed content, form and scope of the agreement’s investment rules. These 
actors could build on extensive and close relationships with EU and US state 
officials and were actively invited to participate and inform the negotiation 
process. Such preferential institutional access dated back to the early 1990s when 
business associations from both sides of the Atlantic actively drove and supported 
the neoliberal project of transatlantic market integration. A crucial moment in 
forging transnational capitalist class agency was when US Secretary of Commerce 
Ronald Brown, the EU Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan and EU Industry 
Commissioner Martin Bangemann established the Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD) in November 1995, to assemble top executive-level management staff from 
leading EU and US transnational corporations representing both financial and 
productive capital fractions (Van Apeldoorn, 2002: 111; see also Cowles, 2001).109 
EU and US officials entrusted TABD members with a mandate to identify barriers 
to transatlantic trade and investment, which resulted in the formulation of a set 
of recommendations along neoliberal lines. From its inception, the TABD 
consistently emphasised the importance of non-tariff barriers to trade, thereby 
calling explicitly for regulatory cooperation and the mutual recognition of 
standards as well as the creation of a free trade zone and a transatlantic marketplace 
without “excessive domestic laws and regulations” (TABD, 1996; cited in 
Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011: 123; see also Pollack, 2003: 13). At the same time, 
the formation of other social and environmental dialogues across the Atlantic 
lagged behind. The institutional structures foreseen by the NTA existed above all 
to support the neoliberal agenda of further market integration and the narrow 
focus on trade liberalisation and deregulation failed to deliver the intended 
participation and involvement of different social groups. Platforms such as the 
Transatlantic Labour Dialogue and the Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue 
quickly dissolved, as associated groups did not believe that there was much to gain 
or achieve within a purely free-market driven framework (Meyer and Barber, 2011: 
108; Compa and Meyer, 2010). While the dialogues on neoliberal market integration 
gained traction, other societal and environmental issues hence disappeared from 
the agenda.
109 The TABD was later renamed as the Transatlantic Business Council after the merger with the 
European-American Business Council on 1 January 2013.
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 During the preparations for the TTIP negotiations, various transnational 
capital actors rapidly mobilised and embarked on concerted efforts to influence 
and shape the negotiation agenda. In 2013, a group of transatlantic business 
associations consisting of BusinessEurope, Eurochambres, European Services 
Forum, European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 
Transatlantic Business Council, Transatlantic Policy Network, American Chamber 
of Commerce to the EU, AmChams in Europe and the US Chamber of Commerce, 
launched the ‘Business Alliance for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership’ in order to “assisting governments throughout the negotiations and 
[…] do everything possible to bring this agreement to fruition” (BusinessEurope et 
al., 2013). These and other corporate groups channelled their neoliberal preferences 
already during the preparatory stages of the TTIP project and enjoyed privileged 
access to state negotiators prior to and during the negotiations. In the formal 
consultations for the HLWG report, out of the 48 stakeholders consulted, 43 were 
corporate representatives or their representative organisation. In another consultation, 
out of 52 submissions, only one did not come from industry (European Commission, 
2012e; Bartl and Fahey, 2014). Between January 2012 and February 2014, DG Trade 
officials had 597 informal meetings with stakeholders, of which 528 were with 
business representatives, while only 53 were with public interest groups. Among 
the business groups with the most encounters with DG Trade were encompassing 
business associations such as BusinessEurope, ESF, US Chamber of Commerce and 
Transatlantic Business Council, but also sectoral business associations such as 
European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, European Chemical Industry 
Council, European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, 
FoodDrinkEurope and DigitalEurope representing respectively large European 
food and beverage multinationals and Big Tech companies such as Apple, Microsoft 
and IBM (CEO, 2015c). Such informal channels proved crucial for advancing the 
TTIP agenda in line with the neoliberal discourse and the official negotiation 
positions of both the EU and the US largely reflected the interests of transnational 
capital (Young, 2013; Dür and Lechner, 2015; De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2015). 
 With regard to investment, organised transnational capital strongly advocated 
for the inclusion of provisions on investment liberalisation and protection. In 
their joint submission to the HLWG, BusinessEurope and the US Chamber of 
Commerce called for a ‘first class bilateral agreement’ based on the principles of 
non-discrimination, free movement of capital and full protection against 
expropriation (USCC and BusinessEurope, 2012: 2; see also CBI, 2013; BDI, 2013). 
Such an agreement was deemed necessary for “granting legal security to US and 
EU investment on both territories, liberalising new areas for investment, and 
strengthening international investment law” by setting up worldwide principles 
on investment as a ‘golden standard’ aimed at further integrating emerging 
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markets into the ‘global rules-based trade and investment-system’ (BusinessEurope, 
2012: 10; BusinessEurope, 2014a: 9). Particularly, the inclusion of a ‘world-class 
investment chapter’ with strong provisions on investment protection and ISDS 
were seen as important ‘deterrents’ against government regulations, with business 
also pointing to the increased likelihood to settle investment disputes with the 
existence of ISDS in TTIP (The	Guardian, 2016b; Chevron, 2013). In the context of 
burgeoning contestation to ISDS, organised transnational capital was also actively 
encouraged by DG Trade to support and defend TTIP. At the BusinessEurope Day in 
January 2014, EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht complained about losing 
public support for the free trade agenda and delivered the following message: “[w]
e need to see more of you in the press and at public events like this one around 
Europe saying exactly how and why you think trade agreements like this will help 
you grow your company and create jobs. So please, speak up!” (De Gucht, 2014d). 
Subsequently, business groups went in the offensive and organised various events 
and seminars with representatives of transnational corporations with experience 
in ISDS and DG Trade officials to promote the benefits of the system of investment 
protection and how to improve it (CEO, 2014b). This resulted in numerous position 
papers, factsheets, myth busters and op-eds in leading newspapers to debunk the 
increased concerns and criticisms against ISDS and to generate support for TTIP 
(Financial	 Times, 2014b; ICC UK, 2014; ICC Austria, 2014; BusinessEurope, 2014b; 
BDI, 2014). The European Commission managed to actively orchestrate business 
support for the reforms proposed and negotiated in CETA. For example, 
BusinessEurope was in favour of more transparency in ISDS proceedings and 
better ethical requirements for arbitrators, to clarify substantive provisions such 
as fair and equitable treatment or indirect expropriation, to adopt stricter rules to 
prevent frivolous and unfounded claims, and to explore the idea of an appeal 
mechanism (BusinessEurope, 2014b; 2014c). Also the German business association 
BDI published a roadmap for improved investment agreements that laid out 
possibilities for reform, which were very much in line with what was negotiated or 
contemplated under CETA.
 Organised capital was not unified in its support for ISDS in TTIP. Particularly, 
small-and-medium sized enterprises condemned the ISDS mechanism as being too 
expensive and cumbersome, and worried about bearing the costs of unsuccessful 
ISDS cases under the ‘loser pays’ principle first introduced under CETA. With 
average litigation costs per case of around US$8 million (Gaukrodger and Gordon, 
2012), ISDS was perceived as a system discriminatory in favour of the most 
resourceful transnational corporations. Indeed, a 2016 study confirmed that the 
main beneficiaries of ISDS, in the aggregate, have overwhelmingly been companies 
with more than US$1 billion in annual revenue – especially extra-large companies 
with more than US$10 billion – and individuals with more than US$100 million in 
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net wealth (Van Harten and Malysheuski, 2016). As the President of the German 
SME association Bundesverband	 Mittelständische	 Wirtschaft	 (BVMW) Mario Ohoven 
noted, “litigation is not really an option for small and medium-sized businesses as 
they run a serious risk of going bankrupt in the process” (Ohoven, 2014). Likewise, 
the French federation of telecoms operations Federation	Francaise	de	Télécoms saw no 
need for ISDS to safeguard French and European companies’ interests, while the 
European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME), 
representing approximately 12 million SMEs across Europe, demanded the 
European Commission to better take into account the interests of non-exporting 
SMEs with regard to the TTIP negotiations (UEAPME, 2014). 
7.5  The backlash against investment protection and ISDS in TTIP
After the approval of the EU negotiating mandates for the TTIP negotiations in 
June 2013 and the subsequent first round of talks the following month, political 
contestation and social mobilisation against TTIP kick-started almost immediately 
within the EU. NGOs from within the core group of the Seattle to Brussels Network 
were at the centre of an emerging pan-European campaign and could largely build 
on the discursive framing that they had developed since the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Critical in this regard were the publications of a number 
of reports that depicted the TTIP project as ‘A Brave New Transatlantic Partnership’ 
rendering a ‘corporate Utopia’ with severe socio-economic and environmental 
implications (Seattle to Brussels Network, 2013a), or as a ‘Transatlantic Corporate 
Bill of Rights’ posing a threat to democracy and the wider public interest (Seattle 
to Brussels Network et al., 2013). Such claims were underscored by various analyses 
mapping the corporate lobbies and their privileged access to DG Trade negotiators 
(CEO, 2015c), while NGOs, parliamentarians and the wider public were being left 
in the dark about what was on the negotiation table (Friends of the Earth, 2014a). 
The lack of transparency during the negotiations was also criticised by the 
European Ombudsman, which urged the European Commission to provide greater 
public access to negotiating documents and more balanced and transparent public 
participation (European Ombudsman, 2015). 
 The proposed provisions on investment protection and ISDS became one the 
main lightning rods for social opposition to TTIP. Such provisions would render a 
‘Trojan Horse’ allowing corporations to sue governments in ‘secret corporate 
courts’ in case new government regulations would negatively affect their profits 
(Friends of the Earth Europe, 2014b; Seattle to Brussels Network et al., 2013), 
making TTIP, in the words of British writer and environmental activist George 
Monbiot, nothing less than a “full-frontal assault on democracy” (The	 Guardian, 
2013). NGOs from both the EU and the US feared that the inclusion of ISDS in a 
trade deal between the largest economic blocs with 75,000 cross-registered 
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companies with subsidiaries in both regions, including the largest transnational 
companies in the world, would result in a litigation war (Public Citizen, 2014). 
Foreign investors from the US and Western European economies were indeed 
among the main users of ISDS worldwide (see Figure 7.2). Expanding their rights 
under TTIP would massively increase the possibility for those companies to claim 
compensation for legitimate government policies to protect public health, the 
environment and other public interests, and the mere threat of a billion-dollar 
claim would potentially pressure governments to water down or drop progressive 
regulations (CEO, 2014c). A key illustration of such a ‘chilling’ effect of ISDS was 
the announcement by New Zealand’s Minister of Health to delay the enactment of 
tobacco plain packaging legislation until after the ISDS claim by Philip Morris 
against Australia’s plain packaging rules had been resolved (Kelsey, 2017; Tienhaara, 
2018). Moreover, NGOs worried about the impact of ISDS on the regulatory capacities 
of governments to mitigate economic and financial crisis (Olivet and Eberhardt, 
2014), thereby pointing to a number of cases that emerged in the wake of the EU 
sovereign debt crisis (see Chapters Five and Six), and the possibility that fossil fuel 
investors would be able to sue governments for taking climate action, which could 
undermine the transition towards renewable energy (AITEC et al., 2015; Friends of 
the Earth Europe et al., 2016; Sierra Club, 2016). As regards the latter, such fears 
were underlined by a case lodged by Canadian energy company TransCanada 
Figure 7.2  Most frequent home states of ISDS cases, as of end 2013
Source: UNCTAD Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, last accessed at 13 June 2020.
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against the US in 2016, in which it claimed US$15 billion in compensation for the 
decision by US President Obama to revoke a permit for the controversial Keystone 
XL pipeline on the basis of climate considerations.110 
 Such concerns received widespread support from a wide range of NGOs and 
other social movements across the Atlantic. During the first round of negotiations 
in July 2013, more than fifty organisations from the EU and the US sent a letter to 
US President Obama, President of the EU Council Van Rompuy and President of the 
European Commission Barroso, denouncing the opaque and exclusive nature of 
the negotiations and opposing among other things the inclusion of provisions on 
investment protection and ISDS (Seattle to Brussels Network, 2013b). Before the 
third round of negotiations in December 2013, over a hundred organisations 
signed a letter with the sole demand to exclude ISDS from the TTIP negotiations 
(Seattle to Brussels Network, 2013c); in May 2014, more than 120 organisations 
strongly challenged the TTIP negotiations and rejected the inclusion of the 
investment part (Seattle to Brussels Network, 2014); and ahead of the twelfth 
negotiation round in February 2016 a total of 280 groups from across Europe with 
support of US and Canadian groups calling for the exclusion of ISDS from TTIP, 
CETA and other free trade agreements (Seattle to Brussels Network, 2016).
 Other groups that were more embedded within the institutional configurations 
of the EU, most notably through participation in the TTIP Advisory Group or other 
social dialogues and consultation mechanisms, did not categorically reject the 
free trade agenda as such, but joined the opposition to ISDS. Already prior to the 
launch of the negotiations, Europe’s main trade union organisation ETUC adopted 
a critical position on TTIP and demanded a ‘gold standard’ that would safeguard 
the policy space of governments to protect the interests of workers and citizens by 
inter	alia the strengthening of labour and environmental rights in the agreement, 
the narrowing down of investment protection and the exclusion of ISDS, the 
exclusion of public services and no further liberalisation of financial services 
(ETUC, 2013b). This position was upheld during the negotiations when the ETUC 
and its US counterpart AFL-CIO issued a joint declaration in July 2014 reiterating 
their opposition to ISDS (ETUC and AFL-CIO, 2014), with both later on stressing 
that the TTIP negotiations were ‘on the wrong course’ if they continued to include 
a ‘private justice system for foreign investors’ (ETUC, 2016). Also consumer 
organisations like the European Consumer Organisation and the Transatlantic 
Consumer Dialogue, public health groups such as the European Public Health 
Association, and environmental groups like European Environmental Bureau and 
Transport & Environment all vehemently opposed the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP 
(TACD, 2013; BEUC, 2014; Transport & Environment, 2014; EPHA, 2015).
110 TransCanada	v.	United	States, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21. The company dropped the claim after Obama’s 
successor Donald Trump approved the permit a year later.
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 The critique of TTIP was by no means limited to the issue of ISDS. The wide 
range of concerns related to the TTIP negotiations also brought together a wide 
variety of organisations and interest groups, activists and citizens from different 
perspectives anchored in many aspects of people’s everyday life. Particularly, it 
was feared that TTIP would bring about a deregulatory dynamic through the 
breakdown of non-tariff barriers, the liberalisation of services, regulatory 
cooperation and mutual recognition of standards, with adverse impacts on food 
quality standards, the regulation of chemicals and pesticides, affordable health 
care and medicines, labour rights, public services, environmental protection, data 
protection and financial regulation (for an overview, see Seattle to Brussels 
Network, 2013a; Hillary, 2015). Chlorinated chickens, genetically modified 
organisms and US hormone-treated beef became symbolic icons of the potential 
threats posed by TTIP. Other social forces related to nationally-oriented capital 
with a primary focus on production of goods and services for local, regional and 
national markets, or for markets within other European member states, also came 
to resist TTIP. These often involved small and medium-sized enterprises that feared 
increased competition from the massive influx of cheap US imports where 
producers face lower production costs due to less stringent regulations, lower 
labour standards and cheaper inputs, with potentially great impacts on 
employment within the EU (Veblen Institute, 2015; War on Want, 2016; The	
Independent, 2016). Such fertile cross-linkages between different and sometimes 
opposing societal interests were pivotal in the struggle against TTIP that centred 
on widely shared concerns regarding transatlantic market expansion and the 
extension of corporate power to the detriment of public policy objectives and 
democratic governance and accountability.
 A crucial moment in the build-up of the anti-TTIP campaign was the launch of 
a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) under the title Stop	 TTIP in July 2014 by a 
coalition of German NGOs led by Mehr Demokratie, ATTAC, Campact and others. 
The ECI called on the European Commission to recommend to the EU member 
states “to repeal the negotiating mandate for the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and not to conclude the Comprehensive Economic 
Trade Agreement (CETA)” on the basis of the inclusion of ISDS among other things. 
ECIs were introduced under the Treaty of Lisbon with the aim to increase direct 
democracy in the EU by enabling European citizens to call directly – after 
collecting over a million signatures – on the European Commission to propose a 
legal act in an arena where the EU member states conferred power onto the EU 
level. Despite collecting sufficient signatures over the course of summer 2014, the 
European Commission blocked the ECI and stated that the proposed initiative fell 
“outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a 
legal act of the Union” (EurActiv, 2014d). The refusal to register the ECI effectively 
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restricted the democratic potential for citizen participation in EU trade policy 
processes and further undermined the ability of citizens to use the ECI as an 
instrument to challenge established trade policy preferences.111 Subsequently, a 
so-called self-organised ECI was established as an online petition that managed to 
collect up to 3.3 million signatures between 7 October 2014 and 6 October 2015, 
primarily from Germany, the UK, France, Austria and the Netherlands. The 
initiative was supported by more than five hundred organisations including trade 
unions, social justice campaigns, human rights groups and consumer watchdogs 
from the different EU member states.
 The successful mobilisation behind the self-organised ECI helped to transform 
the NGO-led opposition into a full-fledged Stop	 TTIP movement that became 
widespread across Europe. Mass demonstrations started to occur more frequently 
and attracted increased amounts of people. Hundreds of thousands citizens 
participated in Days of Action against TTIP in different European cities, including 
Amsterdam, Brussels, London, Rome and Madrid, with more than 150,000 taking 
the streets of Berlin in October 2015 (Politico, 2015b). More than 2,000 municipalities 
and cities declared themselves as ‘TTIP-free zones’ and sixty mayors and elected 
local representatives signed a declaration in April 2016 calling for a suspension of 
the TTIP negotiations (TTIP Free Zones Europe, 2016). Other forms of direct action 
and civil disobedience included the organisation of public flash mobs, the 
spreading of posters, flyers and large banners on public buildings, and singing 
protests interrupting various high-level TTIP events (TTIP Game Over, 2016; 
Gardner, 2020: 105). And MEPs were targeted through Twitter-storms and e-mail 
bombs, sometimes reaching in the hundreds of thousands, especially around 
specific decision-making moments. What was once an obscure and little-known 
element of trade policy was now making headlines as large news broadcasters, 
television shows and online media in different EU member states frequently 
reported about TTIP and ISDS. 
 In the face of widespread dissent and contestation within Europe, MEPs started 
to turn their eye to the issue, which became a major point of contention particularly 
in the run-up to the European elections in May 2014. Political groups from both 
the left and the far-right were unequivocally opposed to TTIP and the inclusion of 
ISDS therein, albeit for different reasons (Siles-Brügge, 2017: 474). And although 
the S&D did not reject the TTIP negotiations altogether, it strongly opposed the 
inclusion of ISDS as this mechanism “could enable investors to circumvent 
conventional domestic judicial procedures and to initiate legal proceedings before 
111 The organisers of the ECI legally challenged the European Commission’s decision to reject the ECI. 
In May 2017, the European Court of Justice ruled that the European Commission had no legitimate 
reason to block the ECI and annulled the decision (European Court of Justice, 2017b). The European 
Commission decided not to appeal and registered the ECI in July 2017, long after CETA was signed and 
the TTIP negotiations were stalled (European Commission, 2017).
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international arbitration courts […] in order to claim compensation for an alleged 
loss of investment value” (S&D Group, 2014). At national level, various national 
parliaments also adopted critical positions on ISDS in TTIP, including Austria’s 
National Assembly, the Dutch Lower House and the French Senate (De Ville and 
Siles-Brügge, 2015: 104). Hence, during the course of the negotiations, it became 
clear that public and political support for TTIP and ISDS in particular was declining 
in Europe.
7.6  Towards an Investment Court System
In response to the growing and widespread societal and political discontent with 
the TTIP (and CETA) agreement, and in particular the issue of investment 
protection and ISDS therein, the European Commission launched a series of 
initiatives to restore and enhance support for the EU’s post-Lisbon trade and 
investment policy. With the arrival of Swedish Liberal Cecilia Malmström as the 
new EU Trade Commissioner in November 2014, the European Commission 
announced a ‘fresh start’ to the TTIP negotiations (European Parliament, 2014) 
that centred on a ‘transparency initiative’ building on earlier efforts made by her 
predecessor De Gucht (European Commission, 2014c; European Commission, 
2015a). Under his tenure, the Commission had already established a special 
Advisory Group in January 2014, which consisted of experts and stakeholders 
representing a broad range of interests, from environmental, health, consumer 
and workers’ interests to different business sectors to provide EU negotiators with 
input for TTIP. This was complemented by a proactive PR strategy, mainly through 
the creation of a Twitter account (@EU_TTIP_team) and a website devoted to TTIP, 
and the formal declassification of the TTIP mandates by the EU member state 
governments in October 2014 (Council of the EU, 2014). Malmström’s initiatives 
went as far as making EU negotiating texts and documents more publicly available 
and enhancing access to TTIP texts for MEPs by extending the use of a ‘reading 
room’ beyond those sitting in the INTA Committee. Such levels of transparency of 
EU trade negotiations were unprecedented at that time. 
 The most notable response with regard to investment, however, came in 
January 2014 when EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht decided to stall the 
negotiations on investment protection and ISDS in TTIP and launch an online 
public consultation on the matter (European Commission, 2014b). Between 27 
March and 13 July 2014, DG Trade received a record number of approximately 
150,000 submissions, which at one point made the designated website crash 
forcing the Commission to extend the deadline by ten days (European Commission, 
2014d). Although intended to generate more public legitimacy to investment 
protection and ISDS, the results of the public consultation reflected a widespread 
social opposition, which marked a major blow to the neoliberal investment 
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discourse. The scope of the consultation was limited to the EU proposals taken by 
the European Commission in the CETA negotiations, thereby leaving no room to 
question the desirability of including investment protection and ISDS in the first 
place. The vast majority – 97 percent – of the often collectively submitted responses, 
however, fundamentally rejected the inclusion of the ISDS mechanism altogether 
(European Commission, 2015b).
 Against the background of escalating opposition, the European Commission 
faced considerable pressure to withdraw the ISDS provisions from the TTIP 
negotiations. The incoming President of the European Commission Jean-Claude 
Juncker publicly announced in his political guidelines that the new Commission 
“will not accept that the jurisdiction of courts in the EU Member States be limited 
by special regimes for investor-state disputes”, putting the final approval of an 
eventual ISDS clause in TTIP in the hands of the new Vice-President of the European 
Commission Frans Timmermans (Juncker, 2014). The matter also created tensions 
within the European Commission and overshadowed the start of the tenure of 
incoming EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström. Allegedly, the German 
head of Juncker’s cabinet Martin Selmayr intervened with Malmström’s written 
testimony submitted before her confirmation hearing in the European Parliament 
in September 2014, suggesting that “no investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism will be part of that agreement”, even though Malmström herself was 
supportive of ISDS (Financial Times, 2014c). In response, as many as fourteen EU 
member state ministers, including from the UK, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland and the Czech Republic, sent a letter to the Commission insisting 
that the inclusion of ISDS was part of the mandate issued by the member state 
governments and should not be overruled by Juncker and his staff (Financial 
Times, 2014d). 
 During the following months, DG Trade officials were busy to flesh out 
renewed investment protection proposals for the TTIP negotiations and took the 
results of the public consultation as the starting point for a ‘root and branch 
improvement’ of the system. In its final report published in January 2015, the 
Commission identified four key areas in which further reform was deemed 
necessary: (a) the protection of the right to regulate; (b) the establishment and 
functioning of arbitral tribunals; (c) the relationship between domestic judicial 
systems and ISDS; and (d) the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate 
mechanism (European Commission, 2015b: 28). In a following concept paper with 
the title Investment	in	TTIP	and	beyond	–	the	path	for	reform,	published on 5 May 2015, 
the Commission spelled out the principles for further reform in these four key 
areas whereby the concluded agreements with Canada and Singapore served as a 
‘very high benchmark’. First, the Commission acknowledged that with regard to 
the right to regulate, “greater clarity in relation specifically to investment 
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protection and arbitration could be helpful” and steered towards a reaffirmation 
of the right to regulate “in a legal provision in the body of the relevant chapter” 
(European Commission, 2015c: 5). Second, in recognising the potential conflict of 
interests among arbitrators who could simultaneously act as lawyer or legal 
counsel in ISDS cases, the Commission proposed a requirement that all arbitrators 
were to be chosen from a fixed roster, which would allow to ‘break the link’ 
between the disputing parties and the arbitrators (ibid.: 7). Third, the inclusion of 
a bilateral appellate mechanism for ISDS would be able to review awards as regards 
errors of law and manifest errors in the assessment of facts, ensure consistency in 
the interpretation of the agreement and “increase legitimacy both on substance 
and through institutional design by strengthening independence, impartiality 
and predictability” (ibid.: 9). And fourth, the Commission proposed to ensure that 
parallel claims were to be prohibited so that investors could not obtain double 
compensation, possibly through the inclusion of a fork-in-the-road clause or a no 
U-turn clause. It was furthermore suggested to clarify the relationship between 
ISDS and domestic courts by confirming that the application of domestic law 
would not fall under the competence of ISDS tribunals, domestic law could be 
taken into account by ISDS tribunals only as a factual matter, and any interpreta-
tions of domestic law made by ISDS tribunals would not be binding on domestic 
courts (ibid.: 11). Importantly, the Commission considered these proposals as 
‘stepping stones’ towards the establishment of a multilateral system, both through 
bilateral EU trade and investment agreements and through the pursuit of a 
permanent court that would apply to multiple agreements and between different 
trading partners, thereby institutionalising ISDS on a global level (ibid.: 11-2). 
 Although these proposals were far from the proclaimed ‘fresh start’, essentially 
merely addressing some of the most pressing issues regarding the ad	hoc nature of 
the ISDS system while leaving the substantive investment protection provisions 
unchanged, they gained some traction particularly within social democratic 
circles. At a free trade conference hosted by the German SPD in February 2015, the 
German Minister of Economic Affairs Sigmar Gabriel met with EU Trade 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and pitched an alternative proposal centred on 
the idea of creating a permanent international investment tribunal (EurActiv, 
2015c; BMWI, 2015). Likewise, the French government put forward very similar 
ideas in a proposal submitted to the European Commission in June 2015 that, in 
the words of the French State Secretary for Foreign Trade Matthias Fekl, would 
establish new “dispute settlement practices for the 21st century” (EurActiv, 2015d; 
Fekl, 2015). And as outlined in the previous chapter, cooperation along the 
German-Franco axis also received support from other social democratic leaders 
across Europe and helped to generate the necessary political clout behind the idea 
of a permanent investment court.
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 These proposals also found their way within the ranks of the European 
Parliament where a majority opposition to ISDS was gaining ground. With pro-TTIP 
political groups pertaining to the neoliberal discourse (EPP, ALDE and ECR) only 
holding a minority, support in favour of the agreement, and the ISDS mechanism 
in particular, essentially came to rely on the S&D. While it did not categorically 
oppose a transatlantic trade agreement as such, the S&D unequivocally rejected 
the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP and CETA as outlined in an official position paper 
adopted in March 2015 (S&D Group, 2015). This position was also reflected in a 
draft report for a resolution by the European Parliament prepared by the German 
MEP for the S&D and Chair of the INTA Committee Bernd Lange and published in 
February 2015, which stipulated that investment protection in TTIP could “be 
achieved without the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism” and concluded that “such 
a mechanism is not necessary in TTIP given the EU’s and the US’ developed legal 
systems” (European Parliament, 2015a: para	K.1.d.xiv). 
 The S&D Group was, however, internally divided on the matter and key leaders 
started to abandon their critical position on ISDS. According to leaked minutes 
from a meeting between the European Commission and the EU member states in 
February 2015, the US government demanded the inclusion of ISDS in exchange 
for opening its government procurement market for EU competitors, which was 
one of the top priorities for DG Trade negotiators. Subsequently, the European 
Commission started to reach out to MEPs with the purpose to ‘manage’ the 
discussion on ISDS and S&D leaders began to pressure their members to drop their 
opposition (Wetzels and Harmsen, 2016). INTA Chair Lange remarkably shifted his 
position and after reaching a compromise with the EPP his final report no longer 
rejected ISDS but instead called for a ‘permanent solution’ along the lines of the 
European Commission’s concept paper, with a public international investment 
court as the “most appropriate means to address investment disputes” (European 
Parliament, 2015b: para S.1.d.xv). Lange was joined by another German S&D MEP 
and President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz, who reportedly assured 
to save the TTIP agreement during a private meeting with key figures of the EU’s 
power bloc, collectively referred to as the G5, consisting of himself, President of 
the European Commission Juncker, Vice-President of the European Commission 
Timmermans, EPP Group Chairman Weber and S&D Chairman Pittella (Politico, 
2015c).  
 At the same time, a group of dissident S&D MEPs submitted, together with 
other MEPs from both leftist (Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL) and right-wing populist 
groups (EFDD), a counter-proposal that opposed the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP, 
which received support from almost one-third of all S&D members (European 
Parliament, 2015c: amendment 27). It was only after a controversial postponement 
of the final vote by Schulz, allegedly with the purpose to ensure sufficient support 
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within the S&D rank-and-file, that the plenary ultimately adopted the resolution 
in July 2015 with a two-third majority from the S&D. Following an amendment 
that was brought in by INTA Chair Lange at the eleventh hour, this resolution 
recommended “to replace the ISDS system with a new system for resolving disputes 
between investors and states” with more specific elements listed that matched 
with the proposals by the European Commission (European Parliament, 2015d: 
para S.2.d.xv).  
 With the necessary support in the European Parliament secured, the European 
Commission formally announced its finalised proposal for a new Investment 
Court System (ICS) as published on 12 November 2015 after consultations with the 
Council and European Parliament for formal transmission to the US to re-engage 
in the negotiations on the investment chapter (European Commission, 2015d). The 
ICS would replace the existing ISDS mechanism in all ongoing and future EU 
investment negotiations, including TTIP. In terms of content and scope, the 
substantive provisions on investment protection remained largely untouched and 
basically followed the CETA text. The only substantive novelty was the reaffirmation 
of the right to regulate by stipulating that the investment provisions “shall not 
affect the right of the Parties to regulate […] through measures necessary to achieve 
legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, 
environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or promotion and 
protection of cultural diversity” (European Commission, 2015e: Article 2(1)). The 
inclusion of a reference of this kind in the legal body of the text itself should be 
understood as a concession to the centre-leftist discourse to better safeguard the 
regulatory capacities of states without having to water down the core provisions 
on investment protection. 
 With regard to form, the ICS would build on existing procedural reforms 
already achieved in CETA. Most notably, the proposal would replace the ad	hoc ISDS 
mechanism by setting up an investment court system composed of a tribunal of 
first instance and an appeal tribunal similar to national or international courts 
such as the International Court of Justice and the WTO Appellate Body. The 
tribunal of first instance would be composed of fifteen ‘judges’ appointed jointly 
by the EU and the US for a six-year term of which five would be EU nationals, five 
US nationals and five nationals of third countries (ibid.: Article 9(2)). Three judges 
would be assigned randomly to each case, instead of being appointed by the 
parties, but always one from the EU, one from the US and one from a third country, 
who would also serve as the chairman (ibid.: Article 9(6)). The judges would obtain 
a monthly retainer fee (ibid.: Article 9(12)), although fixed tenures with regular 
salaries were foreseen as a possibility upon mutual agreement (ibid.: Article 9(15)). 
The proposed appeal tribunal was to be composed of six members jointly appointed 
for a six-year term (ibid.: Article 10). Both the members of the tribunal of first 
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instance and the appeal tribunal were subject to ethical requirements, including 
the prohibition from acting as legal counsel or as expert or witness in any 
investment disputes, in order to enhance independence and impartiality (ibid.: 
Article 11(1)). Moreover, the European Commission committed itself to start 
working together with other countries on setting up a permanent international 
investment court with the purpose to replace all investment dispute resolution 
mechanisms provided in EU FTAs, EU member state agreements with third 
countries and in trade and investment agreements concluded between non-EU 
countries over time. The creation of such a multilateral court was said to “further 
increase the efficiency, consistency and legitimacy of the international investment 
dispute resolution system” (European Commission, 2015f).   
 In sum, the ICS was essentially nothing more than an expanded arbitrator 
roster with an appeal mechanism, something already anticipated under the CETA 
agreement, yet was presented as a radically ‘new’ system of investment dispute 
resolution that fundamentally differed from the ‘old’ system of ISDS. In the words 
of Vice-President of the European Commission Timmermans, “[w]ith this new 
system, we protect the governments’ right to regulate, and ensure that investment 
disputes will be adjudicated in full accordance with the rule of law” (European 
Commission, 2015g). The ICS proposal reflected a further step towards the 
‘embeddedness’ of foreign investment regulation by further institutionalising and 
entrenching the practice of ISDS in court-like structures, but at the same time gave 
the European Commission the political leeway to considerably expand investor 
rights in line with the neoliberal project by co-opting and neutralising certain 
centre-leftist elements within the EU’s power bloc. This became manifest by the 
decision to include the ICS proposal in the EU-Vietnam FTA for which negotiations 
concluded in December 2015, and the inclusion of most parts in CETA as agreed 
with Canada in February 2016 (European Commission, 2016a; European 
Commission, 2016b).  
7.7   The demise of TTIP and the roll out of the Investment  
Court System
During the course of 2016, political support for the TTIP project started to crumble. 
Major disagreements between the EU and the US remained unresolved, including 
on issues such as government procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
regulatory convergence on standards and conformity assessments, and trademarks, 
generic names and geographical indicators, with US officials showing little 
appetite for the EU’s proposal for an Investment Court System (US and EU, 2017; 
EurActiv, 2015e). In May 2016, the French President Hollande threatened to reject 
TTIP in light of French reservations with regard to agriculture and France’s State 
Secretary for Foreign Trade Fekl called for a suspension of the negotiations in the 
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summer due to the perceived reluctance on the part of the US government to make 
further concessions (EurActiv, 2016b; The	Guardian, 2016c). These statements were 
echoed by the German Minister of Economics Gabriel who admitted that the TTIP 
negotiations had ‘de facto failed’, as the two sides could hardly agree on any item 
after fourteen rounds of talks. With surveys showing plunging public support for 
TTIP in Germany, indicating widespread fears of lowering standards for products, 
consumer protection and labour markets, Gabriel considered the project ‘dead in 
the water’, thereby concluding that “[w]e must not allow ourselves to submit 
ourselves to the American proposals [..] In Europe we have our way of living 
together” (EurActiv, 2016c; EurActiv, 2016d). Only twelve EU member state 
governments, including the UK, Italy, Spain, Finland and Sweden, continued to 
back the TTIP negotiations and wrote a joint letter to EU Trade Commissioner 
Malmström in September 2016 in support of the deal, with Germany and France 
notably absent (EurActiv, 2016e). The final blow to the TTIP project came with the 
election of the Republican Donald Trump as the new US President in November 
2016 and the concomitant rise to power of the right-wing and populist discourse, 
which centred on an ‘America First’-type of foreign economic policy and a major 
overturning of Obama-era trade initiatives, most notably reflected by the US 
withdrawal from the TPP agreement and the reversal of US sponsorship of 
multilateral trade policy (Tooze, 2018: 591-7). Ultimately, EU Trade Commissioner 
Malmström concluded in November 2016 that “TTIP will probably be in the freezer 
for quite some time” (EurActiv, 2016f) after which the transatlantic economic 
relationship became characterised by increased trade tensions. 
 From the ashes of the failed TTIP project, however, arose a new European 
model of foreign investment regulation that has since then been actively pursued 
by the European Commission with support from EU member state governments 
and the European Parliament. The ICS model has become a standard feature in 
post-Lisbon EU FTA negotiations and already found its way in the signed agreements 
with Canada, Singapore and Vietnam, all ratified by the European Parliament, the 
concluded negotiations with Mexico, and ongoing negotiations with Indonesia, 
Chile and Tunisia. The fact that investment protection was dropped from the 
EU-Japan FTA negotiations, mainly due to irreconcilable differences on dispute 
resolution, indicates that the European Commission is not willing to accept 
anything else but its ICS mechanism. As the European Commission clearly 
indicated, “[a]nything less ambitious, including coming back to the old Inves-
tor-to-State Dispute Settlement, is not acceptable […] For the EU, ISDS is dead” 
(European Commission, 2018b). Meanwhile, the European Commission and the EU 
member states have been actively pursuing the establishment of a multilateral 
investment court (MIC) under the auspices of the United Nations Commission of 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) since 2017. Such a MIC would be a permanent 
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body that would decide investment disputes arising under existing and future 
trade and investment agreements and would move away from ad	 hoc	 ISDS 
procedures by setting up a tribunal of first instance and an appeal mechanism 
with full-time adjudicators appointed by the MIC member states. A standing 
two-tier mechanism is said to bring greater predictability, consistency and 
correctness in investor-state dispute resolution and would seek out to address 
other concerns related to independence and impartiality of the adjudicators and 
bringing down the costs and duration of proceedings (UNCITRAL, 2019).
  Notwithstanding the reforms and innovations brought by the ICS/MIC model, 
many of the systemic imbalances and asymmetries in the allocation of rights and 
responsibilities characteristic of the neoliberal mode of foreign investment 
regulation remain intact under the embedded neoliberal compromise. Most 
importantly, the ICS/MIC model continues to provide a parallel and preferential 
legal system of investment protection only available to one class of actors, that is, 
the transnational capitalist class, by allowing them to by-pass domestic legal 
systems and courts and bring their investment disputes directly before international 
arbitration (see also Kumm, 2015; Yilmaz Vastardis, 2018). Transnational corporations 
and their shareholders are still granted with a wide set of property rights that 
leave considerable discretion to adjudicators to interpret those expansively and to 
potentially establish new property rights otherwise not recognised in the domestic 
context (Poulsen et al., 2015: 22-3; Johnson, 2018; Schneiderman, 2016). This would 
further shift the risk of regulatory change from investors to states and taxpayers, 
while putting increased pressures on the regulatory capacities of governments.112 
Although the EU approach places great emphasis on the reaffirmation of the 
so-called right to regulate, a euphemism for decision-making by democratic 
institutions such as governments, parliaments and courts, this does not preclude 
the possibility for transnational capitalists to seek compensation for the 
introduction of laws, regulations or court-decisions that are allegedly in breach of 
the substantive investment protection standards (Van Harten, 2015b: 4-5). Claims 
for compensation, particularly on the basis of vague notions of ‘fair market value’, 
would allow adjudicators to inflate damages to billions of dollars with enormous 
financial impacts on host state governments (Sachs, 2019; Bonnitcha and Brewin, 
2020; Marzal, 2020), which could still constrain and discipline future state 
behaviour, and thus effectively enhance the potential for regulatory chill (cf. 
Tienhaara, 2018). 
112 Although post-Lisbon EU FTAs establish an institutional structure consisting of joint committees 
entrusted with a broad mandate to take binding decisions and treaty interpretations, they further 
shift the exercise of public authority in the hands of the executive without parliamentarian 
involvement and thus at the detriment of democratic legitimacy and institutional balance (see for 
example, Weiss, 2019). 
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 At the same time, these extensive investor rights are not equated with a 
meaningful set of corresponding investor obligations. EU FTAs are still designed to 
primarily redress the mistreatment of foreign investors and generally fail to raise 
the bar on imposing investor responsibilities to respect human rights and 
environmental standards (see also Gathii and Puig, 2019; Cotula, 2018; Arcuri, 
2019).113 Within the overall architecture of EU FTAs, provisions on labour, 
sustainable development and corporate social responsibility are typically dealt 
with in separate chapters containing generalised, hortative references to 
non-binding and aspirational standards, primarily targeted at states rather than 
the investors, that are explicitly excluded from the agreements’ dispute settlement 
mechanisms and instead rely on dialogue and consultation mechanisms (Bernas-
coni-Osterwalder and Mann, 2019; Marx et al., 2017; Orbie et al., 2016). This stands 
in stark contrast with the investment chapters in EU FTAs that contain strong and 
binding investment protection provisions and a self-standing enforcement 
mechanism at the disposal of foreign investors.
 Significant steps have been made to address the lack of judicial independence 
and impartiality with regard to dispute resolution. The bilateral ICS model 
however remains a for-profit system of adjudication in which only foreign investors 
can bring claims allowing for lucrative remuneration of the adjudicators and thus 
still retains the possibility for producing reasonable perceptions of bias (Van 
Harten, 2016b). In that sense, the MIC proposal goes a step further by moving 
towards a system of fully tenured adjudicators with the purpose to establish full 
independence and impartiality. Nevertheless, both the ICS and MIC models still 
contain many of the widely recognised systemic flaws and imbalances common to 
ISDS. Foreign investors are still not required to first exhaust domestic remedies 
before submitting a claim, contrary to what is required under customary 
international law and international human rights law (Kelsey et al., 2019: 7-10; 
Brauch, 2017). Although the ICS/MIC model seeks to strengthen consistency in 
the application and interpretation of the investment rules in specific EU FTAs, 
and potentially across wider agreements, it does not necessarily tackle, and may 
even exacerbate, inconsistencies and conflicts with other areas of law and policy, 
such as domestic law, environmental and human rights law, and sustainable 
development objectives (Johnson and Sachs, 2018; Krajewski, 2017). 
 Moreover, the ICS/MIC model only provides for limited avenues for investment- 
affected citizens and communities, whose rights or interests may be at stake in a 
particular investment dispute, to participate in the proceedings, most notably 
through amicus	 representation (Perrone, 2019; Kelsey et al., 2019; Cotula and 
113 At the minimum, post-Lisbon EU FTAs require covered investment to be “made in accordance with 
the applicable law at the time the investment is made” (CETA Article 8.1) and exclude investors 
from ISDS if “made through fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, corruption, and conduct 
amounting an abuse of process” (CETA Article 8.18(3)). 
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Schröder, 2017).114 This may even be exacerbated when investment disputes are 
being settled out of court without proper democratic scrutiny whereby the investor 
and the state reach a deal that might affect the rights and interests of third parties 
(Hafner-Burton et al., 2017; Johnson and Skartvedt Güven, 2017). In a similar vein, 
the possibilities for states to file counterclaims against investors for any breach of 
their international obligations, allowed under some IIAs, are explicitly ruled out 
from EU FTAs, thereby further contributing to the structural asymmetry of the 
global investment treaty regime and the wider gaps in the global governance of 
transnational capital.115 Finally, EU FTAs still expressly desire that the adjudicators 
have demonstrable expertise in international investment law, and in the resolution 
of disputes arising under international investment or trade agreements in 
particular. Despite the aims to bring greater diversity among the adjudicators (e.g. 
UNCITRAL, 2019: para 21), future investment disputes under EU FTAs are likely to 
be handled by the same ‘clubby crowd of investor-friendly arbitrators’ that have 
thus far dominated ISDS (Van Harten, 2016b).116 In sum, the post-Lisbon EU 
investment policy that emerged in the wake of the CETA and TTIP negotiations 
sets out to further institutionalise and perpetuate the structural imbalances 
within the system of investment protection in favour of transnational capital. By 
focusing merely on procedural reforms rather than the underlying substantive 
standards, the currently envisaged MIC setting out to replace all ICS mechanisms 
under EU FTAs would, in the words of one commentator, become “a device for 
neoliberal rules of investment protection with even greater authority” (Sornarajah, 
2016).
7.8  The resilience and political limits of embedded neoliberalism 
This ultimately begs the question why the post-Lisbon EU investment policy did 
not bring about a fundamental break away from the prevalent neoliberal 
regulatory discourse. Returning to the five conditioning factors that were 
identified in the theoretical chapter of this dissertation helps to answer this 
question. First, dominant political and social forces have construed the eroding 
support for the global system of investment protection in terms of a legitimacy 
crisis, or in other words, as a crisis within the existing system rather than a crisis of 
114 In its TTIP proposal, the European Commission foresaw the right of intervention for third parties with 
a direct interest in the proceeding, albeit limited to the option of supporting one of the two disputing 
parties’ positions. This proposal was not reflected in the CETA, EU-Singapore and EU-Vietnam 
agreements. The EU proposal for a MIC foresees that “third parties, for example representatives 
of communities affected by the dispute, may be permitted to participate in investment disputes” 
(UNCITRAL, 2019: para 29).
115 See CETA Article 8.40; EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement Article 3.20; EU-Vietnam 
Investment Protection Agreement Article 3.56.
116 A first testimony to this was the agreed roster of arbitrators for general dispute settlement under 
CETA Article 29. Of the sixteen members by the EU and Canada, there were only six women with none 
appointed as chairperson, and nobody from a least developing country (Council of the EU, 2019).  
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the system. By downplaying the problems and widespread concerns emanating 
from the inherently asymmetric nature of the system, whereby the public interest 
of states and citizens remains subordinate to the private interests of investors (see 
for example Duva et al., 2019; Arcuri and Violi, 2019; Albi et al., 2016), in terms of 
a legitimacy crisis, it is suggested that the system could be fixed through mere 
institutional tweaks or other middle-ground solutions while remaining the 
fundamentals intact. This is reflected in the European Commission’s staunch 
belief that the main shortcomings of the system stem from the ad	hoc nature of 
dispute settlement, rather than from the underlying one-sided substantive rules 
on investment protection, with the understanding that bringing permanency in 
dispute settlement would produce more stability and predictability for states, 
investors and other actors, and reduce the potential for regulatory chill (see for 
example, Brown, 2018). Particularly, it was considered crucial that justice had to 
be “seen to be done”, indicating that the European Commission was more 
concerned with changing the perception of investor-state dispute resolution than 
with addressing its structural problems, while reiterating that the main purpose 
of the proposed reforms was to “rebuild trust in the system and, consequently, 
improve the recognition and implementation of its decisions” (European 
Commission and Government of Canada, 2017: 3). Thus far, the solutions pursued 
by the EU reflect a strategic attempt to keep as much of the system of investment 
protection intact by incorporating some procedural concessions rather than 
abolishing ISDS altogether and tackling the deeper structural problems 
underpinning the global system of investment protection.
 At the same time, expanding investor rights under EU FTAs has become a 
central feature of post-Lisbon EU trade policy. The European Commission continues 
to wholeheartedly promote neoliberal investment policies with the aim to “attract 
FDI by extending and deepening the single market, ensuring open and competitive 
markets inside and outside Europe, improving European and national regulation, 
and expanding and upgrading Europe’s infrastructure and its scientific base” 
(WTO, 2017: 38). As explained in Chapter Five, neoliberal trade and investment 
policies became a key feature of the EU’s macroeconomic strategies in response to 
the global financial and economic crisis to restore and enhance EU competitive-
ness, and strong market access and protection for EU companies abroad formed a 
crucial part of that strategy. As explained by the European Commission, investment 
protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement is “key in creating a stable 
environment for companies to do business” and forms “part of a bigger set of 
policies designed to foster growth through encouraging the creation of regional 
and global value chains which can spur growth” (Brown, 2018: 8). This would 
furthermore contribute to the expansion and deepening of what has been referred 
to as ‘hyperglobalisation’ (UNCTAD, 2018) whereby the model of export-led growth 
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in combination with increasing concentration of markets in the hands of a 
shrinking number of even larger and more transnational economic actors has led 
to inequitable economic development through the erosion of both countervailing 
worker bargaining power and effective state regulation, with the gradual dilution 
of the social and political accountability of transnational corporations as a result. 
With social policy areas such as the protection of labour rights, consumers and the 
environment or provisions preventing corporate tax avoidance largely 
unenforceable, post-Lisbon EU FTAs are becoming “a mechanism for promoting 
rentseeking by large exporting firms, especially through provisions pertaining to 
[intellectual property rights], cross-border capital flows, investor-state dispute 
settlement procedures and the harmonisation of regulatory standards, etc., which 
have little to do with ‘trade’ in the strict sense” (UNCTAD, 2018: 43; see also Rodrik, 
2018; Piketty, 2016). Hence, only minor procedural innovations have been adopted 
to restore legitimacy of a system aimed at enhancing global patterns of capital 
accumulation, and thus further tipping the balance in favour of transnational 
capital, rendering EU responses in the field of foreign investment regulation 
merely reformist in nature. 
 Second, there has been no structural shift in the underlying balance of power 
between social forces in relation to newly emerging accumulation structures. The 
post-Lisbon EU investment policy continues to cater the interests of transnational 
productive and financial capital fractions and new generation EU FTAs further 
incentivise transnational accumulation structures rather than curbing them. As 
explained in Chapter Five, transnationalisation strategies were a key response to 
the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-9 and the subsequent Eurozone 
crisis, which became reflected in a surge in extra-EU FDI targeting large (emerging) 
markets as important spatial fixes. Particularly, the share of global accumulation 
through fiscal-incentives-seeking FDI continued to increase with ‘phantom’ capital 
accounting for forty percent of the global stock of FDI, or around US$15 trillion in 
total, equivalent to the annual national income of China and Germany combined, 
playing no productive role in host economies but rather shifted around the world 
with the sole purpose of reducing corporate tax liabilities (Financial	Times, 2019; 
Damgaard et al., 2019). As shown throughout this dissertation, organised 
transnational capital actors, representing primarily productive and to a lesser 
extent financial fractions, with a key interest in expanding market access and 
investment protection abroad have been highly influential in driving and 
sustaining the neoliberal content, form and scope of the post-Lisbon EU investment 
policy. 
 This does not mean that organised transnational capital unequivocally 
supported the EU reforms. Many business groups and private companies 
vehemently opposed the views of the European Commission that the existing 
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system of ISDS was broken and in need of structural reform and reiterated that the 
system was in fact functioning satisfactorily to their advantages (BusinessEurope, 
2015; TABC, 2015; AFEP, 2017; USCIB, 2017; Chevron, 2017). Corporate lobby groups 
such as BusinessEurope, US Chamber of Commerce and ESF feared that the 
included provision on the reaffirmed right to regulate, in combination with 
perceived limitations stemming from the renewed standards of fair and equitable 
treatment and indirect expropriation, might “substantially limit the scope of 
legitimate investment protection” (BusinessEurope, 2015: 4; Politico, 2015d; ESF, 
2016). Moreover, moving away from a system in which the investor was given the 
opportunity to choose one of the three arbitrators towards a system on the basis of 
a fixed roster of publicly appointed arbitrators who would be randomly assigned to 
cases raised major concerns about the potential bias in favour of states 
(BusinessEurope, 2015: 5; see also EFILA, 2017; ESF, 2017). At the same time, it was 
often acknowledged that some changes were required to save the system of 
investment protection from sinking. The ESF for example stated that various of its 
members accepted that “the political situation in the EU made unlikely that it will 
come back from the bilateral solution of the Investment Court System established 
in CETA and other FTAs” (ESF, 2017). BusinessEurope generally welcomed the 
reforms “as an important step in the right direction” (BusinessEurope, 2019: 28), 
whereas the German BDI supported “the long-term objective of implementing a 
multilateral dispute settlement” (BDI, 2015: 19). It is along such lines that organised 
transnational capital voiced overall support for the new EU approach taken in 
FTAs and its MIC proposal.
 Third, despite the mass protests and the formation of a widespread movement 
against TTIP and CETA, no clearly articulated counter-hegemonic project around 
which a new constellation of social forces could coalesce has surfaced yet in 
Europe. Neoclassical economic theories of comparative advantage, underpinning 
the spread of the neoliberal ideology during the past decades, are still dominating 
EU trade policy and alternative visions on more democratically controlled and 
sustainable trade and investment policies have not found their way yet within the 
EU’s power bloc. A point of reference hereby is the Alternative Trade Mandate 
developed by an alliance of more than fifty European organisations representing 
farmers, trade unions, human rights advocates, environmentalists, fair trade 
networks and development workers calling for an overhaul of the neoliberal trade 
regime and envisioning workable alternatives on a democratic, fair and sustainable 
trade regime (ATM, 2013). This initiative, which took place during 2012 and 2013, 
successfully mobilised a broad range of different perspectives and material 
interests sharing common values with regard to democracy, cooperation, public 
participation, human rights, social justice, gender equality and sustainability. It 
centred on broad principles such as increased role of governments in regulating 
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trade and investment in pursuit of industrial and (sustainable) development 
strategies, prioritising local and regional food markets and respecting food 
sovereignty, universal access to high-quality public services, social protection, 
high labour and environmental standards, democracy and transparency. 
 Several political groups in the European Parliament endorsed these principles, 
and the ATM became a rallying point in the run-up of the European elections in 
2014. Since then, the political centre and left seemed unable, however, to further 
develop the ATM in a powerful alternative project that could challenge the 
neoliberal discourse and fundamentally restructure the current trade and 
investment regime. Different individual NGOs and progressive leaders have 
developed similar proposals on setting course for a more sustainable trade agenda 
(Friends of the Earth Europe, 2018; Campact, 2017; Namur Declaration, 2016; Mehr 
Demokratie, 2016), but such efforts largely failed to establish the necessary 
political linkages and generate wider public support. Meanwhile, such social 
forces were unable to generate TTIP-levels of mobilisation and contestation to 
other ongoing and concluded EU FTA negotiations, such as the ones with Japan, 
Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Tunisia, Australia, New Zealand and Mercosur. 
Opposition to the EU trade agenda became effectively reduced again to a handful 
of specialised NGOs criticising particular elements of the EU trade agenda (e.g. 
forestry, labour rights, animal welfare) rather than challenging the neoliberal 
trade discourse as a whole (see for example, FES, 2020; FERN, 2018; Transport & 
Environment, 2017; Eurogroup for Animals, 2019). 
 Fourth, the European Commission enjoys significant powers reflected in its 
strategic selectivity and operational autonomy vis-à-vis other parts within the EU 
institutional ensembles and wider societal interests, and has been able to take a 
proactive approach in redrafting the substantive and procedural investment rules 
in a way still compatible with the neoliberal discourse. Most notably, the European 
Commission ignored calls by the European Parliament to exclude speculative 
forms of investment from the scope of EU FTAs and to include an obligation for 
investors to exhaust local judicial remedies (European Parliament, 2011a: paras 11 
and 31) and the recommendation to exclude ISDS from the CETA negotiations and 
maintain a state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism to address investment 
disputes (European Parliament, 2011e: para 11). In relation to the EU member state 
governments, the Commission unilaterally claimed exclusive competences on 
both FDI and portfolio investment on the basis of Article 207 TFEU (see Chapter 
Five) and sought for example to present the CETA deal as an ‘EU-only’ agreement 
(EurActiv, 2016g). It was only after fierce pressure on the highest political level, with 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel herself intervening, that the Commission 
ultimately presented CETA as a ‘mixed agreement’ to the Council in July 2016, 
with the exclusion of investment protection from the scope of provisional 
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application prior to national ratification (European Commission, 2016c). Moreover, 
the European Commission failed to check the compatibility of the investor-to-state 
dispute settlement mechanism in CETA with EU law and refused to ask the ECJ for 
an opinion on the matter (EurActiv, 2015f). Such a request eventually came from the 
Belgian government as part of the compromises reached in the wake of the 
tumultuous CETA signing and the Walloon opposition in October 2016. Twelve EU 
member states had already ratified CETA by the time the ECJ confirmed in a 
landmark ruling in April 2019 that the agreement was in line with EU law (Council 
of the EU, 2020; European Court of Justice, 2019). 
 The provisional application of EU FTAs itself marks a rather undemocratic 
feature of EU trade policy by allowing FTAs to be provisionally applied even before 
all the necessary ratification steps at member state level have taken place, thereby 
increasing the pressure on national parliaments to vote in favour. After the ECJ 
found in its Opinion 2/15 on the EU’s powers to conclude the EU-Singapore FTA, 
delivered in May 2017, that the EU has exclusive competence only with respect to 
direct investment (European Court of Justice, 2017a), the European Commission 
decided to split the EU-only trade parts from the mixed investment parts of EU 
FTAs. This resulted in the conclusion and signing of separate free trade agreements, 
including also investment liberalisation and market access, to be ratified at EU 
level on the one hand, and investment protection agreements to be ratified both at 
EU and member state level on the other hand. At the time of writing, the European 
Commission has applied this approach in the agreements with Singapore and 
Vietnam, signed respectively in 2018 and 2019. 
 In relation to wider societal interests, the European Commission clearly 
ignored the many voices calling for a withdrawal of investment protection 
provisions and ISDS/ICS from EU FTAs, including from trade unions, small-and-
medium-sized enterprises, human rights and consumer groups, farmers, 
environmental organisations, judges and legal experts, academics and citizens. In 
line with its structurally inscribed neoliberal preferences, the European 
Commission continued to pursue the expansion of investor rights in spite of 
mounting social opposition. It sidestepped the many negative and critical reactions 
received in the public consultation on ISDS in TTIP and further limited citizens’ 
participation by refusing to register the ECI. The resulting new ICS/MIC model was 
considered as a ‘slap in the face of public opinion’ (Seattle to Brussels Network, 
2015) that was essentially nothing more than ‘putting lipstick on a pig’ (Global 
Justice Now, 2015) or a mere ‘rebranding exercise’ of ISDS (Eberhardt, 2016). The 
relative autonomy of DG Trade and the ensuing support from organised 
transnational capital allowed it to effectively neutralise and/or co-opt oppositional 
forces, while at the same time further marginalising more radical solutions from 
the outset and thus the possibilities for structural change. 
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 And fifth, there are no signs of a fundamental departure from the neoliberal 
path in terms of wider EU economic regulation. Recent developments in the fields 
of EU industrial and competition policy (Wigger, 2019; Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 
2014), EU corporate governance structures (Horn, 2012b), European financial and 
monetary policies (Braun, 2020; Fernandez et al., 2018), international taxation 
policies (Lesage et al., 2014) as well as broader EU macroeconomic strategies (Jäger 
and Springler, 2015; Heinrich, 2015) and austerity and structural adjustment 
programmes imposed on Europe’s peripheral states (Sotiris, 2017; Bieler and 
Jordan, 2018; Lapavitsas et al., 2012) highlight the class-character of crisis 
management in Europe, thereby pointing towards the general trend of 
neoliberalism being deepened and intensified rather than being abandoned. Such 
processes have been increasingly understood in terms of ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’ as deliberate state strategies marked by an “explicit predisposition 
to insulate policymaking from popular dissent through coercive, administrative 
and legal deployment of state power” (Burak Tansel, 2017: 4; see also Bruff and 
Burak Tansel, 2019; Fabry and Sandbeck, 2019). Against this background, a major 
break away from neoliberalism in the field of EU foreign investment regulation 
would seem rather out of sync with wider developments within the European 
political economy. To recap, the post-Lisbon EU investment policy did not reflect a 
major break away from dominant modes of foreign investment regulation as none 
of the conditioning factors that are likely to spur regulatory shifts could be 
identified. Instead, it set out to further expand and institutionalise the system of 
investment protection, by recalibrating and mutating the neoliberal regulatory 
discourse, in response to the manifold challenges emanating from the growing 
dissatisfaction with the system’s institutional design. 
 The resulting embedded neoliberal outcome remains, however, highly fragile 
and very contested. While the (partial) co-optation of centre-leftist forces within 
the EU’s power bloc offered a temporary stabilisation, the embedded neoliberal 
project continues to suffer from a lack of wider public legitimacy. In 2017, more 
than 400,000 EU citizens called on the EU to abandon its plan to establish a 
multilateral investment court (WeMove, 2020a), while in 2019-20 an alliance of over 
200 European organisations, trade unions and social movements ran a petition 
across 16 EU member states with almost 850,000 signatures, calling on the EU and 
EU member state governments to withdraw from existing trade and investment 
agreements containing the ISDS mechanism, and not to conclude any such 
agreements in the future (WeMove, 2020b). On a global level, governments from 
emerging economies are increasingly reconsidering the costs and benefits of their 
investment treaty networks, with countries such as Indonesia, India, South Africa, 
Ecuador and Tanzania terminating (some of) their investment treaties (Carim, 
2013; Olivet, 2017; The	East	African, 2018; Singh and Ilge, 2016). Growing discontent 
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with the neoliberal straitjacket made many developing country governments 
decide to craft new models that are more sensitive to their developmental interests 
and that seek to impose more obligations on foreign investors and foresee a greater 
role for domestic courts and other alternative forms for the resolution of investment 
disputes (Singh and Ilge, 2016; Vieira Martins, 2017; Gazzini, 2017). And at the 
United Nations, an intergovernmental working group has been tasked to elaborate 
an internationally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights with the purpose to improve 
access to justice and remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses 
(UNHRC, 2020). Such developments point towards a growing consensus on the 
need to curb the reign of transnational capital rather than further expanding its 
reach. 
 From the other side, the embedded neoliberal project is being challenged by 
the resurgence of radical-right and populist forces embodied in the votes for Brexit 
and Trump in 2016. While these forces in themselves do no contemplate a major 
departure from neoliberalism, but rather reflect a process towards what has been 
referred to as ‘neo-illiberalism’ (Hendrikse, 2018), they articulate a political project 
of reclaiming national state sovereignty and a move away from supranational 
institutional structures. For Brexit supporters, a vote against TTIP stood for a vote 
against the EU (Left	 Food	 Forward, 2015), while the Trump administration acted 
upon the longstanding US distrust in international dispute settlement bodies 
(USTR, 2018) by (partly) omitting, with bipartisan support from US Congress, the 
ISDS mechanism from the renewed free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico 
(Wallach, 2020) and continuing blocking the reappointment of members of the 
WTO Appellate Body (Foreign	 Policy, 2019). At the same time, these challenges 
formed a catalyst to the embedded neoliberal project to reinforce and present 
itself as the only viable way forward, thereby revealing a cunning ability “to 
exploit threats to its survival as opportunities for expansion” (Jessop, 2016: 417; see 
also Peck, 2010a; Hendrikse, 2018). Indeed, European leaders have been quick in 
seizing the momentum to present EU trade and investment policy as a beacon of 
promoting liberal values of democracy, rule of law and economic prosperity within 
a hostile environment of rising protectionism and populism. Critics to CETA and 
TTIP were vilified as ‘trade hooligans’ living in a ‘post-factual reality’ and were 
warned, in a Thatcherite style of There	Is	No	Alternative, that “the alternative to free 
trade is isolationism and protectionism, a return to national egoisms, and as a 
result – the threat of violent conflict” (Tusk, 2016a; Tusk, 2016b). An alternative 
that would be, in the words of EU Trade Commissioner Malmström, “little short of 
catastrophic” (Malmström, 2017).  
 In that sense, the project of embedded neoliberalism underpinning the 
post-Lisbon EU trade and investment policy has reached the final stages of its 
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maturation phase in terms of its life cycle, and the first signs of a transition to its 
delegitimation phase are beginning to show (see Chapter Two). The resilience of 
the embedded neoliberal project will of course be further tested with the next 
serious economic crisis, but at the moment there still seems to be some life left for 
another phase of neoliberal dominance, albeit one “wrought with deepening 
contradictions and increasingly unstable” (Van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 2). 
With some scholars referring to neoliberalism as ‘dead but dominant’ (Smith, 
2008) and as an ideology entering into its ‘zombie phase’ (Peck, 2010b), embedded 
neoliberalism as a hegemonic political project of European transnational social 
forces underpinning the social purpose of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy 
has become increasingly discredited but not yet displaced. The current juncture 
bears therefore much resemblance to what Gramsci referred to as a crisis of 
authority, which “consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new 
cannot yet be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms 
appear” (Gramsci, 1971: 276).    
7.9  Conclusion
This chapter unravelled the political struggles that have given shape to the 
content, form and scope of the TTIP investment provisions. It traced the political 
origins of the TTIP project to broader processes of transatlantic market integration 
since the 1990s. Moreover, the chapter showed how the European Commission 
aimed to sell TTIP in terms of a project aimed at restoring economic growth after 
the global financial and economic crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, and 
thereby as an attempt to enhance EU competitiveness through market expansion 
and protection, and as a geopolitical project aimed at reasserting EU and US 
leadership over the global trade and investment system in the wake of increased 
challenges posed to the liberal world order by the rise of large emerging economies. 
Both key narratives should be understood as two sides of the same coin, placing 
TTIP at the intersection of the contradictory but dialectically related logics of 
capitalist expansion and geopolitical rivalry. Reflecting its structurally inscribed 
strategic selectivity, the European Commission pursued an investment chapter 
based on the embedded neoliberal compromise that emerged during the CETA 
negotiations, in which it sought to expand investor rights while reassuring 
centre-leftist concerns regarding the regulatory capacities of states to regulate in 
the public interest. The transnational capitalist class played a critical role in 
shaping the path for TTIP and enjoyed preferential institutional access to key state 
negotiators to influence the course of the negotiations. The resilience of the 
embedded neoliberal compromise was put to a serious test when a growing 
alliance of different NGOs, trade unions and other grassroots movements 
successfully transformed opposition into a broad social movement against TTIP 
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and CETA across Europe. Such contestation resonated with national governments 
and parliamentarians from a number of key EU member states, particularly from 
the centre-leftist discourse, which increasingly rejected the inclusion of ISDS in 
TTIP. This did not however result in fundamental changes in the content, form 
and scope of the EU investment policy. Instead, some additional procedural 
reforms were proposed that would further perpetuate and institutionalise the 
practice of ISDS, and thus further embed the neoliberal path of foreign investment 
protection, rather than radically breaking away from it. Even though the TTIP 
project as a whole proved to be a bridge too far, the resulting Investment Court 
System formed a prime example of how EU political and economic forces were able 
to recraft and mutate neoliberalism along new pathways to regain political 
support and legitimacy for continued market expansion and protection, albeit in 
a fragile and highly contested fashion. 
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This study has sought to contribute to an understanding of the politics of European 
foreign investment regulation. The main argument of the study is that the 
particular content, form and scope of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy need to 
be understood against the backdrop of broader, material processes of capitalist 
restructuring, the agency of the transnational capitalist class and subordinate 
social forces, and the ascendancy of neoliberalism as the hegemonic discourse. 
More specifically, the study has revealed the politically and socially contingent 
nature of foreign investment regulation by analysing and presenting the content, 
form and scope of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy as reflecting the outcome 
of a political struggle between rivalling regulatory discourses advanced by 
different social class fractions at different junctures and mediated through the 
multi-scalar, institutional ensembles of European state formation. This particular 
outcome has been characterised in terms of a temporary and fragile compromise 
that primarily seeks to further market expansion and protection for European 
investors globally, thereby reflecting an intensification of disciplinary neo -
liberalism and the subsumption of public authority to market disciplines and 
private property rights bound up with the interests of transnational capital. On 
the other hand, this compromise caters to certain elements of the centre-leftist 
discourse in order to advance certain social protection principles and institutional 
safeguards with the purpose of generating sufficient political support and public 
legitimacy. This concluding chapter will provide an overview of the study’s main 
findings in relation to the research questions and discuss its main empirical and 
theoretical contributions. Moreover, it will look at the broader implications of the 
research findings by critically assessing the fragile consensus underpinning the 
embedded neoliberal compromise and its durability in the face of increased 
challenges posed by the crisis conditions related to climate change and COVID19 
in particular. The final section will explore several avenues for more sustainable 
and socially just alternatives.   
8.1  Explaining the politics of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy
The neoliberalisation and supranationalisation of European foreign investment regulation
In order to fully grasp the political nature of European foreign investment 
regulation it is necessary to consider its broader historical trajectories and 
profound transformation against the backdrop of global and European capitalist 
restructuring processes and the underlying ideational and socio-economic 
changes informing the European integration project. The advancement of legal 
rules on the protection and promotion of foreign investment and the concomitant 
562932-L-bw-Verbeek
Processed on: 15-7-2021 PDF page: 274
274
CHAPTER 8
spread of bilateral investment treaties formed a key part of the neoliberal turn in 
the 1980s following the breakdown of the post-war social order of embedded 
liberalism. Even though these legal rules and treaties became hegemonic with the 
ascendancy of the neoliberal discourse since the 1980s, their ideological origins 
first materialised in response to the capitalist developments after the end of the 
Second World War and subsequently took shape during the 1960s and 1970s. 
 The post-war period of embedded liberalism saw processes of sustained inter-
nationalisation of productive capital in the advanced capitalist economies, 
involving a structural shift from resource-seeking investment to market-seeking 
investment as the predominant form of FDI in order to set up production sites in 
industrial and manufacturing sectors in new markets. Such developments were 
accompanied by concerted efforts among Western capitalist states to establish 
multilateral rules and frameworks for the protection of foreign investment, but 
these generally failed to generate sufficient political support. On the one hand, 
their inherent liberal contents in favour of transnational capital fundamentally 
contradicted the hegemonic Keynesian ideas of national state intervention and 
capital controls to curtail international capital flows in order to sustain the class 
compromise between nationally oriented productive capital and organised labour. 
On the other hand, the breakdown of colonialism, which effectively put an end to 
the imperial legal and institutional frameworks that regulated and facilitated the 
expansion of European capital into the colonised territories, spurred renewed 
challenges to capitalist private property relations in the developing world. These 
challenges were rooted in the broader ideological cleavages with regard to foreign 
investment regulation emanating from the spread of global capitalism and 
European imperialism since the 17th century. 
 After the end of the Second World War, various private proposals on multilateral 
investment codes emerged from within neoliberal circles in Western Europe, 
particularly in Germany, in response to the challenges posed to uninhibited 
capital accumulation in the developing world in the wake of decolonisation and 
economic nationalism. These proposals were unable to attract support from 
governments in order to be adopted as a multilateral convention, but ultimately 
informed a first series of European BITs with a number of developing countries and 
former colonies. In terms of content, these BITs narrowly focused on the protection and 
promotion of foreign investment without reference to overarching policy goals 
and centred on a set of core protections such as compensation for direct and 
indirect expropriation, fair and equitable treatment and non-discrimination. 
In terms of form, BITs started to provide for private enforcement through ISDS 
before international arbitration tribunals particularly after the adoption of 
the ICSID Convention in 1965. And in terms of scope, these treaties granted post- 
establishment protections to a broad definition on investment including both 
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direct and portfolio investment and other forms of financial and intangible 
property held by any national or company operating in the territory of either 
contracting party. The neoliberal discourse underpinning these BITs was still far 
from hegemonic and prospects for their advancement on a global level further 
diminished as a group of newly independent states sought to reconfigure the post- 
colonial economic order under the NIEO proposals during the 1960s and 1970s. 
 Within the European integration project, foreign investment remained 
largely regulated at national level as part of the political responses to the increased 
pressures emanating from the dominant presence of US capital in the productive 
sectors of the European economies. The post-war recovery of many Western 
European economies was premised on active state intervention, including the na-
tionalisation of key economic sectors, screening of FDI and the development of an 
industrial policy in order to boost domestic competitiveness. Control over 
cross-border capital flows was deemed necessary to use monetary policy and 
interest rates for Keynesian macroeconomic steering. Although minor steps 
towards enhanced integration were taken throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
national mercantilist responses to the aggravated economic crisis and the 
American challenge eventually prevailed over joint European solutions.
 From the 1980s onwards, European foreign investment undertook a profound 
transformation with the ascendancy of neoliberal ideas, which were premised on 
the transnationalisation of production and finance and the concomitant shift in 
the underlying power balance in favour of transnational capital. The transition 
from Fordism to post-Fordist flexible regimes of production saw the rise of 
functionally integrated and geographically dispersed global production networks. 
The fragmentation and decentralisation of production worldwide gave rise to effi-
ciency-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking investments as the predominant forms 
of FDI, with a growing part of FDI flowing to offshore investment hubs informed 
by fiscal-incentives-seeking motivations. Moreover, the rise of transnational 
financial capital has been engendered by various processes of financialisation as a 
key driver in the broader shift towards finance-led growth regimes. Neoliberalism 
became the hegemonic discourse underpinning global economic integration with 
many governments worldwide turning to policies of privatisation, deregulation 
and liberalisation to enhance transnational capital mobility. Generally, the 
neoliberal project first emerged through a deconstructive moment in the late 
1970s and early 1980s that increasingly challenged the ideological foundations of 
the crisis-ridden post-war order of embedded liberalism. In a subsequent 
constructive moment, starting in the mid-1980s and lasting into the 1990s, foreign 
investment regulation became increasingly underpinned by the neoliberal 
discourse with BITs being promoted as key instruments to attract FDI. EU member 
state governments, particularly the Western European ones with growth models 
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centred on transnational accumulation patterns, developed large networks of BITs 
to promote and protect their overseas investment interests. 
 Throughout the 1990s, the neoliberal project further consolidated at EU level 
and the European Commission increasingly sought to enhance economic compet-
itiveness through the progressive abolition of restrictions on trade and investment 
and creating a ‘level playing field’ for European investors abroad. With the active 
support from an emergent transnational capitalist class, the European Commission 
became the vanguard of multilateral investment rules during the 1990s and early 
2000s. When such multilateral efforts, most notably at the OECD and WTO, stalled 
due to internal disagreement and increased opposition from newly emerging 
markets, the European Commission turned towards bilateralism as an avenue to 
promote neoliberal investment rules. It was under the neoliberal competitiveness 
discourse outlined in the 2006 Global	Europe strategy that the EU launched a new 
series of bilateral free trade agreements that increasingly included provisions on 
market access and investment liberalisation. At the same time, these initiatives 
were underpinned by a gradual strengthening of the European Commission’s 
regulatory powers against the backdrop of competitive pressures particularly 
from the US and Japan, thereby enhancing its strategic selectivity privileging the 
interests of transnational capital. This culminated in the full transfer of 
competencies on FDI with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, 
which brought about a further Europeanisation of foreign investment regulation. 
Finally, the contested character of the neoliberal hegemonic project became 
revealed by the strong societal and political opposition to the MAI and WTO 
investment talks underpinning the rise of an emerging centre-leftist discourse 
regarding foreign investment regulation. Such contestation became partially 
reflected in the institutional changes to EU trade policy introduced with the 
Treaty of Lisbon, which ultimately laid the groundwork for further politicisation 
of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy.
Political struggles over the post-Lisbon EU investment policy and the rise of embedded 
neoliberalism
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the concomitant institutional 
shifts regarding European foreign investment regulation offered a temporary 
momentum to challenge the dominant neoliberal discourse. The global financial 
and economic crisis of 2008-9 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis that hit 
Europe after 2010 severely affected FDI flows, leading to divestment and relocation 
of investment activities to emerging markets in the face of stagnating capital 
accumulation in the EU. The crises pushed different European economies into 
recession with many governments adopting interventionist and protectionist 
measures and national rescue packages to support domestic corporations and 
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industries. At the same time, the European Commission quickly seized the 
momentum to push for the continuing and deepening of neoliberal trade policy as 
necessary in response to the crisis and to foster economic growth. Subsequently, 
the new EU investment policy emerging from the supranationalisation of FDI 
regulation under the Treaty of Lisbon became part and parcel of the reinforced 
neoliberal discourse within the ranks of DG Trade. Hence, the EU investment 
policy crystallising after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon became 
crucially informed by the further consolidation and deepening of the neoliberal 
project that, in terms of content, form and scope, increasingly sought to liberalise 
and protect EU investment abroad at the highest levels possible. Importantly, the 
emerging post-Lisbon EU investment policy also saw the (re-)pronunciation of 
social principles related to safeguarding regulatory policy space and social and 
environmental protection. The linking of neoliberal investment rules with social 
protection principles formed a key expression of what emerged as embedded	
neoliberalism broadly reflecting the outcome of a political struggle over the 
emerging post-Lisbon EU investment policy between a dominant neoliberal 
discourse and a subordinate centre-leftist discourse. 
 On the one hand, the neoliberal core of the emerging post-Lisbon EU 
investment policy has its material foundations in the transnational fractions of 
industrial and financial capital and the state-capital nexuses deeply rooted in the 
transnational accumulation regimes of the mainly Western European member 
states. The neoliberal discourse was politically advanced through the agency of 
organised business both at national and EU level, with support from a burgeoning 
investment arbitration industry, and institutionally mediated through the 
strategic selectivities of the European Commission and the centre-right flanks of 
the European Parliament. At the same time, there were major disagreements 
within the power bloc regarding the exact delineations of the neoliberal project 
with regard to the content, form and scope of future EU trade and investment 
agreements. Moreover, conflicts arose with regard to division of regulatory powers 
related to the post-Lisbon EU investment policy. This was particularly reflected in 
the adoption of Regulation 1219/2012, whereby EU member state governments led 
by Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK, successfully pushed back the 
proposed review of their existing BITs by the European Commission and bringing 
them in line with EU law. Instead, Regulation 1219/2012 constitutionalised the 
existing EU member state BITs under EU law and further locked in neoliberal 
investment rules without review. Likewise, Regulation 912/214 ensured that EU 
member states retained discretionary powers in taking financial responsibility 
and liability in ISDS cases. 
 On the other hand, the centre-leftist project emerged out of a growing 
European alliance of subaltern social forces, such as trade unions, NGOs and other 
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grassroots movements concerned with the protection and advancement of broader 
public interests. These social forces increasingly challenged and contested the 
neoliberal project and rejected the inclusion of ISDS in future EU agreements. 
Moreover, necessary political linkages were established with the left-leaning 
fractions of the European Parliament, which became an important arena for the 
articulation of the centre-leftist discourse and the overall politicisation of the 
post-Lisbon EU investment policy. 
Political contestation and the consolidation of embedded neoliberalism in the CETA and 
TTIP negotiations
The CETA and TTIP investment negotiations were critical milestones in the making 
of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy, which became further entrenched along 
the lines of embedded neoliberalism. Both negotiations involved a project of 
transnational market expansion and protection that was deeply embedded in 
broader processes of transnationalisation and neoliberal restructuring on both 
sides of the Atlantic with great support from organised transnational capital. 
CETA’s investment chapter reflected a compromise between an emerging European 
model of foreign investment protection, reflecting mainly the interests of the 
Western European export-oriented economies while incorporating certain elements of 
the centre-leftist discourse, and the North American model, seeking to incorporate 
certain clarifications in an attempt to restrict arbitral tribunals in excessively 
interpreting investment protection standards such as FET and indirect expropriation 
and to shield non-discriminatory regulatory actions in the public interest. Most 
notably, CETA included a range of reforms of the ISDS mechanism with the aim to 
restore consistency and legitimacy of the system with the purpose to ensure the 
necessary political support. The CETA project has been strongly supported and 
actively promoted by the transnational capitalist class. Business lobby groups such 
as the CERT, BusinessEurope and ESF enjoyed privileged access to the European 
Commission and strongly called for unbridled market access and unrestricted 
protections for investment in line with the EU member state BITs. However, 
organised capital could not prevent the introduction of certain reforms on both 
the substantive and procedural standards in the CETA investment chapter, 
although it still supported the agreement in overall. At the same time, a broad 
alliance of NGOs, trade unions and other grassroots movements feared the 
potential negative impact of CETA on workers, the environment and the capacities 
of governments to regulate public services and other public interests and 
increasingly mobilised across the Atlantic to challenge the neoliberal discourse, 
and received support from various centre-leftist political leaders across Europe, 
thereby enhancing the spread of societal and political discontent with investment 
protection and ISDS and an increased opposition to it.
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 Similar dynamics can be observed in the TTIP negotiations. Notably, the European 
Commission framed TTIP in terms of a project aimed at restoring economic growth 
after the global financial and economic crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, 
and thereby as an attempt to enhance EU competitiveness through market expansion 
and protection, and as a geopolitical project aimed at reasserting transatlantic 
leadership over the global trade and investment system in the wake of increased 
challenges posed to the liberal world order by the rise of large emerging economies. 
Both key narratives underpin the broader imperialist nature of the TTIP project by 
placing it at the intersection of the contradictory but dialectically related logics of 
capitalist expansion and geopolitical competition. The European Commission 
pursued an investment chapter based on the compromise that emerged during the 
CETA negotiations, in which it sought to expand investor rights while reassuring 
certain centre-leftist concerns regarding the right to regulate in the public 
interest. Like the CETA project, the transnational capitalist class was a key driving 
force in shaping the path for TTIP and enjoyed preferential institutional access to 
key state negotiators to influence the course of the negotiations. At the same time, 
political contestation erupted when a growing alliance of different NGOs, trade 
unions and grassroots movements successfully transformed opposition into a 
broad social movement against TTIP and CETA across Europe that spilled over to 
various political leaders in a number of key EU member states, particularly from 
the centre-leftist discourse, that increasingly rejected the inclusion of ISDS in 
TTIP. However, this did not result in a fundamental breakaway in terms of content, 
form and scope of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy. Instead, the European 
Commission presented some additional procedural reforms under the name of an 
Investment Court System that would further perpetuate and institutionalise the 
practice of ISDS, and thus further embed the neoliberal path of foreign investment 
protection with the aim to regain political support and public legitimacy. Although 
the TTIP project eventually stalled, the introduction of ICS in the CETA text proved 
sufficient to secure its ratification by the European Parliament and approval by the 
European Court of Justice, while opposition to newer FTA negotiations with ICS 
has been decreased.  
 The post-Lisbon EU investment policy did not bring about a major shift away 
from the prevalent neoliberal regulatory discourse due to five factors: 1) dominant 
actors have construed the eroding support for neoliberal investment rules and 
ISDS in terms of a legitimacy crisis rather than a systemic crisis; 2) there has been 
no structural shift in the underlying balance of power between social forces in 
relation to newly emerging accumulation structures; 3) despite massive 
contestation against TTIP and CETA, there has been no clearly articulated coun-
ter-hegemonic project around which a new constellation of social forces could 
coalesce in Europe; 4) the European Commission continues to enjoy considerable 
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strategic selectivity and operational autonomy vis-à-vis other parts within the EU 
institutional ensembles and wider societal interests; and 5) there have been no 
signs of a fundamental departure from the neoliberal path in terms of wider EU 
economic regulation. 
 The lack of a qualitative shift in foreign investment regulation ultimately 
raises some important questions about the usefulness of the term ‘embedded 
Table 8.1   European foreign investment regulation under neoliberalism and 
embedded neoliberalism
Neoliberalism 
(EU member state BITs)
Embedded neoliberalism 
(post-Lisbon EU FTAs)
Content · Prevalence of narrow focus on 
promotion and protection of 
foreign investment
· Broad and unqualified 
substantive protection 
standards 
· No or limited references to 
broader public policy objectives 
and safeguards
· Prevalence of narrow focus on 
promotion and protection of foreign 
investment in investment chapter
· Certain clarifications and qualifications 
of substantive protection standards
· Reference to the right to regulate in 
public interest
· Subordinate and hortatory references to 
corporate social responsibility, labour 
rights and sustainable development
Form · Ad hoc investor-to-state dispute 
settlement
· Arbitrators appointed by 
disputing parties
· No rules on ethical behaviour 
for arbitrators
· No appeal mechanism
· Limited transparency and 
participation in proceedings
· Semi-permanent investment court 
system
· Fixed roster of arbitrators appointed by 
treaty parties
· Rules on ethical behaviour for 
arbitrators
· Appeal mechanism
· Increased transparency and 
participation in proceedings
Scope · Post-establishment protection
· Any-kind-of-asset-based 
definition of investment 
(FDI, portfolio, other forms 
of financial and intangible 
property)
· Broad definition of investor (any 
national or company operating 
in the territory of either 
contracting party)
· Market access and investment 
liberalisation 
· Prohibition of performance 
requirements
· Post-establishment protection
· Any-kind-of-asset-based definition of 
investment (FDI, portfolio, other forms 
of financial and intangible property)
· Additional requirement of having 
substantial business activities 
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neoliberalism’ as a concept to capture the main characteristics of the post-Lisbon 
EU investment policy. Indeed, one could wonder to what extent embedded 
neoliberalism really differs from neoliberalism itself and whether the latter then 
entails a ‘disembeddedness’ of the economy from its social foundations. However, 
this study rejected an idealist understanding of neoliberalism as purely and solely 
mirroring normative or utopian visions of intellectuals and think tanks (for 
example, Mirowski, 2009; Klein, 2007; Blyth, 2002), but rather as a political practice 
deeply engrained in and mediated through an ensemble of class-based, institutional 
and ideological configurations. In fact, it was Polanyi himself arguing that “the 
idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia” and that “[t]he human 
economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non - 
economic” (Polanyi, 2001 [1957]: 3, 250). In that sense, just as the market economy 
is always embedded, we could then speak of an ‘always embedded neoliberalism’ 
to account for the historically and geographically specific manifestations of 
neoliberalism (Cahill, 2014; see also Block, 2003; Peck and Tickel, 2002). This also 
underscores the conceptualisation of neoliberal hegemony in a Gramscian sense, 
as being “constructed through a complex series or process of struggle. It is not 
given, either in the existing structure of a society or in the given class structure 
of a mode of production” (Hall, 1988: 53).
 It is precisely because of its constructed and negotiated nature that ‘always 
embedded neoliberalism’ follows different pathways and trajectories in different 
historical epochs and different geographical and political contexts, thereby 
suggesting that there may be also different levels of embeddedness. Despite the lack 
of a structural break away from the neoliberal project, the profound politicisation 
of EU foreign investment regulation certainly produced several noticeable changes 
in the conduct of investment rule-making that crucially shaped the content, form 
and scope of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy and that point towards greater 
levels of embeddedness than in the pre-Lisbon era. Van Apeldoorn (2009: 26) 
conceptualises the neoliberal embeddedness of European socio-economic governance 
in terms of a contradiction between on the one hand a progressive marketisation 
and neoliberalisation at the supranational level with on the other hand policies 
aimed at advancing social protection remaining largely embedded at the national 
level. In contrast, the findings of this study highlight a reversed dynamic. 
Neoliberal investment rules and policies display a higher degree of embeddedness 
at EU level after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon than at EU member 
state level in the preceding phases when such rules and policies were rolled out on 
a large scale since the late 1980s. This is spelled out below in terms of class-based, 
institutional and ideological configurations.
 In terms of class-based	configurations, the post-Lisbon EU investment policy and 
the respective trade and investment agreements thereunder remain largely driven 
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and shaped by an underlying asymmetrical social power balance in favour of 
transnational productive and financial capital. At the same time, organised labour 
and social movements played a crucial role in contesting the advancement of the 
neoliberal project and formed the social foundations of a centre-leftist project that 
received support from wider political and societal circles across Europe. The 
absence of such a counter-hegemonic project prior to the Treaty of Lisbon may 
seem to reflect a larger degree of consensus with regard to foreign investment 
regulation, but the vehement opposition to the establishment of multilateral 
investment rules proposed at the OECD and the WTO, ultimately leading to their 
demise, suggests otherwise. It seems more plausible that the lack of politicisation 
of the EU member state BITs relates to the fact that these are mostly with developing 
countries whereby investment flows mainly in one direction with the sovereignty 
costs and risks for arbitration being borne almost entirely by the capital-import-
ing states. The CETA and TTIP projects on the other hand provoked renewed 
concerns in the capitalist core countries about increased market expansion and 
commodification processes adding up to the disciplinary grip of neoliberalism 
and the power of transnational capital over social and economic life. 
 In terms of institutional	 configurations, the elevated role of the European 
Parliament in EU trade policy as co-legislator in the implementation of the 
Common Commercial Policy and as well as its formal role in ratifying trade and 
investment agreements greatly enhanced the embeddedness of the post-Lisbon EU 
investment policy. The European Parliament proved an important institutional 
entry point for the articulation of the centre-leftist discourse and generally 
facilitated greater parliamentary involvement during particular treaty 
negotiations, albeit to a certain extent, with some parliamentary debates even 
making headlines. At the same time, the role of the European Parliament as a 
progressive force is also limited as it also reflects the power configurations of 
various centre-right and right-wing settings at home. In response to the waning 
public legitimacy of the neoliberal project in terms of transparency and 
participation, the European Commission put much effort in multi-stakeholder 
consultations. For example, it intensified Civil Society Dialogues on particular in-
vestment-related topics and it created a TTIP Advisory Group that later evolved into 
an Expert Group on EU FTAs with participation of representatives of both civil 
society organisations, trade unions and business associations. Likewise, more 
position papers and text proposals were published in a way to enhance 
transparency. Moreover, the European Court of Justice delivered several influential 
opinions that crucially shaped the legal and institutional pathways of EU trade 
policy. While Opinion 1/17 greenlighted the compatibility of CETA with EU law, 
Opinion 2/15 ruled that investment protection and investor-state dispute 
settlement were a mixed EU competence for which parliamentary ratification at 
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national level was also required. Such institutional embeddedness at EU level 
stands in stark contrast with how investment policy is generally being conducted 
at member state level where BITs tend to be silently ratified without much 
parliamentary involvement or stakeholder dialogues – at least until recently – or 
legal checks by domestic constitutional courts.
 Finally, in terms of ideological	 configurations, much of the normative and 
discursive underpinnings of the neoliberal project were challenged in the wake of 
the CETA and TTIP negotiations. Political and economic elites increasingly 
struggled to ‘sell’ these free trade agreements to a larger audience with arguments 
highlighting the expected benefits in terms of economic growth and employment 
losing credibility, while counter-arguments pointing to the negative impact on 
democratic governance and the policy space to regulate and protect the public 
interest gained traction. Whereas BITs have been traditionally perceived of as 
rather undisputed instruments to foster FDI and advance the rule of law and good 
governance in developing countries, the European Commission increasingly 
defended the inclusion of investment protection and investor-state arbitration in 
EU FTAs as contributing to the strategic advancement of an international 
rules-based order in times of lingering protectionism and nationalism. The 2015 
Trade	for	All communication is an important testimony of rephrasing neoliberalism 
in terms of values such as sustainable development, inclusiveness, responsibility, 
transparency and enforcement (European Commission, 2015h).
8.2  Main contributions and reflections on further research
This study has offered a theoretically informed and empirically rich analysis on 
the politics of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy. Its main contribution lies in 
the emphasis on the inherent political	nature of transnational legal rules aimed at 
the promotion and protection of foreign investment. At the same time, the study 
provides for a unique account on the politics of those legal rules by unravelling the 
specific struggles that came to inform the particular content, form and scope of 
the post-Lisbon EU investment policy against the backdrop of broader capitalist 
restructuring processes and related social power relations. By applying a historical 
materialist framework, the study takes a more holistic approach by taking 
particular forms of foreign investment regulation as the outcome of the dialectical 
interplay between material structures, human agency and discursive practices. 
With regard to material structures, the study embeds foreign investment 
regulation within wider developments and transformations of global and 
European capitalism and the underlying social orders driven by a contradictory 
dynamic of an ever-expanding capital and its reliance on extra-economic means to 
facilitate the expansion and reproduction of capitalist social relations. IIAs are 
thus considered here as the concrete manifestation of what has been theorised as 
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capitalist imperialism consisting of a persistent transnationalisation process that 
takes shape through the geographical, institutional and legal parameters of the 
interstate system and geoeconomic dimensions. 
 Therefore, the study reiterates the critical role of states and state actors as key 
nodes in the political construction, development and transformation of investment 
rules over time. In contrast to much of the mainstream literature seeking to 
explain state interests for signing up to IIAs in a methodologically nationalist 
fashion, the study contributes to opening up the black box of the state by concep-
tualising it as a complex ensemble of institutions that may provide a certain 
degree of cohesion but that function as key locations for political contestation. The 
analysis on the coming about of the EU investment policy has highlighted the 
multi-scalar nature of European state formation by accounting for the particular 
role of different state institutions at different levels, in particular the European 
Commission, EU member state governments and the European Parliament, and to 
a lesser extent the European Court of Justice. Following a strategic-relational 
understanding of the state, the study demonstrates that the European Commission 
(DG Trade) enjoys a significant operational albeit relative autonomy from wider 
societal interests, thereby rejecting any instrumentalist or functionalist 
understanding of the state as merely expressing the preferences of dominant class 
fractions in a direct manner. The notion of operational autonomy allows us to 
capture the ability of the European Commission to temporarily go against the 
interests of dominant power groups and cater certain interests of subordinate 
groups to generate necessary political support on an operational basis. Yet such 
autonomy is only relative to the wider social power relations. Following Poulantzas 
(1978), the state is conceptualised here as the institutional and material 
condensation of a broader balance between different social forces at a particular 
juncture. In that sense, the EU and its institutional set-up display a structurally 
inscribed strategic selectivity in favour of neoliberal investment rules that in turn 
reflects the wider shift of power towards the interests of transnational capital 
with the ascendancy of neoliberalism since the 1980s. 
 In terms of agency, the study ascribes a key role to transnational social forces 
in driving, sustaining and contesting foreign investment regulation. Several 
recent mainstream studies on the politics of IIAs tend to either downplay or 
outright deny the critical influence of organised business in processes of investment 
rule-making. In contrast, this study reveals, by relying on internal reports acquired 
under the right of access to EU documents, the organic links between DG Trade 
officials and representatives from organised business and the investment 
arbitration industry in the making of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy. 
Moreover, the study highlights the agency of resistance as a major force in 
contesting, de-legitimising and ultimately modifying the neoliberal investment 
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rules. The focus on agency brings some important new insights into the notion of 
new	constitutionalism understood as the politico-juridical lock-in of neoliberalism, 
which has often been accused of as being a ‘form-determined’ tool at the disposal 
of the dominant classes, by underscoring its constructed, negotiated and contested 
nature. Hence, the post-Lisbon EU investment policy is seen here as a particular 
political project constructed by the agency of dominant social forces with support 
and resistance from subordinate groups that is articulated ideologically through 
the discursive and political practices of a variety of actors. The rise of embedded 
neoliberalism characterising the post-Lisbon EU investment policy reflects then 
the outcome of an ideological struggle for hegemony between a dominant 
neoliberal regulatory discourse and a contending centre-leftist regulatory 
discourse.
 The findings of the study also raise several avenues for future research. The 
study has focused mainly on the content, form and scope of investment rules 
enshrined in bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements. Although 
these constitute a prime outcome of political negotiations, further research should 
include also more in-depth analyses of arbitral tribunal approaches and ISDS 
awards in order to account for the evolving nature of international investment 
law. Even though investment treaties have remained largely unaltered over the 
past five decades, their broad and open-ended provisions have given wide 
discretionary power to a class of arbitrators and lawyers to expand the boundaries 
of investment protection and private property rights and as such to demarcate the 
limits of state regulatory powers. The profound political role of the arbitrators 
warrants further investigation on the development of international investment 
law outside the confines of democratic and political decision-making, while at the 
same time accounting for tribunal responses to increased levels of politicisation. 
In that respect, international organisations such as ICSID, UNCITRAL, OECD and 
UNCTAD have provided critical ideological input and political support for the 
development of the field with some institutions playing a leading role in ongoing 
efforts on ISDS reforms. More conceptual discussion is needed on the role of such 
institutions from a strategic-relational understanding and on how they are deeply 
embedded within the wider structures of capitalism. 
 More insights on the different trajectories of foreign investment regulation 
within the European Union could shed some important light on the uneven and 
asymmetric character of the EU investment policy and European governance more 
widely. Chapter Five sought to highlight the different accumulation strategies and 
growth models within the European political economy informing the different 
positions of several CEE member states in the subsequent FTA negotiations, but 
these have not yet been further empirically substantiated. At the same time, future 
research may go beyond such Eurocentrism and take into consideration the 
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structural hierarchies and dependencies underpinning the uneven and unequal 
development of global capitalism with different forms of political mobilisation 
driving and contesting the spread of neoliberal investment rules across the world. 
Particularly, governments and societies in the Global South have long-standing 
experience with the impacts of foreign investment liberalisation and enhanced 
protection through IIAs, with many currently in the process of reconsidering 
their policy frameworks to attract FDI, including terminating and renegotiating 
their IIAs and developing more progressive models aimed at the recalibration the 
balance between the substantive rights and obligations for investors and the 
advancement of sustainable economic development objectives. Although such 
efforts are increasingly recognised, thereby underscoring the emancipatory 
potential for transformative action, little (critical) political economy research has 
been done so far on IIA reforms in the Global South in order to grasp their political 
nature and limits. 
 Moreover, moving beyond a focus centred on the EU is crucial to understand 
the rise of large emerging markets as important players in the global political 
economy and the increased articulation of geopolitical discourses and pressures 
giving rise to renewed tensions and conflicts in the global trade and investment 
regime. Future research could analyse and explain the political and geographical 
imaginaries of the ‘new state capitalism’ as important markers for renewed state 
intervention with regard to investment policy-making, including in the European 
Union, and the potential impact on changing rules, norms and institutions 
underpinning global economic governance (e.g. Ilias and Dixon, 2020; Roberts et 
al., 2019). Finally, future research could further explore the changing political 
economy of FDI and the emergence of new forms of FDI, particularly those 
engendered by processes of financialisation, such as private equity, corporate 
bonds and loans, and round-tripping FDI, as well as hybrid forms of FDI such as 
those by state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds. It is particularly the 
interface between foreign investment regulation and other areas of regulation 
such as competition policy, tax policy, financial regulation and corporate 
governance that deserves further attention to arrive at a broader understanding of 
the political and legal architecture behind neoliberal hegemony and the 
concomitant free flow of transnational capital. 
 Finally, the adoption of a critical political economy framework entails a few 
methodological limitations. Taking a more holistic approach, the study has 
painted the wider political processes that informed and shaped the post-Lisbon EU 
investment policy with a broad brush. This means that certain specific aspects of 
the EU investment policy, or international investment law in general, that merit 
further in-depth attention remain rather underexamined here. Undoubtedly, 
international investment law has become more sophisticated in recent years and 
562932-L-bw-Verbeek




specialised legal literatures and textbooks have focused on crucial developments 
from within the field and, for example, on its interactions with other fields of 
international and domestic law and policy (e.g. environmental law, human rights, 
corporate social responsibility). Some of those nuances may have been lost along 
the way as a result of taking a helicopter view. Moreover, the focus on broader 
political struggles as the main explanatory element tends to underemphasise the 
agential role of specific state officials as well as other issues related to institutional 
practices and (in)coherences and bureaucratic politics in EU policy-making 
processes. While the critical political economy approach seeks to avoid a certain 
methodological individualism, this does not mean that such other explanatory 
elements do not play a role in the making of the EU investment policy. Indeed, 
important political science studies have examined how policy-makers may 
internalise external pressures in the form of possible arbitration threats, 
reputational damage and diplomatic pressures. At the same time, other studies 
have pointed to the specific role of individual agents or a set of agents operating 
within the investment treaty regime, and have uncovered for example the power 
dynamics and ideologies among investment arbitrators or the specific discursive 
tactics and strategies of social movements in contesting and politicising EU trade 
and investment policy. Such analyses make important empirical and conceptual 
contributions and allow for a better understanding of the agential and institutional 
dimensions of foreign investment regulation.
 Lastly, a final methodological reflection needs to be given on the position of 
the author as both an academic researcher and an activist. The author’s 
institutional affiliation with an NGO that actively takes part in criticising IIAs and 
ISDS, at least during the latter stages of the research period, has certainly had 
epistemological implications and undeniably contributed to shaping the author’s 
worldviews and normative stances. However, it must be reiterated that the critical 
approach taken in the study rejects the possibility of a radical subject-object 
separation whereby the researcher can take a clear distance from what is being 
observed. At the same time, being an NGO representative also opened up new 
doors for empirical and conceptual reflections that may have otherwise been 
closed for an academic researcher, for example through first-hand access to 
confidential documents and contacts with key political decision-makers.
8.3   The durability of the embedded neoliberal project in times 
of ensuing crises
The study has identified embedded neoliberalism as a next phase in the life course 
of the neoliberal project and as a concept underpinning the social purpose of the 
post-Lisbon EU investment policy. The emerging compromise has indeed become 
politically embedded through class-related, institutional and ideological configurations, 
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at least on a temporary basis, within the European political economy, but the 
intense politicisation and contradictions in the practical implementation reveal 
its highly fragile and contested nature. Despite its sustained levels of embeddedness, 
the neoliberal project is increasingly challenged in terms of its legitimacy. 
Renewed forms of state interventionism arising under the conditions of ensuing 
socio-economic and ecological crises seemingly contrast the neoliberal under -
pinnings of foreign investment regulation and private property protection, 
thereby jeopardising and disrupting previously uninhibited processes of capital 
accumulation. 
 Climate policy is one such area where increased state action aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions to stop global warming undeniably affects the profit 
expectations of investors in the fossil fuel industry. It has been calculated that in 
order to meet the target of keeping average global temperature below 2 degrees 
Celsius of warming above pre-industrial levels as set under the Paris Agreement in 
2015, a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 percent of current coal 
reserves need to remain untouched up to 2050 (McGlade and Ekins, 2015). This 
does not only mean an insurmountable effort to shift investment towards clean 
energy, but also the urgent phase out of current stocks of investment in the 
exploration, production, transportation and processing of fossil fuels. At the same 
time, climate policy measures such as phasing out carbon-intensive sources of 
energy, imposing carbon taxes, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies or revoking or 
modifying permits for the extraction of fossil fuels may trigger ISDS claims by 
foreign investors and their shareholders (Sachs et al., 2020; Güven and Johnson, 
2016). This is not a mere hypothetical situation. The fossil fuel industry is already 
among the most litigious sectors in ISDS and features prominently on the list with 
the largest amounts of awarded compensations. As of January 2020, out of 1,023 
known treaty-based arbitrations, 173 cases (almost 17 percent) were initiated by 
investors involved in extracting, transporting, refining, selling or burning fossil 
fuels or providing services to fossil fuel companies (Tienhaara and Cotula, 2020; 
UNCTAD, 2021b). ISDS cases have already been filed against policy measures in 
relation to placing restrictions on coal-fired power plants,117 banning hydraulic 
fracturing,118 revoking of a construction permit for an oil pipeline,119 issuing a 
moratorium on oil and gas operations in coastal areas,120 and phasing out coal-fired 
power.121 And ISDS threats have reportedly played a role in drafting and adopting 
new climate legislation that tends to be overly generous for fossil fuel investors in 
countries such as France, the Netherlands and Germany (Friends of the Earth 
117 Vattenfall	v.	Germany,	ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6.
118 Lone	Pine	v.	Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2.
119 TransCanada	v.	United	States, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21
120 Rockhopper	v.	Italy, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14.
121 Westmoreland	Mining	Holdings	LLC	v.	Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2019.
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Europe et al., 2019; ClientEarth, 2019; EurActiv, 2020; Die	Zeit, 2020). These examples 
demonstrate how ISDS enables foreign investors to raise the costs and risks of 
climate action and to socialise their stranded assets. It remains to be seen to what 
extent governments are recognising these risks and whether an increased number 
of ISDS cases will effectively put pressure on governments to fundamentally 
reform or terminate their investment treaties.122 So far, efforts to reform 
investment rules and ISDS, for example at UNCITRAL or the Energy Charter Treaty, 
are getting bogged down in viscous, consensus-based multilateral discussions that 
seem unable to deliver any meaningful outcome on the short term. 
 The greatest challenge to the survival of the embedded neoliberal project 
emerged with the outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic in early 2020 that plunged 
the world into a massive public health and economic crisis. Governments 
worldwide are taking wide-ranging emergency measures to curb a rapid spread of 
the virus and to mitigate the negative impacts of the pandemic. The exceptionality 
of such measures, many of which were unthinkable prior to the outbreak, may 
suggest a rupture from neoliberal modes of economic regulation. Governments 
have closed down non-essential services and restricted local or national movement 
of people with many businesses forced to downsize their operations drastically, 
often resulting in worker layoffs and closures, due to the emergency measures. 
Governments have taken steps to ensure access to medicines by easing compulsory 
licenses over patented drugs and medical devices. Several have temporarily 
nationalised private hospitals and private health care companies with others 
restricting the exports of medical supplies, medicines and food (see for example, 
UNCTAD, 2020b; Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., 2020). Many of such measures 
severely impact business activities and create an unprecedented risk of investment 
arbitration under trade and investment treaties. Emergency measures taken in 
times of crisis have often triggered ISDS claims from foreign investors arguing to 
be treated discriminatorily or unfairly, or to be (indirectly) expropriated without 
proper compensation. This has been the case for government measures taken in 
the wake of the Argentine financial crisis of the early 2000s, the global financial 
and sovereign debt crisis of 2008-2010, and the social and political upheaval of the 
Arab Spring in 2011. A number of leading experts have therefore called for a 
permanent restriction on all arbitration claims related to government measures 
targeting health, economic and social effects of the pandemic, as well as an 
immediate moratorium on all ISDS claims at least until the end of the pandemic 
(CCSI, 2020). UNCTAD has also stressed the need to safeguard sufficient regulatory 
space in IIAs to protect public health and to minimise the risks of investor-state 
122 In 2019, the EU itself faced its very first ISDS claim under the ECT filed by the Russian-owned Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline consortium in relation to an amendment to the EU Gas Directive (2009/73/EC) 
aimed at extending the EU regulatory framework to pipelines to and from third countries. Nord	
Stream	2	AG	v.	European	Union, PCA Case No. 2020-07.
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arbitration (UNCTAD, 2020b). In the words of several legal scholars, “[l]eaving 
the adjudication of state responses to the COVID19 outbreak to investment 
arbitration would not only be short-sighted and inappropriate; it would also 
further deepen social inequalities by continuing to channel public funds into 
large amounts of litigation and compensation costs” (Davitti et al., 2020). The 
emergence of  COVID19- related claims would thereby most likely result in the 
further delegitimisation of neoliberal investment protection rules and most 
probably wipe out any remaining support for the already fragile embedded 
neoliberal compromise. 
 At the same time, the widespread state interventionism in response to the 
financial and economic impact of the pandemic raises the question whether we 
are witnessing a discursive shift underpinning foreign investment regulation. 
Governments have offered generous stimulus packages and state aid to domestic 
businesses affected by the emergency measures, while some also lowering 
thresholds for the screening of FDI to protect strategic industries against foreign 
takeovers. Particularly, the European Commission has urged the EU member 
states to use FDI screening in times of public health crisis and economic 
vulnerability, following the FDI Screening Regulation adopted in 2019, warning 
that “vigilance is required to ensure that any such FDI does not have a harmful 
impact on the EU’s capacity to cover the health needs of its citizens” (European 
Commission, 2020a). Despite the emphasis on the temporary nature of the 
emergency measures, they form part of an already lingering shift from naïve 
neoliberalism based on free markets and the free flow of capital towards a more 
strategic and geopolitical discourse increasingly informing the EU’s increased 
assertiveness in the field of trade and investment policy and enforcement (Meunier 
and Nicolaidis, 2019; Holden, 2017). This could first be seen in March 2019 when 
the European Commission published a communication that presented the 
strategic outlook on China, which was perceived of as a ‘systemic rival’ and an 
‘economic competitor’ (European Commission and EU High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2019). This would also be in line with the 
ambition of the newly incoming President of the European Commission and 
former German Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen to become a ‘geopolitical 
Commission’ in response to the crisis of multilateralism, the growing trade wars 
between the US and China, the fallout of Brexit, and the various conflicts brewing 
at the European borders (Politico, 2019). Amidst the COVID19 crisis, newly appointed 
EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan launched a major trade policy review in June 
2020 calling on the EU to pursue a model of ‘open strategic autonomy’, understood 
as “strengthening the EU’s capacity to pursue its own interest independently and 
assertively, while continuing to work with partners around the world to deliver 
global solutions to global challenges” (European Commission, 2020b). 
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 Despite such discursive shifts, commentators have also noted a ‘creative 
reinvention’ of the neoliberal paradigm in response to the COVID19 crisis and 
underscore the continued push by the EU for the expansion and liberalisation of 
trade, including the intensification of WTO negotiations on investment facilitation, 
digital trade rules and e-commerce, proposals for a plurilateral agreement on 
trade in essential goods and permanent elimination of tariffs on medical 
equipment, and continued efforts to negotiate bilateral trade and investment 
agreements (Orbie and De Ville, 2020). These developments indicate that the 
European Commission is adapting and modifying rather than replacing the 
neoliberal discourse in response to the COVID19 crisis, and thus reflecting ‘more 
business than usual’. At the same time, indications of an increased ‘geopoliticisa-
tion’ or ‘securitisation’ of trade policy in a Hobbesian sense does not necessarily 
offer a viable and sustainable alternative to rampant neoliberalism in terms of 
bringing socio-economic and ecological justice and advancing public well-being. 
Such an alternative may only become viable through a radical transformation of 
the existing social order and a break away with the underlying ideas and social 
practices. 
8.4  Exploring alternative avenues for foreign investment regulation
What emancipatory role is there to play for IIAs in establishing such a profound 
transformation? One could argue that conceptualising international investment 
law in terms of the commodity form would imply a theory against IIAs altogether. 
Pashukanis himself was definitely hostile to law as he understood it to be the 
reflection of capitalist property relations and hence as an integral part of capitalist 
class society where the market had a commanding role.123 Although he did not 
argue for an immediate elimination of law in the advent of the rise of socialism, 
Pashukanis foresaw instead its eventual withering away as an “inevitable result of 
the generalisation of substantive equality and the marginalisation of social 
relations mediated by the market” (Mieville, 2005: 101; Pashukanis, 1978). Such a 
conception of law offers a rather pessimistic outlook for any emancipatory or 
progressive project to come out of international (investment) law. However, this 
study has demonstrated that its content is historically and socially contingent and 
open for contestation by counter-hegemonic social forces. Even though the legal 
form may limit the transformative power of such struggles, for it is impossible for 
international investment law to address all the problems stemming from the 
unequal distribution of the means of production, it is argued here that counter-he-
gemonic forces can pursue a strategy of ‘principled opportunism’ (Knox, 2009: 433; 
123 It was this feature of his theory of law, and his insistence on its ultimate withering away, that led 
to Pashukanis’ murder during the Great Purge of the late 1930s. As under Stalinism the demand for 
greater contractual discipline within the planned economy was strengthened, Stalin could not allow 
for an argument that law would wither away under socialism.
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see also Lukács, 2017 [1923]: 264) to help reshaping the content of IIAs insofar they 
can advance certain social and progressive policy aims. In the same vein, IIAs 
should be abandoned when they no longer provide the useful openings for such 
aims, thereby making room for alternative avenues that prove to be much more 
productive. In that sense, it is imperative to get rid of the existing stock of IIAs as 
soon as possible by either terminating treaties or withdrawing consent to ISDS (see 
for example Johnson et al., 2018b), thereby allowing governments to redesign their 
investment policies aimed at contributing to sustainable development and 
advancing human well-being.
 In terms of content, rethinking foreign investment regulation would start from 
the premise that FDI is not a panacea for sustainable economic development. 
Current FDI patterns typically include mergers and acquisitions, often financed 
with debt and private equity, that merely lead to the ownership transfer of existing 
productive capacities and the further concentration of capital. FDI also increasingly 
involves the round-tripping and re-routing of phantom capital that do not add to 
existing stocks of FDI, while a growing part of capital flows is dedicated to divi-
dend-payouts and share-buy-back schemes rather than activities associated with 
gross fixed capital formation. Foreign investment regulation should therefore aim 
to counter these developments of footloose transnational capital flows and actively 
support and contribute to broader regulatory shifts away from neoliberal austerity 
towards more proactive public spending in health, education, housing, energy, 
infrastructure, labour markets and job security, and income and wealth 
distribution to bring about more resilient and revitalised economies. In that 
respect, IIAs should be redesigned as means to advance those broader public policy 
and sustainability objectives. We should no longer speak of investment agreements 
that solely focus the promotion and protection of foreign investment as such but 
rather on its comprehensive regulation. Future IIAs would set out to encourage 
and increase sustainable investments and discourage unsustainable and harmful 
investments, while ensuring a just transition towards more sustainable and 
equitable economies and societies (see also Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., 2019). 
Whereas existing IIAs entail a balance that is highly tilted in favour of protecting 
private property rights over public rights and interests, future IIAs would help 
restoring that balance and subjecting private property rights to wider public 
policy objectives, including promoting tax justice, fighting social inequalities, 
advancing human rights and combating climate change. 
 This would mean foremost a significant narrowing down of the substantive 
standards on investment protection. IIAs should omit any reference to the 
standards of fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security and 
legitimate expectations, as these have led to broad and expansive interpretations 
by arbitral tribunals. Particularly, the inclusion of investors’ legitimate 
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expectations as an enforceable right favours stability over change, resulting in 
undue limitation of governmental policy space to adapt policy frameworks and in 
regulatory chill (see also Johnson	et al., 2019a: 84). Rather, investment protection 
should be limited to narrow standards of treatment, such as denial of justice, 
breach of due process, targeted discrimination (e.g. based on nationality, race, 
gender, religion), and other forms of abusive treatment by the host state 
government. At the same time, governments should maintain the possibility to 
pursue national industrial and developmental strategies, even if this would mean 
selectively discriminating in favour of sustainable forms of FDI that contribute to 
those strategies or shielding certain strategic sectors or infant industries from 
foreign competition altogether. Moreover, future IIAs would also omit any reference 
to indirect expropriation and only offer protection for direct expropriation 
without compensation. Such compensation should cover the investor’s direct 
losses and not future profits.
 Future IIAs should reaffirm the right of governments to regulate in the public 
interest. They would need to ensure that possible future measures that may disrupt 
the operations of foreign investors, such as those to mitigate climate change, 
advancing sustainable development objectives and implementing and complying 
with obligations under international and domestic law, would form part of a 
predictable and transparent regulatory framework to be expected by foreign 
investors. Furthermore, future IIAs would regulate rather than prohibit the use of 
performance requirements, such as requirements on local content, employment, 
research and development, transfer of technology and training, which may help 
host state governments to better reap the benefits from foreign investment 
projects. Foreign investors and investment should comply with obligations and 
guidelines on corporate social responsibility and business and human rights, such 
as the ILO Tripartite MNE Declaration, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights. Likewise, they must also contribute to the compliance of the host and 
home state with their international law obligations, including under multilateral 
environmental agreements, human rights treaties, and ILO conventions. Affected 
stakeholders should be able to raise complaints under the IIA in case of 
non-compliance by the investor and/or the state. 
 In terms of form, investment disputes should no longer be resolved through 
the parallel legal system of ISDS, or any derivative form of ISDS, that is only 
available to the transnational capitalist class. First, governments should undertake 
efforts to strengthen their domestic legal systems and institutions to improve the 
domestic rule of law not only for foreign investors but also to domestic companies 
and citizens and all relevant stakeholders. Domestic courts are the most 
appropriate bodies to hear investor grievances that arise in the public domain and 
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to rule on the relevant facts and law (Kelsey, 2019; Brauch, 2017). This also better 
allows the state and its institutions to properly address and resolve the matter, 
whereas ISDS merely focuses on providing aggrieved foreign investors with 
monetary compensation for damages. Second, political and other commercial risk 
insurances would enable foreign investors to bear their own investment risks 
instead of socialising them through ISDS. Many existing risk insurance schemes 
offer protections similar to those offered in IIAs and ISDS, while some also require 
compliance with particular human rights, anti-corruption, environmental and 
other sustainable development norms (e.g. Johnson et al., 2019b: 5). Third, 
state-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms would increase the involvement of 
the home state in the resolution of investment disputes. This does not suggest a 
return to the earlier practices of ‘gunboat diplomacy’. For example, Brazil has 
developed a new type of investment treaties that sets up an intergovernmental 
institutional structure to identify, prevent and resolve potential investment 
conflicts, including an ombudsman, joint committees, consultations and 
state-to-state dispute settlement as a last resort (Vieira Martins, 2017). Such 
structures could allow governments to raise broader issues in relation to the 
investment dispute, for example on human rights and sustainable development. 
Likewise, other transparent, inclusive and democratically accountable forms of 
alternative dispute prevention and mediation mechanisms that are accessible to 
the whole range of relevant stakeholders (next to the foreign investor also workers, 
communities, NGOs, states, domestic companies), whose rights and interests are at 
stake in the respective investment dispute, could offer a viable replacement for 
ISDS. 
 In terms of scope, the definition of investment should be profoundly narrowed 
down. As they currently stand, IIAs entail a very wide scope of all types of assets to 
be covered by the treaty, often defined in any kind of tangible and intangible assets 
that is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by covered investors. Such a wide 
definition incorporates types of investments and assets with questionable 
contribution to the host economy, including short-term financial and speculative 
capital, corporate and government bonds, shares and stocks, intellectual property 
rights and trademarks, goodwill, royalties and contracts. Future IIAs would 
therefore focus only on direct and re-embedded forms of foreign investment that 
tangibly contribute to the productive capacities of the host state economy and the 
generation of decent work, while respecting the ecological boundaries of the 
planet. Governments should evaluate which types of investments and investors 
they want to attract under IIAs and that are in line with their sustainable economic 
development objectives. For example, governments could contemplate setting up 
specific criteria or qualities to FDI (OECD, 2019), or developing positive lists with 
targeted sectors and classifications to define what type of investments the treaty 
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would cover (Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., 2019). Investors need to have a seat and 
real economic activities in the home state to avoid abusive practices of treaty 
shopping, and potentially also avoiding taxes and other legal liabilities, while 
governments should be able to deny benefits if investors engage with practices of 
corruption and bribery or violate core labour standards and human rights. 
Likewise, market access and investment liberalisation should be drastically limited 
and only apply to those sectors where governments decide it would best fit their 
national development objectives. Crucial public services, like education, health 
care and housing, should be excluded from liberalisation, while market access for 
other critical sectors such as energy, infrastructure and utilities should be 
carefully drafted according to strong sustainability and social interest criteria.  
 Such a qualitative shift in the content, form and scope of future IIAs cannot be 
materialised without a fundamental democratisation of trade and investment 
policy-making processes (see also Seattle to Brussels Network, 2018). This would 
mean to break open the strategic selectivities in favour of neoliberalism and 
dominant class interests that are currently structurally inscribed in the 
institutional set-up of the European Union in order to enhance the inclusivity, 
democratic accountability and public legitimacy of EU trade policy and ultimately 
also the European integration project. A balanced stakeholder input reflecting 
different societal interests must be ensured through open and transparent public 
consultations prior to drafting the mandates and formulating the negotiation 
objectives as well as during the negotiations and implementations of trade and 
investment agreements. Privileged access by big business needs be curbed 
significantly to counter the corporate capture of decision-making processes in the 
EU (see also ALTER-EU, 2018). The European Parliament as well as EU member state 
parliaments must play a greater formal role in EU trade and investment policy. 
Unlike most parliaments, the European Parliament has no formal right of 
legislative initiative, which is almost solely reserved for the executive bodies of the 
EU. In that sense, the European Parliament should be formally involved in the 
discussion and approval of the negotiation mandates, even though this would 
imply amending the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, while EU 
member state governments should ensure proper discussion and consent by their 
national parliaments. Likewise, the exceptional role of the European Commission, 
and DG Trade in particular, in formulating, negotiating and concluding trade and 
investment rules must be balanced by ensuring better involvement and 
participation from other DGs and ministries that advance public interest 
objectives. Such profound democratisation would contribute to further socially 
and institutionally embedding, and hence politicisation of EU trade and investment 
policy. Politicisation should not be conflated with something negative in this 
regard. After all, it is precisely because of its inherently political nature, as this 
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study has shown, that foreign investment regulation should also be subjected to 
political mediation and democratic scrutiny.
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Between January 2013 and October 2014 a total number of 23 semi-structured 
interviews have been conducted with a wide range of key agents involved in the 
making of the EU investment policy. 
Date Function Organisation
15-01-2013 Campaigner Corporate Europe Observatory 
15-01-2013 Campaigner 11.11.11 
21-03-2013 Campaigner Transnational Institute 
02-04-2013 Official I DG Trade 
03-04-2013 Trade advisor The Greens/EFA 
03-04-2013 Trade advisor Socialists and Democrats 
04-04-2013 Trade advisor European Peoples Party 
17-04-2013 Representative BusinessEurope
18-04-2013 Official II DG Trade 




25-07-2013 Representative AK Europe
26-07-2013 Official EU member state II
13-08-2013 Representative MEDEF
04-09-2013 Chair INTA Committee of the EP
18-10-2013 Representative BDI
25-10-2013 Official EU member state III
29-08-2014 Official III DG Trade
18-09-2014 Official DG Internal Market
18-09-2014 Official IV DG Trade
29-10-2014 Official V DG Trade
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This dissertation seeks to contribute to an understanding of the politics of foreign 
investment regulation, understood as an ensemble of legal rules, guiding principles 
and regulatory practices on how to promote and protect foreign investment, by 
focusing on the coming about and subsequent developments of the investment 
policy of the European Union (EU) following the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009. It critically assesses and explains the substantive content, 
institutional form and jurisdictional scope of the post-Lisbon EU investment 
policy, particularly in the context of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) and EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) negotiations. The dissertation advances a critical political economy 
perspective rooted in historical materialism that takes the content, form and 
scope of the post-Lisbon EU investment policy as the outcome of political struggles 
between different social forces and state institutions at a particular historical 
juncture. These struggles need to be understood within the wider social relations 
of capitalist production and concomitant structural inequalities in material, 
ideological and institutional power. The dissertation rests upon an empirical 
analysis that reconstructs the making and transformation of EU investment policy 
against the backdrop of broader processes of capitalist restructuring and the 
underlying ideational and socio-economic changes informing the European 
integration project. It builds on the triangulation of different qualitative research 
methods of empirical data gathering, using both primary and secondary sources, 
including the method of process tracing, document analysis and semi-structured 
expert interviews. 
 The dissertation traces the historical and ideological origins of foreign 
investment protection and explains the post-war developments of European 
foreign investment regulation. It identifies a neoliberal discourse that emerged 
from within transnational fractions of resource-seeking and finance capital in 
Western Europe, particularly in Germany, which crucially informed the first 
European bilateral investment treaties (BITs) arising largely in response to 
increased challenges to sustained capital accumulation and private property 
relations following the post-colonial reconfiguration of North-South relations. 
These early BITs focused narrowly on the protection of foreign investment against 
uncompensated expropriation, discriminatory and unfair treatment and capital 
controls, with the possibility for foreign investors to bypass domestic legal system 
and directly resort to international arbitration under the institutional framework of 
investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS). At the same time, the lack of a common 
European approach to foreign investment regulation should be understood in the 
context of the wider international order of embedded liberalism and the prevalence 
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of state-organised capitalism, which rested on national class compromises between 
industrial capital and organised labour and the dominance of Keynesian macro - 
economic policies aimed at controlling cross-border capital flows. Within the 
European integration project, foreign investment regulation remained largely 
regulated at national level as national mercantilist responses to the economic 
challenges of the 1960s and 1970s, and the competitive pressures from the presence 
of US capital in the productive sectors of European economies in particular, 
increasingly prevailed over joint European solutions. 
 From the 1980s onwards, European foreign investment regulation undertook 
a profound transformation with the ascendancy of the neoliberal discourse, 
against the backdrop of processes of transnationalisation of production and 
finance and the concomitant shift in the underlying power balance in favour of 
transnational capital. Western European states, particularly those with growth 
models centred on transnational accumulation patterns, massively expanded 
their networks of BITs as the preferred legal instruments to promote and protect 
foreign investment. Throughout the 1990s, the neoliberal project consolidated at 
EU level with the European Commission becoming the vanguard of multilateral 
investment rules with active support from an emergent transnational capitalist 
class. When such multilateral efforts, most notably at the OECD and WTO, stalled 
due to internal disagreements and increased opposition both from newly emerging 
economies, the European Commission turned towards bilateralism as an avenue 
to promote neoliberal investment rules, resulting in a new series of bilateral free 
trade agreements that increasingly included provisions on market access and 
investment liberalisation. Such efforts were accompanied by a gradual strengthening 
of the European Commission’s institutional and regulatory powers, which enhanced 
its strategic selectivity in neoliberal investment rule-making, culminating in the 
full transfer of competencies on foreign direct investment with the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. At the same time, strong societal and political 
opposition to the OECD and WTO talks revealed the potential political limits to 
the neoliberal project and reflected the rise of an emerging centre-leftist discourse 
regarding foreign investment regulation.
 The global financial and economic crisis of 2008-9 offered a temporary 
momentum to challenge the dominant neoliberal discourse. The European 
Commission quickly seized the momentum to push for the continuing and 
deepening of neoliberal trade policy as necessary in response to the crisis and to 
foster economic growth. After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
concomitant institutional shifts regarding foreign investment regulation, EU 
investment policy became part and parcel of the reinforced neoliberal discourse 
within the ranks of the European Commission. It is argued that the post-Lisbon EU 
investment policy became characterised by a contradictory dynamic between a 
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persistent process of neoliberalisation that in terms of content, form and scope, 
sought to liberalise and protect EU investment abroad at the highest levels possible 
on the one hand, and a (re-) pronunciation of principles related to safeguarding 
regulatory policy space and social and environmental protection. The linking of 
neoliberal investment rules with social protection principles formed a key 
expression of what emerged as ‘embedded neoliberalism’ broadly reflecting the 
outcome of a political struggle over the post-Lisbon EU investment policy between 
a dominant neoliberal discourse and a subordinate centre-leftist discourse. 
The neoliberal core has its social basis in the transnational fractions of industrial 
and financial capital and the state-capital nexuses deeply rooted in the outward- 
oriented and capital-exporting accumulation regimes among the longstanding 
Western European member states. The neoliberal discourse was politically advanced 
through the agency of organised transnational capital, with support from a 
burgeoning investment arbitration industry, and institutionally mediated through 
the strategic selectivities of the European Commission and the centre-right parties 
in the European Parliament. At the same time, the centre-leftist discourse was 
advanced by a growing European alliance of subordinate social forces, most notably 
trade unions, NGOs and other grassroots movements associated with public 
interest concerns. These concerns became manifest primarily in the left-leaning 
fractions within the ranks of the European Parliament, which formed an 
increasingly important platform for the articulation of the centre-leftist discourse. 
  The post-Lisbon EU investment policy further entrenched along the lines of 
embedded neoliberalism in the context of the CETA and TTIP negotiations. Both 
negotiations involved a project centred on transnational market expansion and 
protection that was deeply embedded in broader processes of transnationalisation 
and neoliberal restructuring on both sides of the Atlantic. CETA’s and TTIP’s 
investment chapters reflected on the one hand a compromise between an emerging 
European model of foreign investment protection, representing mainly the 
interests of the Western European export-oriented economies while incorporating 
certain elements of the centre-leftist discourse, and the North American model, 
seeking to incorporate certain clarifications in an attempt to restrict arbitral 
tribunals in excessively interpreting investment protection standards. The trans- 
national capitalist class was a key driving force in shaping the path for CETA and 
TTIP and enjoyed preferential institutional access to key state negotiators. At the 
same time, political contestation erupted with the emergence of a broad social 
movement against CETA and TTIP across Europe that spilled over to various 
political leaders in a number of key EU member states, particularly from the 
centre-leftist discourse, that increasingly rejected the inclusion of investment 
protection and ISDS in both agreements. However, this did not result in a 
fundamental breakaway in terms of content, form and scope of the post-Lisbon EU 
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investment policy, but rather to additional procedural reforms under the name of 
an Investment Court System that would further perpetuate and institutionalise 
the practice of ISDS, and further embed the neoliberal path of foreign investment 
regulation with the aim to regain political support and public legitimacy. 
 The dissertation concludes that the post-Lisbon EU investment policy did not 
bring about a major shift away from the prevalent neoliberal regulatory discourse. 
These findings contribute to a better understanding of neoliberalism as a political 
practice deeply engrained in and mediated through an ensemble of class-based, 
institutional and ideological configurations in order to fully grasp both its endurability 
and limits. The dissertation underlines the conceptualisation of investment policy 
as being constructed, negotiated and contested through complex processes of 
struggle, and highlights the critical role of the state with its structurally inscribed 
selectivities as the key institutional terrain through which these struggles are 
mediated. Finally, by emphasising the socially contingent and open-ended nature 
of foreign investment regulation, the dissertation underscores the emancipatory 
potential for transformative action. 
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Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan het beter begrijpen van de politiek van het reguleren 
van buitenlandse investeringen, dat gezien wordt als een samenspel van juridische 
regels, richtlijnen en regelgevende praktijken betreffende de manier waarop 
buitenlandse investeringen worden bevorderd en beschermd, door te richten op de 
totstandkoming en de daaropvolgende ontwikkelingen van het investeringsbeleid 
van de Europese Unie (EU) na de inwerkingtreding van het Verdrag van Lissabon in 
2009. Het onderzoek analyseert en verklaart de substantiële inhoud, de institutionele 
vorm en de juridische reikwijdte van het post-Lissabon EU-investeringsbeleid, 
met name in de context van de onderhandelingen over de Brede Economische en 
Handelsovereenkomst (CETA) tussen de EU en Canada en het Transatlantisch 
Handels- en Investeringspartnerschap (TTIP) tussen de EU en de VS. Het proefschrift 
hanteert een kritisch politiek economisch perspectief dat is geworteld in het 
historisch materialisme en dat de inhoud, vorm en reikwijdte van het post-Lissabon 
EU-investeringsbeleid beschouwt als het resultaat van politieke strijd tussen 
verschillende sociale krachten en staatsinstellingen op een bepaald historisch 
moment. Deze strijd moet begrepen worden in het kader van de onderliggende 
sociale verhoudingen binnen het kapitalisme en de daarmee samenhangende 
structurele ongelijkheden in materiële, ideologische en institutionele macht. 
Het proefschrift steunt op een empirische analyse die de totstandkoming en de 
transformatie van het investeringsbeleid van de EU reconstrueert tegen de achter - 
grond van bredere processen van kapitalistische herstructurering en de onderliggende 
ideologische en sociaaleconomische veranderingen die het Europese integratie-
project sturen. Het proefschrift bouwt voort op de triangulatie van verschillende 
kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden van empirische dataverzameling, waarbij 
zowel primaire als secundaire bronnen worden gebruikt, inclusief de methode 
van process tracing, documentanalyse en semi-gestructureerde expert interviews. 
 Het proefschrift traceert de historische en ideologische oorsprong van de 
bescherming van buitenlandse investeringen en verklaart de naoorlogse ontwikkelingen 
van de Europese regulering van buitenlandse investeringen. Het identificeert een 
neoliberaal discours dat opkwam binnen transnationale fracties van hulpbron-
nenzoekend en financieel kapitaal in West-Europa, met name in Duitsland, en dat 
een grote invloed had op de eerste Europese bilaterale investeringsverdragen 
(BIT’s). Deze BIT’s ontstonden grotendeels als reactie op de toegenomen uitdagingen 
voor kapitaalaccumulatie en private eigendomsverhoudingen ten tijde van de 
postkoloniale herschikking van de verhoudingen tussen landen in het mondiale 
Noorden en Zuiden. Deze eerste BIT’s waren vooral gericht op de bescherming van 
buitenlandse investeringen tegen onteigening zonder compensatie, discriminerende 
en oneerlijke behandeling en kapitaalcontroles, met de mogelijkheid voor buitenlandse 
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investeerders om het nationale rechtssysteem te omzeilen en rechtstreeks een 
beroep te doen op internationale arbitrage in het institutionele kader van de ge-
schillenbeslechting tussen investeerders en staten (ISDS). Tegelijkertijd moet het 
ontbreken van een gemeenschappelijke Europese aanpak van de regulering van 
buitenlandse investeringen worden begrepen in de context van de bredere 
internationale orde van “embedded liberalism” en de dominantie van staatsgeleide 
kapitalisme. Deze orde berustte op nationale klassencompromissen tussen industrieel 
kapitaal en georganiseerde arbeid en de dominantie van Keynesiaans macro- 
economisch beleid gericht op het beheersen van grensoverschrijdende kapitaal-
stromen. Binnen het Europese integratieproject bleef de regulering van buitenlandse 
investeringen grotendeels op nationaal niveau geregeld, omdat nationale mercan-
tilistische antwoorden op de economische uitdagingen van de jaren zestig en 
zeventig, en de concurrentiedruk van de aanwezigheid van Amerikaans kapitaal 
in de productiesectoren van de Europese economieën in het bijzonder, steeds meer 
de overhand kregen op gezamenlijke Europese oplossingen. 
 Vanaf de jaren tachtig onderging de Europese regulering van buitenlandse 
investeringen een grondige transformatie met de opkomst van het neoliberale 
discours, tegen de achtergrond van processen van transnationalisering van productie 
en financiën en de daarmee gepaard gaande verschuiving in het onderliggende 
machtsevenwicht ten gunste van transnationaal kapitaal. West-Europese staten, 
met name die met een groeimodel dat is gebaseerd op transnationale accumulatie-
patronen, breidden hun netwerken van BIT’s enorm uit als de juridische 
instrumenten bij uitstek om buitenlandse investeringen te bevorderen en te 
beschermen. In de jaren negentig consolideerde het neoliberale project zich op 
EU-niveau, waarbij de Europese Commissie een groot pleitbezorger werd van multi- 
laterale investeringsregels, met actieve steun van een opkomende transnationale 
kapitalistische klasse. Toen dergelijke multilaterale inspanningen, met name bij 
de OESO en de WTO, vastliepen als gevolg van interne meningsverschillen en 
toenemende oppositie van opkomende economieën, richtte de Europese Commissie 
zich op bilateralisme als middel om neoliberale investeringsregels te bevorderen, 
resulterend in een nieuwe reeks bilaterale vrijhandelsovereenkomsten die in 
toenemende mate bepalingen bevatten over markttoegang en liberalisering van 
investeringen. Deze inspanningen gingen gepaard met een geleidelijke versterking 
van de institutionele en regelgevende bevoegdheden van de Europese Commissie, 
die haar strategische selectiviteit bij het opstellen van neoliberale investeringsre-
gels versterkte, met als hoogtepunt de volledige overdracht van bevoegdheden 
inzake directe buitenlandse investeringen met de inwerkingtreding van het 
Verdrag van Lissabon in 2009. Tegelijkertijd bracht sterke maatschappelijke en 
politieke oppositie tegen de OESO- en WTO-besprekingen de potentiële politieke 
grenzen van het neoliberale project aan het licht en weerspiegelde het de opkomst 
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van een centrum-links discours met betrekking tot de regulering van buitenlandse 
investeringen.
 De wereldwijde financiële en economische crisis van 2008-2009 bood een 
tijdelijk momentum om het dominante neoliberale discours ter discussie te 
stellen. De Europese Commissie greep dit momentum snel aan om aan te dringen 
op de voortzetting en verdieping van het neoliberale handelsbeleid als noodzakelijk 
antwoord op de crisis en ter bevordering van de economische groei. Na de inwer-
kingtreding van het Verdrag van Lissabon en de daarmee gepaard gaande 
institutionele verschuivingen met betrekking tot de regulering van buitenlandse 
investeringen, werd het investeringsbeleid van de EU een integraal onderdeel van 
het versterkte neoliberale discours binnen de gelederen van de Europese 
Commissie. Het onderzoek laat zien dat het zich langzaam uitkristalliserende 
post-Lissabon EU-investeringsbeleid gekenmerkt werd door een tegenstrijdige 
dynamiek tussen enerzijds een aanhoudend proces van neoliberalisering dat qua 
inhoud, vorm en reikwijdte streefde naar een zo hoog mogelijke liberalisering en 
bescherming van EU-investeringen in het buitenland, en anderzijds een 
toenemende nadruk op beginselen die verband hielden met het vrijwaren van de 
beleidsruimte op het vlak van regelgeving en sociale en milieubescherming. 
De koppeling van neoliberale investeringsregels aan sociale beschermingsbeginselen 
vormde een belangrijke uiting van wat in het proefschrift “embedded neo- 
liberalism” wordt genoemd en wat in grote lijnen de uitkomst was van een 
politieke strijd over het post-Lissabon investeringsbeleid van de EU tussen een 
dominant neoliberaal discours en een ondergeschikt centrum-links discours. 
De neoliberale kern heeft zijn sociale basis in de transnationale fracties van 
industrieel en financieel kapitaal en de verwevenheid van staat en kapitaal die 
diep geworteld is in de kapitaalexporterende accumulatieregimes van de 
West-Europese lidstaten. Het neoliberale discours werd politiek bevorderd door 
toedoen van het georganiseerde transnationale kapitaal, met steun van een 
ontluikende investeringsarbitrage-industrie, en institutioneel bemiddeld door de 
strategische selectiviteit van de Europese Commissie en de centrumrechtse 
partijen in het Europees Parlement. Tegelijkertijd werd het centrum-linkse 
discours prominenter door een groeiende Europese alliantie van ondergeschikte 
sociale krachten, met name vakbonden, NGO’s en andere sociale bewegingen die 
zich bezighielden met het algemeen publiek belang. Deze bezorgdheid kwam 
vooral tot uiting in de linkse fracties binnen de gelederen van het Europees 
Parlement, dat een steeds belangrijker platform voor de verwoording van het 
centrum-linkse discours vormde. 
 Het post-Lissabon EU-investeringsbeleid heeft zich in de context van de CETA- 
en TTIP-onderhandelingen verder verankerd langs de lijnen van “embedded 
neoliberalism”. Beide onderhandelingen betroffen een project dat gericht was op 
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transnationale marktexpansie en -bescherming en dat diep verankerd was in 
bredere processen van transnationalisering en neoliberale herstructurering aan 
beide zijden van de Atlantische Oceaan. De investeringshoofdstukken van CETA 
en TTIP weerspiegelden aan de ene kant een compromis tussen een opkomend 
Europees model van buitenlandse investeringsbescherming, dat voornamelijk de 
belangen van de West-Europese exportgeoriënteerde economieën vertegenwoor-
digt en bepaalde elementen van het centrum-linkse discours integreert, en het 
Noord-Amerikaanse model, dat bepaalde verduidelijkingen tracht in te bouwen in 
een poging om arbitrale tribunalen te beperken in hun overmatige interpretatie 
van investeringsbeschermingsnormen. De transnationale kapitalistische klasse 
was een belangrijke drijvende kracht achter de totstandkoming van CETA en TTIP 
en genoot preferentiële institutionele toegang tot belangrijke staatsonderhande-
laars. Tegelijkertijd barstte een politieke strijd los met de opkomst van een brede 
sociale beweging tegen CETA en TTIP in heel Europa, die oversloeg op verschillende 
politieke leiders in een aantal belangrijke EU-lidstaten, met name uit het 
centrum-linkse discours, die de opname van investeringsbescherming en ISDS in 
beide overeenkomsten in toenemende mate verwierpen. Dit leidde echter niet tot 
een fundamentele breuk in termen van inhoud, vorm en reikwijdte van het post- 
Lissabon investeringsbeleid van de EU, maar eerder tot aanvullende procedurele 
hervormingen onder de naam van een Investment Court System dat de praktijk 
van ISDS verder zou bestendigen en institutionaliseren, en het neoliberale pad van 
buitenlandse investeringsregulering verder zou verankeren met het doel om 
politieke steun en publieke legitimiteit terug te winnen. 
 Het proefschrift concludeert dat het post-Lissabon investeringsbeleid van de 
EU geen grote verschuiving teweeg heeft gebracht van het heersende neoliberale 
discours. Deze bevindingen dragen bij tot een beter begrip van het neoliberalisme 
als een politieke praktijk die diep verankerd is in en bemiddeld wordt door 
een geheel van klassegebonden, institutionele en ideologische configuraties, 
om zowel het voortbestaan als de houdbaarheid ervan volledig te kunnen 
begrijpen. Het proefschrift onderstreept de conceptualisering van investerings-
beleid als zijnde geconstrueerd, onderhandeld en uitgedaagd door middel van 
complexe strijdprocessen, en benadrukt de cruciale rol van de staat met zijn 
structureel ingeschreven selectiviteiten als het voornaamste institutionele terrein 
waarlangs deze strijd wordt bemiddeld. Door de nadruk te leggen op het sociaal 
contingente en open-einde karakter van de regulering van buitenlandse investeringen, 
onderstreept het proefschrift tenslotte het emancipatoire potentieel voor sociale 
verandering.
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